Inauguration Of Building Of Multan Bench Of Lahore High Court, Multan

THE INAUGURATION OF BUILDING OF MULTAN BENCH OF LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN Inaugural Address By Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem, Chief Justice of Pakistan [26‑11‑1988] Esteemed Governor of Punjab Makhdoom Muhammad Sajjad Hussain Qureshi; Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Minister for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, Attorney‑General for Pakistan; Distinguished Brethren; Distinguished Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; Distinguished Chief Justice Federal Shariat Court; Mr. Justice Abdul Shakurul Salam, Chief Justice, Lahore High Court; Distinguished Chief Justices of High Courts of Sind and Baluchistan, and Distinguished Judges of the High Courts of Lahore, Sind, Peshawar and Baluchistan; Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, President of the High Court Bar Association, Multan; members of the High Court Bar Association, Multan; Ladies and Gentlemen! It is with great pride and pleasure that I accepted the invitation of the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court to inaugurate the Court House at Multan which is to house the permanent Bench of the Lahore High Court. It is a great stride towards bringing home justice to the people inhabiting the city of Multan and a vast area around it. It is a historical city where lived great many Muslim Saints and Mystics. It provided a thoroughfare to the travellers and the conquerors proceeding from North to Delhi and elsewhere and itself became a centre of great religious and political eminence. The city reported to have existed during the days of Hiuen Tsang, a Budhdhist tourist, who passed through the city in 741 A. D. He called it Mu‑lo‑san‑pu‑lu. Alberuni as far back as in the 11th Century called the city as Mula‑tans in one of his travel accounts. Muhammad Bin Qasim, the Muslim conqueror, came to Multan within 70 years of the visit of the Budhdhist traveller. In the A'in‑e‑Akbari, the city was stated to be the headquarter of one of the Subas or Provinces of the Mughal Kingdom, which comprised in those days of three divisions, namely, Multan, Dipalpur, and Bhakkar. During the British rule and before the establishment of the permanent Bench of the Lahore High Court, .the principal Civil and Criminal Court of the District was that of the District and Sessions Judge. 2. Here are the shrines of Hazrat Shams Tabrez, Hazrat Shaikh Bahauddin Zakriya and his grandson Hazrat Shah Rukan‑i‑Alam. There are also other shrines of Shah Alam, Shaikh Muhammad Yousaf Gardezi, Musa Pak Shaheed and many others and all these have bestowed upon Multan, a unique reputation of being a holy city in Pakistan. 3. The architectural grandeur of the buildings, mausoleums and mosques speak eloquently of the expanding Islamic civilization and culture which has blended the experience of the past with the present. 4. It was in the year 1866 that the Chief Court of Punjab, the predecessor of the Lahore High Court, was established. It was the final Court of Appeal from the decisions of the Subordinate Courts. As history tells us it was after strenuous efforts that under the Letters Patent of 1919, the Chief Court of Punjab was given the status of a High Court, which continued to exercise its several jurisdictions until Partition and thereafter till 1955 when it became the Seat of the High Court of West Pakistan under the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, and on the dismemberment of One Unit, this Court again assumed its original shape as the Lahore High Court. The several permanent Benches were thereafter established under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as amended by the President of Pakistan during the continuance of Martial Law. 5. This Court has continued to grow with all its noble traditions eversince its establishment and its rich heritage is a matter of pride for all of us. If I may say so, it is the most adorable institution of the Province which caters for the largest number of litigants in the whole of Pakistan. 6. My fondness for constitutionalism has often motivated me to speak on the rule of law without which the basic freedoms of the people cannot foster and be realized. It is the rule of law which gives meaning and content to the fundamental freedoms. It is the rule of law which is a base for a democratic polity. The concept of life, liberty, right to property, and equality, was first enunciated by Islam which was subsequently adopted in the constitutions of the Western countries. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to which Pakistan is also a signatory, internationalised these rights in a broad sphere to give content and meaning to the notion of human dignity. Under the Declaration, every human beings has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well‑being of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care, necessary social services and the right to security in the event of unemployment. It also specifies the relationship of an individual towards community or the State. One such duty is that "All human beings are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood". In dealing with the exercise of human rights one of the Articles of the Declaration states: "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society". The limitations do not authorise any or all suppressions of fundamental freedoms. Besides, the Declaration provides for the individual's right to life, liberty and personal security, the right to leave his country, the right to return to one's country, the right to a nationality, the right to property, the right to freedom of political association, freedom of thought and expression and many others. 7. The history of constitutional legislation in our country shows that it was for the first time that in the 1956 Constitution some of the human rights were guaranteed and redress for their violations was provided through the medium of judicial review by the Superior Courts with the power to issue appropriate writs. This Constitution remained in force for a period of two and a half years, when it was abrogated in 1958. During this short period, there was hardly any realization of the significance of the human rights by the people of Pakistan, and their impact on their lives and well‑being. Again, the 1962 Constitution was enacted without the Chapter on Human Rights. However, as a result of the struggle of the people of Pakistan, it was incorporated in the 1962 Constitution which too was abrogated in 1969. This era was also short‑lived, and there were not many occasions for the Superior Courts to juridically define the human rights, and thus develop the law for the people to achieve their realization. The Interim Constitution of 1972 restored the human rights which were re‑enacted in the 1973 Constitution. 8. During all this period there was political instability in the system of Government giving rise to emergencies and frequent denials of human rights with the result that the people of Pakistan were deprived of their enjoyment. This was so because the functioning of the Superior Judiciary was curbed and it could 'not ensure the enjoyment of these rights. It thus led to an interruption in the enforcement of constitutionalism and a consequent denial of the superiority of the rule of law which is so vital for the survival of democratic institutions. 9. It appears that human rights declarations from 18th to 20th century expressed a particular conception of the good society, and of the ideal relationships between the state and its citizens. The rights are no longer treated as pious wishes, but they are now considered as positive law or, at a minimum, as principles of positive law. The concept of human rights is aimed at improving conditions of the world society. 10. From a comprehensive perspective, human rights are best understood by reference to the empirical facts of human interaction in the shaping and sharing of values. The concept of values indicates the preferences of the people as to what is it that they cherish. It has now been universally accepted, that the peoples of the world, whatever their differences in cultural traditions and sectarian practices, are increasingly demanding participation in the shaping and sharing of all basic values. They demand respect, power, enlightenment, well‑being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude. In relation to respect, they demand a fundamental freedom of choice for participation in different value processes, for equality in both the positive and the negative sense, and for a large domain of personal autonomy. In relation to power, they demand full participation as persons in the process of authoritative decision making. Ir. relation to enlightenment, they seek freedom to acquire, use, and communicate information and knowledge. In relation to well‑being, they seek health, safety, and comfort. In relation to skill, they demand the freedom to discover, to mature and to exercise their latent talents. In relation to affection, they seek establishment and enjoyment of congenial personal relationships. And in relation to rectitude, they demand freedom to form maintain and express norms of responsible conduct. Thus, by reference to human rights a reference is made to the degree to which these demands are met and to the equality of participation and enjoyment in each of the different value processes. 11. It may be of interest of find that a dominant principle pertaining to human societies and human organization of the last quarter of the 20th century is that of human dignity. Even though the concept of human rights has existed in the world from medieval ages onwards, several different philosophies and differing viewpoints having a direct bearing on the concept were projected in the past. A struggle, therefore, ensued to locate common threads in this idea and to arrive at a consensus. It took about a thousand years for the philosophers and the jurists to attain their goal. Ultimately, during the post World War II period, after the establishment of the United Nations Organization, it was felt that the concept of human dignity constituted the link that united the perspectives emerging in different parts of the world. Now this principle has been accepted, with varying degrees of completeness and precision, by the international, the national and the regional settings all over the world, and it has found a place in the constitutional and legislative codes of many national communities. The values associated with the concept of human dignity have now been widely diffused and it appears to be a universal phenomenon now: The concept of human dignity, as it has emerged recently, has several important components. One such component indicates that there should be a basic share of participation for all persons in the decision making processes of Governments concerned. Another such component operates against discrimination based on caste, colour, creed, sect, and sex. And yet another component requires that the system of rewards and awards in every country should have direct relevance to the capabilities and accomplishments of its citizens. 12. It is a well‑known fact that human rights liberate man from restrictions and inhibitions which hinder his full development as a human being. They are in fact the powers of man to achieve self realization. Carl J. Fridrich, a well‑known Harvard University Professor, has quoted in one of his Papers on "Rights, Liberties and Freedoms", the maxim that "freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor unless it is demanded by the oppressed". The present trends indicate that the fuller implementation of recognized human rights depends upon the power the individuals can marshal through organization, whether by means of effective pleading before Courts, or by making a move for needed legislation, or by securing remedial action in the administrative field. I do entertain the hope that gradually human rights will have universal recognition and application and the ultimate condition of human freedom, i.e., the freedom from fear, will prevail. 13. The notion of fundamental human rights also incorporates the idea of civil liberties which is grounded in the conviction that freedom requires both social Lana political organization which, can overcome both natural and min‑made obstacles to the realization of human freedom. Modern democracies are based on the assumption that the surest way to consolidate democracy is to have all citizens participate in shaping the conditions of such freedom. 14. It is said that the failure of men to appreciate the rights which they possess, or indeed to know about them, creates great obstacles to their enforcement. For unless a complaint is made and insisted upon, the law‑enforcing authorities are not likely to pay any attention to it. So far, it has also been said, that an individual has less and less recourse to any corrective remedy against those who are in positions of power and authority. It is obvious that serious injustice may develop and continue to prevail because of the ignorance, the indifference or the weaknesses of the under‑privileged. The Courts' leadership in establishing the goals to achieve in the sphere of human rights are now commanding widespread public acceptance. The Courts in many parts of the civilized world are expanding and revitalizing the human rights clauses via the constitutional adjudication. 15. Human rights can be enforced ire settings where the rule of law prevails. The effective protection of the Fundamental Human Bights of the individual is an indispensable basis for achievement of a sound legal order based on peace and justice. The important point is that the peoples of the world now have an established institutionalised so process through which they can freely and unambiguously express their expectations about policy, authority and control in relation to human rights. The recognition and protection of human rights have now assumed the complexion of legal rights of individuals and of legal obligations of states. 16. The time has come when the concept of human rights is crossing national borders: the violation of these rights concerns the international community. Societies have become conscious of social and political rights aimed at creating social awareness pertaining to the benefits of education and improved socio‑political conditions. The people all over the world now appear to be inclined to induce the states concerned to translate certain socio‑economic claims of the lower classes in the obligations of the state. Thus, the doctrine of social rights is acquiring greater acceptance than heretofore, even in some of the more affluent countries. 17. But while every effort is being made to reshape the constitutionally guaranteed rights in accordance with a wider and more adequate conception of human freedom, the problem remains of how to combine the civil rights and liberties into a balanced and harmonious whole. This problem cannot be solved by arranging these rights and liberties into a rank list of simple priorities; the problem is multi‑dimensional and dynamic. It can only be solved in approximation and through a strong and vigorous rule of law in response to specific situations and particular circumstances. The concept seeks to ensure balance between the individual's rights and freedoms on the one hand and the collective needs of state security and national development on the other. An important safeguard that the rule of law requires to be embodied in a constitution is a guarantee that the essential basic and fundamental human rights shall be preserved and respected. The strengthening of the rule of law is crucial to the viability of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The rule of law operates to protect these freedoms and is recognized as a source for the diffusion of attitudes, ideas and norms which have a modernizing and innovative impact on the preservation and enforcement of these rights. It is, therefore, considered essential that agencies concerned with the enforcement of the rule of law assume responsibility of infusing governmental action with the spirit and substance of the basic human rights. The centrality of the rule of law to human rights development is now suggested as an essential ingredient of a democratic polity. In scientific legal terms, it can be said that human rights development is in quintessence the ordering of the liberties of man into a polity infused with qualities of freedom ennobling the puny lives of those who have formed the state. Thus the concept of human rights denotes within the framework of a rule of law a series of ultimate progressions from ascription to personal achievement, from alienation and withdrawal to enlightening participation in collective social life, from arrogance and coercion to refinement and respect for merit, and from contraction to expansion of free choice. These are the attributes of earthly existence which have become meaningful largely by encompassing them within the context of rule of law and its consequent institutions. It may not be possible to conceive of fundamental human rights and civil liberties outside the ambit of the rule of law. In Aristotelian terms, human society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not for mere companionship. The purpose of statecraft is consistently to adjust behaviour of men to legal norms which reflect the state's noble ends. The rule of law derives its augustness and its power from its mission to lift human beings to its own nobility. If the term "majesty of the rule of law" has any significance, it is that. An overarching purpose of the rule of law is that it gives form, cohesion, and direction to all public action within a nation state. 18. Thus the rule of law has the potential of maintaining national integration through orderly and just accommodation of human rights norms. The ideological cohesion of the social order depends on the proper enforcement of human rights through the rule of law. The comprehension of social order in such a setting depends on an examination of the dynamics of adjustment between human rights norms and the rule of law. Thus it is essential to identify the basic assumptions underlying the constitutional system pertaining to human rights and after it is taken care of they can be identified, elucidated, and woven into a cohesive doctrine. It may then be necessary to strengthen the role of Courts as diffusers and mediators of human rights norms. 19. The interpretation given by the Courts in human rights cases may entail the definition, elaboration and enforcement of values beyond those constitutionalized by the framers. The function of human rights cases, in my view, is to juridically define, elaborate and enforce their values beyond those constitutionalized by the framers. It seems to me that if a democratic society adopts a Constitution and incorporates in that Constitution safeguards for individual liberties, these safeguards do indeed take on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. The intensifying demands of people for these values may be fortified by an increasing recognition that the most fundamental principles underlying all constitutional law are those which today are described as of human rights. In a world in which peoples enjoy ever increasing enlightenment about the conditions affecting their common interests, a concern for human rights is not treated as utopian, but is taken as a definite reality. The important fact is that the peoples of the world, whatever their differences in outlook and styles of living, are today increasingly demanding the enhanced protection of all those basic rights commonly characterized in empirical reference as those of human dignity. 20. Here I cannot help quoting Prof. Carl J. Fridrich: "What, then, may we hope? The fact that rights are ever more universally recognized, even by those who seem least inclined to make them a reality, is the great distinguishing characteristic of our time. It justifies us in the hope that human rights will become more broadly descriptive of the actual behaviour of men and Governments; that even the right to an effective international and supranational order will gradually come within man's grasp". 21. Let the rule of law serve the humanity in Pakistan and elsewhere for a better world, where human beings can live in peace, honour, and with dignity. This is the purpose which the international community today is striving to attain. This is how I will end my discourse. With great pleasure, I would now inaugurate the Court House of the Multan Bench of the Lahore High Court. Address By Mr. Justice A. s. Salam, Chief Justice Lahore High Court Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem, learned Judges of the Supreme Court, Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Wasim Sajjad, the Governor of the Punjab Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi, Attorney‑General of Pakistan, Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Raja Muhammad Khurshid, Chief Justice of Federal Shariat Court, Mr. Justice Gul Muhammad Khan, the Chief Justice of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court, Sardar Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Chief Justice of Sind High Court, Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian, Chief Justice of Baluchistan High Court, Mr. Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, brother Judges of the High Courts, Advocate‑General of the Province of Punjab, Additional Advocate‑General at Multan, Present of the .Multan High Court Bar Association, the Presidents of Bar Associations, learned Advocates, members of the Senate, National Assembly of Pakistan and Provincial Assembly of Punjab, ladies and gentlemen! It is Allah's grace that I am standing here to welcome you on the auspicious occasion of inauguration of the Lahore High Court Building at Multan, a city from antiquity of a great saint Hazrat Bahauddin Zikria, his grandson Shah Rukan‑i‑Alam, and other reverend beings. A personal reference I wish to make for publicly acknowledging long love the great saint had for my ancestor and affection I believe he has for me. Some eight hundred years ago Hazrat Bahauddin Zikria went to Pakpattan to meet Baba Farid‑ud‑Din Shakarganj. My ancestor was the disciple of the latter and his duty was to bring wood from the jungle for cooking. He must have been a good worker and devotedly served the great guest. When Hazrat Bahahuddin Zikria came back to Multan, he wrote to Baba Farid of Pakpattan that the latter should send his disciple my ancestor to him and instead have as many of his own disciples as he liked. Baba Farid wrote back with reference to the name of the disciple which was Jamal that Beauty is not exchangeable. He appointed the litter as his first Khalifa. When 1 came to Multan in 1383., I went to the Mazar and after prayers said that my ancestor could not come. I have come. Please accept me. I believe it was Allah's will and Hazrat Bahauddin Zikria's acceptance, of my request that I continued to be a Judge in spite of the Provisional Constitution Order. Another incident I would also like to relate for the same reason. And that is that sometime in March/April, 1987 1 was on nomination in Multan. I went to the Mazars. After prayers I was coming back from the mausoleum of Shah Rukan‑i‑Alam. My eyes fell on an inscription containing a Persian Couplet. I do not know Persian but the first few words of the last line I could understand. Those were AASIAN DUST GEER I knew I was Asi i.e GUNEHGAAR and also that I needed helping hand. So I said to Shah Rukan‑i‑Alam that here is a sinner needing helping hand. Sometime Dr. M.S. Rana, Principal Law College, Multan told me to recite. Within few days, I was appointed Acting. Chief Justice of the High Court. Besides making public acknowledgements I wanted to share these experiences to show, that service and respect to the worthy beings is liked by Almighty Allah and His pleasure is more than enough for everything in life here and hereafter. Sir, you all know the famous couplet which is to this effect: In 1940, Pakistan Resolution was passed. Seven years later Pakistan was on the map of the world. High Court Bench was established in 1981 and its building has been inaugurated by the highest Judge and jurist of this country, Chief Justice of Pakistan Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem‑‑comparable to him are not found in the annals of history of any time, civilization or country. Never ever was a Judge who, undaunted by absolute brute force and unaffected by hurricane of current stood erect and acted according to his conscience showing independence of mind par excellence and carrying the highest twelve of the ultimate Court the country, showed the way how to give effect to the democratic will of the people. Wherever was a Judge of so independent a mind, creative and able to carry the best, that the country lost in the morass of Martial Law, is pulled up and put on the rails of democratic Constitutional Government, a Government of the people, by the people and for the people? If we 5o astray and do not follow the principles and the Constitution God forbid, disaster would be the inevitable consequence. It would be, then, no use decrying others. People, generations after generations, and history will not excuse the persons responsible. If we have slight intelligence, discernment or even memory, we know that deviation from the right path leads irretrievably to doom. It has done so before and will do so again. It is Allah's dicta and nature or reason's rule, whatever you may call it. Let us, therefore, pray and vow in the precinct of this High Court that we would tread on the right path which leads to showering of His blessings and avoid going astray or where doom looms large. Ameen! The State has spent money, the architects have planned, Justice Muhammad Ahmad was supervised, the masons have built and the labourers have sweat, to make this glorious building for rendering justice to all without any distinction whatsoever. You all know that the great and the last Prophet (Peace be upon him) decided cases in the mosque. The place there justice is ;lone is called from time immemorial 'temple of justice'. Whatever you 'nay call it, the place where justice is done is sacrosanct. The building is there. Let our hearts be attuned to truth. Seven years is a long enough time to imbibe the spirit. Let no one say that the last line of the couplet still holds true. Let the people who enter the portals of these premises be all engaged in pursuing justice, truth and righteousness. Those who come to seek redress of their grievances, let them have confidence and faith that they would be heard patiently, sympathetically, and their causes determined honestly and impartially without fear or favour. Those who come to plead their causes are called advocates or vakils. Vakil is Allah's name too. They deserve our utmost respect. Can anybody show restiveness or impatience if he remembers that the vakils standing before him carry the name of God Himself. If He were there, would anyone dare but be on the best of the behaviour? The Judges have to remember that they are sitting on judgment over people whom His own Maker, the Allah, has created by His own hands, has infused His spirit in them, ordered angels to prostrate before them and made them most respectable in His entire creation. How can they (the Judges) not show respect to the people before them? Nor can they ever forget that what they are doing is the one thing which is so important that Allah has kept it for Himself to do it on the Day of Judgement. He would do so on the basis of evidence collected by his angels, given by each limb of the man and after asking him to have his say and tell his part of the story. If He is so thorough and careful, how can a mere creature not do his best to determine what is correct, true and right? Sir, I have taken long for which I apologize but 1 wished to emphasise that we all Judges, lawyers, litigants and members of the staff attached who have anything to do within these premises must have clean hands, do our best, concentrate on our respective duties and be aware that our Maker is looking in the inner most processes of our thought. He and His creatures the people know when we deviate. May Allah in His infinite mercy shower His blessings. On these buildings and all the people who enter, and guide everyone to tread on the right path and keep those who go astray or are doomed, away from it. Ameen! May this building of the Lahore High Court at Multan be a befitting resting place of, Hazrat Bahauddin Zikria and seat of justice tempered by Hilum, when the Chief Justice of Pakistan Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem has inaugurated it. WAFAQI MOHTASIB (OMBUDSMAN) AND BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN By Rosy Masud While introducing the draft Order for the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) in the Majlis‑e‑Shura the then Law Minister stated [See record of Proceedings of the Majlis‑e‑Shura of 4th April, 1982, page 51.] that the institution of Ombudsman was given to the world by Islam and righteous Caliphs, especially Hazrat Umar and Hazrat Ali and their representatives used to act as Mohtasib. It must, however, be stated that the institution as established in Pakistan has been conceived largely on the pattern of the institution of Ombudsman as developed in Scandinavia and adopted in other countries especially the U.K. and other Commonwealth countries. The role of Mohtasib was quite different in the Islamic jurisprudence and it had within its sweep not only maladministration of Governmental Agencies but also the observance of Haqooq‑ul‑Allah of citizens, control of markets, public works, etc. The objectives of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) have, however, been spelt out in the Preamble to the President's Order No.l of 1983, on the other hand as follows:‑ "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the appointment of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through maladministration. 2. The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) is, therefore, only concerned with the diagnosis, investigation, redress and rectification of any injustice done to a person through the maladministration of a Federal Government Agency. Now, the Pakistani Law of the Ombudsman's institution is largely based on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act, 1967 of the U.K. although there are some differences in details like the provision in the U.K. Law that complaints can only be entertained when received through a Member of the Parliament and complaints directly, received from the public cannot be investigated by the Commissioner besides, there is no definition of the term 'maladministration' in the English Law. In the President's Order No. 1 of 1983 the term maladministration has, however been defined as follows:‑ "Maladministration" includes:‑, (i) a decision process, recommendation, act of omission or commission which‑‑ (a) is contrary to law, rules or regulations or is a departure from established practice or procedure unless it is bona fide and for valid reasons; or (b) is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, biased, oppressives, or discriminatory; or (c) is based on irrelevant grounds; or (d) involves the exercise of power, or the failure or refusal to do so, for corrupt or improper motives, such as bribery, jobbery, favouritism nepotism and administrative excess; and (ii) neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inefficiency and inaptitude, in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities" [For a detailed analysis of the term 'maladministration' please see "Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman)‑‑A Panacea for Mal-administration" by the author (All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Journal, 1986, pp. 6‑19)]. 3. Now, in order to fulfil his objectives the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) has to deal with the bureaucracy every day. It is, therefore, worthwhile to study the broad design, structure, objectives and orientation of bureaucracy in Pakistan. The administrative machinery that the new born state of Pakistan inherited from British India over 40 years back was designed and structured to meet the colonial objectives of draining the wealth of the country with as little effort as possible. The entire structure was thus geared to the smooth collection of revenues and maintenance of law and order. 4. On gaining independence, the major objectives of the Government were asserted to be development of the country and bringing about social justice in accordance with the teachings of Islam and aspirations of a free self‑governing people. These new objectives of the Government called for a complete restructuring and reorientation of the administrative machinery. 5. During the period of over 40 years some feeble efforts were made to reform the administrative machinery to make it more responsive to the needs of an independent country where the objective of the administrative machinery is to bring about welfare of the common man. These efforts, however, largely failed to make a dent in the overall structure and orientation of the administrative machinery. 6. The reasons for this failure can easily be discerned. The most important one is the lack of any political commitment. No political leadership has come to power in the country with a clear commitment to completely restructure and reorientate the machinery to make it responsive to the needs of the people. The other most significant factor has been the fact that whatever efforts have been made to reform the administrative machinery were shaped and formulated by the people who had themselves been a part of the administrative machinery for long years and had imbibed the old philosophy of administration. 7. Even to respect of the inadequate proposals for reform that gave emerged from this framework it may be observed that hurdles were placed in their way by the very administrative machinery which these proposals were meant to reform. The fate of the proposal for administrative reforms made by the last Commission set up for the purpose headed by Justice Anwar‑ul‑Haq clearly brings this point home. 8. It must, however, be conceded that leaving aside the basic structure and orientation of our administrative machinery that was geared to achieve the colonial objectives it had some commendable features also. The introduction of competitive examinations for recruitment to the higher rungs of the administrative machinery introduced merit system in place of traditional spoil system ensuring the quality and efficiency of the machinery. Besides, the concepts of Rule of Law and of Human Rights etc. that developed in the Western Jurisprudence had their impact or the administrative machinery inherited by us at the time of partition. Now, both in Islamic Jurisprudence and Western Jurisprudence 'public authority' is considered to be in the nature of a trust to be exercised in a judicious and fair manner. The concept of public authority developed under Monarchy and feudalism specially during the Sikh era in our country, however, was that it was something inherited or acquired as spoil to be used in an arbitrary and whimsical manner. After partition we seem to have drifted towards this perverted concept of public authority. This has been a major source of alienation of our bureaucracy from the common man. 9. It would also be useful now to briefly recapitulate the evolution and establishment of the institution of Ombudsman in the West and its implantation in Pakistan. The need for the institution arose with the phenomenal growth of powers of the bureaucracy as the state's activities permeated into almost every walk of life. In the West evolution of democracy had led to emergence of the principle of responsibility of Executive to the Parliament. Under the classical analysis of British Constitution, for instance, the doctrine of Ministerial Responsibility was considered to be the cornerstone of the British Constitution. The tremendous growth of state powers, however, resulted in the Executive gaining ascendancy and the party system ensured that in anything but the last resort the Executive controlled the Parliament [Administrative Law (Fifth Edition), by H.W.R. Wade, pp.29 & 30]. It was, therefore, felt that the traditional mechanism of Questions and Debates in the Parliament was inadequate to check the abuse of Executive's powers. Only cases of considerable political importance attract the attention of the Parliament and it exercises no check on the day‑to‑day functioning of the Executive. As our legal system and administrative machinery are largely based on the pattern of the U.K., it may also be mentioned that the Courts in England checked abuse of administrative powers to some extent through the evolution of the doctrine of ultra vires etc. but the Courts proceedings being expensive and cumbersome judicial control of administration was not considered to be adequate to ensure administrative justice. It was in this background that the need for a machinery for investigation of complaints by citizens against Governmental actions of all kinds on day‑to‑day basis, in a non‑political manner without being confined to the determination of their legality, was felt. The Ombudsman introduced a process of administrative accountability that was impartial, non‑political, inexpensive and expeditious. 10. One distinguishing feature of the institution of Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) in Pakistan has been the large number of complaints handled by it. Whereas most of such institutions in 60 or so countries of the world handle only a few hundred cases a year each, including the Parliamentary Commissioner of the U.K., the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib in Pakistan has been, inundated with thousands of public complaints. In the first 5 months of its existence in 1983 the institution received 7,814 complaints about half of which pertained to provincial Agencies and did not fall within, its jurisdiction [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's) Annual Report, 1983.]. In 1984 the number of complaints rose to 38,030, out of these 18,509 complaints pertained to provincial Agencies [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's) Annual Report, 1984]. In the 3rd year of its existence i.e., 1985 the institution received 34,939 complaints out of which 15,391 pertained to provincial Agencies [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombusdman's) Annual Report, 1985.]. In the fourth year, i.e., 1986 the number of complaints received by the institution increased to 42,744, out of which 16,331 pertained to the provincial Agencies [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's) Annual Report, 1986]. During the last year, i.e., 1987 the number of complaints further rose to 44,323 out of which only 36% pertained to provincial Agencies and out of the remaining 28,415 complaints relief was provided in 52% cases [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's) Annual Report, 1987]. A large number of complaints which are handled by the Wafaqi Mohtasib in Pakistan are normally handled by the internal complaint handling machineries of the Government Agencies in the advanced countries. The glaring disparity between the number of cases handled by the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) in Pakistan and similar institutions elsewhere in the world, however, put it in a different category altogether. The main reason why there is such a large number of complaints filed with the institution in Pakistan compared with similar institutions elsewhere is the insensitivity of our bureaucracy to the aspirations and needs of the common man. 11. During the investigation of this large number of complaints by the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib there has been a constant exposure of our bureaucracy to the concept of accountability and the suffering of the common man as a result of bureaucratic and insensitive attitude of our administrative machinery. There are a large number of cases reported in the Annual Reports of the Wafaqi Mohtasib but I would only mention below a few cases investigated by me to illustrate the attitude of the bureaucracy which has given rise to grievances of the citizens against administrative machinery. 12. In one case a lady took a loan of Rs. 3,000 from a Commercial Bank (the National Commercial Bank) against the title deed of her property situated in Lahore. The bank went into liquidation in 1968 and the Official Liquidator issued her a notice for re‑payment of the loan. After re‑payment of the loan to the Liquidator she approached the State Bank of Pakistan, as advised, for the release of her title deed. She was informed that according to the agreement between the State Bank and the Liquidated bank, the amounts recovered from the borrowers were to be passed on to the State Bank. Since the amount paid by her to the Liquidator had not been received by the State Bank, her title deed could not be returned. 13. The complainant contended that she was not bound by the agreement between her bank and the State Bank of Pakistan of which no notice had been given to hereby either. She approached various authorities for 12 years to get her grievance redressed but without any result. Then she decided to come to Wafaqi Mohtasib. 14. The State Bank when asked to comment, stated that the National Commercial Bank had obtained two loans of Rs. one million and Rs. 1.4 million from the State Bank of Pakistan and had pledged securities belonging to its borrowers (including the title deed of the complainant) against these loans. While concluding the loan agreements, the bank undertook that as and when any of its borrowers repaid the loan, the amount would be passed on to the State Bank immediately. In the complainant's case, the Official Liquidator had not forwarded the amount to the State Bank and, therefore, the documents were not released to her. The Agency further reported that the complainant had made this issue the subject‑matter of a suit before the Civil Judge, Lahore. The Court directed the State Bank to return the title deed but the State Bank filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, which was accepted and the suit of the complainant was dismissed with costs. 15. On the face of it, it appeared that the complainant was entitled to redemption of her title deed on payment of the principal loan and the interest and that she could not be bound by any agreement between the mortgagee and the sub‑mortgagee, particularly when she had no notice of the agreement. 16. The Agency was, therefore, asked for copies of the judgments of the Civil Court and the Additional District Judge which were furnished by the Agency. It was found that the Civil Court had upheld the stand of the complainant but his judgment was upset by the appellate Court largely on the ground that the lower Court did not have jurisdiction in this case and that the matter fell within the jurisdiction of the Sind High Court. It was pointed out to the State Bank that the Civil Court had upheld the stand of the complainant while the Additional District Judge had accepted the State Bank's appeal only on the ground of jurisdiction. The Agency was advised to consider the matter in this light. 17. The Agency then decided to release the title deed to the official Liquidator in view of the fact that the loan stood fully repaid. However, they felt persuaded to do so only on compassionate grounds without prejudice to their stand that the amount refunded by the complainant ought to have been passed on to them first as per agreement between the State Bank and the bank under liquidation. Subsequently, the complainant confirmed the receipt of the title deed. 18. Thus, was redressed a grievance which was more than a decade old on Wafaqi Mohtasib's intervention and a little positive attitude adopted by the State Bank [Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman's) Annual Report, 1985, p.340.]. 19. Similarly, in a complaint investigated against Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited the Agency asserted that the street of the complainant was narrow and technically it was not feasible to lay gas main in the same. When the area was physically inspected, the street in Maskeenpura, Lahore, in question, really appeared to be narrow but it came to light during the spot inspection that the adjacent street of the locality which was equally narrow had already been provided gas. On being questioned the Agency's officers failed to give any cogent reasons why they had laid gas main in that street while ignoring the complainant's street. In the final order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib the Agency was directed to lay gas main in the complainant's street as well and the Agency complied and the complainant expressed his gratitude. 20. In another case the complainant and his neighbour from Multan had applied for gas on the same date. The complainant's neighbour had been provided gas and he had been ignored. When the matter was taken up with the Agency, the Agency provided gas to the complainant as well but explained that his neighbour was provided gas on the recommendations of the Corps Commander Multan. Although the grievance of the complainant was thus redressed the Wafaqi Mohtasib in his final order observed that the discrimination which the Agency admitted to have indulged in on the recommendation of a senior officer was in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, our Constitution and the law of Qur'an and Sunnah. 21. In yet another case the complainant felt aggrieved by the attitude of the Station Master of his town's Railway Station and alleged that the officer literally misbehaved with traders who went to book their goods at the Railway Station. He further alleged that the Station Master demanded money over and above freight charges. On complaints made against him by the citizens an enquiry was conducted into the matter but the Station Master manoeuvred to go scot free. Matters had allegedly come to such a pass that the traders of the area had stopped booking their goods through the Railways since 17th May, 1984 resulting in substantial loss to the Agency. The matter was taken up with the Pakistan Railway. Pending receipt of their report, the complainant informed that he was abused and threatened by the Station Master for having submitted a complaint to Wafaqi Mohtasib and was being pressurised to withdraw the complaint. The Agency was asked to submit a report in respect of these allegations which would amount to contempt if proved true. The Agency explained that the complainant did not cooperate with the Enquiry Officer appointed in this case and had refused to come to the Railway Station for the purpose. Further, when the Railway Inspector visited his shop to record his statement, he refused to comply. In respect of the allegations regarding manipulation of the parcel bills, the Agency admitted that the Station Master had made some corrections in the weight and charges in account and record‑foils of the parcels bill: which were irregular, and was being proceeded against for this irregularity. The Agency, however, claimed that the earnings of the Railway Station on account of booking of parcel. traffic had, in fact, increased in 1984 as compared to 1983, in contradiction to the allegations made in the complaint. As regards the charge that the Station Master had picked up a scuffle with the complainant on filing the present complaint, the Agency deputed a senior officer to hold an enquiry into the matter. The Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that a scuffle did take place on 28th November, 1984 between a gateman of the Railway Station and some persons including a nephew of the complainant, but the Station Master was not involved in it. A case had also been registered with the Railway Police against the persons who had beaten up the gateman while he was performing official duty. 22. The complainant was asked to submit a rejoinder. He explained that he did not co‑operate with the Railway Inspector, who was a friend of the Station Master, as he did not expect justice from him. He, however, fully cooperated with the enquiry officer who was appointed subsequently by the Railway authorities. The enquiry reports and other relevant record was, therefore, examined. In both the enquiries the Station Master had been found guilty of misconduct to the extent of overcharging, and alteration of record and of rudeness. He was accordingly charge‑sheeted and punished with stoppage of increment for one year. The allegation that the Station Master had assaulted the complainant was not proved, nor was it correct that the traffic of goods by rail had decreased as a result of the boycott of the town's merchant community. Subsequently, the complainant sent a letter of thanks and informed that the Station Master had also been transferred from the town. So, by making a complaint to the Ombudsman he obtained relief which was denied to him and other traders by the Agency [Ibid., p.475.]. 23. During the investigation of such cases the administrative machinery of our country has largely responded positively to the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib leading to redress of grievances in thousands of cases. Through the process of constant exposure to the concept of accountability and highlighting of the grievances of the citizens resulting from the insensitive and dehumanised approach that has developed as a tradition of our bureaucracy a significant change has taken place in the manner in which the common man is dealt with by these Agencies. The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib, however, needs to be strengthened and further streamlined in order to make this change of lasting significance and of greater dimensions. The hardcore of bureaucracy has yet to be affected by the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib and even in the public dealing Agencies where the interaction of the institution has been most frequent this healthy change is yet precarious and temporary in nature. Unless the system of administrative accountability is, therefore, extended to the Provincial Agencies and is further strengthened it would be premature to conclude that there has been a lasting change in the orientation of the bureaucracy in Pakistan let alone its structure which has remained more or less intact. CONSTITUTION AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION By Mr. Justice Tanzil‑ur‑Rehman, Judge, High Court of Sind The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, like the two previous Constitutions of 1962‑ and 1956, guarantees the fundamental rights as enumerated in Part II of the Constitution. The powers to suspend the operation of Fundamental Rights, which have been conferred by Part II of the Constitution, as abovesaid, is exclusively dependent on the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency by the President of Pakistan under Article 233 of the Constitution requiring the security of Pakistan or any part of its territory. 2. It is, however, significant to note that the solemnity of one's right to profess and practice his religion stands excepted under Article 233 of the Constitution and it cannot be suspended even during a state of Emergency. Article 233 reads as under.‑ "233. Power to suspend Fundamental Rights during emergency‑period.‑‑Nothing contained an Articles 15, 16, 17; 18, 19 and 24 shall while a proclamation of Emergency is in force, restrict the power of the State as defined in Article 7 to make any law or to take any executive action which it would, but for the provisions of the said Articles, be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect, and shall be deemed to have been repealed, at the time when the Proclamation is revoked or has ceased to be in force. (2) While a Proclamation of Emergency ^is in force, the resident may by order, declare that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II as may be specified in the Order, and any proceeding in any Court which is for the enforcement, or involves the determination of any question as to‑ the infringement, of any of the rights so specified, shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force, and any such Order may be made in respect of the whole or any part of Pakistan. Order made under this Article ,shall, as soon as be laid before a joint sitting for approval and any provisions of clauses (7) and (8) of Article 232 shall apply to such an Order as they apply to a Proclamation of Emergency," A bare reading of the above Article 233 (alongwith preceding Article 232) will reveal that while the Constitution gives powers to issue a Proclamation of Emergency, on account of war or internal disturbances, if the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which the security of Pakistan or any part thereof is threatened by war and external aggression or by internal disturbances beyond the power of a Provincial Government to control (as provided in Article 232) it confers power on him to suspend the operation of a , number of Articles viz. Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 24, during the period of Emergency. These Articles relate to the freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of trade, business or profession, freedom of speech and protection of property rights but it does not include Article 20 which is concerned with the fundamental right of a citizen of Pakistan to profess and practice in accordance with his religion and faith, which reads as under:‑ "20. Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institution.‑‑subject‑ to law, public order and morality. (a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. " What I mean to say is that even in a state of Emergency when there is a threat of war or actual war the people of Pakistan cannot be deprived of their fundamental right to profess and practice in accordance with their religion. Sa, the freedom of religion has been kept at a higher pedestal than the other rights and it cannot be interfered with by a misguided Ruler or the Assembly even in the name of "State of Emergency". 3. Article 20, in its true perspective, if I may say so, has two aspects; one is the right to freedom of belief in a religion and the other is the right of freedom to act according to that belief in that religion, inasmuch as the said Article provides for guarantee (i) to profess and (ii) to practise according to one's religion or faith. The first aspect as to profess is absolute. The Holy Quran also says: that there is no compulsion in the matter of religion (which one professes). The second aspect, i.e., to practise may, however, be regulated by law without compelling a citizen to adhere to or accept a belief in nature other than the one he holds. Let me elaborate it by giving an example. It is the fundamental right of every Muslim, for example, to perform prayers (Salat). It cannot be negatived, in any circumstance, by any law whatsoever. Even a curfew cannot be imposed in a locality during the timings of Juma prayers resulting in the restraining of the Muslims of the locality from performing their Juma prayer in the mosque (as Juma' prayer can only be performed in the Mosque where Juma' prayer is held) which will be a violation' of Article 20 of the Constitution and commandment of the Almighty Allah (See Darwesh M. Arbey v. Federation of Pakistan P L D 1980 Lah. 206 at page 285). But if a Muslim insists on performing his prayers on a road which may affect or disturb the traffic or, for that matter, to take out a procession which, according to the belief of a group of individuals, is religious in nature, the Legislature may regulate the performance of the Salat with regard to traffic rules or the taking out of procession by fixing its route. However, if the law, in its leaps and bounds, is multidimensional inasmuch as it affects the religious beliefs nr regulates the act in a manner that it, in ultimate analysis, affects one's belief from where the question of Halal and Haram, valid and invalid, springs, it cannot, then, be said that the law merely regulates an act. That is why, it is not only the religious belief which is guaranteed by Article 20 of the Constitution, but the religious practice in accordance with that belief which is an essential consequence of it, has also been guaranteed. A law which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights remains ineffective. Fundamental right is, in fact, a check on the power of Legislature, and any enactment made in violation of that fundamental right is ab negative. When a fundamental right is in vogue, the Legislature has no power to enact any law in derogation thereof. Such power is, no doubt, made available to Legislature, under Articles 232 and 233 of the Constitution in a state of Emergency in the country but no sooner the emergency is lifted the enactment would be eclipsed. This power, too, as stated earlier, does not apply to the fundamental right of professing and practising one's religion according to his own belief and faith subject, of course, to law and morality. It, therefore, follows that if the Legislature by enacting a law either affects or tries to circumvent one's belief or the liberty to act according to that belief which is imbibed in his religion, it would prima facie, amount to denying the fundamental right to profess and practice, and to that extent the said law or any provision thereof may be declared as null and void by the Courts of Pakistan. 4. It may, however, be stated that the terms "law" and "morality" used in Article 20, now read with Article 2‑A, cannot be interpreted in isolation, as purely technical terms. Law and Morality in Pakistan, have to be understood and interpreted in the context of law which is based on and has a sanction behind the Book of Allah and Sunnah of His Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w), Ijma, Consensus (of the jurists of the Ummah) and lastly the principle of Qiyas (analogical deduction); the first two being the primary sources and the other two being the secondary sources of Islamic Shariah. The term "morality" as used in Article 20 can, therefore, only means, in the present context, Islamic morality or the principles of morality which Islam advocates. Therefore, a law having no foundation or root in morality, as envisaged by Islam, will not be a proper guide for coming to correct understanding of the exact scope of the terms "law and morality" in the aforesaid Article. I may here refer to an inaugural address of a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Justice A.R. Cornelius, one of the most eminent Judges that Pakistan has ever produced, delivered by him at the Second Law Conference at the S.M. Law College, Karachi on March 11, 1965 on "Law, Fundamental Rights and Religious Conscience". He stated that:‑ "In my personal philosophy, the force of religion in the shaping of the laws and their due implementation even in the secular field is paramount ...We find that the legal processes at the highest level are conducted in the English language, that the fundamental rights themselves are borrowed from the foreign Constitutions and expressed in the English language and that practically all legal education is imparted in the English language. It is a development which is not in line with the requirements of our Constitution. Within our Constitution there is embodied also the great Objectives Resolution, representing a consensus of the best minds that were applied to this vital task in the period immediately following the grant of independence. In the Objectives Resolution, it is clearly laid down for the guidance of secular affairs of Pakistan, that they should be conducted in the way of democracy to ensure equality, tolerance and social justice according to the dictates of Islam. The Fundamental Rights themselves are the major commandments which can lead to the implementation of equality, tolerance and social justice in the democratic mode. The Judge who expends a Fundamental Right of the Constitution is excepted to draw inspiration from the high sources which are permanently inscribed in the words of the Holy Qur'an. Though the issues pertaining to the application of Fundamental Rights arise in the Courts every day in a large number of cases, yet very rarely the Court addresses itself to the question as to how this law should be understood with reference to the principles of Islam. (Law and Judiciary in Pakistan by Mr. Justice A.R. Cornelius, Lahore pages 63 and 66). Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem, the present Chief Justice of Pakistan, in his leading and a most instructive judgment in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan P L D 1988 S C 416 discussing 'what is morality' has stated that:‑ "The Holy Qur'an itself is the guide for eliciting the meaning of the word 'morality'. In Ayat 151, Sura AI‑Anam (VI), it is ordained: (Draw not near to shameful deeds that which be apparent and that which be concealed). This being the moral Code, every Muslim is enjoined to obey it. This verse is the touchstone of what is moral and what is immoral. Necessarily, morality is part and parcel of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan and included in the expression 'Integrity of Pakistan'. Therefore, not only individually but also collectively Muslims have to live with an exclusively moral framework as enjoined by the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah. No civilised society can deny this standard of morality. The concept of democracy in our Constitution should, therefore, be regarded to be imbued with individual and collective morality as according to Islam (Holy Qur'an and Sunnah). It goes without saying that morality provides the basis for the society's spiritual values and in terms of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice." Although the above observation has been made in the context of Article 17(2) of the Pakistan Constitution, 1973, it will remain a torch‑bearer for any discussion of 'Morality' in relation to "Law and Religion" in Pakistan. FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION By W. Justice Tanzil‑ur‑Rehman, Judge, High Court of Sind It seems necessary to first recall the historical background of the promulgation of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 For this I would like to refer to a passage from the book "Woman in Muslim Family Law" By John Esposito, New York, 1982, at page 83. The learned author writes:‑ "On August, 1955, eight years after Pakistan's founding, the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws was established to review Muslim Family Law to determine whether changes were necessary. The Commission was composed of three men, three women and one religious scholar (to represent the Ulama) The report (in June, 1956), represented the recommendations of the six laymen majority. However, shortly thereafter in August 1956, Mauiana Ihtishamul Haq (Thanvi) a religious scholar (alim, pl.ulama) and a traditionalist published a vigorous dissenting report taking issue with virtually every major recommendation of his colleagues on the Commission. There then ensued an extended debate between the modernists and traditionalists". It appears that as a result of countrywide protest of the Ulama, the said report remained lying dormant with the Government for several years. It however, received an impetus during the military rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan who could impose it on the Muslims of Pakistan, under the cover of Martial Law. The strong support came from All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), headed by Begum Rana Liaquat Ali Khan, wife of the first Prime Minister, Shaheed‑e -Millat, Liaquat Ali Khan. So, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, as Chief Martial Law Administrator and self‑appointed President of Pakistan promulgated the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance on 2nd March. 1961 which came into force on 15th July, 1961. Notwithstanding the rigours of the Martial Law, there was a countrywide resentment, particularly by the Ulama community over the promulgation of the said Ordinance, being against the injunctions of Islam. Later on, the said Ordinance on the enforcement of one‑man made Constitution of 1962, was given Constitutional protection, keeping it outside the ambit of the authority of the Courts of Pakistan from being challenged as violative of Fundamental Rights and repugnant to Islam (See Gardezi's case, PLD 1963 SC 51 at page 74). Although the protection to this Ordinance was first afforded in the Constitution of 1962 but this protection continued in the subsequent Constitutions of 1972 and 1973 and still continues to be so after the revival of the Pakistan Constitution of 1973 by President's Order No. 14 of 1985, perhaps, because of the secular influences working both in and outside the relevant quarters. The protection to Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 under Article 8(3) by the Constitution, 1973 amounts to suspension of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to the people of Pakistan by Article 20 of `he Constitution, 1973 which reads as under:‑ "20. Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions.‑‑ Subject to law, public order an morality,‑‑ (a) very citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion, and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. In fact, by protecting the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, Article 20 of the Constitution has become, to that extent, nugatory. This amounts to tinkering of Article 20. It means that an ordinary statute has been allowed to run counter to Article 20 of the Constitution, for being included in the First Schedule, so as to claim immunity from the attack of contravening the fundamental right to profess and practise one's religion according to his own faith as guaranteed under Article 20. But, to my mind, after insertion of Article 2‑A in the Constitution by President's Order No. 14 on 2nd March, 1985 and the Objectives Resolution being made substantive part of the Constitution allowed by the Eighth Constitutional Amendment by the Parliament the position has undergone a change. The Article 2‑A and the Objectives Resolution as its Annex are reproduced below:‑ "2‑A. The Objectives Resolution to form part of substantive Provisions.‑‑The principles an provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution reproduced in the Annex are hereby made substantive part of the Constitution and shall have effect accordingly." "The Objectives Resolution. In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolvers to frame a Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan. Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people; Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah: Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures; Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their power and authority as may be prescribed; Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes; Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured; Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded; So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity." It, therefore, seems necessary to see whether the said Ordinance comes into conflict with the principles and provisions of the said Objectives Resolution. In the face of Article 2‑A, subsequently added, it would not perhaps, be possible to extend recognition to the said protection in so far it derogates or comes into conflict with the principles and provisions underlying the Objectives Resolution, which would ultimately affect the religio‑social guarantee given to the people of Pakistan which the Constitution so solemnly proclaims, envisages and secures. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, when examined from the point of view of the infringement of fundamental rights, in my humble view, it comes into conflict with Article 20 of the Constitution inasmuch as it prevents Muslims to practise their religion according to their belief and faith (See my Article "Constitution and the freedom of Religion"). It also negatives the express provision as contained in Article 227 which, inter alia, provides that in the application of clause (1) as contained in Article 227, in so far it relates to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression "Qur'an and Sunnah" shall mean Qur'an and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect. In other words the interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah will be recognised and applied in accordance with the belief of every Muslim sect. It is true that the right guaranteed under Article 20 is subject to law and morality, but these two expressions, law and morality, will now be subjected to the interpretation in the light of Explanation to Article 227 and Article 2‑A; with the result that the said Ordinance, if found against law and morality, judged by Islamic standards, it will amount to transgressing the limits and will not be saved merely because it comes within the expressions of law and morality simpliciter used in Article 20 or clause (6) of the Objectives Resolution as referred to in Article 2‑A of the Constitution, as the law and morality should nevertheless be in conformity with the provisions of Article 2‑A or, to be more precise, so far as the law and morality relate to Muslims, it would mean conformable to the law and morality as laid down in the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. It is true, as pointed out earlier, that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is a protected piece of legislation, since its inception, by its inclusion in the First Schedule so as to save it from being challenged in a Court of law on the ground that it infringes fundamental right of a Muslim to profess and practise his religion. It cannot, therefore, be attacked on the basis of violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 of the Constitution. Let it be added that the very fact that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance has been protected is sufficient to contend that the framer of the law was conscious in his mind that the same, being against the fundamental right as guaranteed in Article 20 of the Constitution, was liable to be challenged in a Court of law and the result being obvious, and, perhaps, for that reason, protection was afforded to that law from being so challenged since its very inception. Thus, the very inclusion of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in the first Schedule, which saved it from the operation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution, is enough to show that the Legislature was itself, or I must say, because there was no Legislature in those days, the sole framer of the Constitution and of the said Ordinance, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan was himself conscious of the fact that the said law was apparently opposed to, in the conflict and inconsistent with the fundamental right to profess and practise one's own religion. Not only that, no provision of the said Ordinance was challengeable in any Court of law on the ground of its repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, under the Constitutions of 1962, 1972 and 1973. This fact is further fortified by further excepting the said Ordinance from the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court as constituted by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, in May, 1980 to be tested on the anvil of the Qur'an and Sunnah, in spite of the fact that the exclusion of the Ordinance from the jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court seems to be inexplicable, as to why the application of Shariat to a very important branch of law touching the basic foundation of Muslim society was specifically denied to the Shariat Courts? Let me elaborate the point. The Federal Shari'at Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution, has been empowered to examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. The term 'law' has been defined in Article 203‑B of the Constitution 1973, which excludes, inter alia, 'Muslim Personal Law from the jurisdiction of the Federal Shari'at Court. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was held to be falling within the scope of "Muslim Personal Law" in the case reported as Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta P L D 1981 S C 120. The Supreme Court (Shari'at Appellate Bench), while examining the question of its jurisdiction with reference to section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, (relating to succession), in the aforesaid case, held that section 4 ibid, being part of law applicable to Muslims alone and "Muslim Personal Law", in such context, scrutiny of such section was outside the jurisdiction of Shari'at Courts and the decision of the Shari'at Bench, of the Peshawar High Court in Mst. Farishta v. Federation of Pakistan P L D 1980 Pesh. 47, holding provisions of the said section contrary to Injunctions of Islam was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court further observed that:‑ "The question is not what is the 'Muslim Personal Law' of the Muslim in the divine sense of that law, but as to what is the law for the time being in force which applies and has been applied to Muslims alone as a class and as a special law. If it has been so applied, it will fall within the set of those laws which apply to the class of people known as Muslims and in resultant sense will be Muslim Personal Law for them. This law will not be challengeable before the Shari'at Courts and the wrong, if any, done by that law, will be remedied by the Council of Islamic Ideology." A survey of the criticism on the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 will show that some of the provisions of that Ordinance, prima facie, seem to be in conflict with Shari'at, but they have all along been given effect to by the Courts in the absence of the proper forum to examine the provisions of the said Ordinance in the light of the Qur'an and Sunnah. "Muslim Personal Law" is nothing but Shari'at which is also obvious from the short title of the enactments on the subject, namely. The Muslim Personal Law (Shari'at) Application Act, 1937 (since repealed) and the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shari'at) Application Act, 1961. The history of statutory law on "Muslim Personal Law" has always been equated with the word "Shari'at" but unfortunately, the Federal Shari'at Court was precluded from its review. The Council of Islamic Ideology, of which the present writer happened to be its Chairman for four years (1980‑84) had suggested to the Government of Pakistan certain amendments in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, to bring it in accord with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah (See Council's report on Family Laws). The Government, probably, for fear of 'opposition of a section of women, felt hesitant to implement the recommendations in respect of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 not only of the Council but the Ministries of Law and Religious Affairs as well. Under the circumstances, the Council and Ansari Commission and the several Ulama Conventions held under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, during 1980‑84, presided over by the President himself recommended that it would be advisable that the expression "Muslim Personal Law" be omitted from the definition of 'law' occurring in Article 203‑B of the Constitution so as to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Shari'at Court to questions involving 'Muslim Personal Law' including the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. If the Federal Shari'at Court comes to the conclusion that the provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance or for that matter any other statutory law failing within the domain of 'Muslim Personal Law' is in conflict with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, it will pave the way for the Government to amend the law accordingly and the Government will also be avoiding the criticism being apprehended, on this account. (See Council's Fifteenth Report on "Islamization of Laws"). It was only in early 1986 that the Senate of Pakistan gave effect to that recommendation and passed the 9th Amendment Bill to the Constitution, in fact, to redeem the pledge given by the Ruling party to the Senators belonging to the Jamaat‑e‑Islami and some of the members of Independent group, at the time of passing the Eighth Constitutional Amendment Bill in November, 1985. But this Bill remained lying dormant in the National Assembly, till the National Assembly was dissolved by the President by his Proclamation dated 29th May, 1988, when the said Bill died its own death. However, in the judgment pronounced by me on a Constitutional Petition, Qamar Raza v. Tahira Begum (P L D 1988 (March Part) Karachi 169), I expressed my view that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, notwithstanding the aforesaid protection under Article 8(3) of the Constitution, is open to be challenged under clause (2) and (3) and the First paragraph of the Objectives Resolution, made substantive part of the Constitution under Article 2‑A, and the Explanation added to clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution .and that the said Ordinance or any provision thereof may, therefore, be ignored by the High Court under Article 268 of the Constitution to the extent of its repugnancy to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Qur'an and Sunnah. I wrote:‑ "48. Now, looking to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, it is settled proposition of law that Constitution is the fundamental and Supreme Law of the land and all laws are subservient to it. It, therefore, follows that if there be a law which is not in conformity with the Constitution, it must, in its application to a particular case, yield to the Supreme Law, that is, the Constitutional provision. Thus, notwithstanding the legal position that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 overrides any other law or custom having the force of law, it remains subservient to the Constitution to the extent that it is inconsistent with or comes into conflict with any provision thereof. No doubt, the Ordinance is protected under Article 8(3)(b) from application of Article 8(1) and (2). Clause (6) of Article 2‑A of the Constitution may also be invoked in aid, and, thus, is not challengeable on the ground that it violates any of the fundamental rights enumerated in and guaranteed by the Constitution, but it is still available to be challenged under any of the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the principles and provisions of the Objectives Resolution (except clause (6) thereof) as made substantive part of the Constitution under Article 2‑A and, in view of the provisions of Article 2‑A, making the Objectives Resolution as substantive part of the Constitution, "any Court, Tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce an 'existing law' is now obliged under Article 268 of the Constitution 'to construe the same with all such adaptations as are necessary to bring it into accord with the provisions of the Constitution". The provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, thus, do not stand immune except for the protection provided under Article 8(3)(b) of the Constitution itself. Any provision of the said Ordinance, thereof, can be challenged to the extent that it comes into conflict with the provisions of Article 2‑A of the Constitution, except clause (6) thereof relating to the fundamental rights. 49. Testing section 7 at the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in particular, on the touchstone of Article 2‑A (read with the Objectives Resolution) it appears that, for detailed reasons which will follow shortly, it violates the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty as stated in the opening paragraph of the Objectives Resolution and is 'in conflcit with .clauses (2) and (3) of the said Resolution' inasmuch as it violates the principles of social justice enunciated by the Qur'an and Sunnah, and disables the Muslims to order their lives, in accordance wtih the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. (p. 202 of the Law Report)". Now, the President of Pakistan, on 15th of June, 1988 has promulgated the "Enforcement of Shari'ah Ordinance". Preamble of the said Ordinance, inter alia provides:‑ "Whereas the Principles and Provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution have been incorporated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as substantive part thereof; And whereas the Objectives Resolution provides that the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; And whereas it is necessary to carry out the purposes of the Objectives Resolution and provide that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; And whereas the National Assembly is not in Session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 89 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the President is pleased to make and promulgate the Ordinance." The Ordinance defines Shari'ah as under:‑ (e) 'Shari'ah' means the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Explanation.‑‑As envisaged in Article 227 of the Constitution, in interpreting the Shari'ah with respect to the ,personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression 'Qur'an and Sunnah' shall mean the Qurari and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect." Subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 4, being relevant, are also reproduced below:‑ "4 (3). The High Court may, either of its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government or on a reference made under the first proviso to subsection (1) examine and decide whether or not any law relating to Muslim Personal Law, any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure or any provision of such law, is repugnant to Shari'ah: Provided that while examining and deciding the question, the High Court shall call for and hear the views of experts having specialized knowledge in the field to which the question relates and of such other persons as the High Court may deem fit. (4) Where the High Court takes up the examination of a law or provision of law under subsection (3), and such law or provision of law appears to it to be repugnant to Shari'ah, the High Court shall cause to be given to the Federal Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List in the Constitution or to the Provincial Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter not enumerated in either of those Lists, a notice specifying the particular provisions that appear to it to be so repugnant, and afford to such Government adequate opportunity to have its point of view placed before the High Court. (5) If the High Court decides that any such law is repugnant to Shari'ah, it shall set out in its decision‑‑ (a) the reasons for its holding that opinion; (b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant; and specify the day on which the decision shall take effect." . .. . Thus, the Ordinance, among some other things, empowers all the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its appellate jurisdiction to examine the question of the vires of Muslim Personal Law which includes the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, from Shari'ah point of view, in the light of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and declare it or any provision thereof as void, if found repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Despite the fact that the Ordinance has its Constitutional limitation as to its short span of life under Article 89(2) of the Constitution, if the age‑old public controversy on the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 is almost over, at least, for the present, and the venue has now shifted from the National Assembly to the High Courts and the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction. HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION MULTAN Address By Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem, Chief Justice of Pakistan [26‑11‑1983] Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Minister for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; Esteemed Chief Justice; Distinguished Judges; Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, President of the High Court Bar Association, Multan; Members of the High Court Bar. Association, Multan; Ladies and Gentlemen! It is an occasion of great satisfaction to be amongst the members of my fraternity to which I belong, and whose dignity is uppermost in my mind which it is my duty to preserve and protect. I hold the fraternity not in the restricted sense, but in the wider context of being a brotherhood as it is understood internationally. Indeed, I feel very happy to be amongst you. 2. Plato believed that in an ideal system of Government philosophers would be "kings". In our era, the ideal has to be reinterpreted by saying that statesmen should be scholarship‑oriented lawyers. The lawyers in present day world support the cause of contemporary questions in order to exert the influence for which their scholarly position gives them the opportunity. In the course of this kind of scholarly participation, the obligation of lawyers is to carry scholarship into participation. The lawyers occupy a strategic position which imposes upon them obligations of sharing in leadership of the community. The good activities in a community are its civilizing influences. 3. The very term legal profession implies a high level of social prestige to which many occupational groups aspire and which lawyers clearly enjoy in our society. Such social status emerges in part out of the special skills and knowledge that are allegedly peculiar to legal profession. Affirmation of these special competencies is found in the organization of legal and judicial institutions in Pakistan. 4. I have noted, with a sense of appreciation, another aspect of legal professionalism, that is, self‑regulation. The lawyers represent not only clients' interests, but also represent the legal system as officers of the Court. This implies some professional responsibility to serve the society at large. 5. Beyond the status enjoyed by professions generally, tire legal profession derives great power from its control over the law which is of crucial importance to the political and social system in Pakistan. The tendency for basic social issues to become questions of law implies an obvious role for lawyers in the determination of public policy. Practising lawyers do not merely render to the community a social service, but they are also considered a part of the governing mechanism of the state. 6. It has rightly been said that lawyers are the primary gate keepers to the administration of justice. Their prominence remains well‑established in both elective and appointive offices. Lawyers are prominent in politics. Aside from the power that accrues to roles with obvious political influence, the public power of the legal profession stems largely from the part lawyers play in applying and interpreting the law, in advising private clients in the settlements of legal matters, and thereby in the shaping of law in action. Lawyers enjoy the credit of transforming real‑life events into a legal formulation. 7. It has been found that access to the legal profession has been quite open to those seeking upward mobility. Alexis de Tocquerille, who laid the philosophical foundation of political democracy in the United States of America, pointed out in his 1835 description of Democracy in America, that "if I were asked where I placed American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it occupies the judicial bench and bar". Indeed, legal profession has been portrayed as a path to higher status in a society that leads to upward mobility. 8. The members of legal profession have contributed significantly, everywhere, to the growth of the concept of legal culture. This concept provides very useful insights into close relationship between law and political authority. It has now been universally accepted that law is always a "principle" in one part and "power" in another part. Law depends on the political power of the state while providing a necessary component of legitimacy to governmental authority. In many modern states, this dualism is expressed as constitutionalism or an equivalent theory of how to share the existence of both adequate power to govern and effective limits on the exercise of those powers. I need here to emphasise that popular acceptance and participation are indispensable if law is to play an effective role in a democratic society. Law must at least appear to do justice and effectively carry out its other functions. Law should be the antithesis of a certain practice in non‑democratic societies contained in the 'expression: "For my family, everything; For my friends, justice; For my enemies, the law". 9. In my opinion, law should continue to be the object of reverence for the society as a whole. The "rule of law" is important for all democratic societies because it incorporates those internal attributes of a legal culture that flesh out its contours and thus better accounts for the performance and consequence of its legal system. Among the attributes commonly associated with the "rule of law", mention is specifically made of constitutionalism, legalism, professionalism, pluralism, and the unique relationship between law and politics. Constitutionalism implies that every nation should have a Constitution in the sense of having a set of fundamental values, a specification of what powers the Government may or may not exercise, anti an enumeration of basic human rights that people retain. The concept of constitutionalism promotes the idea that public life and public policy should be fair, open, consistent, and protective of personal, social, religious, and political liberty. Constitutionalism has also come to stand for an enduring and reciprocal relationship between citizens and the Government. 10. In regard to legalism, a common feature is that all judges of higher Courts take an oath to defend and to uphold the Constitution. The main function of legal rules is to resolve disputes and regulate human conduct in a manner that helps maintain order and dispenses justice. This process is known as legalism. 11. The idea of legal pluralism enables the members of legal profession to understand and accept the variations often found in the operation of legal institutions. Legal institutions do not operate abstractly. There is substantial discretion, and that discretion is often exercised in response to regional, local, or transcendent professional norms. Legal pluralism implies the presence of regional and local differences in the way in which the citizens use the Courts and respond to the decisions of the Courts. And law is inextricably linked with Government and the political process, a linkage that is specially distinctive wherever legal institutions have assumed an important role. 12. I would like to emphasize the important symbolic role of law and the attachment that people have to it, and the high degree to which the spirit of law has permeated the human society. The spirit of law gradually spirals beyond the walls of Courts of law into the core of society where it descends to all classes of people. The legal culture implies a high degree of citizens' support. It casts a duty on the members of legal profession to create social awareness among the people and to make them rights‑conscious. The members of legal profession are being called upon, in democratic settings, to mobilize the law in order to protect perceived infringements of the rights of people. 13. Distinguished Members of the Bar: This is the time to appreciate that the law and the legal culture must deal with many new claims of right and justice. Thus, as the system and its values on which the legal culture rests become more complex, the legal culture will have to become more realistic and more open to mediated solutions between competing members. 14. The society is not unmindful of the important role being played by advocates. It is obvious that advocacy is more than the mere application of a set of technical rules and doctrines on behalf of certain interests. First, it is often necessary for the advocate to define and identify the client's interest. Second, effective advocacy requires an understanding of the purposes of the rules or doctrines the lawyer is seeking to invoke on behalf of his client. Third, the kind of advocacy the society allows a lawyer is limited by professional canons, personal ideas, and by a correct appreciation of the role of lawyers in the social system. All these limits vary from time to time, and from context to context, they cannot be understood without a regard for the teachings or moral philosophy, economics, sociology, history and anthropology. None of these is meant to obviate a need for training in the skills of advocacy. The structure of law is embedded in the intricate details of professional rules, and a mastery of those details is essential for success in this profession 15. The quality of legal profession ultimately depends on the depth and imagination of its members. Serious intellectual discussions among colleagues may some times be considered desirable. The ostensible function of an institution known as the "Legal Theory Workshop" is acquiring wide acceptance in certain developed countries. The object of this Workshop is to provide lawyers, with a forum to present their work in progress, with an eye towards revision and further improvement. Talk about recent legal issues equips the lawyers with skills having direct relevance to their profession. Talk about legal issues is also a form of continuing education, a source of intellectual renewal and growth, in which the members of legal profession can be motivated to re‑examine their premises; learn of new developments in other fields, and combat the narrowness that often accompanies the monotony of doing the same type of work every day. Thus they can overcome the danger of becoming obsolete and may be persuaded to broaden their focus in order to attain a measure of expertise in an increasingly complex world. It seems imperative, if the members of legal profession are interested in doing justice to their profession and to themselves, to find ways to enlarge their visions and renew their critical capacities. 18. With these comments, I wish to express my thanks to you for inviting me here and wish you the best of luck and hope that you will do your level best to upgrade the quality of legal profession.