Access To Justice

ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACCESS TO JUSTICE By Dr. Faqir Hussain, Joint Secretary, Pakistan Law Commission Introduction Justice Abdul Majid Tiwana's judgment [l1 in the allotment of plots by the ex‑Prime Minister and Chief Minister (Punjab) unleashed a spate of adverse comments from certain legal quarters, as to the desirability of exercise of powers of judicial review and the jurisprudential basis of High Court jurisdiction. It is argued that relaxation of locus standi and suo motu exercise of powers by a High Court is ultra vires of the law and violative of the Constitution. [2] It is contended that the current common law notions of judicial neutrality, impartiality and adversarial system of litigation inhibit the Courts from playing an activist role as a social reformer. It is further argued that while performing their functions and exercising their powers and authority the Judges must limit their deliberations to the issues in hand and must never assume the role of an activist, seeking to eradicate social evils from the society; such a. role it is stated, does not belong to the judiciary, hence must not be assumed. The controversy as to the role and functions of the judiciary stems from the on‑going debate as to the advisability as well as admissibility of entertaining public interest cases by the superior judiciary of Pakistan. This controversy centres around the notions of liberalised standing whereunder not just the `aggrieved party' but also a person with sufficient interest or a concerned citizen or a public spirited individual or social action group are given standing to bring claims on behalf of poor classes or economically or socially disadvantaged sections of society. The central issue in the controversy is the question of locus standi or right to seek access to justice. This article traces the genesis and evolution of the law of locus standi, describes the vicissitudes it went through over the centuries, narrates the changes effected to it through Constitutional provisions, legislative reforms and Courts interpretations, and explains the effects of such alternations as to the refinement arid development of this concept. It further seeks to clarify this rule and determine its meaning, scope and compass in the contemporary jurisprudence. The purpose, of course, is to clarify the law so as to enable the judiciary to meet the challenges of modern times, give effect to the dictates of law and the Constitution and assist the people in realising the benefits of rule of law. Locus Standi: Genesis and Evolution Locus standi means the entitlement of a person to invoke the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case involving existing rights or duties.[3] In order to bring action, thus, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that he has suffered a grievance or loss of his right or interest. An important limitation on the availability of remedies is that they are awarded only to a litigant who has standing to the suit. In this respect remedies are co‑relative with rights and only those whose vested rights are infringed can bring a claim. No one else can have standing before the Court. The traditional rule of locus standi provides that "judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally‑protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally‑protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally‑protected interest of the person seeking such redress:'[4] This rule was postulated by the House of Lords in the case of ex pane Sidebotham in 1800. [51 Faced with the question of maintainability of appeals, this Court expressed the opinion that the appellant should be a "person aggrieved", meaning he must have suffered a "legal grievance" by a decision which has "wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something". This definition was subsequently approved by Lord Esher in In re: Reed Brown & Co.[6] The principle underlying this observation is that only the holder of the right can sue This traditional doctrine of standing thus attributes the right to sue to a private individual who holds the right which is in need of judicial protection; whereas in the case of breach of a public right, State alone is competent to bring an action. [7] This rule of "ancient vintage" indeed rose during the era when private law dominated the legal scene [8] and litigation was considered to be merely a private affair between, two individuals or parties to settle their disputes against each other. This concept of restricted standing reflected the police of "bourgeois State" and "individualistic philosophy" of rights then prevailing, A right of access to judicial remedy required the aggrieved individual's formal right to litigate or defend a claim.[9] Besides restricted standing, the "laissez-faire" doctrine prevented the State from showing any concern for the poor or weaker party, which under the prevailing system could never hope to have an effective access to justice. "Justice like other commodities in the laissez‑faire system, could be purchased only by those who could afford its costs, and those who could not were considered the only ones responsible for their fate. Formal, not effective, access to justice--formal not effective, equality‑‑was all that was sought".[10] Unjust and inequitable though the system was, it dominated the legal scene until the beginning of the current century. The rule as to standing was strictly followed. The Courts construed standing too narrowly and insisted on strict compliance with its requirements. They refused to admit petitions and grant relief unless the petitioner had established his standing beyond any doubt. The criteria for entertaining claims remained, having suffered a personal "legal injury". No departure or deviation from this standard was allowed. Emergence of Public Law The principle of restricted legal standing well suited the era of human civilisation when private law prevailed and human relations were formed on right‑duty pattern. State intervention in such relationship was minimal and discouraged by the propounders of "laissez‑faire". However, as civilisation advanced and public law made appearance on the legal horizon, remedies under the private law system proved inadequate to resolve human problems and meet the challenges of time. Public law deals with issues of community and reflects the concerns of collectivity. It aims at extending the role and functions of the State in the socio economic development of the society. Lately, there has been an, enormous increase in the governmental activities in the area of economic development and social welfare of the society. Consequently, new rights and obligations are being created. These rights are collective or diffuse in nature and belong to community‑at‑large. As a result individual rights and duties are. being replaced by collective social rights and duties. There is an increasing emphasis on public interest and community welfare. The concept of human rights is undergoing a radical transformation with socio‑economic rights assuming significance. This new category of human rights increasingly find mention in the newly‑framed constitutions of the World.[11] These rights include, inter alia, the right to education, health, work, social security and clean environment etc. These rights require for their enforcement affirmative action in the shape of appropriate legislation. Accordingly, new laws are being enacted to give effect to the dictates of the Constitution. These laws need to be duly monitored and properly executed. The judiciary, thus, assumes a special responsibility to ensure that these laws are duly enforced and the rights and benefits contained therein are fully secured. This is an entirely new jurisdiction and an altogether different function for the judiciary. In order to perform this function the laws of standing, rules of procedure and roles of judges must change. The old principles of private law, practices of common law and rules of Anglo‑Saxon jurisprudence ought to be abandoned as they do not help in the effective executive of public laws and proper enforcement of diffuse rights. Thus, the traditional notions of locus standi, adversarial system of litigation and non alignment of judiciary must be modified. Liberalising Techniques The rules as to standing have not remained static. Legislative reforms, changes to the rules of procedure and interpretation by the Courts have changed this concept and extended its scope so as to admit groups, representative interests and public spirited individuals to have access to Courts and enforce diffuse interests. To do so, different methods were implied and diverse devices contrived in various jurisdictions. To achieve this aim, reforms were introduced to give legal representation to groups, diffuse interests and concerned citizens. Since the enforcement of law and maintenance of rule of law is primarily the responsibility of Government, the traditional view is that acts of breach of law and lapses in the performance of public duty are actionable at the instance of the Government. In the UK, Australia and other common law countries, the Attorney‑General represents the Government interest, hence, he alone is competent to bring an action in such matters. However, since the office of Attorney‑General is susceptible to political pressure he is unable to protect public interest, therefore, as a reformative measure the system of relator action" was introduced whereby an individual or group, who otherwise have no standing to suit, may, with the permission of the Attorney‑General, initiate proceedings for the enforcement of public duty or redressal of public injury. This system is in vogue in the UK and Australia, The quest for an effective mechanism to protect public interest is continuing and newer options are being explored to remedy the shortcomings in the system. Such other options include the establishment of the institution of "Public Advocate" in the US. Public Advocate represents the public interest before the administrative and judicial tribunals. This experiment began in 1974 in the State of New Jersey and was later extended to other States. Another option available is the creation of a regulatory agency or appointment of an Ombudsman, to represent the collective interest of groups. This procedure is being tried in various countries. To supplement the governmental action, certain countries have allowed private individuals called, "Private Attorney‑General"[12] or "ideological plaintiff'[13] to litigate for the cause of aggregate or collective interest. The purpose of this reform is to stop a particular Government practice injurious to public interest or causing public nuisance. Thus, the US `Clean Air Act, 1970' permits private citizens to bring an action for the protection of the environment. The Italian Law of 1967 also allows "any one" to bring a suit for illegally granting building permits. Similarly, the `Bombay Cinematograph Act, 1918' and `Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954' granted standing to a person who may not have suffered a personal loss or injury. Yet another reform in the system has been the recognition of groups or associations, called "Organisational Private Attorney‑General"[14] to initiate actions in support of their rights and the interests of their members. Thus, in France a 1973 Statute, commonly known as Loi Royer, granted standing to associations of consumers to sue for their collective interests. Through yet another law in 1976, France granted standing to associations representing racial minorities to bring claims on behalf of their members. Similarly, in 1977 the Federal Republic of Germany passed a law which granted standing to consumers associations to bring actions in support of their rights and interests. During the mid‑1960s there emerged in the US public interest law firms which specialised in class actions. These law firms brought actions and contested claims on behalf of unrepresented or under‑represented groups or classes. The issues with regard to which such actions are brought are wide and varied. Some of the areas covered are environmental protection, product safety, consumer protection, civil liberties and minority rights. etc. This procedure enabled a large number of groups, classes and sections of society to have access to justice and avail the benefits of rule of law. The procedure of accepting amicus curiae briefs also helps in liberalising the rule of locus standi. Under this procedure individuals with sufficient interest may present their viewpoint before the Court, in proceedings to which they are not a party. This procedure thus helps in accommodating a wide range of interests having sufficient interest in the subject‑matter to participate in judicial proceedings. The last reform in the series is the introduction of public interest litigation, initiated by concerned citizens or public‑spirited individuals or social action groups on behalf of poor and down‑trodden sections of the society. The Indian judiciary played a leading role in initiating and developing this system of litigation. This system had the effect of almost discarding the concept of "aggrieved party" and making the jurisdiction of the Court wide open to special interest groups and public‑spirited individuals. The Supreme Court of India expressed the view that where a person or group of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness, disability or economically or socially disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court, any member of the public or group, acting bona fide, may bring an action for relief.[15] The judiciary in Pakistan followed this precedent and admitted public‑spirited individuals and groups to bring claims for the enforcement of fundamental rights and maintenance of rule of law.[16] This way the Courts relaxed the traditional rule of standing and admitted persons with sufficient interest or special interest to file petitions. In some cases the Courts entertained even letters and telegrams to become the basis for Court intervention. [17] In other situations, the Court assumed suo Motu jurisdiction in cases of human rights abuses, reported by the media or coming to the Court's notice during the proceedings of a pending case.[ 18] Judicial Interpretation With the expansion of public law and extension in governmental functions, the judiciary assumed an enhanced role with regard to execution of laws and maintenance of rule of law. Such a role was envisaged by the law and the Constitution. The judiciary, therefore, made quite an extensive use of its powers of judicial review and relaxed standing so as to ensure effective execution of laws and proper administration of public policy. Any deviation from law or policy was taken notice of. Governmental agencies and public authorities were taken to task for an act of violation of law or breach of public duty. This was necessary for the due observance of the rule of law and proper performance and functions by the government departments and public authorities. Refusing standing to a plaintiff with a good cause, merely because he is not an aggrieved party, means that a Government agency or public functionary is left free to violate the law, and that is contrary to public interest. [19] As Lord Denning observed: [20] I regard it as a matter of high Constitutional principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a Government Department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or injured can draw and seek to have the law enforced, and the Courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate. With a view to provide remedy, outdated technical rules of locus standi were disregarded and concerned citizens granted standing to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.[21] The Courts in the UK, [22] US [23] Canada,[24] and India[25] have, through their interpretations liberalised the criteria of standing and adopted flexible rules, designed to allow plaintiff with genuine interest or concern to act in public interest. Similarly, the Courts, in Pakistan have expressed the view that the rules as to standing must be liberally interpreted. The Supreme Court in the case of Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust,[26] expressed the view that "the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant shows that he has personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in the manner not permitted by law would result in loss of some personal benefit or advantage". The rule as to standing was further relaxed by the Supreme Court in the case of public interest.[27] The Court expressed the view that in cases of breach of law or violation of fundamental right, any member of the public, acting bona fide may move the Court for the enforcement of fundamental right and vindication of rule of law. Such a person, the Court stated, may not be personally hurt or affected by the impugned action. [28]. New Trend Of late there has emerged a new trend towards liberalising standing and making access to justice easily available. The expansion of public law and increasing emphasis on the rule of law make it obligatory for the State to bring about necessary reforms in the procedure for standing so that citizens may conveniently report the cases of breach of law or default in public duty aid get redress of their grievances. Consequently, the rules as to standing are constantly being revised. The criteria for standing vary from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even within a given jurisdiction, different criteria apply to different (private and public law) remedies. For instance, for obtaining the private law remedies of injunction and declaration, the law is strictly construed and the plaintiff is required to prove the breach of his own rights, whereas the prerogative remedies are awarded at the instance of any person whom the Court considers to be deserving[29]. Again, distinction is made amongst the various prerogative remedies. For instance, the criteria as to mandamus is stricter than certiorari and prohibition. The different procedures to private and public law remedies were abolished in the UK in 1977 by the application for judicial review. After this reform remedies in both groups thus became available through a single proceeding, in which the first step was to obtain the Court's leave to appeal. The relevant rule reads: [30] The Court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. This change had the effect of introducing a uniform rule of standing for both groups of remedies. Standing was required to be determined as a primary question. The purpose was to check false and frivolous claims on the part of irrelevant persons or mischief‑makers. The Law Commission, however, recommended that the primary test should be abolished and standing should be determined at the time of grant of relief. The. new rule as to standing came before the House of Lords in the case of R v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, [31] wherein the Court interpretation gave a new and liberal character to the rule of standing. The Court held that the question of sufficient interest should not be considered as a primary issue in abstract or as an isolated point. The issue, the Court stated, must be considered on merit together with the legal and factual context. The Court further clarified the law of standing as to the provision of prerogative writs and observed that mandamus must not be subjected to stricter rules than certiorari. This way the Court introduced a uniform criteria for the prerogative remedies. This ruling of the House of Lords had the effect of virtually abolishing the requirements of standing. [32] The ruling was followed in the subsequent cases: Thus, the Court accepted the standing of a tax payer to dispute the legality of Government contribution towards the EEC.[33] Similarly, the Court accepted the standing of a TV set licence holder to prevent a breach of duty by the Broadcasting authority. [34] Despite these significant advances no clear rule on the subject could be developed. The rule receives different interpretations from different Courts. Of late there have been signs of retreat by the judiciary. [35] There is even a talk of return to the old standards. It is stated that standing should be restricted to litigants asserting their personal interests. [36] Changes in Pakistan The rules as to standing in Pakistan have transformed with changes in the legal system. The expansion of public law, growth of welfare legislation and consequential augmentation of governmental functions and activities had the effect of diluting the strict criteria of standing. The development of democratic values and growth of Constitutional practices further helped in consolidating the gains and liberalising the rule of standing. Advance towards the rule of law also had the corresponding effect of softening the rule. The elaborate provisions as to fundamental rights including socio‑economic rights in the Constitution, their enforcement by the superior judiciary and the system of separation of powers rendered the traditional concept of locus standi somewhat irrelevant and inappropriate. It considerably enhanced the role and powers of the judiciary to act as the guardian of the Constitution and enforce its provisions. Restricted standing was perceived as hindering the advance towards perfecting the rule of law and enforcing the socio‑economic rights of the people. Emphasis on strict requirements of standing was regarded as inimical to the Constitutional culture and destructive of the rule of law. Thus, new methods and techniques were devised to overcome the problem of standing. The perusal of case‑law on the subject clearly brings out this changing scenario in the legal domain. Initially, standing received narrow meaning and restricted interpretation, however, with the passage of time the tune and tenor of judiciary changed and it started giving relaxation in the standard. Thus, while interpreting Articles 184(3) and 199 of the Constitution (Articles 32 and 226 are the corresponding provisions in the Indian Constitution), the judiciary restricted standing to an aggrieved party with a legal grievance. [37] The Supreme Court of Pakistan further observed that since sub‑clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 199 speak of an `aggrieved party or `any person' to file petition, the High Court cannot assume suo motu jurisdiction under this Article. [38] However, as time went by the Court softened its stance and relaxed the criteria. It was clarified that "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Article 199 may not have a right in the strict juristic sense but only to show that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty, the non performance of which may result in loss of some "personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of the privilege".[39] As regards the issuance of prerogative writs, the Courts did and continue to make a distinction between various remedies. The requirements for mandamus and certiorari are stricter and the Courts insist on "party aggrieved" possessing a "legal right: or "real interest" in order to be eligible to file petition.[40] For prohibition, the insistence is not on `party aggrieved' but merely `personal interest'.[41] However, a fairly relaxed procedure applies to the habeas corpus and quo warranto writs. These writs may be filed by any person, be he a friend or relative or even a stranger. [421 It seems that the judiciary continues to languish under the influence of common law. The ruling of Inland Revenue Commissioner [431 has so far not fully permeated into our legal domain. No cogent reasons have been given as to the difference in standards between mandamus or certiorari and other writs. No valid justification has been advanced as to why mandamus and certiorari should receive different reception and dissimilar treatment. These writs deal with the rule of law, performance of public duty and quashing of illegal acts. Denying access to a plaintiff with good cause merely because he is not personally effected by the action means that the public authority is left free to flout the law with impugnity. Such an outcome besides breeding contempt for the legal system, promotes the feelings of revolt and rebellion against the administration. This state of affairs obviously is not favourable for the maintenance of the rule of law and efficient performance of public functions. Such a situation is not countenanced by a system of democratic polity and Constitutional rule and calls for remedial measures. Public Interest Litigation One way of resolving the problem is by further expanding and developing the scheme of public interest litigation. This new and most imaginative method of adjudication has already been introduced and actively pursued by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Certain High Courts too have registered cases under this jurisdiction. Among these the High Court of Sindh is leading the way while a few cases are pending before the Lahore High Court. The list of cases, pending before these Courts under the public interest jurisdiction now runs in hundreds. Nearly 250 complaints/petitions were entertained by the Supreme Court alone during the first ten months of the current year. With the passage of time this number is gradually increasing. The procedure for entertaining cases under this jurisdiction is both simple and informal. No formalities/technicalities/procedural rules are prescribed for bringing a claim before the Court. The Court can entertain a case and establish jurisdiction on receiving a complaint either from the aggrieved party or any other person or group. Cases are registered on receipt of letters/telegrams[44] or by taking suo motu notice of violations reported in the media.[45] In some instances new cases were registered when during the pending proceedings violations came to the Court's notice. [46] The exercise of jurisdiction under the public interest litigation is contingent upon the inability or disability of a person or class of persons to pursue their claims in the Court of law. Such inability or disability may arise from personal deficiency (ignorance, poverty) or economic, social or physical constraints (convicted prisoners, bonded labour, scheduled castes, women in custody, children in jail etc.). The jurisdiction also covers cases of violation of law or breaches of public duty reported by a concerned individual. In these cases the Supreme Court justified the need for public interest litigation and in the case of Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan [47] and Darshan Masih v. The State [48] established the constitutionality of its jurisdiction. Interpreting Article 184(3) [49] of the Constitution the Court observed as follows: (1) The Supreme Court can entertain a case and issue appropriate writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights when an element of public interest is involved in the matter; (2) In doing so the Court may disregard the traditional rule of locus standi and dispense with the requirements of aggrieved party; (3) The petition may be filed by a bona fide public‑spirited individual or social action group, not necessarily affected by the action; and (4) The other rules of procedure such as adversarial system of litigation, payment of court‑fee, engaging a lawyer, filing of affidavit etc. may also be dispensed with. [50] As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court, the Indian Judiciary found authority for public interest litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to issue "directions, orders, or writs" for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. The Court took the view that this article protects not just individual's own but also other people's fundamental rights. [51] This practice was later approved by the Supreme Court.[52] The High Court of Sindh in the case of Muntizma Committee v. Director, Katchi Abadis,[53] quoting extensively from the Indian precedents, reached a similar conclusion. The Court stated that whenever the conscience of the Court is shocked by an action/inaction of the Government, it will exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. This Court further clarified that for establishing jurisdiction, the narrow concepts of "causes of action" and "person aggrieved" may be ignored. With the evolution of democarcy and growth of constitutionalism there is an emerging trend towards the preservation of rule of law and protection of human rights. Human rights issues are taking centre stage and coming to limelight, both in the domestic jurisdiction as well as international level. The provision of fundamental rights and their enforcement by the Courts find an increasing mention in the political and legal parlance. Access to justice is assuming the status of a fundamental right, a primary fundamental right, as without it all other rights become illusory. The enjoyment of rights fundamental or ordinary and individual or collective, depends on the right to have access to justice. Such access must not be theoretical and formal but actual and substantial. Above all, it should be inexpensive, expeditious and universal. The Constitution and legal system are replete with pledges and promises to this effect and provide ways and means to enforce the same Judiciary is mandated that as guardian of the Constitution and custodian of the rule of law, it must present, and protect the same. To do so, necessary powers are given to it together with authority conferred to make its own rules of procedure and conduct. All other State authorities and Government functionaries are obligated to help and assist the judiciary in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions. A judiciary blessed with such an honour, endowed with so vast powers and entrusted with such onerous responsibilities ought never to be complacent with its performance and must continue to strive for further attainments. It must strike at the roots of injustice and preserve the rule of law. And to do so it should take cognisance whenever there is any violation of law or breach of duty. Such violations and breaches may either be brought to its notice through formal petitions or other means of communications, such as letters, telegrams or through the media. Formalities, technicalities and restrictive procedures must not be allowed to obstruct the course and frustrate the end of justice. REFERENCES [1]. Judge, Lahore High Court. [2]. Asif Sated Khan, Suo Moto Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction, PLD 1993 SC (Journal). [3]. The Law Reform Commission of Australia (Discussion Paper No 4) Access to Justice‑I Standing: Public Interest Suits, 99 Elizabeth Street, Sydney, 2000, p.5. [4]. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 at 185 [5]. Ch. D 458. [6]. (1887) 19 QBD 174. [7]. Mauro Cappelletti, Access to Justice, Vol III, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Milan, p.520. [8] S.P. Gupta v. Union 9f India, op cit, p. 185. [9] Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth (eds), Access to Justice, Vol I, A.W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co., Milan, p.6. [10]. Ibid. at 7. [11]. Examples are the Preamble of the French Constitution, 1958; Art. 3 of the Italian Constitution; Art. 20, 28 of the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Parts III & IV of the Indian Constitution, 1950 and Part II of the Pakistan Constitution; 1973. [12]. The terminology was coined by Judge Jerome Frank. See Associated Industries v, Ickes, 134 2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). [13]. Terminology suggested by Professor Louis Jaffe in, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non‑Hohfeldian Plaintiff, 116 U PA L RW 1033 (1968) [14]. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth (eds), Access to Justice, op cit, p.40. [15]. S.P.Gupta v. Union of India, op cit, p. 149. [16]. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 416; See also Darshan Masih v. The State, PLD1990 SC 513. [17]. S.P. Gupta v Union of India, up cit, Darshan Masih v. The State, op cit. [18]. Ram Pyari v. Union of India (1987)'2 RLR 410; Mst Shafia Begum (I IR Case No.4), 1992; Samjhota Express (IIR Case No 6); 1992; HR Cases Nos.2, 20 & 25, 1992(Not yet published). [19]. Professor Bernard Schwartz & HWR Wade, Legal Control of Government (1972) p.291. [20]. R v. Greater London Council ex p. Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550. [21]. Inland Revenue Commissioner ex p. National Federation of Self‑Employed and Small Business Ltd. (1982) AC 617. [22]. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting Authority (1973) 1 All ER 689; Gouriet v, Union of Post Office Workers (1977) 3 All ER 184. [23]. Barrows v Jackson (1952) 346 US 349; United States v. James Griggs Raines (1960) 362 US 17. [24]. Thorron v. Attorney‑General (1974) 43 DLR (3d) 1; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v McNeil (1975) 55 DCR (3d) 632. [25]. K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 2177; Akhil Bharatiya Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298. [26]. PLD 1969 SC 223. [27]. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan , op cit, Darshan Masih v. The State, op cit, [28]. Muntizma Committee v. Director, Katchi Abadis, PLD 1992 Kar. 54. [29]. HWR Wade, Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 689. [30]. Order 53, Rule 3 (5). [31]. (1982) AC 617. [32]. HWR Wade, Administrative Law,op cit, at 703. [33]. R v. Her Majesty's Treasury (1985) QB 657. [34]. R v. Independent Broadcasting Authority (1984). [35]. David Feldman, Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative Perspective, The Modern Law Review, Vol 55, No. 1, January, 1992, p.52. [36]. R v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1990)1 All ER 754. [37]. Raj Narain Singh v. Patna Administration Committee, AIR 1959 SC 569; Pakistan Steel Mills Association v. Province of West Pakistan, PLD 1964 Lah 138; Ch. Muhammad Yunus v. Republic of Pakistan, PLD 1972 Lah. 847. [38]. Tariq Transport Co. v. Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, PLD 1958 SC 437; Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain, 1982 SCMR 549. [39]. Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, PLD 1969 SC 223; Muntizma Committee v. Director, Katchi Abadis, op cit. [40]. Nisar Ahmad v. Additional Secretary, Food, PLD 1978 Lah. 1149; Ch. Zahoor Elahi v Director, Anti‑Corruption, PLD 1975 Lah. 532: [41]. Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah, PLD 1989 SC 166. [42]. Abdul Mujib Pirzada v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1990 Kar. 9; Federate of Pakistan v. Haji Saifullah, op cit. [43]. R v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, op cit. [44]. Darshan Masih v. The State, op cit. [45]. Mst. Safia Begum (HR Case No 4); 1992 Samjhota Express (IIR Case No.6), 199: (unpublished). [46]. HR Cases Nos.2, 20 & 25 of 1992. [47] PLD 1986 SC 416. [48] PLD 1990 SC 513. [49] Art.184(3): "Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article." [50]. HR Cases Nos.9,and 20 of 1992. [51]. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs (1986 LRC (Const.) 546, HC; State of West Bengal v. Sampal, AIR 1985 SC 195. [52]. Chaitanya v. State of Karnatka, AIR 1986 SC 825. [53]. Op cit.