The System At Work

THE SYSTEM AT WORK THE SYSTEM AT WORK By Ch. Irshad Ahmad [Additional Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad.] "Parliament makes the law, executive carry the law into effect and the judiciary enforce the law", said Lord Templeman in M. v. Home Office 1994 SCMR 1352; (1993) 3 All ER 537; (1993) 3 WLR 433 (HL). How far the above statement is true the above‑quoted case might be an appropriate instance. M., who wished the executive to carry the law into effect and the judiciary to enforce the law, was a black not a white. He was an alien not a patrial. To be straight he was a citizen of Zaire. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 23rd September, 1990. He claimed asylum immediately upon his arrival on the footing that he was a refugee within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), which had been incorporated in the domestic law of the U.K., as being a person who "owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". M. was interviewed by Immigration officers, and on 16th November 1990 he was informed that the Home Secretary was minded to refuse asylum. This was not, of course, a decision made by the Home Secretary personally. The decision was taken by the officers of Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office of appropriate level, but was expressed in the name of the Home Secretary. M. was re‑interviewed on 2nd and 24th December 1990 and a final decision to refuse asylum was communicated to him in a detailed letter dated 11th March, 1991 from the Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office. The essence of M.'s claim was that whilst in Zaire he had organized anti‑government strike action among his fellow teachers, and been arrested. He has spent three days in a local prison where he was physically maltreated. He escaped with the assistance of a prison guard and was smuggled on to a cargo aircraft at Zaire airport of Kinshasa, and taken to Lagos in Nigeria. He did not claim asylum there because he did not trust the Nigerian authorities not to return him to Zaire. In Lagos he was able to acquire a fake Nigerian passport and a ticket for a flight for London. M. sought leave of the High Court to apply for judicial review of Home Office's decision to refuse him asylum. (In per our legal parlance he filed a writ/Constitutional petition. Like our law relating to writ/Constitutional petitions, in the U.K. too grant of hearing to application for judicial review is discretionary with court. Therefore, the applicant needs leave of the court to apply for judicial review. Although under our law it is also discretionary with the High Court to admit or not to admit a writ Constitutional petition for hearing and for that purpose High Court hears petitions at pre‑admission stage but, it appears, that in the U.K. obtaining of leave to apply for judicial review is more formal). His application was heard and refused on 25th March, 1991. As permissible under the U.K. law he promptly sought to renew his application before the Court of Appeal. (As per our procedure he filed an appeal against the order refusing leave to apply). Meanwhile M.'s supporters in the U.K. arranged for him to be examined by an organization called the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. On 12th April 1991 a doctor of that organization opined that the scars M. bears are entirely compatible with the causes he ascribes, and the spinal trouble he suffers quite likely to have arisen from the prison experience he described. Every one might have expected that the doctor's report would have been sent to Home Office at once and that Office might review M.s' case but that was not done until April 30. In the meantime M.`s deportation to Zaire had been scheduled by 6‑00 p.m. London‑Paris‑Kinshasa flight on May 1. This time had been notified to M. on April 23 but his solicitor heard only on April 30. Timings of deportation became cause for emergency for every one. In the morning of May 1, the Court of Appeal was told of the urgency of the situation, and the Court interrupted its work late on the afternoon in order to hear M.'s application (appeal). All concerned were very conscious of the fact that the application was being heard at the fifty‑ninth minute of the eleventh hour. At about 4‑55 p.m. the Court of Appeal delivered a five‑page judgment giving reasons for refusing the application. Those connected with the Medical Foundation or other supporters of M. in the U.K. thought that his case was not being fully deployed by his legal advisers and that he would be better served if he was represented by different solicitors namely M/s. Winstanley ‑ Burgess who had very much experience in such cases. Someone approached this firm and Mr. Burgess obtained instructions to act on M.'S behalf. Act about 2‑30 p.m. he had notified the Home Office that he was acting on M.'s behalf. Although professional eyebrows could be raised at Mr. Burgess to act in replacement of the solicitor already acting for M. but in view of the fact that the case involved fundamental human right regarding protection of life no one made any criticism. For M. things had begun to go seriously wrong at the conclusion of the proceeding in the Court of Appeal. The counsel who appeared for the Home Office left the Court with his instructing solicitor and Home Office officials. In the corridor outside the Court they were met by Mr. Burgess and Mr. Scannell, the counsel, who told., them that they were about to make a further application on behalf of M. for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision to deport him at 6‑00 p.m. This application was to be made to the duty judge in chamber. At about 5‑25 p.m. on May 1 the hearing of further application for leave to apply for judicial review commenced before judge Garland. M. was represented by Mr. Scannell and the Home Office by Mr. Gordon. The judge was not to know to what extent M.'S case had been considered by the Home Office or the Courts. The whole matter was strange to him. He was told and all present believed that M. was due to take off in custody at 6‑00 p.m. Manifestly the judge had no time to study the papers and to consider the arguments. He was faced with a situation in which he needed more time to reach decision whether to give leave to apply, and on no view of the law he had any jurisdiction to impose any stay order unless and until he had given such leave. Meanwhile the clock was ticking and, no doubt, M. was about to board the aircraft. Under the circumstances the judge Garland did what any judge would have done. Having concluded that application was not frivolous he sought to obtain an undertaking from Mr. Gordon on behalf of the Home Office that M. would not be flown out of jurisdiction until he or any other judge had time to' give proper consideration to M.'s now application. The judge thought that he had obtained such undertaking from Mr. Gordon on behalf of the Home Office and on that basis alone he refrained from immediately giving leave to apply. Instead he adjourned the case. When it became apparent that judge Garland wished M.'s departure to be postponed Mr. Palmer of Treasury Solicitor's office ‑ left the court room and telephoned the Home Office to convey the judge's wishes and told an officer at the Home Office that the judge had expressed the wish that M. should not be removed from the U.K. and asked him to do his best to ensure that the removal does not take place. This was at approximately 5‑50 p.m. The Home Office passed the judge's `request' to Terminal 3 whereas M. had to take off from Terminal 4. It is a mistake and not a fault. At 6‑29 p.m. the doors of the aircraft carrying M. to Paris were closed, and it took off at 6‑47 p.m. At 7‑45 p.m. the aircraft touched down at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. The plane on which M. was to continue his flight from Paris to Kinshasa (Zaire) was due to leave at 10‑20 p.m. Prior to M.'s departure from. Paris numerous discussions took place between Home Office officials and a Member of Parliament who was intervening on M.'s behalf M.'s new solicitor and the Home Office Minister. (In British system `Minister's is a junior position, as compared to `Secretary of State'. Secretary of State's position is as of a `Federal Minister' in our system. The Home Office officials and the minister were under the impression that the judge wanted M. to be returned to the U.K. The view was, however, taken that it would not be appropriate to intervene at Paris. Accordingly, no action was taken by the Home Office to prevent M. leaving Paris, and at 10‑40 p.m. the aircraft carrying M. and his escort departed from Paris. At about 11‑20 p.m. Mr. Burgess, M.'s solicitor,' telephoned Judge Garland at his home and informed him what had happened and that M. would be exposed to a grave risk of persecution on his arrival in Zaire. Judge Garland at once gave a mandatory order over telephone requiring the Home Secretary to return M. to the U.K. (The mandatory order given by the judge orally and announced to M.'s solicitor over telephone was as effective as a written order and took effect from the moment it was announced). M.'s solicitor informed the Home Office desk about the mandatory order. But, shortly afterwards the solicitor thought that it would be better to get Judge's order in writing and accordingly he visited Judge Garland at his home arriving at about 12‑30 a.m. The Judge wrote out an order, signed it and handed over to the solicitor. The order concluded: It is ordered that the Secretary of State for the Home Department by himself, his servants or agents do forthwith procure that (1) M. be returned within the jurisdiction of this court and further that (2) pending the return of M. he be kept in the care of the servants or agents of the Secretary of State and/or of the servants or agents of Her Majesty's Government in Zaire: until further order herein; (3) that the Secretary of State be at liberty to apply to vary or discharge this order at 10‑30.a.m. on Tuesday, 2nd May, 1991; (4) cost reserved". Having obtained the order the solicitor first read out its content to the Home Office over telephone and subsequently faxed a copy to the Home Office at about 1‑40 a.m. Duty officer in the Home Office asked his opposite number at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to contact Kinshasa immediately and arrange for M. to be met on arrival by officials from British Embassy who should look after him and help him to return to the U.K. provided he wanted to do so. The aircraft landed at Kinshasa at 7‑30 a.m. and shortly, afterwards M was seen by an official of the Embassy. M. told the official that he wished to return to London. He was booked on a flight due to leave Kinshasa to 9‑00 p.m. that evening. During the morning of May 2, the case was discussed with the Minister. He had been kept informed of the developments during the night, and upon arrival at office he at once called for up to date reports. The minister concluded that the case raised issues of much importance, therefore, instructions of the Home Secretary should be sought. It proved impossible for this to be done before 4‑00 p.m. and even then it was achieved by canceling and other appointment. At the beginning of the meeting Mr. Kenneth Baker, Home Secretary, knew nothing of the case. The meeting was attended by the minister, an Assistant Under Secretary of the Immigration Department, and a member of Legal Department of Home Office. The Secretary of State was advised that (i) if M. is returned to the U.K. it would be difficult to effect his removal; (ii) Judge Garland had exceeded his powers in making the order because it was a mandatory order against the Government and was outside Court's jurisdiction; and (iii) the reasons for M.'s removal still hold good. The Home Secretary, therefore, agreed that subject to Treasury Counsel's advice M. be not returned to Britain. A conference took place with Treasury Counsel at 5‑15 p.m. The Counsel was told that the deadline for cancelling the booking for M.'s return flight was 5‑30 p.m. The Counsel advised that Home Office should have an opportunity to challenge Judge Garland's order made late the night before, and in the meantime the Home Office might reasonably hold its hand. In the light of Counsel's advice to which Mr. Baker's decision to cancel M.'s return had been subject, the booking for return flight was cancelled. At 9‑00 a.m. on May 3, the Home Office's counsel applied to Judge Garland for the order made by him at 1‑15 a.m. on 2nd May to be set aside. The application was granted. Judge Garland came to the conclusion that on the basis of the House of Lord's decision in Reg. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd. (1990) 2 AC 85 he had no jurisdiction to make the order (he made at 1‑15 a.m. on 2nd May) and discharged the order but indicated that he had made the order: "On the basis not that I was granting a mandatory injunction against the Crown, which clearly I could not do, on authority, but that I was seeking to compel the obedience of an undertaking freely given to the Court and which to the Court appeared to have been breached." Later the same day a further conference took place with counsel and as a result of that conference in the light of Judge Garlands holding that he had received an undertaking, a decision was taken by the minister to effect M.'s return to the U.K. When the instruction was received by the British Embassy in Kinshasa to cancel M.'s booking on the return flight at 9‑00 p.m., Second Secretary in the Embassy went to the airport to tell M. of the decision. He told M. that there was no urgent need for M. to attend Court proceeding in the U.K. but asked him to remain in touch with Embassy. M. gave two contact addresses. M. later left Kinshasa Airport. Efforts were made by the staff of Embassy to find him at or through contact addresses but without success. Eventually M. made contact with his solicitor by telephone from Nigeria, but it was not clear whether he entered that country legally or illegally. After M. was known to have reached Nigeria, the Home Office offered to fly him back to London but there was some disagreement as to the terms of this offer. Before that disagreement was resolved contact with M. was lost. THE SYSTEM SEEN AT WORK M.'s case did not raise a question of national importance. It was a simple case of an alien who wished to enter Britain but we see how the system is responsive even to a simple case. The sequence of the events shows that the executive and the judicial departments of the system do not rest. They work 24 hours. In the whole sequence of events nobody says that Sahib was retired, call tomorrow when Sahib is in office. When Sahib will be in office? We cannot ask. At least the query cannot be answered. Chronologically we see that:‑‑ (i) The Court of Appeal interrupted its works on May 1 to hear M.'s appeal when it came to its notice that M.'s deportation was scheduled at 6‑00 p.m. (ii) Judge Garland was ready to hear the matter after Court hours at 5‑25 p.m. Neither he had left the Court‑room earlier nor refused to hear the matter on the footing that the time was over and the Court had arisen for the day. (iii) No one has raised eyebrow what interest the Judge had to hear a matter after Court hours. When the case was taken up at 5‑25 p.m. the Home Office's counsel was present. He did not raise objection that he needed time to file written statement etc. or to prepare the case. (iv) As soon as it became apparent to Home Office's solicitor that judge has wished M.'s departure to be postponed he immediately took steps to postpone M.'s departure. It looked as if he was M.'s solicitor. He acted as a true officer of the Court. (v) From 7‑45 p.m., when the aircraft landed in Paris until 10‑20 p.m., when the aircraft was to depart for Kinshasa, the case was considered by the minister and Chief Immigration Officer. Nobody was minded that offices have closed. (vi) Judge Garland attended to M.'s solicitor telephone call at home at 11‑20 p.m. Not only that no odd hour excuse was made, he at once gave mandatory injunction over telephone and at 12‑30 a.m. handed down a written order. (vii) On the receipt of Judge's order, at 1‑40 p.m. the duty clerk of the Home Office asked resident clerk of the Foreign Office to arrange for M.'s return through British Embassy in Kinshasa. Every one sitting in his seat was not only responsible for his duty but had also the power to perform the duty. (viii) Shortly after his arrival in Zaire (7 a.m.) M. was seen by an official of the British Embassy and was booked on the flight due to leave at 9‑00 p.m. the same evening. (ix) Although on May 3, Judge Garland discharged the order passed on earl hours of May 2 on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to make mandatory injunctions against the Crown, but he had indicated that he had made the tinder on the basis not that he was making mandatory injunction against the Crown but he was seeking to compel the 'obedience on the undertaking given to the Court which to the Court appeared to have been breached. The executive took all steps to effect M's return to the U.K. No one took the view that the discharge of the order had taken effect from the time it was made, therefore, there was no need td bring M. back. So far as its title is concerned the article ends with the observations in the factual background in the preceding paragraph, but what happened later is more important from. legal point of view to quantify this article to appear in a leading law journal rather than to appear either in x' political science journal or public administration journal. ' Although Embassy people could not find M. to effect his return to U.K., and it appears, that he had remained no more interested to take refuge in the U.K. but he was very much interested to' know the meaning of the historic principle of `rule of law' intimately linked with the name of Professor Dicey and the celebrated doctrine of the separation of powers enunciated by Montesquieu some 300 years ago. On May 7,1991, proceedings were commenced on behalf of M. in the High Court seeking to have the Home Office fined and Mr. Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State, Mr. Peter Lloyd M P., the Minister, and some other officials of the Home Office committed to prison or fined for contempt of Court in falling to comply with Judge Garland's order made at early blurs of May 2. In the High Court the complaint was heard by Judge Simon Brown, and he on authority held that he cannot punish the Home Office or the Secretary of State or the Minister for contempt of Court. The Judge was, however, critical of the authority which he found binding on him. The Judge's decision is reported (1992) 4 All ER 97. M. appealed to the Court of Appeal and that Court found Mr. Kenneth Baker and the Secretary of State guilty of contempt of Court and directed him to pay the cost of proceedings personally (see (1991) 4 All ER 121; (1992) 2 WLR 73). Both M. and Mr. Kenneth Baker appealed to the House of Lords against the decision of the Court of Appeal. M.' claimed that the Government and the Home Office could be found guilty for contempt of Court. Mr. Kenneth Baker's claim was that neither he nor Home Office nor the Government could be found guilty of contempt of Court. The House of Lords held that the Government, the Home Office could be found guilty of contempt of Court. The House of Lords' judgment is reported 1994 SCMR 1352; (1993) 3 All ER 537; (1993) WLR 433. The Court .of Appeal recognised the importance of the case from Constitutional point of view. Lord Donaldson M.R. observed: "This case is remarkable for the chapter of accidents, mistakes and misunderstandings which have occurred". Its importance however, lies elsewhere. It lies in the fact that for the first time in modern history it has become necessary to consider whether the judiciary has any and if so what powers to enforce orders addressed to Government Departments or Ministers. In particular it has been necessary to consider whether the prerogative remedies of habeas corpus (produce the body) which goes to the heart of individual's liberty, mandamus (an order to do a particular thing) and prohibition (and order to refrain from doing a particular thing) when addressed to Government Departments or Ministers are in law "orders" or merely "requests". Fortunately, the criticism made by M. against the view that no mandatory injunction can be issued against the Government have acted as catalyst for the change made by the House of Lords in its earlier view expressed in Re. v. Secretary of State of Transport Ex parte Factortame Ltd. (1990) 2 AC 85. The following issues of the Constitutional importance were debated in contempt proceedings: (1) What was the status of the undertaking given to Judge Garland that M. shall not be deported as scheduled at 6‑00 p.m. on 2nd May? (2) What was the status of Judge Garland's order of 2nd May? Was it not void on the basis of House of Lord's authority in Reg. v. Secretary of State for transport Ex Parse Factortame Ltd. (1990) 2 AC 85 that interim injunctive orders cannot be made against the Government? (3) If a Court has the jurisdiction to make a final injunction does it not have the jurisdiction to make an interim order? (4) Can the Government or the Home Office be proceeded against for contempt? (5) Did the Home Office or Mr. Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State, commit contempt of Court? Brief answers to the above questions ad seriatum are follows: (1) It is trite law that an undertaking to the Court is as binding as an injunctive order to the like effect (1992) 2 WLR 72, page 92 (CA). (2) The Court of Appeal said (page 92 ibid): "It is not a correct analysis that Judge Garland's order which was later set aside on the footing that on the authority of the House of Lords decision in Reg. v. Secretary of State for Transport: Ex Parte Factortame Ltd. was void and of no legal effect as having been passed without jurisdiction. The High Court is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction. The judges of that Court acting as such, can make any order which is not illegal, the sole question on a reconsideration of the order or on appeal being whether the order should have been made. This order was irregular and therefore should not have been made, but it was not made without jurisdiction. An order which is made by a Court with unlimited jurisdiction is binding unless and until it is set aside. Common sense suggests that this must be so. Were it otherwise Court orders would be consistently ignored in the belief, sometimes justified, that at some time in the future they would be set aside. This would be a recipe for chaos. If authority be required, it is provided by the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Diplock in Isaacs v. Robertson (1985) AC 97,102‑103: "Their Lordships would, however, take this opportunity to point out that in relation to orders of a Court of unlimited jurisdiction it is misleading to seek to draw distinctions between orders that are `void' in the sense that they can be ignored with impunity by those persons to whom they are addressed, and orders that are 'voidable' and may be enforced unless, and until they are set aside. Dicta that refer to the possibility of there being such a distinction between orders to which the descriptions `void' and 'voidable' respectively have been applied can be found in the opinions given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the appeals Marsh v. Marsh (1945) AC 271, 284 and Maefoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1962) AC 152, 160, but in neither of those appeals not in any other case to which counsel has been able to refer their Lordships has any order of a Court of unlimited jurisdiction been held to fall into a category of Court orders that can simply be ignored because they are void ipso facto without there being have them set aside. The cases that are referred to in these dicta do not support the proposition that there is any category of orders of a Court of unlimited jurisdiction of this kind; what they do support is the quite different proposition that there is a category of orders of such a Court which a person affected by the order is entitled to apply to have set aside ex debito justitiae in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court without his needing to have recourse to the rules that deal expressly with 'proceedings to set aside orders for irregularity and give to the, judge at discretion as to the order he will make. The judges in the cases that have drawn the distinction between the two types of orders have cautiously refrained from seeking to lay down a comprehensive definition of defects that bring an order into the category that attracts ex debito justitiae the right to have it set aside, save that specifically it includes orders that have been obtained in breach of rules of natural justice." The House of Lords affirmed the above opinion in following words: "The order (made by Judge Garland on May 2) was made by the High Court and therefore, has to be treated as a perfectly valid order and one which has to be obeyed until it is set aside: (see Issacs v. Robertson 1985 AC 97,102). (3) The House of Lords after reviewing legal and Constitutional development in the field of remedies against the Crown and the Government departments concluded that the Courts have the jurisdiction to make injunctive order against the Crown, ministers and Government. The House also held that power to grant an interim relief was linked to the power to grant final relief. Lord Woolf said: "The power of the Court to grant interim injunctions is lined to the power of the Court to grant final injunctions. If the Court has tire power to grant final injunction against a minister it must surely have the power to grant an interim injunction and vice versa". (4) The Court of Appeal was of the view that proceedings for contempt can only be taken against a person or body with sufficient personality. There are only three real sanctions for contempt imprisonment, a fine and sequestration of assets. It is not possible to imprison some body or thing which, whatever else it may be, is not a natural person. It would be largely futile to fine a department since if fine were paid, it would be paid out of funds provided for public purse and the proceeds paid back into public purse. At least it would constitute an important protest. It would be impossible to sequestrate on all the, Government's assets without creating a domestic and international financial crisis of unimaginable proportions and selective sequestration would, I think, bring little more pressure to bear more than mere denunciation. As neither the Crown nor the Home Office has legal personality no such proceeding be brought. The Court therefore, concluded that ministers of the Crown and civil servants axe liable to be proceeded against for contempt of Court in respect of acts or omissions by them personally and it is no defence that what would otherwise constitute a Contempt of Court was committed in discharge or purported discharge of their official duties. The House of Lords, however, held that the Government department can equally be found guilty of contempt of Court, Lord Woolf said: "While contempt proceedings usually are `personal and punitive' arid contempt proceedings against a Government department or a minister in a official capacity, would neither be personal nor punitive (it would clearly not be appropriate to fine or sequestrate the assets of the Crown or a Government department or an officer of the Crown acting in his official capacity), this does not mean that a finding of contempt against a Government department or minister would be pointless. The very fact of making such a finding would vindicate on the requirement of justice. In addition an order for cost could be made to underline the significance of a contempt. The Crown's relationship with the Court does not depend on coercion and in the exceptional situation when Government department's conduct justifies this, a finding of contempt could suffice. In that situation the ability of the Court to make finding of contempt is of great importance. It would demonstrate that a Government department has interfered with the administration of justice". (5) The Court of Appeal found that the Home Office's failure to bring M. back as decided in the meeting held at 4‑00 p.m. of May 2, amounted to impeding or interfering with the course of justice and held that Mr. Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State, acted in contempt. Considering the question of imposition of penalty Lord Donaldson M.R. said: "Any contempt of Court is a matter of the utmost seriousness, but the culpability of the contempt can vary enormously." In the highly unusual circumstances of this case Mr. Baker's culpability falls at the lower end. In the circumstances of this case I do not consider that it is necessary by the imposition of any penalty other than in respect of costs to assert or emphasis the paramount authority of the law, and of the Courts as the Constitutional administrator and enforcer of that law. I would, therefore, make an order for costs to be payable by Mr. Baker personally. The House of Lords, however, finding that the Home Office could be found guilty of contempt of Court directed that Secretary of State for Home Affairs shall be substituted tot Mr Baker as being the person against whom the finding of contempt of Court was made. From legal and Constitutional point of view the importance of M.'s case is that the celebrated doctrine of separation of powers enunciated by Montesquieu some 300 years ago‑‑ "to ensure the liberty of the subject the three sorts of power, the legislative, the executive (or administration) and the judicial ought to be in the hands of separate institutions for there would be an end of everything were the same man or body to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals" and the principle of rule of law enunciated by Professor Dicey:‑‑ "When we speak of the 'rule of law' as a characteristic of our country (we mean) not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. In England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes to one of law administered by the ordinary Courts, has been pushed to its utmost limit. With us every official, from. Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen. The reports abound with cases in which officials have been brought before the Courts, and made, in their personal capacity, liable to punishment, or to the payment of damages, for acts done in their official character but in excess of their lawful authority. A colonial governor, a Secretary of State, a military officer, and all subordinates, though carrying out the commands of their official superiors, are as responsible for any act which the law does not authorise 'as is any private and unofficial person". (Dicey, on the Law of the Constitution, 10th Edn. (1959), pp.193‑194). ' have been incorporated as positive law in the system. MR. JUSTICE TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILANI, JUDGE, LAHORE HIGH COURT Mr. Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jilani son of Muhammad Ramzan Shah Jiani was born, on 6th July, 1949; did BA. (Political Science), LL,B.; did a course, in Constitutional Law from the University of London in the Institute of Advance Legal Studies; started practice at District Courts, Multan in 1974; enrolled as an Advocate of High Court. in 1976; elected General Secretary, District Bar Association; Multan in 1976; elected Member, Punjab Bar Council in 1978; appointed as Assistant Advocate‑General in July, 1979; enrolled' as an Advocate of 'the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1983; promoted as Additional Advocate -General in 1988; led Pakistan delegation in a meeting of SAARC Countries Legal Experts on "Harmonization of Drug Zones in the Region" held in New Delhi; participated in a Seminar jointly organized by Ministry of Interior and U.S. Justice Department on "Enforcement of Drug Laws" in January, 1990 (in Islamabad); attended a meeting of the SAARC Technical Committee on the Prevention of Drug Trafficking as Member of the Pakistan Delegation (held at Karachi from 6th to 8th August, 1990); Member of the Academic Council of the Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan; went to USA on an invitation from U.S. Ministry of Justice for a study of the American Judicial System in 1991; was awarded key of the City of Detroit (Michigan) by the Mayor; author of Booklet/Articles: (a) "Towards a Dynamic Constitutional Order"; (b) "An Essay in Competitive Co‑existence"; and (c) "The Rule of Law in Islam"; appointed as Advocate‑General in 1993; served as Part‑time Lecturer in Jurisprudence in the University Law College At Multan. He took oath as a Judge of Lahore High Court on 7th August, 1994. MR. JUSTICE DR: MUHAMMAD NASEEM, JUDGE, LAHORE HIGH COURT Mr. Justice Muhammad Naseem, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore was born on 1‑5‑1938 in Fazilka, District Ferozopur (India). His late father Ch. Ali Ahmad, Advocate, started his legal practice during the year 1920 after obtaining Bachelor of Laws Degree from the Punjab University, Lahore. After the inception of Pakistan, the family migrated to Bahawalnagar. Mr. Justice Muhammad Naseem got his education in Montgomery (Sahiwal). He passed his Matriculation Examination with scholarship during the year 1953 from Batala Muslim High School, Sahiwal from University of the Punjab. He passed Intermediate Examination with scholarship from University of the Punjab, Lahore, during the year 1955. He was Chief Editor of College Journal `Sahiwal'. He was elected as the President College Union for the Session 1956‑57. He passed Bachelor of Arts Examination from University of the Punjab during the year 1957. He was awarded Honours Degree in Persian. He was awarded Role of Honour by Government College, Sahiwal. He did the Bachelor of Laws from University Law College, Punjab, Lahore, during the year 1959. He started the Legal Practice at Bahawalnagar with his father Ch. Ali Ahmad, Advocate in 1959. He stood second in the P.C.S. (Judicial Branch) Examination during the year 1963 when he was member of District‑Bar Association, Bahawalnagar. He joined as Civil Judge, Rahimyarkhan on 29‑10‑1963. He was promoted as Administrative Civil Judge on 15‑6‑1971. He was promoted as Additional District and Sessions Judge on 26‑4‑1973. He was promoted as District and Sessions Judge on 22‑9‑1980. He worked as District and Sessions Judge, Kasur, Multan, Rahimyarkhan, Khanewal and Bahawalpur. He worked as Special Judge, Special Court (Banking), Multan as well as Special Judge (Central), Multan. He was working as District and Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur when elevated. He compiled the Manual of Instructions and Forms (700 pages) published by the Lahore High Court, Lahord, ,in 1989 and was awarded Certificate of Merit by the Lahore High Court, Lahore. He was awarded the "Chair of Honour" by the District Bar Association, Khanewal in September, 1992. Mr. Justice Muhammad Naseem participated for four months in Advanced Course in Shariah (Islamic Law) in Institute of Training in Shariah and Legal Profession, Islamic University, Islamabad during the year 1982, and visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia. . ' Mr. Justice Muhammad Naseem was conferred honorary title of Doctor of Philosophy in Procedural Law by the London Institute For Applied Research in the Convocation held on 17‑1‑1994 in Islamia University, Bahawalpur. Mr. Justice Muhammad Naseem has shown his keen interest; in the research work. The Articles on different subjects written by him are published in different law journals out of which following two are noteworthy:‑‑ (1) Working Environments and Pressure on Civil Judges (PLJ 1991 Magazine 143). (2) Making of an Advocate (PLJ 1992 Magazine 86). He took the oath of his office as Judge of the Lahore High Court on 7th August, 1994.