Overview of Competition Laws of Pakistan With Reference To Competition Regimes of EU & UK

OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAWS OF PAKISTAN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAWS OF PAKISTAN WITH REFERENCE TO COMPETITION REGIMES OF EU & UK By Irfan Munawar Gill, Advocate, Lahore Introduction A Abuse of Dominant Position 78 (a) Abuse of Dominant Position from the Perspective of Ordinance of 2007 78 Dominant Position 78 Abuse of Dominant Position 79 (b) Abuse of Dominant Position from the perspective of UK Competition Act, 1998 ("ACT Of 1998") 80 Chapter 2, section 18 of Act of 1998 80 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited 4-4-2001 80 (c) Abuse of Dominant Position as per EC Treaty 80 Article 82 EC Treaty 80 British Airways v. Commission 1998 ECR 207 81 United Brands v. Commission 1998 ECR 207 81 B. Prohibited Agreements 81 (a) Prohibited Agreements from the Perspective of Ordinance of 2007 82 Agreement 82 Prohibited Agreements 82 (b) Prohibited Agreements as per Act of 1998 83 Chapter 1, section 2 of Act of 1998 83 Hasbro Toys and Games 83 Price Fixing of Replica Football Kit 83 Store Cards Reference Case 18/3/2004 84 (c) Prohibited Agreements as per EC Treaty 84 According to Article 81 of EC Treaty 84 ICI v. Commission 1972 ECR 619 84 Microsoft, Commission Decision 24/4/2004 85 C. Individual and Block Exemptions 85 (a) Individual and Block Exemptions under the Ordinance of 2007 85 Criteria for Individual and Block Exemptions 85 (b) Individual and Block Exemptions as per Act of 1998 86 Criteria for Individual and Block Exemptions 86 (c) Individual and Block Exemptions as per EC Treaty 86 Costen and Grundig v. The Commission 1966 ECR 299 87 Vichy CJ 1991 L 75/75 87 Re VBBB and VBVB Agreement 1984 2 CMLR 344 87 D Mergers 87 (a) Mergers as per Ordinance of 2007 87 Mergers 87 Factors for Determination of Substantial Lessening of Competition 88 (b) Mergers/ Concentrations as per U.K. Competition Act of 1998 and EC Treaty 89 Definition of Concentration 89 Continental Can (1973) 90 BAT-Philip Morris (1987) 91 E. Deceptive Market Practices 91 (a) Ordinance of 2007 91 (b) U.K. Competition Act of 1998 and EC Treaty 91 F. Competition Authorities 91 (a) Competition Commission of Pakistan Sections 12-27 92 Functions and Powers of the Commission (sections 28-40) 92 Powers to Issue Interim Order 92 Power of Commission in relation to Proceedings or Enquiry Section 33 92 Power to Enter and Search Premises Section 34 93 Forcible Entry Section 35 93 Penalty Section 38 93 Leniency Section 39 93 Power to Make Rules and Regulations Sections 55 and 56 93 Appeals 93 (b) UK and EU Competition Authorities 94 G. Conclusion 94 Introduction Monopoly Control Authority established under Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance, 1970 laid to eternal rest on 3rd October, 2007. Competition Ordinance of Pakistan was promulgated on 03.10.2007 ("Ordinance of 2007") with specific mandate to create conditions for free competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity to enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anti-competitive behaviour. Competition Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) has been established under section 12 of Ordinance of 2007 to give effect to the provisions of Ordinance of 2007 and has been given wide powers to check and punish anti-competitive practices. The Competition Commission in UK and European Commission at EU level are responsible to create and maintain effective competitive environment on State and community level respectively. Now, I would like to discuss in my own idiosyncratic manner the Ordinance of 2007 and the Commission with particular reference to competition regimes of UK and EU supported by approach/interpretation adopted by competition commission along with office of Fair Trading UK and EU Commission while giving effect to the provisions of competition laws. A. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION Controlling the behaviour of the dominant market players is vital for maintaining the even playing field for new entrants and competitors so that dominant player could not engage in distortive practices that affect the shape and structure of market. (a) Abuse of dominant position from the perspective of Ordinance of 2007 Dominant position Chapter I, section 2(e) of the Ordinance of 2007 defines the dominant position as under:- "Dominant Position" of one undertaking or several undertakings in a relevant market shall be deemed to exist if such undertaking or undertakings have the ability to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, consumers and suppliers and the position of an undertaking shall be presumed to be dominant if its share of the relevant market exceeds forty per cent. Abuse of dominant position:-- Chapter 2 section 3 of the Ordinance of 2007 (1) No person shall abuse dominant position. (2) An abuse of dominant position shall be deemed to have been brought about, maintained or continued if it consists of practices which prevent, restrict, reduce or distort competition in relevant market. (3) The express "practices" referred to in subsection (2) shall include but are not limited to:-- (a) limiting production, sales and unreasonable increases in price or other unfair trading conditions; (b) Price discrimination by charging different prices for the same goods or services from different customers in the absence of objective justifications that may justify different prices. (c) Tie-ins, where the sale of goods or service is made conditional on the purchase of other goods or services. (d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connections with the subject of contracts. (e) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions on other parties, placing them at a competitive disadvantage. (f) Predatory pricing driving competitor out of a market, prevent new entry and monopolize the market. (g) Boycotting or excluding any other undertaking from the production, distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of any service. (h) Refusing to deal. As the Ordinance of 2007 and the Commission established under the Ordinance of 2007 has just few months before replaced the toothless Monopoly and Control Authority so there are no case laws/determinations to clarify the scope and application of doctrine of abuse of dominant power as expounded by section 3 of the Ordinance of 2007. The Commission has recently initiated an inquiry into the complaint lodged by Islamabad Stock Exchange against Karachi Stock Exchange alleging contravention of provisions of section 3 of Ordinance of 2007. (b) Abuse of dominant position from the perspective of UK Competition Act, 1998 ("Act of 1998") Chapter 2, section 18 of UK: (1) Any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to the abuse of dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom. (2) Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in:-- (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts. "Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited 4-4-2001" 'The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) held that Napp had violated S.18(2)(b) of the Act of 1998, for the UK authorities Napps' conduct constituted an abuse as it limited production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers". (c) Abuse of dominant position as per EC Treaty Article 82 EC Treaty says: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between member shareholders. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:-- (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; British Airways v. Commission 120041 CMLR 1008 "Advocate-General explained in this case that Article 82 of EC, like the other competition rules of the treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution) which has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market. In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantaged to consumers are also to be feared." United Brands v. Commission 119981 ECR 207 "ECJ held that the fact that an undertaking forbids its duly appointed distributors to resell the product in question in certain circumstances is an abuse since it limits markets to the prejudice of consumers". B. PROHIBITED AGREEMENT Globalization has created worldwide markets for many products and services. Competition authorities around the world are fraught with serious challenges to control the cartel like behaviour particularly secret agreements among competitors often referred to as hardcore cartels, directed at price fixing, customer allocation and production output restrictions are the most egregious violations of competition laws. Pakistan has recently experienced the worst demand and supply gap as major suppliers acted like cartels and earned abnormal profits at the cost and to the detriment of market and consumers. (a) Prohibited agreements from the perspective of Ordinance of 2007 Agreement: Chapter I, section 2(b) of Ordinance of 2001 defines agreements as: "Agreement includes any arrangements, understanding or practice, whether or not it is in writing or intended to be legally enforceable." Prohibited Agreements: Chapter II, section 4 of Ordinance of 2007 (1) No undertaking or association of undertakings shall enter into any agreement or in the case of an association of undertakings, shall make a decision in respect of the production, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of goods or the provision of services which have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or reducing competition within the relevant market unless exempted under section 5 of this Ordinance. (2) Such agreements include, but are not limited to:-- (a) fixing the purchase or selling price or imposing any other restrictive trading conditions with regard to the sale or distribution of any goods or the provision of any service. (b) Dividing or sharing of markets for goods or services, whether by territories, by volume of sale or purchases, by type of goods or services sold or by any other means. (c) Fixing or setting the quantity of production, distribution or sale with regard to any goods or the manner or means of providing any services. (d) Limiting technical development or investment with regard to the production, distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of any service. (e) Collusive tendering or bidding for sale, purchase or procurement of any goods or service. (f) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a disadvantage. (g) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. (3) Any agreement entered into in contravention of the provision in subsection (1) shall be void. The Commission has recently started investigations and issued notices to Pakistan Bank Association (PBA) and all leading banks to appear before it and show cause why an enforcement action should not be taken against it. The notices were issued in response to an advertisement in the newspapers published jointly by all banks which prima facie shows cartel like behaviour on the part of banks. (b) Prohibited agreements as per Act of 1998 Chapter I, section 2 of Act of 1998. (1) Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade within the UK and have as their object or affect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK are prohibited unless they are exempt in accordance with the provisions of this part. (2) Subsection (1) applies in particulars, to agreements, decision or practices which (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions. (b) Limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment. (c) Share markets or sources of supply. (d) Apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. (e) Make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage have no connection with the subject of such contracts. "Hasbro Toys and Games" "The Director General of Fair Trading concluded that Hasbro UK Limited, one of the largest toy and games suppliers in the UK, entered into several price fixing agreements in violation of section 2 Competition Act." "Price fixing of Replica Football Kit" "The evidence that a number of retailers involved adopted retail prices that were higher than would have been the case in the absence of agreement." Store Cards Reference Case 18/3/2004" "The OFT referred the supply of store card services to the 'competition commission following its conclusion that there are features of the sector, both in the supply of store care services to retailers, that appear to prevent, restrict or distort competition." (c) Prohibited agreements as per EC Treaty According to Article 81 of EC Treaty: (1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertaking and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member states and which have as their object or affect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market and in particular those which: (a) Directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions. (b) Limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment. (c) Share markets or sources of supply. (d) Apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. (e) Make the conclusion of contracts subject to 'acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage have no connection with the subject of such contracts. (2) Any agreements or decision prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automatically void. "ICI v. Commission [1972] ECR 619 "Parallel behaviour may be evidence of a concerted practice especially if the parallel conduct is such as to enable those concerned to attempt to stabilize prices a level different from that to which competition would have led and to consolidate positions to the detriment of effective freedom of movement of products in the common market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers." "Microsoft, Commission decision 24/4/2004" "The Commission believed that Microsoft's refusal to supply had the consequence of "stifling innovation" in the impacted market and of "diminishing consumers choices" by locking them into a homogenous Microsoft solution. C. INDIVIDUAL AND BLOCK EXEMPTION Maintaining the effective competitive environment in the relevant markets on one hand and to promote growth by encouraging the innovations and efficiencies to take benefit of economies of scale and economies of scope on the other hand is the task of competition authorities around the world. A balance needs to be maintained and the burdensome regulations should be withdrawn as the markets become effectively competitive. Exemptions clauses have been introduced in the competition laws of Pakistan. UK and EU to give exemptions to those agreements which otherwise fall in the prohibited agreements on the ground that their benefits outweigh their disadvantages. (a) Individual and block exemptions under the Ordinance of 2007 Section 5 and section 7 of Ordinance of 2007 authorize the Commission to grant individual and block exemptions to particular agreement or particular category of agreements from section 4 prohibitions if a request for an individual or block exemption has been made to it by a party to a particular agreement or particular category of agreements. The Commission may impose such conditions as it thinks appropriate which granting exemption. Criteria for Individual and Block Exemptions Section 9 of the Ordinance of 2007 says that: (1) The Commission may grant individual or block exemption in respect of an agreement which substantially contributes to:-- (i) improving production or distribution; (ii) promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. (iii) the benefit of that clearly outweigh the adverse effects of absence or lessening of competition. As the Commission has just been established so it would be interesting to see how it acts under these provisions and grants exemptions. (b) Individual and Block Exemptions as per Act of 1998 Section 4 and section 6 of Competition Act, 1998 authorize director to grant exemptions to a particular agreement or category of agreements falling in the prohibition clause (Chapter 1 Prohibition) Criteria for individual and block exemptions Section 9 of Competition Act, 1998 provides that individual and block exemptions can be granted to any agreement which:-- (a) contributes to:-- (i) improving production or distribution; and (ii) promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit but (b) does not: (i) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives. (ii) afford the undertaking concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of products in question. (c) Individual and Block Exemptions as per EC Treaty Article 81(3) of EC Treating provides that any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, any decision or category of decisions by association of undertakings or any concerted practice or category of concerted practices which are otherwise declared void by Article 81(1) can be granted exemption if they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of resulting benefit and which does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives and which does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. "Costen and Grundig v. the Commission [1966] ECR 299" "ECJ held that particular benefits generated by the agreement (i.e. those resulting from improvements in production/distribution) must outweigh its detrimental effects in order for Article 81(3) to apply." "Vichy OJ [1991] L 75/57 In this case, "the Commission has refused to grant an exemption on grounds that the agreement in question has not allowed consumers a fair share of its resultant benefits." Re VBBB and VBVB Agreement 119841 2 CMLR 344 "Commission held that resale price maintenance (RPM) in the books market did not provide consumers with a fair share of its alleged benefits and thus as a result of RPM, consumers would in fact be deprived of improved choice and lower prices." D. MERGERS The company's merger, concentrations or acquisitions can create or strengthen a dominant position which may give rise to abuse of dominant position. Merger situation applies to companies and undertakings in all economic sectors. Pakistan has recently witnessed mergers in the financial sector where two local commercial banks have been acquired by foreign banks. (a) Mergers as per Ordinance of 2007 Chapter II, section 11 of the Ordinance of 2007 provides that no undertaking shall enter into a merger which substantially lessens the competition by creating or strengthening the dominant position in the market and imposes obligations on undertakings to submit pre-merger applications to the commission and the Commission will determine whether the proposed merger meets the threshold conditions provided in Competition (Merger Control) Regulations, 2007 (the "Regulations of 2007") Mergers According to Regulation 3 of the Regulations of 2007, merger shall be deemed to have occurred if:- (a) two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, merge into a new undertaking and cease to exist as separate legal entities; (b) one undertaking is absorbed by another with the latter retaining its legal entity and former ceasing to exist; (c) one or more persons or other undertakings who or which control one or more undertakings or acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; (d) one ore more persons or other undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; (e) the result of an acquisition by one undertaking of the assets (including goodwill) or a substantial part of the assets, of another undertaking is to place the first undertaking in a position to replace or substantially replace the second undertaking in the business or as appropriate, the part concerned of the business in which that undertaking was engaged immediately before the acquisition; (f) a collaborative arrangement by which two or more undertaking devote their resources to pursue a common objective provided that such arrangements must be; (i) subject to joint control; (ii) performs the functions of an autonomous entity; (iii) on a lasting basis. Factors for determination of substantial lessening of competition According to Regulations 6 of the Regulations of 2007: The Commission while determining the merger application will assess the strength of competition in the relevant market and will take into account any factor that is relevant to competition in that market, including but not limited to following:-- (a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; (b) the ease of entry into the market including tariff and regulatory barriers; (c) the level and trends of concentration and history of collusion in the market; (d) the degree of countervailing power in the market; (e) the dynamic characteristics of the market including growth, innovation and product differentiation; (f) the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; (g) whether the business or part of the business of a merger party or merger has failed or is likely to fail; (h) whether the merger situation will result in the removal of an effective competitor: Provided that an undertaking having gross value of assets excluding value of goodwill less than 300 million or combined value of undertakings is less than one billion or annual turnover of undertaking in the preceding year is less than five hundred million or combined value is less than one billion do not need to make application for clearance to the commission before merger. (b) Mergers/Concentrations as per UK Competition Act, 1998 and EC Treaty EC Merger Regulations issued to give effect to the provisions of treaty and to control the concentration in the EU for creating affective competitive environment. UK equivalent to EC Merger Regulations is the Schedule 1 annexed to Competition Act, 1998 which has incorporated most of EC Merger Regulations. Definition of Concentration Article 3 of EC Merger Regulations defines "Concentration" as:-- (1) A Concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results from: (a) the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings; (b) the acquisition by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking or by one or more undertakings whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. (2) Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, conferred the possibility of exercising decisive influence on a undertaking in particular by:-- (a) ownership or the rights to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking. (b) Rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking. (3) Control is acquired by persons or undertakings which:-- (a) are holders of the right or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned. (a) While not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom. (4) The creation of joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1(b). (5) A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where securities have been held by a financial, credit or insurance company on temporary basis for reselling them or where control has been acquired as a result of liquidation, winding up or analogous proceedings. Concentrations with community dimension shall be notified to the commission prior to their implementation and commission has the power to grant, suspend and impose penalties in case of contravention of any provisions of this Regulation. Continental Can (1973) 'The court ruled that there is an abuse of a dominant position when a company already holding such a position strengthens it by acquiring a competitor." BAT Philip Morris (1987) 'The court acknowledged that in the absence of a dominant position, an acquisition of this kind could be penalized as forming an anti-competitive agreement under Article 81 of EC Treaty." E. DECEPTIVE MARKET PRACTICES Smooth functioning and growth of markets depends to a greater extent on the confidence of investors and consumers in the relevant markets. Market players who are in a position to manipulate could engage in anti-competitive and deceptive market practices which work to the detriment of transparent markets and consumers interests so proper regulatory framework is necessary to streamline and control such practices. (a) Ordinance of 2007 Section 10 of the Ordinance of 2007 provides that no undertaking shall enter into deceptive market practices and the deceptive marketing practices shall be deemed to have resorted to or continued if an undertaking resorts to:-- (a) the distribution of false or misleading information that is capable of harming the business interests of another undertaking. (b) Distribution of false or misleading information to consumers, including the distribution of information lacking a reasonable basis related to price, character, method or place of production, properties, suitability for use or quality of goods. (c) False or misleading comparison of goods in the process of advertising. (d) Fraudulent use of another's trademark, firm name or product labelling or packaging. (b) UK Competition Act, 1998 and EC Treaty No such specific corresponding provisions regarding deceptive trading practices exist in Competition Act, 1998 and EC Treaty. P. COMPETITION AUTHORITIES Competition authorities have a tough job in this globalized world at a time when the world markets are converging and the financial institutions are evolving into complex groups in the form of conglomerates. To monitor the relevant markets and to foster the competitive environment, competition authorities around the world have been given the wide powers. (a) Competition Commission of Pakistan sections 12-27 Competition Commission has been established by virtue of section 12 of the Ordinance of, 2007 and is a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal. The Commission shall consist of not less than five and not more than seven members and a competition commission fund shall be established which shall be utilized by the commission to meet charges in connection with the functioning of the Commission. (1) Functions and powers of the Commission (sections 28-40) As per section 28 of the Ordinance of 2007, the powers and functions of Commission shall be:-- (a) to initiate proceedings in accordance with the procedures of this Ordinance and make orders in cases of contravention of the 'provisions of the Ordinance. (b) to conduct studies for promoting competition in all sectors of commercial economic activity. (c) To conduct enquiries into the affairs of any undertaking as may be necessary for the purposes of this Ordinance. (d) To give advice to undertakings asking for the same as to whether any action proposed to be taken by such undertakings is consistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, rules or orders made thereunder. (e) To take all other actions as may be necessary for the carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance. The Commission may subject to such conditions as it thinks fit to impose, delegate all or any of its functions and power to any of its members or officers as it deems fit. Powers to issue interim order Where the Commission is of the opinion that the issue of a final order in proceedings is likely to take time and serious or irreparable loss can occur, it can issue interim orders in public interest. Power of Commission in relation to proceedings or enquiry Section 33 The Commission shall for the purposes of proceedings or enquiry under the Ordinance of 2007 have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Power to enter and search premises section 34 The Commission shall have the power to authorize any officer to enter and search any premises for the purpose of enforcing any provision of the Ordinance of 2007. Forcible Entry Section 35 If an undertaking refuses without reasonable cause to allow the commission to exercise the power to enter and search premises, an investigating officer of the Commission may by written order signed by any two members enter by force any place or building if necessary. Penalty section 38 The Commission may by order direct any undertaking or any director, officer or employee of undertaking to pay by penalty such sums as may be specified in the order if after giving the undertaking concerned an opportunity of being heard it determines that such undertaking has been found engaged in any activity prohibited under the Ordinance of 2007 or failed to comply with an order of commission. Leniency section 39 The Commission may impose lesser penalty on an undertaking which is party to prohibited agreements or is alleged to have violated Chapter II Prohibitions if it makes full and true disclosure in respect of alleged violation. Power to make rules and regulations sections 55 and 56 The Commission may with the approval of Federal Government by notification in the Official Gazette make such rules and regulations as are necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Ordinance of 2007. Appeals An appeal shall lie to the Appellate Bench of the Commission in respect of an order made by any member or authorized officer of the Commission and any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission comprising two or more members or of the appellate bench of the Commission may within sixty days of the communication of the order, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. (b) UK and EU Competition Authorities The Competition Commission along with office of fair trading in UK and European Commission in EU exercises, to a greater extent, same powers and performs the same functions as are conferred on the Competition Commission of Pakistan under the Ordinance of 2007.One major difference is that the Commission can authorize any member to enter any premises even forcibly without warrant while in UK and EU, authorities need warrant before entering the premises in most of the cases. Secondly, Ordinance, 2007 imposes penalties on members also if they act mala fide while no such specific corresponding penalty clause exists in UK and EU competition laws. G. Conclusion The Ordinance, 2007 is a well-drafted law and is based upon the principles developed by competition regimes of UK and EU. Still, much of the success of Ordinance, 2007 depends upon how the Commission interprets and implements the provisions of this Ordinance. The Commission has a crucial role to play in this regard as it has to develop precise and clear-cut rules to achieve the objectives of Ordinance, 2007, for instance, Relevant Market Doctrine is yet to he clearly defined by the Commission.