Section 122 of Income Tax Ordinance 2001

SECTION 122 OF INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 SECTION 122 OF INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 A lethal weapon in the hands of Revenue against the Taxpayer By Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan Since inception of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the provision of section 122 of the Ordinance of 2001 through process of evolution has under went almost 22 amendments through different Finance Acts, Ordinances and even though statutory regulatory orders issued by the Federal Government purportedly in exercise of power under section 240 of the Ordinance, 2001. The scope of this section is two fold, firstly, it empowers the Commissioner to amend or further amend the orders treated to be issued under section 120 (deemed assessments) or orders made or issued under section 121 (ex parte assessments/best judgment assessment) or to amend an order passed under section 122-C (provisional assessment orders), secondly, the Commissioner can exercise the amendment powers in two eventualities viz., (a) under -section 122(5), where any income which was chargeable to tax has escaped assessment or total income has been under assessed or assessed at too low a rate or has been subjected to an excessive relief or refund and any amount which under a head of income has been mis-classified. The power is qualified with the acquisition of definite information, which may be acquired from audit or otherwise, It is important to point out here that the connotation 'or otherwise' used in subsection (5) of section 122 is of immense importance and encompasses on enlargement of scope of acquisition of definite information. Thus visualize's that definite information may have been acquired for any source (b) under section 122(5A) - the power of amendment can only be exercised, where two conditions necessarily co-exit (i) the order treated to have been issued or made was considered erroneous (whether' on fact or on law) (ii) and for the reason of such _ error any prejudice has been caused to the interest of revenue. It is important to point out here that the provision does not cover orders other than specified under subsection (1) of section 122 of the Ordinance therefore, different orders such as orders under sections 161/205, order passed relating to imposition of penalties, orders passed relating to exemption certificates and other orders visualized under the Ordinance does not fall within the ambit and scope of the expressing provision. Principle laid down 2000 PTD 2407 (Pak Electric fitting) (later merges with former) 1992 PTD 513 Kar. H.C. Once an order of rectification is passed the assessment itself is modified and what remains In field is not order of rectification but the assessment as rectified (Muhammad Amjad v. C.I.T) Let me point out here that a rectificatory order passed under section 221, thereby rectifying an error/mistake apparent and floating on the surface of the record, to the extent. It rectifies an order under sections 120, 121 or 122-C, shall fall within the ambit and scope of section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance for the reason that after rectification, what remains in field is the order under sections 120, 121, or 122-C as rectified under section 221 meaning thereby a changed/ rectified order under sections 120,121 or 122-C remains in field, which is open to exception under section 122. Reliance in this behalf can be placed on case cited as 2000 PTD 2407 in re: Pak Electric Fitting v. CIT and 2 others, wherein the honorable Sindh High Court has laid down the principle that later merges with former. It may also be beneficial and important to refer here a judgment of the learned Sindh High Court in the case cited as 1992 PTD 513 in re: Muhammad Amjad v. CIT and others. Whereas the learned court has held that once an order of rectification is passed, the assessment itself is modified and what remains in the field is not the order of rectification but the assessment as rectified. Lets first discuss the legislative history of section 122 for the benefit of readers:- The first two amendments were made in subsection (1) through Finance Ordinance, 2002 firstly a comma was inserted after the words issued under section 121 and secondly the words "or issued under sections 59, 59A , 62, 63 or 65 of the repealed Ordinance" were inserted. Basically the insertion was aimed to enhance, enlarge and extend the scope of power of amendment with a view to cover up the assessments made or deemed to have been made under the repealed Ordinance of 1979. Since extension of scope of amending power being in the context of repealed Ordinance of 1979, it was in sharp contradiction, with the provisions of section 239 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (saving provision) viz-a-viz sections 6, 18, and 21 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, the validity of such amendments as well as actions taken by the income tax authorities on the basis of such amendments were challenged by the taxpayer in different High Courts while the department, contested, the same up till the level of Supreme Court of Pakistan. Finally the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled as CIT v. Messrs Elli Lilly reported as 2009 SCMR 1279 = 2009 PTD 1392 held that the powers of amendment as visualized under section 122 cannot be exercised in respect of assessments relating to the repealed Ordinance of 1979. It was held that the assessments up till the assessment year ended on 30th June, 2003 relevant to financial year ended on 30th June, 2002 shall be governed by the repealed Ordinance and only the relevant provisions of the repealed Ordinance could be applied by the revenue authorities, competent to amend the assessments under the new Ordinance. Thus in view of the judgment of Apex Court the amendment so made became ineffective. It is important to point out here that the above words and figures issued under sections 59, 59B, 62, 63 and 65 of the repealed Ordinance, were later on omitted from section 120(1) of the Ordinance, 2001 through the Finance Act, 2012, while through the same Ordinance after the figures 121 the words and figures "or issued under section 122C" were also inserted. Due to the effect of above stated omission and two fold (a) the provision of repealed Ordinance so omitted were admitted to be outside the scope of section 122 in line with the judgment of Supreme Court supra and (b) because of insertion of words and figures indicated above insertion was that the provisional assessments were brought under the amending power and with effect from 1st July, 2012, any provisional assessment could also be amended and further amended by the Commissioner section 122 surpa. Subsection (1) of section 122 under went a change through Finance Act, 2003 and the words 'to ensure that the taxpayer is liable for the correct amount of tax for the tax year to which the assessment order relates' appearing after the words 'considers necessary' were omitted. The amendment was made with a view that omitted words were superfluous and un-necessary for the reason that the assessence of section 122 viz-a-viz amendment was enhancement of amount qua the tax liability as is apparent and evident from the language used in subsections (5) and (5A) of section 122. These provisions in unequivocal terms address to and pre-supposes enhancement became of usage of phrases, "escapement, under assessed, assessed to low rate, excessive refund, misclassification of head of income resulting in low yield of tax and error causing prejudice to the interest of revenue." Therefore, the result and consequence of amendment under both the subsections shall safely and logically be inferred as higher charge of tax. The Fifth Amendment relates to substitution of subsection (2) through Finance Act, 2009. The original subsection was not happily worded and limitation for amendment was dealt in a causal manner. Firstly, the newly phrased subsection (2) commence/starts with a nugatory language, therefore, because of the negative word of command. The provision has become substantive and mandatory. Thus it prohibits and restrains any amendment subsequent to expiration of limitation, secondly under the original provision the limitation for taking action as 0 amend an assessment commences from the date of issuance or treating as having issued an order and concludes on expiry of five years from the aforesaid date of commencement, whereas through the substituted provisions the period of limitation has been enhanced and the time clock starts running from the end of the financial year in which the date of issuing or the assessment order treating to have issued an assessment order falls. Let us exercise and understand the effects of amendment in a competitive mode. According to original provision the date of filing of return was relevant for the reason that as soon as or on the day a complete return under section 114 was furnished the same was treated to be an order under section 120 for instance the return is filed on 31st December, 2003 the limitation of five years shall start on the said date and five years shall consequently expire on 30th December, 2008, which was the last date of limitation, while in the case of new provision the financial year in which return was filed shall become relevant. In the eventuality referred above the relevant financial year ended on 30th June, 2004 and therefore, the limitation to make an amended order shall laps and expire end on 30th June, 2009 viz. five years from the end of financial year in which the date of filing return falls. Please note that limitation is a matter of procedure and no one has right in the procedure the effect of the amendment shall be that those cases, the limitation whereof has already expired prior to amendment shall be considered as 'past sand concluded transaction' and cannot be touched under the garb of extended/enhanced limitation. However, such cases, where limitation clock had not stopped and was in motion at the time of amendment, such cases shall be governed by the extended limitation. Reliance in this behalf is placed on the principle enshrined in case reported as 2005 PTD 14 in re: Fawad Textile Mills Limited Lahore v. Pakistan. The next amendment relates to subsection (3) of section 122. Thereby the words 'or (6A)' after the words and figures subsection (6) and prior to the words and figures "of section 114" were inserted in the provision through Finance Act, 2010. It is important to point out here that the amendment was made effective from 5th June, 2010. Earlier the amendment was made through Finance Amendment Ordinance, 2009 (XXII of 2009) promulgated on 28th October, 2009 and on expiry of the said Ordinance, the same amendment was carried through Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 (1st of 2010) promulgated on 6th February, 2010. The purpose of insertion is to make a corresponding change as has been visualized by bringing about a change in the provision relating to revised returns and certain conditions have been imposed on the revision of return subsequent to the issuance of a show cause notice under section 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance. Please appreciate that this provision acknowledges revision of return under two different provisions viz., under section 114(6) or 114(6A) of the Ordinance, meaning thereby the legislature places both the provisions and eventualities on two different pedestals. A very interesting position may emerge where amendment proceedings have been initiated and notice under section 122(9) has been issued and a taxpayer comes to know an error or mistake other than enumerated in the notice referred above. In the given circumstances, the question arises, whether a taxpayer can revise the return or not, without touching or fulfilling the requirements of section 114(6A) of the return. Despite the fact that provisions of section 114(6) are subservient to subsection '(6A). Yet in my opinion a taxpayer can revise a return on parameters and issues not subject matter of the notice of amendment. The reason for forming such opinion is multi-fold. Firstly that law does not prohibit filing of such revised return, secondly in case revision is made in respect of such discrepancies which are subject matter of the notice under section 122(9) than of course the requirements of subsection (6A) of section 114 shall come into play and return could only be revised by fulfilling the requirements thereof in different eventualities visualized under subsection (6A) supra. It is also interesting to note that in section 114(6) in its clause (c) which was inserted through Finance Act, 2012, one of the condition for revision of return has been provided that taxable income declared is not less than and loss declared is not more than income or loss, as the case may be, determined by an order issued under sections 121, 122, 122A, 122-C, 129, 132, 133 or 221 and whereby any of the condition provided in section 114(6) are not complied with the return furnished shall be treated as an invalid return as if it had not been furnished. The perusal of the conditions contained in section 114(6) would reveal that the, fourth condition viz. as contained in clause "C" supra is irrational and unreasonable for the reason that it lays down restriction on the right of a taxpayer to correct an error which is found subsequent to amendment, rectification or decision of appeal and this makes an error/mistake go with without any adherence and such mistake shall continue and survive for ever. To my mind this could not have been the legislative intent and we are to think about any such eventuality. Thirdly, if a return is revised on the issues/mistakes other than specified in the notice, only the requirements of subsection (6) are to be complied with and fourthly provision of subsection (3) of section 122 specifically mention both the provisions of subsections (6) and (6A) of section 114 on alternate position. Had a return could only be revised in the manner provided under subsection (6A), there was no need for mentioning subsection (6) in the said provision. Therefore, section 114(6) can be applied in two situations (i) where no notice under section 122(9) has been issued for amendment, the revision shall be made after fulfilling the requirements of this subsection (ii) where notice of amendment has been issued and error or omission not for thing part of such notice can be corrected by filing the revised return, without being influenced by the requirements of section 114(6A). The next two amendments are in subsection (4) of section 122. Firstly, the word 'or' appearing before the words and figure 'sub-section (1)' and prior to the figures `(3)' were substituted with a 'comma' and secondly, the words 'or 5A' were inserted after the figure (3) through Finance Act, 2003. The effect of substitution and insertion was two fold firstly the substitution of 'or' with comma was for the correction of the language and secondly, to give effect to newly inserted subsection (5A) in subsection (4) of section 122. Earlier plea was taken before Supreme Court that once an amendment of an assessment is made under section 122(5A) the same cannot be further amended as the amendment under subsection (1) or (3) does not cover the amended assessment under section 122(5A). Therefore, to remove the lacuna and ambiguity the words or (5A) have been inserted. The next change was again brought about in subsection (4) of section 122 of the Ordinance and after the words 'the commissioner may further amend' and before the words 'the original assessment' the words 'as may time as may be necessary' were inserted through Finance Ordinance, 2002. The effect of the amendment is very significant for the reason that the Commissioner was allowed to amend an original assessment as many times as he may consider necessary or may be warranted from the facts of the case. Thus it follows clearly the after amending or further amending an original assessment, the commissioner has not been debarred from invoking the amending provisions, if despite having exercised the said powers, the commissioner is in possession of another definite information or for that matter on some other issue he considers that the amended or the further amended assessment is yet erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue, he may, as deemed necessary shall amend the original assessment as many times, any other definite information comes to his possession or otherwise the order so amended is found and considered, erroneous causing adverse effect on the revenue. It is noteable that, the words 'a original assessment' have been used in the context of amendment or further amendments. The significant underlying principal is that what remains in the field after amendment or further amendments shall be the original assessment as amended under section 122. Therefore, in any manner the amendment or further amendment shall merge into the original assessment and thus the original assessment in the amended shape or position shall remain intact and in the field. It is also important to state here that amendment and further amendments can only be made within the time frame provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 122(4). Let me point out here that in subsection (4) for giving a comparative position the words 'within the later of' have been used, and have debatable significance for the reason that the comparison provided in clauses (a) and (b) creates ambiguity in different situations, which needs a huge debate for its reconciliation. Let us leave it for some other session where specifically this' issue shall be taken up. However, it is important that clauses (a) and (b) also underwent a change through Finance Act, 2009 whereby after the words 'five years' ' appearing in clause (a) and after the words 'one year' appearing in clause (b) the word 'after' appearing before the words 'the commissioner' in both the clauses were omitted and the words 'from the end of the financial year in which' were inserted. The above amendment/insertion was aimed to enhance the period of limitation provided for amendment and further amendment. Previously the period of limitation was respectively reckoned from the date of issuance or treating to have issued the original assessment or amended assessment respectively, but due to the amendment, the limitation shall commence from the end of the financial year in which such original assessment or amended assessment was issued or treated to have been issued or made respectively. Let us examine the aspect of limitation in the context of the position prior to amendment and subsequent to the amendment. For example a person/taxpayer files his original return on 30th October, 2003 and revised return on 15th June, 2004. The period of limitation for further amendment shall in case of clause (a) viz., five years had to expire on 29th October, 2008, while under clause (b) the same expires on 14th June, 2005 and since later of both is 29th October, 2008 the limitation would have expired on 29th October, 2008. Now placing the above example in the context of amended law, the limitation in case of clause (a) viz., original assessment shall commence from 30th June, 2004 for the reason the order of assessment was treated to be issued in the financial year ended on 30th June, 2004 and therefore, from the said date the limitation of five years shall expire on 30th June, 2009 instead of 29th October, 2008. Similarly in case an amended assessment issued or treated to have been issued and falling in clause (b) the limitation of one year shall commence from the end of financial year viz., 30th June; 2004 and shall end on 30th June, 2005, viz., one year from the end of financial year. Since the later of two is 30th June, 2009 viz., 30th June, 2005 and 30th June, 2009 therefore, even in the case of amended assessment issued and treated to have been issued shall be 30th June, 2009. It is again notable that such cases, where limitation of five years falling under clause (a) or one year falling under clause (b) had expired prior to the effective date of amendment i.e. 1st July, 2009, the same shall be treated as past and concluded transactions and shall not be effected by the enhanced limitation, while such cases where time clock had not stopped running and limitation was alive at the relevant time of amendment, the period of limitation shall be governed by the extended limitation period on the principal laid down by superior courts in Fawad Textile case, for the reason that the limitation is matter of procedure and no one has any right in the procedure. Next comes subsection (4A). This subsection was inserted by Finance Act, 2003, earlier a different subsection (4A) was inserted through S.R.O. No. 633(1)/2002 dated 14th September, 2002 and later on the said S.R.O. was rescinded by S.R.O. No. 608(I)/2003 dated 24th June, 2002. The original insertion made through S.R.O. 633(1)/2002 and later on rescinded through S.R.O. 608(1)/2003 has a history of legislative battle. Let me remind you that the Federal Government in exercise of powers under the garb of removal of difficulties as provided under section 240 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 made a number of amendments in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through the S.R.O. dated 14th September, 2002 under certain misconception of law and through subordinate legislation/ administrative orders. Since it is, settled principal of law that main legislature/statute cannot be amended through a special regulatory orders/subordinate legislation, therefore, the said amendments were challenged before the Lahore High Court to be void ab initio, unlawful, without jurisdiction and ultra vires of the Constitution and an attack on the powers of the legislature (National Assembly). The Lahore High Court vide order passed in the case reported as '2005 PTD 1621 in re: Kashmir Edible Oil \ v. Federation of Pakistan' graciously declared S.R.O. 633(1)/2002 as invalid and illegal document' while the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as 2006 SCMR 109 in re: CIT v. Kashmir Edible Oil Limited endorsed the judgment of the Lahore High Court and held that the Federal Government was not empowered to bring about drastic changes in the Ordinance to achieve purpose of removing the difficulty and since Federal, Government exceeds powers of delegated legislature as contemplated by section 240 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The view taken by High Court was upheld. Any how the newly inserted subsection (4A) provides that limitation provided for completion of assessments or re-assessment under the repealed Ordinance shall remain effective as such and shall apply in the cases falling within the purview of the repealed Ordinance and shall not be influenced are effected by the period of limitation provided under the new Ordinance viz a viz., subsection (4) of section 122. The next amendment relates to section 122(5) which was substituted through Finance Act, 2003. The original subsection (5) was a mixture of sections 65 and 66A of the late Ordinance" of 1979. The old provision was altogether different from the newly inserted provision. It may be noted that provisions of section 122(5A) did not find place on the statute till Finance Act, 2003. The provisions of section 122(5A) was originally inserted through S.R.O. 633(1)/2002 but after rescinding the same through S.R.O. 608(1)/2003, a new subsection (5A) was inserted through Finance Act, 2003. Section 122(5) is parameteria to section 65 of the repealed Ordinance. This provision is one of the two basic tools for amendment of assessment, which empowers the commissioner that where he is satisfied that (1) any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment or (2) total income has been under assessed or assessed at too low a rate or has become the subject of excessive relief or refund or (3) any amount under a head of income has been misclassified the commissioner on the basis of definite information, which may have been acquired through audit or otherwise, may amend or further amend the assessment under subsections (1) or (4) of section 122. This subsection is one of the main provisions empowering commissioner for amendment or further amendments. The important connotations, which needs consideration are (i) satisfied (ii) definite information (iii) any income chargeable to tax (iv) escaped assessment (v) total income (vi) under assessed (vii) assessed at too low a rate or excessive refund (viii) amount (ix) misclassification. Lets consider the phrase 'satisfied', first let me point here that the wording of the Act of 1922 and Ordinance of 1979 are different. In the Act of 1922 the words used are 'reason to belief' while in the repealed Ordinance legislature has used the words 'where for any reason'. However all these words when examined with the conditions giving reason for escapement, under assessment and assessed to too low rate, excessive relief or refund or misclarification, the purpose remains the same and are dependent upon the existence of definite information acquired through audit, which Comes into possession by any source including the Audit. The connotation 'satisfied' means to gratify fully the wants, wishes or desires, free of doubt, suspense or uncertainty. It conveys a sense not of self righteousness, but a condition of objective fulfillment, satisfaction or achievement, arrived after due enquiry and after ascertaining the rational basis for the same. Satisfaction must be objective in nature and not subjective, which restrains the authorities to act on whims and capricious and they cannot act without there being any material before them (reliance 1996 CLC 293 in re: Ghulam Nabi Rana v. Pakistan PLD 1990 Kar. 474, PLD 1989 Pesh 215 and AIR 1967 SC 295) Thus when the connotation 'satisfied' as used in this sub-section is examined on the touch stone of clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of subsection (5), the same revolves around acquisition of 'definite information' it follows that the commissioner at the time of invoking the amendment provision, must objectively see firstly that the information acquired was a definite information and then for the reason and basis of such definite information, he has objectively reached to a conclusion that a taxpayer's income which was chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or his total income has been under assessed or assessed to too low a rate or subjected to excessive relief or refund or for the reason of mis-clarification of any head of income has been subjected to a lower rate of tax. Thus the pre-condition shall be satisfaction of existence of definite information and consequent loss of tax because of its non application while taxing a person. Thus pre-condition shall be objectively application of judicious mind. The next connotation is 'definite information' through this connotation has been explained and defined under section 122(8) yet the same is not exhaustive definition. It includes information on sales or purchases of any goods made by taxpayer, receipt of taxpayer from services rendered or any other receipt that may be chargeable to tax under the Ordinance and on the acquisition, possession or disposal of money, assets, valuable article or investment made or expenditure incurred by taxpayer. Since the definition is not exhaustive but inclusive, all other things, which may be the subject matter of tax or related to taxable income, total income or for that matter to any head of income, shall form part of definite information but the fact remains that such 'information must qualify to be so definite being obvious, that no further trial, consideration or evidence is required to prove it to be definite information. Various superior Courts have defined the term as under:--- (1990 PTD 369 Kar. in re: Philips Electric Ltd. v. ITO Karachi). "Definite information conveys a meaning which is not the same as change of opinion. A different interpretation of any provisions of law or drawing a different conclusion from a given set of facts will not amount to a definite information." The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as 1993 PTD 766 and 1993 SCMR 1232 in re: Central Insurance Company v. C.B.R. Page 769 "The word 'information' has wide connotation and it is also used in relation of an accusation of the commission of an offence. Whereas, the word 'definite' carries inter alia meaning defined, having distinct limits, fixed, exact, clear precise, bounded etc. Since the word 'information has been prefixed by the word 'definite' in subsection (2) of section 65 of the Ordinance, it controls the generality of the word 'information'. Every information cannot be treated as the basis for re-opening of the assessment, but the information should be of the nature which should qualify as a definite information. In other words, mere guess, gossip or rumour cannot be treated as definite information. However the expression 'definite information' cannot be given a universal meaning, but it will have to be construed in the context of the circumstances of each case." Further referable decision are reported as PLD 1990 SC 399, 1993 SCMR 1108, 2001 SCMR 777, 2003 PTD 2611, 2002 PTD 679 and 1993 SCMR 1108. It may also be seen that the legislature has used the word any income chargeable to tax with reference to escapement of assessment, which signifies that whole or part of any income which can be taxed under section 4 of the Ordinance, and for any reason whatsoever it could not be charged to tax and has wholly or part thereof has escaped taxation shall warrant action under section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. In clause (ii) instead of any income the connotation 'total income' has been used in the context of under assessed or assessment to too low a rate, or subject to excessive relief or refund. In contrast to reference to chargeable income used in clause (i) the reference to total income has purposefully been made. Total income and taxable income are two different connotations, the earlier form income under all heads of income amenable to charge of tax for a year in as much as the income exempt from tax also form part of total income, whereas the income exempt from tax does not form part of taxable income. Therefore, necessarily both the income under any head, whether exempt or otherwise shall be treated as total income. Therefore, where total income has been under assessed (lower than the actually assessable) or for that matter for the reason of its under assessment, it has subjected to a lower rate of tax or in consequence or result of escapement relief or refund was allowed in excess of the amount warranted under the law. The next clause refers to 'any amount' which has been misclassified. It is again important that instead of income or total income reference has been made to 'any amount' the reason is that an amount may be taxable under the head 'business income' but under some wrong notion, it was shown as salary income or dividend income. It may be appreciated that by placing the income under wrong head, it will be subjected to a lower rate of tax and by amendment, it is clarified in the proper head of income and consequently the same shall fetch a higher tax. Therefore, so as to deal with such particular situation the reference has been made to "any amount" being misclassified and has been brought to the jaws of amendment. Finally we come to subsection (5A) of section 122 which was originally inserted through S.R.O. 633(1)/2003 and after its rescission of the same through S.R.O. 608(1)/2003 this subsection was inserted through Finance Act, 2003. It is clarified here that Finance Act, 2003 is effective from 1st July, 2003, therefore, in my opinion the same shall not be applicable to tax year 2003; especially when the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Elli Lilly case has held that since this provision is substantive in nature having direct relation with the enhancement of income viz., related tax liability therefore, applicable prospectively. The full bench of the tribunal, has also held that provision of section 122(5A) are not applicable on tax year 2003. Reliance is placed on Ogra's case cited as 2010 PTD (Trib.) 355 To conclude, let me state here that the amending provisions as contained under section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 have far reaching effects and utilized by the tax authorities, some time objectively and on certain occasion subjectively, which has arisen to an unending tug of war and litigation inter se the tax payer and the tax collector.