The Pak Gulf Doctrine and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in Pakistan

FROM FRAGMENTATION TO FRAMEWORK: FROM FRAGMENTATION TO FRAMEWORK: THE PAK GULF DOCTRINE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN PAKISTAN By Dr. Ikram Ullah, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, International Islamic University, Islamabad 1. Introduction The role of courts in scrutinizing arbitral awards often presents a familiar dilemma: while courts are expected to defer to arbitrators, they must also avoid endorsing decisions that are legally or factually flawed. This tension - between upholding arbitral autonomy and fulfilling the judiciary's duty to ensure justice - has troubled courts across the world. Pakistan is no exception. The result is a body of case law marked by inconsistency, swinging between excessive deference and unwarranted interference. Against this backdrop, the judgment of Islamabad High Court (hereinafter 'IHC') in Gulf Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Godwin Austen Johnson1 (hereinafter 'Pak Gulf') provides a much-needed and thoughtful judicial response to a long-standing question in Pakistani arbitration law: To what extent can, or should, courts interfere with arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter '1940 Act')? In Pak Gulf, authored by Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, J., the court synthesizes the fragmented jurisprudence that followed the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aeroflot Russian International Airlines2 (hereinafter 'Gerry's'). Building on Gerry's, the IHC introduces a structured framework - referred to in this article as the 'Pak Gulf Doctrine.' This doctrine organizes the judicial review of arbitral awards under the 1940 Act into two clear limbs. First, it laid down triggers (exceptions), the existence of which is must for persuading the court to examine the award on the basis of such trigger (exceptions). Second, Pak Gulf elucidates the scope or extent of such scrutiny i.e. how far the court can go to scrutinize the award. Importantly, the IHC's approach in PakGulf is firmly anchored in precedents. It builds upon Gerry's without deviating from its doctrinal foundations. Through a doctrinal reconstruction rooted in Hodgkinson v. Fernie3 and contextualized within Pakistani arbitration law, the court attempts to restore a balance between arbitral independence and necessary judicial oversight. Although Pak Gulf is a High Court judgment and thus not binding on other High Courts and Supreme Court, its analytical depth and clarity make it a potentially persuasive authority. Unless overruled or explicitly distinguished by the Supreme Court, it offers a viable framework for courts dealing with arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act 1940 (hereinafter '1940 Act'). This article critically examines the development, structure, and application of the Pak Gulf Doctrine. It also assesses the doctrine's coherence and legal soundness by evaluating its application in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pakistan Railways v. CRRC Ziyang Co. Ltd.4 thereby highlighting the practical relevance and future utility of the Pak Gulf Doctrine. 2. Critique of Gerry's: An Incomplete Catalogue Leading to Confusion Pak Gulf acknowledges Gerry's to be the only judgment 'that has all the principles gathered in one place'. It compiled 30 key principles from leading domestic and foreign arbitration jurisprudence. Each principle listed in Gerry's is supported by a judicial precedent - foreign or local. As observed in Pak Gulf, this compilation now serves as a comprehensive reference point, eliminating the need to search further a field. A complete list of Gerry's 30 principles is attached as Annex A at the end of this article. However, Pak Gulf also characterizes Gerry's as 'unfinished business.' While the Supreme Court undertook a commendable effort to gather a broad range of principles from various landmark judgments, it stopped short of offering a coherent and internally consistent synthesis. In the IHC's view, the Supreme Court did not complete the task by pushing through to 'further to an internally consistent synthesis of those principles to reach the summit that was meant to be the endpoint of the entire exercise.' As a result, instead of resolving the debate over the judicial scrutiny of arbitral award, Gerry's has, according to the IHC, added to the confusion. One clear example of this confusion is the tendency of parties to selectively invoke apparently contradictory principles from the Gerry's judgment depending on the position they wish to support. As the IHC aptly notes, Gerry's has something for everyone. This selective reliance was illustrated as follows: Award creditors typically rely on Principles 1 and 2, which stress that the arbitrator is the final judge of fact and law. Award debtors, on the other hand, often cite Principles 20, 22, and 24, which permit judicial intervention where an award suffers from a material error of fact or law. This kind of cherry-picking has led to what Pak Gulf terms the 'Gerry's bewilderment', where even the courts either mechanically list all 30 principles without truly applying them or rely only on those that align with their desired outcome. The IHC criticizes this trend, warning against excessive judicial passivity and stating: Gerry's sanctions no warrant for abdication of the primary judicial duty of scrutinizing an award by hiding behind the 'arbitrator's supremacy' principle and making the award the rule of Court by an almost mechanical process. Moreover, Pak Gulf cautions that even judgments passed by benches of the same strength as Gerry's' could be deemed per incuriam if they either fail to engage with Gerry's or apply its principles selectively. 3. Completing the Doctrinal Framework: From Confusion to Coherence To move beyond the doctrinal confusion left unresolved in Gerry's, Pak Gulf undertakes a structured and systematic reformulation of the framework of judicial review. Instead of discarding Gerry's, the IHC builds upon it - starting with a diagnostic critique, then synthesizing its scattered principles through the lens of Hodgkinson v. Fernie, and finally operationalizing a coherent doctrine grounded in Pakistani arbitration law. This section traces that development, culminating in what this article refers to as the Pak Gulf Doctrine. 3.1. IHC Doctrinal Diagnoses: Misreading Gerry's Pak Gulf aptly diagnoses the core problem behind 'Gerry's bewilderment': a widespread misreading of Gerry's 30 principles as if each were independent and self-contained. In reality, the IHC explains, these principles overlap and repeat a few central ideas with different emphasis. The court gives an illustration: How are [civil courts] to reconcile, for instance, principles Nos. 1 and 2 that the arbitrator is the sole and final judge of all questions of law and fact... with principles Nos. 19 and 20, whereby the Court can set aside the award for a factual or legal error on the face of the award...? The IHC emphasized that the apparent contradictions arise not from substantive doctrinal divergence, but from variations in language across decades of judgments. Thus, rather than rejecting Gerry's, the Court sought to complete its unfinished mission by distilling a coherent rule out of the doctrinal mess. 3.2. Genesis of the Pak Gulf Doctrine: A Structural Doctrinal Response Once the root problem was diagnosed, the IHC moved toward formulating a new doctrine. It built the Pak Gulf Doctrine on three main steps, beginning with Hodgkinson v. Fernie and integrating it with Pakistani legal developments. 3.2.1. Step 1: Hodgkinson v. Fernie - Revisiting the Classic Rule To address the uncertainty caused by Gerry's, the IHC turned to the classic authority of Hodgkinson v. Fernie - listed as Principle No. 6 in Gerry's. The court described it as: a destination that has served the test of time The core principle in Hodgkinson v. Fernieis that: Where a cause, or matters in difference, are referred to an arbitrator, he is the sole and final Judge of all questions, both of law and of fact.5 However, the only exceptions to that rule are cases where: a. the award is the result of corruption or fraud,6 b. the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award,7 c. or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award. 8 In modernizing this doctrine, the IHC replaced the phrase 'some paper accompanying and forming part of the award' with the term 'record', aligning with Gerry's Principle No. 19: The Court can set aside the award if there is any error, factual or legal, which floats on the surface of the award or the record. 3.2.2. Step 2: Reasoned Award - Integrating Section 26-A of the 1940 Act Another enhancement came from Gerry's Principle 3, which requires that awards include sufficient reasons under Section 26-A of the Arbitration Act, 1940 - a point not present in Hodgkinson v. Fernieas this is later development. With this, the IHC expanded the formulation: Where a cause, or matters in difference, are referred to an arbitrator, he is the sole and final Judge of all questions, both of law and of fact. However, the only exceptions to that rule are cases where: a. the award is the result of corruption or fraud, b. the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award, c. or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award. d. the award does not state the reasons in sufficient detail to enable the Court to answer a question of law arising out of the award. 3.2.3. Step 3: Final Refinement - Provisos, Record and Question of Law IHC observed that courts have often overlooked a vital principle where two opinions on a question of law were equally plausible, then the Court is not entitled to substitute its preferred view for that of the arbitrator. The Court also emphasized that if only one legal view is possible and the arbitrator's interpretation is plainly wrong, the court has a duty to intervene. Otherwise, judicial review becomes meaningless. Based on this, the IHC finalized the Pak Gulf Doctrine with two important alterations i.e. the removal of exception (c), and the inclusion of 'record' within the scope of the 'award': Where a dispute9 is referred to an arbitrator, he is the sole and final judge of all questions, both of law and fact. However, the only exceptions to that rule are cases where: a. the award is the result of corruption or fraud; b. the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award; or c. the award does not state the reasons in sufficient detail to enable the Court to answer a question of law arising out of the award. Provided that, where two opinions on the question of law are equally plausible, then the Court shall not substitute its preferred view for that of the arbitrator expressed in the award; and Provided further that, in relation to both clauses (b) and (c), reference to the expression 'award' includes the 'record' on which the award is based, if the answer to the question of law necessitates a reference to the record. Explanation. The expression 'question of law' includes conclusions drawn from proven facts. IHC explained that the term 'question of law' also includes conclusions of fact that are legally flawed - such as when an arbitrator draws a conclusion not based on evidence or not supported by evidence rationally. The IHC stated whether there has been a failure to consider material evidence, or whether an unwarranted conclusion of fact was drawn in the award that no reasonable adjudicator would arrive at, are questions of law, in that a neutral adjudicator is not entitled to ignore a material item of evidence nor to draw a perverse conclusion from the evidence, because, when the parties appoint an arbitrator to be their neutral adjudicator, they cannot be attributed the absurd intention that they also agreed that the arbitrator could ignore a material item of evidence or draw a perverse conclusion from the evidence.10 3.2.4. Operationalisation of Pak Gulf Doctrine: A Judicial Roadmap Pak Gulf also sets out a procedural framework for trial and appellate courts when applying the doctrine during judicial review of an arbitral award. The court must begin with a presumption of correctness in favour of the arbitral award. The award debtor, in turn, must identify a relevant trigger (exception) under the Pak Gulf Doctrine 'with reference to the memos of applications or appeal and the replies'. Once such a trigger is identified, the court may, with the assistance of counsel, examine the award - and if necessary, the record - to determine whether this presumption has been rebutted. Crucially, the court must limit its scrutiny to the specific trigger (exception) raised in the pleadings and arguments, as it is not permitted to search independently for hidden flaws. As Pak Gulf clearly affirms: The Court does not sit in appeal over the award and should not try to fish or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings or the award. Two key points emerge. First, simply identifying a trigger (exception) does not in itself justify granting a remedy such as remission, modification, or setting aside the award. It only allows the court to initiate a further inquiry into that specific trigger (exception), based on the award and, if required, the record. Second, the Pak Gulf Doctrine's triggers (exceptions) cover all statutory grounds available under the 1940 Act - interpreted by Pakistani courts - including 'patent illegality, fraud, misconduct, or jurisdictional excess.'11 The IHC adopts a middle path between complete judicial passivity and excessive intervention. While affirming the arbitrator's primary role in dispute resolution, the court also stresses that it is not bound to uphold an award that is flawed or unjustified. As Pak Gulf notes, this approach 'strikes a balance between the two extremes,' ensuring that judicial review is neither superficial nor overreaching. As the IHC aptly puts it: we should like to think that this progression of the Court's function would strike a balance between the two extremes of a completely hands-off approach and a deeply interventionist approach concerning the triggers for and scope of scrutiny of the award by a Court. 3.2.5. Remedies are Consequential, not Doctrinal While the Pak Gulf Doctrine provides a clearer structure for judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards, the judgment makes it clear that it does not aim to alter or expand the statutory remedies available to courts. Whether an award should be set aside, modified, or remitted depends entirely on the specific nature of the identified trigger (exception). As the Court explains by way of example, if the flaw in the award is a lack of sufficient reasoning under Section 26-A, the correct remedy is to remit the award - not to set it aside. In this way, the Pak Gulf Doctrine merely identifies the triggers and defines the scope of judicial review for those triggers, while the remedies remain governed by the existing provisions of the 1940 Act. As the IHC notes: This clarification is important, because the entire exercise undertaken is an attempt to elucidate and circumscribe the triggers for and the scope of scrutiny of an award and not as to what consequences are to follow therefrom, which are already prescribed in the Arbitration Act. 3.3. Doctrinal Significance: Coherence and Accountability in Judicial Review The Pak Gulf Doctrine presents a doctrinally sound approach to the judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards. In formulating it, the IHC followed a methodical progression: it identified the flaws in Gerry's, diagnosed their underlying causes, proposed a doctrinal remedy by grounding its solution in time-tested common law authority (Hodgkinson v. Fernie), incorporated relevant Pakistani jurisprudence, and offered practical guidance for the doctrine's application. Rather than discarding Gerry's, the IHC salvaged it by reconciling its apparent contradictions through the enduring logic of Hodgkinson v. Fernie and enhancing it by Pakistani arbitral law. 3.3.1. Legislative and Practical Justifications for Judicial Access to the Record The Pak Gulf Doctrine offers a doctrinally and legislatively grounded framework for the judicial review of arbitral awards. It addresses both limbs of judicial scrutiny: the grounds of review and the extent of review. On the grounds of review, the doctrine identifies doctrinal triggers which encompass the statutory or judicially developed grounds under the 1940 Act. These triggers align seamlessly with the statutory framework and allow the court to determine when a deeper review is warranted. The more delicate issue lies in defining the extent of review - i.e., once a trigger is established and the court decides to further examine it, can the court look beyond the face of the award and examine the underlying arbitral record? The Pak Gulf Doctrine clarifies that an 'award' may include the 'record on which the award is based,' but only where a question of law cannot be answered without such reference. At the same time, it warns that this reference must not become an invitation to 'fish or dig out latent errors' in the award or proceedings. This nuanced position also finds legislative support in Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act, which expressly states: The arbitrators... shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement... or if so directed by the Court..., cause the award or signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court... While the IHC has taken a conservative approach - restricting judicial access only to those parts of the record on which the award is directly based - the statute provides broader textual authority to support even wider judicial access to record when necessary. This legislative anchor ensures that the Pak Gulf Doctrine is not only doctrinally coherent but also functionally sound, equipping courts with the evidentiary tools needed for meaningful scrutiny. 3.3.2. Practical Necessity of Going Beyond the Award In addition to doctrinal and statutory support, practical considerations arising during enforcement proceedings make judicial access to the arbitral record - and in some cases, beyond it - imperative. Courts are frequently called upon to adjudicate issues that cannot be resolved by merely reading the face of the award or the arbitration agreement. These include questions such as: - whether the arbitrator committed misconducted;12 - whether the appointment of arbitrator was illegal or procedurally flawed;13 - Whether award was rendered within limitation;14 - Whether the award is tainted by illegality, fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction;15 - Whether the parties were denied a fair opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.16 Such questions, raised as part of post-award challenges, often require courts to examine not just the award, but the record of the arbitral proceedings - and occasionally, even facts beyond the record. 3.3.3. Unresolved Terrain: Going Beyond the Record in Judicial Review However, certain issues may require the court to consider material even beyond the arbitral record. For instance, the question of whether an arbitrator lacked competence to issue the award17 may necessitate extraneous evidence. While this question qualifies as a trigger (exception) of the Pak Gulf Doctrine, the Doctrine does not expressly clarify whether courts may consider such evidence. This omission is understandable. The Pak Gulf Doctrine was intended as a doctrinal synthesis of Gerry's, not as a comprehensive procedural code. Still, it draws from the structure of the 1940 Act - much like the Indian Supreme Court, which has emphasized that judicial review of awards under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must follow a defined statutory frame-work. More specifically, the Indian Supreme Court has held that where objection to the award pertains to matter falling outside the arbitral record, courts may rely on affidavits from both parties. Cross-examination on those affidavits may be permitted only when 'absolutely necessary,' as courts are generally expected to ascertain the truth from the affidavits alone.18 It stated: we clarify the legal position by stating that an application for setting aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator. However, if there are matters not contained in such record, and are relevant to the determination of issues arising under Section 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. Cross-examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary, as the truth will emerge on a reading of the affidavits filed by both parties. Given the doctrinal and procedural parallels between the Indian and Pakistani arbitration regimes, Pakistani courts may similarly allow affidavits to address extraneous but critical matters arising in enforcement proceedings. 4. Pak Gulf Doctrine covers each of Gerry's Principles The Pak Gulf Doctrine does not merely derive isolated support from select principles in Gerry's; rather, it reconstitutes the entirety of Gerry's into a coherent and conceptually ordered doctrinal framework. Each segment of Pak Gulf Doctrine may correspond to specific principles from Gerry's, but more importantly, the Doctrine as a whole reflects a comprehensive integration of the full corpus of Gerry's jurisprudence - filtered, reorganized, and systematized. This is not a case of incidental reliance; it is a complete doctrinal restatement. Pak Gulf transforms Gerry's from a scattered catalogue of 30 case-law-based propositions into a unified architecture of judicial review, thereby resolving the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions that previously plagued arbitral jurisprudence in Pakistan. Indeed, the 30 Gerry's principles can be thematically grouped across four foundational dimensions of arbitral law and judicial review: a. Extent of the arbitrator's authority to determine fact and law: Arbitrator is the final judge on factual and legal questions, within the bounds of jurisdiction (P1, P2). b. Grounds on which courts may intervene in an award: These include the need for a reasoned award (P3); jurisdictional limits (P4, P5, P9); misconduct or procedural irregularity (P6, P7, P26, P27, P29, P30); corruption or fraud (P15); and facial errors of law (P8, P20, P24). c. The intensity and contours of judicial scrutiny once triggered: P3, P13, P17, P18, P19, P22, and P25 delineate the boundaries of review, including deference to arbitral reasoning, prohibition on reappraisal of facts, and the rule that errors must be evident on the face of the award. d. Provisos and limits on judicial interference: These include deference even in the presence of alternative interpretations (P10, P11, P12), the irrelevance of flawed reasoning unless it reaches the threshold of legal error (P14, P16), and exceptions only for grave defects (P15). Thus, the Pak Gulf Doctrine addresses every key theme found in Gerry's - authority, grounds, extent, and limits - but does so in a far more coherent, functional, and doctrinally precise manner. While the IHC modestly describes its approach as a 'practical synthesis', its legal contribution is far greater: it turns Gerry's from a fragmented reference list into a structured, principled framework for arbitration law in Pakistan. 5. Pakistan Railways v. CRRC Ziyang: A Case Study in Judicial Overreach? The Pak Gulf Doctrine offers a comprehensive solution to the doctrinal and procedural inconsistencies that have long plagued judicial review of arbitral awards in Pakistan. It moves courts away from ritualistic mantras - such as repeating that 'courts are not appellate forums' or that 'illegality must appear on the face of the award' - while nonetheless allowing unlimited scrutiny or, conversely, blind deference. By providing a clear framework grounded in statutory text and precedent, Pak Gulf prevents this oscillation between overreach and abdication. Its practical relevance can be well-illustrated by the Pakistan Railways case, where the core issue before the Supreme Court was whether a civil court was justified in framing issues and directing the recording of evidence during proceedings for enforcement of an arbitral award. As the procedural question in Pakistan Railways arose during the enforcement stage, it touched directly on the broader question of judicial restraint and scope of review - core themes within the Pak Gulf Doctrine. The civil court had framed three issues, all of which fell squarely within Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940: i. Whether the award pronounced by the learned arbitrators is required to be made a rule of the Court? OPA ii. Whether the learned arbitrators misconducted in the proceedings as well as in the pronouncement of award as alleged in the objection petition, if so its effect? OPR iii. Whether the award is liable to be set aside on the grounds as alleged in objection petition? OPR The Lahore High Court overturned the civil court's decision, remanding the matter for a decision on the available record. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, reinforcing the principle that Courts, while deciding applications for passing decrees in terms of awards or while deciding objections to awards, generally exercise limited jurisdiction and do not act as appellate bodies over arbitration awards. Their intervention is to be limited to the specific grounds provided in Section 30 of the 1940 Act. In this regard, the Supreme Court referred to five of its own earlier judgments to reaffirm the autonomy and finality of the arbitral forum, and the permissibility of judicial interference only in narrow and clearly defined circumstances envisaged by Section 30 of the 1940 Act i.e., jurisdictional error, proven misconduct, or a patent legal mistake visible on the face of the record. Based on these five cases, the Supreme Court underscored the 'need for judicial restraint, a value that is central to the 1940 Act and is goal of ensuring inexpensive and expeditious justice. 'Please see Annex Bat the end of this article for the excerpts of these five cases as used by the Supreme Court. Building on the aim of securing swift and final resolution of disputes with minimal judicial intervention, the Supreme Court observed that courts, while deciding objections to arbitration awards, ought to avoid framing issues and record (sic) evidence unless absolutely necessary. The order for the framing of issues on an application under Section 30 of the 1940 Act must set out the necessity rather inevitability for the framing of issues, which too have to be specific in nature. The Supreme Court further reasoned that the framing of issues and recording of evidence, however, undermines the core objectives of the 1940 Act, which are efficiency, finality, and minimal judicial intervention. It tends to convert the proceedings pursuant to an application under Section 17 of the 1940 Act to make an award a rule of court or proceedings on objections under Section 30 of the said Act to the award, into a regular trial and this contradicts the 1940 Act's objective of limited judicial interference, finality and efficiency in arbitration. When such proceedings turn into full trials involving the framing of issues and recording of evidence, it causes significant delays and negates the time-saving advantage of arbitration. The Supreme Court thus held that courts must pronounce judgment in terms of the award, intervening only on narrowly defined grounds such as misconduct or invalidity, without re-opening factual controversies through the recording of evidence. It further emphasized that arbitrators regulate their own procedure, are not bound by the Civil Procedure Code or the Qanun-e-Shahadat and are under no obligation to frame issues. When courts undertake to record fresh evidence, they bypass established procedural safeguards and encroach upon the arbitrator's exclusive domain to assess evidence and apply the law. The Supreme Court stated that this results in procedural unfairness, relitigation, and the risk of multiple proceedings on the same issues - ultimately undermining the integrity and finality of the arbitral process. In the case at hand, the civil court framed generalized issues without demonstrating the requisite specificity or necessity for doing so. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. 5.1. Treatment of 'Framing of Issues' in Pakistan Railways In Pakistan Railways, the Supreme Court held that civil courts, while dealing with arbitral awards, must avoid framing issues and recording evidence except where such steps are absolutely necessary. The Court also held that any order framing issues must demonstrate not only the inevitability of doing so but also ensure that such issues are specific in nature. While this formulation apparently aligns with arbitration-friendly norms aimed at efficiency and finality, it introduces ambiguities that remain unresolved. The central premise of the Supreme Court's reasoning was that judicial intervention must remain confined to the narrow, clearly defined grounds under Section 30 of the 1940 Act - namely jurisdictional error, proven misconduct, or a patent legal mistake evident on the face of the record (hereinafter 'permissible grounds'). However, this articulation leaves crucial questions unanswered. If the civil court, after fulfilling the inevitability and specificity thresholds, frames issues based on any of the permissible grounds, does that entitle it to record fresh evidence? If so, such an approach would contradict the established jurisprudence that courts must not go beyond the arbitral record - a principle which the Supreme Court itself emphasized. Conversely, if the inevitability of issue framing arises from a ground not recognized under Section 30, would the Court then be allowed discretion to record evidence beyond the permissible scope? If yes, this would empower civil courts to enter forbidden terrain without any defined limits, thereby undermining the entire doctrine of minimal judicial interference in arbitration. Crucially, this case did not originate from a dispute over which grounds allow judicial review of arbitral awards; rather, it revolved around the extent of judicial review - specifically, the procedural consequences once the review over the objections under Section 30 is triggered. In this context, the civil court had framed three issues, including whether the arbitrators had committed misconduct - an unquestionably valid and permissible ground under Section 30. Therefore, the problem was not the framing of issues per se rather the civil court's directive to record evidence. Instead of squarely addressing this procedural question under the extent of review limb of judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court reiterated the grounds of review limb, offering no meaningful guidance on how far a court may go when reviewing enforcement objections. The judgment's doctrinal clarity is further obscured by the Supreme Court's reference to five of its earlier decisions - none of which were directly engaged with the civil court's power to frame issues or record evidence in this context. These cases were cited to reassert well-established principles: that civil courts cannot act as appellate forums in arbitral matters, must exercise restraint, and may intervene only on limited statutory grounds. Yet, this lengthy reaffirmation of uncontested maxims did not clarify the operative question - when and to what extent may a court record fresh evidence after framing issues on permissible grounds? Nor did the Court explain the doctrinal implications of its modified phrasing, whereby 'any error or infirmity that justifies setting aside the award must be apparent on the face of the award itself',19 or 'a patent error of law or miscarriage of justice is evident on the face of the award'20 was replaced with its own words as 'that judicial interference is permissible only in narrow and clearly defined circumstances envisaged by Section 30 of the 1940 Act i.e., jurisdictional error, proven misconduct, or a patent legal mistake visible on the face of the record.' - a shift in terminology made without any legal reasoning or precedent-based justification. Moreover, the Supreme Court's generous praise of Gerry's - describing it as a 'thorough exposition of the principles that govern scrutiny of arbitral awards under the 1940 Act' - appears to result from a cursory engagement with its content. Even more problematic is the Supreme Court's citation of precedents that prohibit reassessment of evidence already evaluated by the arbitrator as authority to prohibit the recording of new evidence during enforcement proceedings. These two scenarios are legally and procedurally distinct: reassessment involves second-guessing the arbitrator's findings, while recording new evidence concerns matters that the arbitrator may never have addressed. The Supreme Court further did not explain how examining arbitral records to evaluate allegations of arbitrator misconduct - clearly a permissible ground - would violate the arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction or compromise procedural fairness. In sum, the Pakistan Railways ruling reflects a doctrinal misalignment: it frames the case as one concerning the grounds of review while ignoring the extent of review - the precise procedural issue in contention. The Court's reliance on irrelevant case law, its casual engagement with Gerry's, and its conflation of distinct legal processes have created more ambiguity than clarity. Had it employed the analytical framework of the Pak Gulf Doctrine, it could have applied a more principled and consistent standard - one that upholds arbitral autonomy while offering courts a calibrated and rule-based approach to enforcement proceedings. 5.2. Applying the Pak Gulf Doctrine: A Clearer Framework The application of the Pak Gulf Doctrine would have offered a structured and consistent method for judicial review on the issue central to the Pakistan Railways case. The process begins by identifying whether any trigger or exception exists, based on the pleadings - such as the memo of application or appeal and corresponding replies. If the award debtor successfully establishes the existence of such a trigger (exception e.g., misconduct), the court proceeds to the next step: a deeper examination of that trigger (exception). Under the Pak Gulf Doctrine, this becomes a question of law - as the Doctrine expressly defines - and thus warrants judicial inquiry. Since this issue (e.g., misconduct)may not be determinable from the award alone, the court is permitted to refer to the arbitral record. However, consistent with the Doctrine's emphasis on limited judicial intervention, the court may not record fresh evidence at this stage. Nonetheless, if a party raises an objection that cannot be resolved even on the basis of the award and record - and where the issue is both necessary and inevitable - the court may allow additional procedural steps. These may include permitting affidavits and, only if absolutely necessary, limited cross-examination. This approach maintains fidelity to the 1940 Act's goal of efficiency while preserving the procedural fairness. 6. Conclusion The Pak Gulf Doctrine marks a pivotal shift in Pakistan's arbitration jurisprudence by providing courts with a principled, rule-based framework for reviewing arbitral awards. It resolves the uncertainty caused by the fragmented and apparently inconsistent application of Gerry's principles, offering instead a coherent set of judicially manageable standards rooted in doctrinal clarity. By treating flawed factual findings as potential questions of law, it enables judicial accountability without undermining the finality, efficiency, and autonomy of the arbitral process. In contrast to the more ambiguous and discretionary approach adopted in Pakistan Railways, the Pak Gulf Doctrine emerges as a disciplined and doctrinally sound alternative. It restores analytical coherence to judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards and strengthens arbitration as a credible and reliable dispute resolution mechanism in Pakistan. Annex A: Gerry's 30 Principles 8. The principles which emerge from the analysis of above case-law can be summarized as under:- 1. When a claim or matters in dispute are referred to an arbitrator, he is the sole and final Judge of all questions, both of law and of fact. 2. The arbitrator alone is the judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence. 3. The very incorporation of section 26-A of the Arbitration Act requiring the arbitrator to furnish reasons for his finding was to enable the Court to examine that the reasons are not inconsistent and contradictory to the material on the record. Although mere brevity of reasons shall not be ground for interference in the award by the Court. 4. A dispute, the determination of which turns on the true construction of the contract, would be a dispute, under or arising out of or concerning the contract. Such dispute would fall within the arbitration clause. 5. The test is whether recourse to the contract, by which the parties are bound, is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If such recourse to the contract is necessary, then the matter must come within the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 6. The arbitrator could not act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. 7. The authority of an arbitrator is derived from the contract and is governed by the Arbitration Act. A deliberate departure or conscious disregard of the contract not only manifests a disregard of his authority or misconduct on his part but it may tantamount to mala fide action and vitiate the award. 8. If no specific question of law is referred, the decision of the arbitrator on that question is not final however much it may be within his jurisdiction and indeed essential for him to decide the question incidentally. 9. To find out whether the arbitrator has travelled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. An arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from an error apparent on the face of the award. 10. The Court cannot review the award, nor entertain any question as to whether the arbitrators decided properly or not in point of law or otherwise. 11. It is not open to the Court to re-examine and reappraise the evidence considered by the arbitrator to hold that the conclusion reached by the arbitrator is wrong. 12. Where two views are possible, the Court cannot interfere with the award by adopting its own interpretation. 13. Reasonableness of an award is not a matter for the Court to consider unless the award is preposterous or absurd. 14. An award is not invalid if by a process of reasoning it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. 15. The only exceptions to the above rule are those cases where the award is the result of corruption or fraud, and where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award, which one can say is erroneous. 16. It is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. 17. It is not open to the Court to attempt to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of his award. 18. The Court does not sit in appeal over the award and should not try to fish or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings or the award. It can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is incorrect. 19. The Court can set aside the award if there is any error, factual or legal, which floats on the surface of the award or the record. 20. The arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. The arbitrator is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law, and if he does not do so he can be set right by the Court provided the error committed by him appears on the face of the award. 21. There are two different and distinct grounds; one is the error apparent on the face of the award, and the other is that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Courts can look into the arbitration agreement but in the former, it cannot, unless the agreement was incorporated or recited in the award. 22. An error in law on the face of the award means that one can find in the award some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. 23. A contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which the contract was made are altered. 24. Even in the absence of objections, the Award may be set aside and not made a Rule of the Court if it is a nullity or is prima facie illegal or for any other reason, not fit to be maintained; or suffers from an invalidity which is self-evident or apparent on the face of the record. The adjudicatory process is limited to the aforesaid extent only. 25. While making an award rule of the Court, in case parties have not filed objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like a post office but must subject the award to its judicial scrutiny. 26. Though it is not possible to give an exhaustive definition as to what may amount to misconduct, it is not misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision, whether his error is one of fact or law and whether or not his findings of fact are supported by evidence. 27. Misconduct is of two types: "legal misconduct" and "moral misconduct". Legal misconduct means misconduct in the judicial sense of the word, for example, some honest, though erroneous, breach of duty causing miscarriage of justice; failure to perform the essential duties which are cast on an arbitrator; and any irregularity of action which is not consistent with general principles of equity and good conscience. Regarding moral misconduct; it is essential that there must be lack of good faith, and the arbitrator must be shown to be neither disinterested nor impartial, and proved to have acted without scrupulous regard for the ends of justice. 28. The arbitrator is said to have misconducted himself in not deciding a specific objection raised by a party regarding the legality of extra claim of the other party. 29. Some of the examples of the term "misconduct" are: i. if the arbitrator or umpire fails to decide all the matters which were referred to him; ii. if by his award the arbitrator or umpire purports to decide matters which have not in fact been included in the agreement or reference; iii. if the award is inconsistent, or is uncertain or ambiguous; or even if there is some mistake of fact, although in that case the mistake must be either admitted or at least clear beyond any reasonable doubt; and iv. if there has been irregularity in the proceedings. 30. Misconduct is not akin to fraud, but it means neglect of duties and responsibilities of the Arbitrator. Annex B: Supreme Court's Five Judgments as referred to in Pakistan Railways case (i) In the case of Messrs Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 108), this court highlighted the prohibition against acting as a court of appeal in arbitral matters. It clarified that courts cannot engage in a de novo evaluation of evidence recorded by the arbitrator to unearth potential errors. Any error or infirmity that justifies setting aside the award must be apparent on the face of the award itself. Where the reasons given by the arbitrator are challenged as perverse or unreasonable, such perversity must be demonstratable from the materials referred to in the award. (ii) In the case of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2003 SC 301), this court observed that even an erroneous interpretation of a contractual clause is not a valid ground for interference, provided the decision falls within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. It was also clarified that arbitrators are not required to give specific findings on each issue, nor are they bound to furnish reasons unless expressly required. If the award is otherwise within the bounds of the reference and the findings are not absurd or legally untenable, a different view of the facts by the court cannot justify annulment of the award. (iii) In the case of Mian Corporation v. Lever Brothers, Pakistan Ltd. (PLD 2006 SC 169), this court reaffirmed that an arbitrator performs a quasi-judicial role, and his decision is entitled to judicial respect unless misconduct is both specifically alleged and conclusively established before the court. This court underscored that a mere difference of opinion regarding evaluation of facts is not a valid basis to annul the award, particularly when the arbitrator has comprehensively examined a dispute. It was further clarified that the court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over arbitral awards and must refrain from re-assessing or re evaluating the evidence in an effort to identify errors. Provided that the arbitrator has remained within the scope of the reference and no apparent legal defect or jurisdictional error exists, the award is to be maintained. (iv) In the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST (PLD 2011 SC 506), this court held that courts are not to act as appellate bodies by reappraising or reevaluating the evidence considered by the arbitrator. This court underscored that judicial interference is justified only where a patent error of law or miscarriage of justice is evident on the face of the award, and that courts must not "fish for latent errors" in the arbitration proceedings or the award or engage in a deeper inquiry into the fact-finding process carried out by the arbitrator. (v) In the case of Gerry's International v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines (2018 SCMR 662), this court undertook a thorough exposition of the principles that govern scrutiny of arbitral awards under the 1940 Act. It was emphasized that an arbitrator, being the final judge of both law and fact, exercises quasi-judicial authority that cannot be lightly interfered with. This court cautioned that courts are not appellate forums in arbitration matters, and any review must be strictly confined to cases involving patent illegality, fraud, misconduct, or jurisdictional excess. This court also articulated thirty guiding principles to delineate the boundaries of judicial interference. 1 2024 CLD 1451. 2 Gerry s International v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines 2018 SCMR 662. 3 (1857) 3 C.B. (N.S.) 189. 4 C.P.L.A. No. 813-L of 2024. 5 Gerry s principles Nos. 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 26 are allocated to this part of Hodgkinson v. Fernie. 6 Gerry s principles Nos. 15, 24, 25, 27, 29 and 30 are allocated to this part of Hodgkinson v. Fernie. 7 Gerry s principles Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29 are allocated to this part of Hodgkinson v. Fernie. 8 Gerry s principles Nos. 18, 19, 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 are allocated to this part of Hodgkinson v. Fernie. IHC also stated that the familiar term record is the convenient shorthand for the phrase some paper accompanying and forming part of the award in the above formulation, and we will use that term instead. Quite aptly therefore, Gerry s principle No. 19 refers to record alongside the award . 9 The Court replaced dispute for cause or matters in difference . 10 IHC in footnote 15 of the Pak Gulf substantiated it view with Supreme Cout s judgments. The question whether an inference follows from certain facts or not, is a question of law : N. M. Khan v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner 1970 SCMR 158; Bibi Jan v. Habib Khan PLD 1975 SC 295. Factual points could not be allowed to be opened or (re)agitated, unless there had been a material misreading or non-reading of the evidence, which was itself a question of law ... : Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Asst. Collector, Sale Tax and Central Excise, Mardan 2019 SCMR 906. 11 Pakistan Railways v. CRRC Ziyang Co. Ltd. C.P.L.A. No.813-L of 2024. 12 Ejaz Ali Siddique and another v. Rana Irshad Ahmad and another 1998 CLC 1684. 13 Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Aslam v. Haji Muhammad Shafi and another PLD 1993 Lahore 11; Allah Bakhsh v. Mst. Shamshad Begum and others 1990 MLD 1937; Khalil-Ur-Rehman and another v. Haji Abdul Karim and 2 others 1998 CLC 680 and Province of Punjab and 2 others v. Sher Muhammad & Co. and 23 others 2001 CLC 613. 14 Pak Malik Constructors Ltd. Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and another PLD 1982 Lahore 57. 15 Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar and others PLD 2003 Lahore 522. 16 Haji Abdul Ghafur Rishi v. Pakistan, PLD 1959 (W. P.) Quetta 21 and Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail v. Shoukat Ali Rakhshani, 2023 MLD 974. 17 Umar Hayat v. Province of Punjab and another, 2003 YLR 828. 18 Emkay Global Financial Services Limited v. Girdhar Sondhi (2018) 9 SCC 49. See also, Canara Nidhi Limited v. M. Shashikala and others MANU/SC/ 1304/2019 (Supreme Court of India); Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade P. Ltd. v. AMCI (I) Pvt. Ltd. and others, MANU/SC/1485/2009 (Supreme Court of India); Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashok S. Dhariwal and others MANU/SC/0048/2023 (Supreme Court of India). 19 Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 108. The Supreme Court wrote as Any error or infirmity that justifies setting aside the award must be apparent on the face of the award itself. Where the reasons given by the arbitrator are challenged as perverse or unreasonable, such perversity must be demonstratable from the materials referred to in the award. 20 Federation of Pakistan v. Joint Ventures Kocks K.G./RIST, PLD 2011 SC 506. The Supreme Court wrote This court underscored that judicial interference is justified only where a patent error of law or miscarriage of justice is evident on the face of the award, and that courts must not fish for latent errors in the arbitration proceedings or the award or engage in a deeper inquiry into the fact-finding process carried out by the arbitrator.