Rejection of plaint

Suit filed by petitioner / plaintiff was rejected by Trial Court due to bar of S.172 of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, which order was maintained by Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Revenue officer / official designated under Land Revenue Act, 1967, could not demarcate any urban property or the property that had gained character of building site

Trial Court rejected claim of petitioner / plaintiff as barred under S.172 Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 and the order was upheld by Lower Appellate Court mainly relying on S.172 of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967

Both the Courts below failed to consider provision of S.3 of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, which excluded jurisdiction of revenue authorities

Provision of S.172 of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, excludes jurisdiction of Civil Court in the matters that are solely within the authority of revenue officers

Matter was outside the jurisdiction of revenue authorities and the suit was properly filed before Civil Court

Civil Court is the most appropriate forum to resolve dispute between parties permanently by following the provisions of O.XXVI, Rr. 9 & 10, C.P.C., or O.XXVI, R.18, C.P.C. enabling Trial Court to conduct site inspection / demarcations under its authority, with the assistance of some expert revenue officials

Both the Courts below being unaware of their jurisdiction as provided by law proceeded to decide the matter without considering its legality

High Court set aside the orders passed by two Courts below as there were material illegalities and irregularities

High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court to decide the suit after appointing Local Commission assisted by revenue staff in order to determine boundaries of suit property

Revision was allowed, in circumstances.

Petitioners / defendants were aggrieved of dismissal of their application seeking rejection of plaint on the basis of arbitration clause available in the agreement to sell

Plea raised by petitioners / defendants was that the precedent judgment relied upon by Trial Court was not applicable

Validity

Order in question was based solely by placing reliance on a judgment which did not discuss or lay down the principle(s) of law subject matter of the case in hand and was distinguishable on facts mentioned therein

Trial Court had given no other reason for reaching the conclusion that how that case law was relevant, thus, making reference to such a case-law based on previous judgment to reach the conclusion was not sustainable

Oder in question was devoid of plausible reasoning and patently ambiguous and there was no explanation in the same as to how the conclusion was reached in the matter and was also based on misreading or non-reading of judgment relied upon in the same, hence such reliance on the judgment was misplaced

Jurisdiction vested in Trial Court had not been exercised properly

High Court set aside order in question and the matter was remitted to Trial Courtfor decision afresh on the application filed by petitioners / defendants

Revision was allowed accordingly.

If the suit is found to be barred by limitation, then plaint has to be rejected forthwith without resorting to the evidence or framing of any issue

Courts below had minutely dilated upon the evidence of the parties and had also rightly non-suited the petitioner on merits as well

Revision, filed by plaintiff, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Averments in the plaint must be read as a whole to determine whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law

This includes a bar created due to the lapse of the limitation period

At the stage of exercise of power under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., if the averments in the plaint ex-facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof, the suit appears to be barred under any law; the plaint can be rejected.

If some material apart from plaint is available on record and admitted by plaintiff, the Court may take such material into consideration

In case of mixed questions of law and fact, correct approach is to allow suit to proceed to written statement and discovery phases, determining the lis either by farming of preliminary issues or through a regular trial with equal opportunities for both parties.

If even one prayer in plaint is found to be maintainable, plaint cannot be rejected in parts.

Court may even reject plaint on its own motion as a sense of duty, if it is found to be genuinely hit by any of the disability or infirmity provided in the clauses of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

Applicant / plaintiff was aggrieved of rejection of his plaint by Trial Court and dismissal of appeal by Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Under O. XLI, R. 31, C.P.C. it was incumbent upon Lower Appellate Court to frame points for determination, record its decision on each of such points and assign reasons for decision, whether judgment of Trial Court was affirmed, reversed or modified

Formulation of points for determination and application of an independent judicial mind to the controversy between the partis was essential to demonstrate that Lower Appellate Court had discharged its appellate jurisdiction in accordance with law

High Court set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court, as it had erred in law, while passing order in question, which suffered from misreading and misinterpretation of law

High Court remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court for decision afresh on appeal on its own merits in accordance with the provisions of O. XLI, R. 31, C.P.C.

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court

Validity

While deciding the application filed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., the Court has to just see that as to whether the plaintiff has disclosed a cause of action or not and as such at the initial stage it should not be the concern of the Court to record any finding that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action or that he would not be able to prove the cause of action, as such aspect of the case is to be determined after recording of pro and contra evidence

In the present case, notably, that the respondents/plaintiffs had successfully disclosed a cause of action, therefore, the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs was liable to proceed in accordance with law

High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law

Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside, plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court

Validity

Even the fact/ apprehension that the plaintiff may not ultimately succeed in establishing the averments made in the plaint, cannot be a ground for rejecting the plaint under O.VII, R.11 C.P.C.

High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law

Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11 C.P.C.

Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court

Validity

Admittedly, both the parties were siblings inter se and dispute pertained to legacy of their father

Whether the disputed gift mutation(s) were validly made or the same was the result of any fraud, were the questions, which would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of pro and contra evidence

Thus, rejecting such a plaint at the initial stage would not meet the ends of justice

High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law

Revision filed by the defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected on ground of limitation, under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court

Validity

Principle of limitation law, acquiescence as well as estoppel cannot be strictly adhered to in the cases of legal heirs who are deriving their title(s) from a common predecessor

High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law

Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of number of a mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court

Validity

While deciding the application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., it is only the contents of the plaint which are to be considered and even a plea taken in the written-statement or any document appended with the written-statement cannot be considered at such initial stage

At the time of deciding an application filed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., for the rejection of a plaint, the Court has to just consider the "contents" of the plaint and every fact mentioned in the plaint has to be consideredas true and correct and even the written-statement or a plea taken in the written statement cannot be taken into consideration

High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law

Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

When the plaint is barred by any law on the face of it, recording of evidence would be a futile exercise and would amount to encouraging the abuse

Where on the plain reading of the plaint, it can be clearly seen that the suit is patently barred by limitation, no evidence is required

To plead that a plaint cannot be rejected because of the suit being barred by limitation/law, without recording evidence, is to plead against the mandate of law as contained in O. VII, R. 11 C.P.C., which essentially requires the court to reject the plaint which appears from its contents to be barred by limitation

Aggrieved person has to pursue his legal remedies with diligence and if a suit is beyond limitation, the delay of each and every day consumed for approaching the court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained

In the instant case the plaint on the face of it failed to explain the delay of a period of 34 years

The contents of the plaint failed to set up a case in a manner which rendered the question of limitation as a mixed question of law and fact

Mere reading of the contents of the plaint made it abundantly clear that it was statute barred and was liable to be dismissed in terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C without employing valuable judicial resources and time of the Trial Court

By specifically incorporating the provision in terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C, the legislature has empowered the court with an independent suo motu and sua sponte power to examine the plaint by using its wisdom

The courts always nip a frivolous suit in the bud, by rejecting such frivolous, fictitious and untenable claims in order to retain courts' docket and time for more serious claims

Non-actionable plaint or suit is a non-starter and in the interest of administration of justice and good judicial governance, it is best if such plaints are dismissed at the earliest

Keeping in view the mandatory provision of S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is duty of every court and forum itself to look into the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether any objection in this regard has been raised or not

Limitation runs even against a void order and a void order too has to be challenged within limitation

In the instant case, there was no justification at the outset merely by considering the averments of the plaint to overlook the delay of 34 years

When Mst. "SB" did not challenge the impugned gift deed in her life time despite third party transfers through registered deeds, petitioner/plaintiff had no right to claim inheritance of Mst. "SB"

Under Art. 100 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 a presumption was attached to the impugned gift deed which was 34 years old document at the time of its challenge before the Trial Court

In the instant case, predecessor in interest of the petitioner/plaintiff (Mst. "SB") never voiced any grievance against the Impugned mutation; even on her demise in 2009, her legal heirs kept a mum for almost six years despite being resident of same village, and suddenly woke up from slumber and filed the suit in November 2015, which was not permissible under the law

There was no substance in the petition which was dismissed, in circumstances.

In the case in hand, it could not have been held that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action or that relief claimed was undervalued

While alleging cause of action, the petitioners in their plaint had specifically narrated this fact

In the case, the plaint contained material facts, cause of action and a valid claim, thereby requiring adjudication on merits

Revisional Court acted in contradiction to established principle of law by rejecting the plaint prematurely

Thus, the order of the Revisional Court was legally unsustainable and must be set aside

Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in dismissing the application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. as the plaint disclosed a cause of action

Revisional Court, instead of identifying a jurisdictional defect, reassessed factual matters, which was beyond the scope of S.115, C.P.C.

Revisional Court was not meant to act as a second Court of appeal

Revisional Court could interfere only if there was a jurisdictional defect or material irregularity in the subordinate Court's order

Since no jurisdictional defect was present in the Trial Court's decision, the revisional Court's interference was unwarranted and illegal

Petition was allowed by restoring the plaint before the Trial Court.

Where target date for performance of agreement to sell was not fixed, limitation of three years would run from the date of vendor's refusal

Limitation being mixed question of law and facts, effect of

Recording of evidence where limitation is a mixed question of law and facts

Rejection of plaint

Pre-requisites

Precessor-in-interest of the petitioners (deceased vendor) in 1984 entered into agreement to sell with the respondents/plaintiffs (vendees) and target date thereof for performance of the same was fixed as six months from the date of agreement

Performance of the agreement to sell was delayed due to some clerical mistake in revenue record due to which sale deed could not be executed

Suit was filed after eleven years when the petitioners allegedly refused performance two days prior to its institution

Reason for such day cited by the respondents was that an ancillary dispute had been pending at revenue forum

Trial Court rejected the plaint deeming the suit time-barred and lacking cause of action

Whereas, appellate court accepted the appeal and remanded the matter for decision on merits

Successors of the original vendor challenged the decision of the appellate court in the present civil revision petition

Pivotal point for determination before the High Court was as to "whether the plaint in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell (stipulating only a six-month time frame without a specific date), could be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of C.P.C. on the sole ground of limitation, despite the plaintiff's/respondent's (vendee) express assertion that the petitioners/vendors refused to perform their part just two days before the suit was filed; and whether such plea of limitation, being dependent on disputed facts, required framing of issues and recording of evidence rather than outright rejection of the plaint"

Held: Under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. the plaint could be rejected only if from the statement in plaint, it did not disclose any cause of action or was barred by law or was incorrectly valued for the purpose of court fee or insufficiently stamped and on being required to make up the deficiency within time allowed to the plaintiff to make up the deficiency, if plaintiff failed to do the needful within the time allowed, then plaint could be rejected, which was not the case in the present matter

In the present case, perusal of plaint showed that the same disclosed a cause of action

The plaintiffs/respondents alleged the execution of sale agreement, payment of earnest money, delivery of possession and the execution of document and that they were ready and willing to perform their part

The agreement did not mention any specific date for the performance of obligation thereunder rather a period of six months was mentioned in the agreement which did not mean any specific date

Being so, the period of limitation in this case prima facie fell in second part of Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provided for three years from the date when the vendee had the notice of refusal to perform by the vendor

In the present case theplaintiffs/respondents claimed that two days before the filing of suit the petitioners/defendant refused to perform the agreement and this being so ex-facie the plaint could not be rejected on the plea of limitation

It needed to be proved by evidence as to when plaintiffs/respondents had notice of refusal to perform the agreement by petitioners/defendants

As to the argument of limitation the objection being mixed question of law and fact the same could not be decided without evidence

The view taken by the appellate court was in accordance with law, whereby, the judgment and decree rejecting the plaint was set aside and the matter was remanded to Trial Court for decision on merits

Revision petition being without any substance was dismissed, in circumstance.

There is no express direction of law to frame a specific issue in respect of limitation, provided an issue in respect of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., is framed since it not only covers barring of the suit by any law under Clause (d) rather it covers Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. as well.

Rejection of the plaint is merited when the suit appears to be barred by law and the import of the word 'appear' is deciphered to mean that if prima facie the Court considers that it appears from the statements in the plaint that the suit is barred, then it should be terminated forthwith.

Plaintiff company sought specific performance of agreement to sell regarding suit properties which were mortgaged with bank as security for a finance facility

Defendant company sought rejection of plaint on the plea that the suit was not maintainable

Validity

Provision of S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not operate retrospectively and transfers that occurred prior to promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not to be treated as void

General restraints as contained in Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 could only set aside those registered transfers that had violated provisions of each of those subsections

Properties that were not furnished as security were not impacted by S. 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 prior to any decree passed and were valid transfers

Agreement of sale instituted for sale of a mortgaged property would be void under S. 23 of Contract Act, 1872 as the object of agreement of sale would be to defeat the provision of law i.e., S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Right of redemption may be recognized in the context of transfers subject to S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Jurisdiction to determine performance of agreement to sell as entered into between parties, in terms of Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 at all times vested with Banking Court and Civil Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain such suit

Plaint seeking specific performance of agreement to sell was barred under the provisions of Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and was liable to be rejected under the provisions of O.VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C.

High Court rejected the plaint seeking specific performance of agreement to sell under O. VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C. as jurisdiction to consider the performance on the agreement of sale in respect of mortgaged property vested in Banking Court under Ss.23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Plaint was rejected in circumstances.

For the purposes of R. 11 of O. VII of C.P.C. the law dictates that only the contents of the plaint or any other admitted facts may be considered and that the contents of the plaint be presumed as true and no allegation countering the facts of the plaint may be entertained

Thus, if a perusal of the facts pleaded in the plaint in a suit shows ex facie that the suit is covered by any of the conditions provided in R. 11 of O. VII of C.P.C. then the suit must fail at its inception and the plaint must be rejected.

Petitioners claimed ownership of suit property measuring 1885 sq.ft. but alleged that the official records wrongly recorded it as 315 square feet since 1973

Their applications for correction before the respondent authorities in 2021 were unsuccessful, leading them to file a civil suit, which was dismissed on account of an earlier similar suit which was also dismissed under O. VII R. 11, C.P.C.

Held: Petitioners themselves admitted that the allegedly incorrect area of the suit property was first recorded in the year 1973 and then again and again until 2011

However, the petitioners did not pursue any remedy whatsoever until the year 2021, for more or less ten years from the last entry in the record

Under Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 the limitation period to institute a suit for declaration was six years which in the present case had elapsed long before the suit was instituted (even if the same was considered from the year 2011 when the last entry was made)

The contents of the plaint clearly showed that a suit was barred by time

There was no benefit in letting the suit proceed to trial

In the present case, for example, it was striking that (allegedly) the area of the suit property was reduced in the record from 1885 sq. ft. to 315 sq. ft. (by almost 80%) but none of the parties concerned came forward timely to seek relief

The suit of the petitioners was stillborn from its inception

It is settled law that stillborn suit must be buried immediately without a formal ceremony

Therefore, both Courts below were right in passing their respective decisions

Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Limitation being a mixed question of law and facts is not a hard-and-fast principle and its application ultimately comes down to the facts and circumstances surrounding every case on its own sight

The issue of limitation varies from being a pure issue of law to being a mixed issue of law and fact on a case to case basis

Where there is controversy surrounding limitation, it becomes a mixed issue to be resolved only after evidence, however, where dates and circumstances relevant for computing limitation are apparent from the plaint itself it become a pure legal issue which may be summarily decided under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

The appellant filed a defamation suit against the respondents for allegedly issuing a defamatory letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) which he claimed damaged his reputation

Trial court rejected the plaint under O.VII R.11 CPC on the ground that the impugned letter was issued in the respondents' official capacity and was protected under "absolute privilege" as per S.6 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (the Ordinance, 2002) and S.483 of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act 2017)

The appellant challenged this rejection in the present appeal contending that such determinations required evidence and could not be resolved at the preliminary stage

Two important points for consideration by the High Court were as to "i. Whether the defamatory letter qualified as a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of S.483 of the Act, 2017? and; ii. Whether the defamatory letter was written by the respondents in their personal or official capacity?"

Held: Perusal of S.483 of the Act, 2017 revealed that whilst powers of the civil court had been vested in the Commission for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) of S.483 in respect of any "proceedings" or "enquiry", the same attained the status of a "judicial proceeding" only within the meaning and for the purposes of Ss.193 and 228 of the P.P.C.

The defamatory letter visibly did not fall in the said category and it could not be classified as part of a "judicial proceeding"

Therefore, reliance of the Trial court on the above noted provision, at least for the purposes of rejection of plaint, was unfounded and incorrect

With regards to the second question for determination by the High Court, same required evidence to be recorded

The appellant should have been given an opportunity to examine the respondents and put forward necessary questions to them to determine the capacity in which the defamatory letter was written

The conclusion by the Trial Court in reference to the said letter being written by the respondents in their "official positions" could not have been made prior to recording of evidence

Trial Court went over and above the permissible scope of O.VII R.11 C.P.C.

Perusal of the impugned order reflected that the Trial court had not distinguished between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit

Matter was remanded back to the Trial Court with a direction to conclude the proceedings within six months

Order of rejection of plaint was set aside and present appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

The appellants/plaintiffs (vendees) filed a suit seeking specific performance of a contract, cancellation of a sale deed, and permanent injunction claiming that their late father (original vendee) had entered into an agreement to purchase the land in 2010, followed by a fresh agreement with legal heirs

Despite part payment through cheques, the vendors (Respondents Nos. 1-7) allegedly sold the land to a third person (respondent No. 8) through a registered sale deed

The trial and appellate courts rejected the plaint on the grounds of res judicata and limitation, leading to the filing of the present petition

The main points for consideration in the present appeal were that (i) "Whether the suit was barred by res judicata; (ii) Whether the suit was barred by Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908"

Held: It stood admitted that the original vendee (father of appellants/plaintiffs) had previously instituted suit against the vendor seeking enforcement of the prior sale agreement

That suit was dismissed on merits, with specific findings that the agreement could not be proved and that vendee's possession was unlawful

Notwithstanding the reliance on the fresh agreement executed with legal heirs of the original vendor, the appellants (vendees) simultaneously grounded their claim on possession allegedly derived from the earlier transaction between their predecessor-in-interests

Application under O. VII R. 11(d) C.P.C. were to be decided as per the following principles: (i) To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to; (ii) The defence made by the defendant in the suit must not be considered while deciding the merits of the application;(iii) To determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it was necessary that (a) the 'previous suit' was decided, (b) the issues in the subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (c) the former suit was between the same parties or parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title; and (d) that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by a court competent to try the subsequent suit; and (e) since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata required consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the 'previous suit', such a plea would be beyond the scope of O. VII R. 11(d), where only the statements in the plaint would have to be perused

Therefore, the issue of res judicata could not have been decided on an application under R. 11 of O. VII of C.P.C.

The reason was that the adjudication on the issue involved consideration of the pleadings in the earlier suit, the judgment of the Trial Court and the judgment of the appellate court

The suit should be decided on merits and the issue of res judicata should remain open and a separate issue on res judicata should be framed along with the other issues

Both the courts below erred in law and wrongly rejected the plaint on the point of res judicata as both went beyond the scope of O. VII, R. 11(d) C.P.C.

However, High Court left the point of res judicata open for the Trial Court to frame the issue upon and decide the same on the basis of pleadings and evidence of the parties

As far as the point of limitation for filing the suit was concerned, the examination of the agreement revealed that no fixed date was prescribed for the performance of the agreement, however, the determination of whether time was of the essence to the contract was a matter that could only be adjudicated once respondents Nos.1 to 7 (vendors) filed their respective written statements, as they were privy to the agreement

The findings of both courts below, which summarily concluded that the suit was barred by limitation and consequently rejected the plaint, appeared to be fanciful and disconnected from the record

The issue of limitation prima facie appeared to be mixed question of law and fact, which required evidentiary adjudication and necessitated a combination of scrutiny of questions of law and fact, which could not be decided hypothetically, cursorily, or without appreciating the starting point of limitation in case before non-suiting any person on the ground of limitation

Courts below erred in law by holding that suit was time barred

Impugned judgments of both the courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court with directions to restore the suit to its original status by affording respondents Nos. 1 to 7 (vendors) an opportunity to file their written statements within stipulated period as provided under the law, however, High Court left open the points of res judicata and limitation for the Trial Court to decide the same after framing of the issues from the pleadings of the parties

Second appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Contention of the respondent/actual owner was that such a suit without an agreement and authority in favour of his son to enter into an oral agreement was barred

Validity-Respondent was the sole and absolute owner of the suit plot and the appellant had failed to place on record any evidence that respondent (actual owner) ever intended or entered into any sale transaction in respect of the suit plot with the appellant either through WhatsApp messages or emails

Entire record of conversation through WhatsApp messages and emails was between appellant and son of actual owner, who was not competent to enter into a sale transaction with the appellant, more particularly when the actual owner in his written statement had specifically stated that he never authorized his son to fetch a buyer or enter into an agreement to sell in respect of the suit plot on his behalf

Appellant had failed to place on record any evidence as to oral transaction between him and the actual owner of the suit plot

Where sale was pleaded through oral agreement then the terms and conditions which were orally agreed were to be stated in detail in the pleadings

In such like cases, a party besides detailing subject matter of the sale and consideration was also required to provide other necessary details such as striking of the bargain, and names of the witnesses in whose presence the said oral transaction for sale was arrived at, which were the essential requirement for proving an oral agreement to sell

Not a single penny had been paid by appellant towards sale consideration and an amount, alleged to have been paid by the appellant, was paid to the Society towards dues and not as part of sale consideration

Appellant failed to make out a case for specific performance of an agreement to sell

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Applicants / plaintiffs were private individuals who sought declaration of ownership on behalf of Municipal Corporation and had assailed lease deed executed between two government organizations in year 2012

Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court concurrently rejected the plaint filed by applicants / plaintiffs

Validity

Municipal Corporation did not come before Court and applicants / plaintiffs without having legal authority to act on behalf of the Municipal Corporation could not initiate legal proceedings related to the interests of that Corporation

Applicants / plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had authority to act on behalf of Municipal Corporation seeking declaration of ownership of suit property

Applicants / plaintiffs sought cancellation of a lease deed, which was executed between Military Estates Officer and PTCL in year 2012, by filing a suit in the year 2017 claiming that the same was result of fraud

For seeking such relief, limitation period was "three years" as provided under Art.91 of Limitation Act, 1908

Applicants / plaintiffs had no concern with alleged lease deed as it had been executed between two government departments

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in concurrent findings of two Courts below who were justified in rejecting the plaint

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Provision of O. II, R. 6, C.P.C. is available only when joinder of causes of action is within the limitations imposed by O. II, R. 3, C.P.C. and Court then feels that one or more of the causes of action cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together

Provision of O. II, R 6, C.P.C. is not intended to say that even if joinder of causes of action is beyond limitations imposed by O. II, R. 3, C.P.C., the Court can nonetheless order separate trials or step into the shoes of plaintiff to remedy the defect by other means, for that would make O. II, R. 3, C.P.C. redundant

High Court rejected the plaint under O. VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C., as joinder of causes of action had gone beyond the provision of O. II, R. 3, C.P.C.

Plaintiffs by virtue of O. VII, R. 13, C.P.C. were free to explore separate suits

Application was allowed accordingly.

Where pleading as to existence of agreement was pleaded from conversations, it was not necessary for petitioner/ plaintiff to spell out entire contract in detail

It was proper to make general claim as to the contract which petitioner/plaintiff was attempting to enforce

If plaint was ambiguous, the Court could ask for further and better particulars to be filed by petitioner/plaintiff under the provisions of O. VI, R. 5 C.P.C.

Just because the terms of agreement were not spelt out, such agreement could not be treated as unenforceable and could not be automatically rejected under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Once agreement to sell was admitted by respondent/defendant and various terms of oral agreement were unilaterally modified by respondent/ defendant, the same amounted to respondent/defendant refusing to perform his obligations on such oral agreement of sale and such admission had given petitioner/plaintiff a right to maintain a lis for specific performance

Date of legal notice was 12-05-2018, time period for institution of lis was to be determined from that date and having been presented on 6-05-2019, suit was within time period specified under Art. 113 of First Sched. of Limitation Act, 1908, and which, subject to evidence to the contrary of any other issue of limitation was maintainable before the Trial Court

There was a material irregularity in judgments passed by two Courts below and both failed to apply the law in respect of application of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., properly

High Court revised judgments by two Courts below which were set-aside and application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. was dismissed

High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision on merits

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Respondent/plaintiff sought recovery of damages for breach of lease agreement and cost of repairs to the damage caused to leased house

Trial Court declined to reject the plaint

Validity

When it comes to foreign affairs and inter-state relations, Courts exercise their powers cautiously and while exhibiting deference to the position of Federal Government

Exercise of judicial power in relation to foreign states may have consequences for inter-state relationships

It is Federal Government aided by Foreign Office and not municipal Courts that are best placed to comprehend consequences that assumption of jurisdiction in relation to foreign states may have on inter-State relations

Given the principle of reciprocity, to the extent that municipal Courts assume jurisdiction in relation to missions of foreign states and/or diplomatic agents, such actions could have consequences for the manner in which other states treat Pakistani missions and diplomatic agents abroad

Provision of S. 4 of Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 provides that final determination of whether or not a person is entitled to any privilege or immunity is to be determined by Federal Government by issuing a certificate in such regard

While it is for the person claiming immunity to establish that it falls beyond the jurisdiction of Courts in Pakistan, any waiver of immunity is to be strictly construed

Provisions of Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 read together with provisions of Treaties clarify that even where a state waives immunity, the execution of a judicial verdict requires a separate and express waiver

Where a foreign state or a foreign mission has been made party to a judicial proceeding and such state or state agent makes a claim for immunity, the Court seized of the matter must issue a notice to Federal Government for purposes of S. 4 of Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 in order to determine whether or not the foreign state or state agent is entitled to the privilege or immunity claimed

Claim made by respondent/plaintiff did not fall within the exclusion from immunity in terms of S. 17 of State Immunity Ordinance, 1981

High Court set aside order passed by Trial Court whereby it held that the Agreement constituted a commercial transaction and failed to appreciate that petitioner/State of Libya enjoyed immunity from judicial proceedings in relation to the claim under provisions of the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 and State Immunity Ordinance, 1981

Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was barred by law

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

By it order dated 27.04.2010 ('the Order') Trial Court allowed the plaintiff time to make the court fee deficiency good with the rider that, in case of non-payment of court fee by the next date of hearing, the plaint would be deemed as rejected

On the next date of hearing i.e. 13.05.2010, without any request from the plaintiff the Trial Court granted the plaintiff a last opportunity to deposit the court fee

Revisional Court, as well as the High Court, both concurrently held that the Order granting time for making good the deficiency was a conditional order and, since the order was not complied with, the plaint was deemed to have been rejected automatically and thereafter the Trial Court could not extend the time and had become functus officio

Legality

On 27.04.2010, time was allowed under Section 149, C.P.C. by the Trial Court to pay the court fee by 13.05.2010, failing which the plaint shall be deemed to have been rejected, however on 13.05.2010, although the court fee stood unpaid, the Trial Court extended the time for payment of court fee without even fixing any time frame in the extension order, and that too without any oral or written request showing any plausible or sufficient cause by the plaintiff/petitioner for not complying with the Order within the stipulated timeframe

Trial Court, without considering the sanctity of its previous order in which the non-compliance of the order impacted an automatic rejection of the plaint and without enquiring or questioning the reasons for non-compliance, extended the time in a slipshod manner on its own motion without realizing the repercussions and consequences of its earlier Order

By passing a conditional order, the Trial Court had not only surrendered and abandoned its jurisdiction of enlargement of time under Section 148, C.P.C., but also closed the doors for the plaintiff in the event of non-compliance of the Order

Supreme Court deprecated practice and tendency of passing such conditional orders and directed that if any act is not complied within the time stipulated in the C.P.C. or time granted by the Court, the most appropriate legal action or step would be for the Court to take up the matter at the end of the expiry period and pass an appropriate order for non-compliance and if the party at default applies for the enlargement of time to comply with the direction(s) due to some sufficient cause(s) including force majeure circumstances which prevented compliance within time, then of course on such request the Court may further extend or enlarge time for compliance

Trial Court had passed the Order for enlargement of time with a perfunctory approach which was unjustified and unwarranted, hence the Revisional Court rightly set aside the Order and the High Court rightly maintained the same

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Principles relating to rejection of plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C stated.

In the present case the business entity was being operated through a registered partnership firm between the two partners i.e. the petitioner (defendant) and respondent No. 1 (plaintiff)

Said business was neither a corporate entity nor was it incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, or the Companies Act, 2017 therefore, the assertion of the petitioner that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 was misconceived and fallacious

As a matter of fact, Section 5 had no applicability or nexus in the matter

Therefore, it had nothing to do with the pending suit between the parties

Substratum of the plaint did not highlight any dispute with regards to the business of the partnership firm, nor did anybody approached the Court for dissolution of the partnership firm or rendition of accounts; but for all practical purposes, the respondent No.1 only entered into an agreement for buying out 50% share of the petitioner in the partnership firm against a valuable consideration, and due to the alleged breach and non-fulfillment of terms and conditions of the agreement, respondent No.1 filed the suit for specific performance of contract with some other ancillary reliefs

All the prayers mentioned by the respondent No.1 were not considered (by the Trial and Appellate Court) which had independent status and were not dependent upon the alleged right of execution of sale deed or transfer of 50% share of the partnership firm in favour of respondent No.1 against a valuable consideration

According to respondent No.1, the partnership business was a going concern and he wanted to buy out 50% share of another partner

The effect of the agreement in question was also to be decided by the Trial Court on whether the arrangement in question could be construed as an agreement for relinquishment of share or retirement from the firm

On the alleged consensus ad idem, the contract was signed, and on the alleged breach, respondent No.1 filed the suit

Court cannot force someone to file a suit for dissolution of partnership or rendition of accounts, but it has to see whether specific performance of contract is possible or not, and in this case, unless the parties were provided equal opportunity to lead the evidence, it was not possible to decide the matter summarily on the basis of an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

At present stage, the Trial Court could not presume or anticipate the outcome that if the case was made out on merits and the Court granted a decree of specific performance, what the plaintiff would do with the partnership business, and whether he would induct any other partner, continue as proprietor, or convert it into a corporate entity of business

That was not the issue before the Court right now

At present, the lis only related to the alleged sale agreement of 50% share of another partner against some valuable consideration

This was the core issue and dispute between the parties which needed to be adjudicated by the Trial Court

High Court had rightly set-aside the orders of Trial Court and First Appellate Court, whereby the plaint was rejected, and remanded the matter to Trial Court with directions to decide the suit on merits

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

In the present case the business entity was being operated through a registered partnership firm between the two partners i.e. the petitioner (defendant) and respondent No. 1 (plaintiff)

Said business was neither a corporate entity nor was it incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, or the Companies Act, 2017 therefore, the assertion of the petitioner that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 was misconceived and fallacious

As a matter of fact, Section 5 had no applicability or nexus in the matter

Therefore, it had nothing to do with the pending suit between the parties

Substratum of the plaint did not highlight any dispute with regards to the business of the partnership firm, nor did anybody approached the Court for dissolution of the partnership firm or rendition of accounts; but for all practical purposes, the respondent No.1 only entered into an agreement for buying out 50% share of the petitioner in the partnership firm against a valuable consideration, and due to the alleged breach and non-fulfillment of terms and conditions of the agreement, respondent No.1 filed the suit for specific performance of contract with some other ancillary reliefs

All the prayers mentioned by the respondent No.1 were not considered (by the Trial and Appellate Court) which had independent status and were not dependent upon the alleged right of execution of sale deed or transfer of 50% share of the partnership firm in favour of respondent No.1 against a valuable consideration

According to respondent No.1, the partnership business was a going concern and he wanted to buy out 50% share of another partner

Effect of the agreement in question was also to be decided by the Trial Court on whether the arrangement in question could be construed as an agreement for relinquishment of share or retirement from the firm

On the alleged consensus ad idem, the contract was signed, and on the alleged breach, respondent No.1 filed the suit

Court cannot force someone to file a suit for dissolution of partnership or rendition of accounts, but it has to see whether specific performance of contract is possible or not, and in this case, unless the parties were provided equal opportunity to lead the evidence, it was not possible to decide the matter summarily on the basis of an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

At present stage, the Trial Court could not presume or anticipate the outcome that if the case was made out on merits and the Court granted a decree of specific performance, what the plaintiff would do with the partnership business, and whether he would induct any other partner, continue as proprietor, or convert it into a corporate entity of business

That was not the issue before the Court right now

At present, the lis only related to the alleged sale agreement of 50% share of another partner against some valuable consideration

This was the core issue and dispute between the parties which needed to be adjudicated by the Trial Court

High Court had rightly set-aside the orders of Trial Court and First Appellate Court, whereby the plaint was rejected, and remanded the matter to Trial Court with directions to decide the suit on merits

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Principles relating to rejection of plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C stated.

Petitioner / plaintiff filed revision as his suit was rejected under O. VII, R. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which judgment was maintained by the District Court

Validity

It was the case of the petitioner that he was recorded owner and in possession of the land in dispute; National Highway Authorities (NHA) had constructed the road while a watercourse towards the northern side of the NHA existed

Revenue extracts appended with the plaint showed ownership of the petitioner in column 11 of relevant Khasra

Official respondents did not dispute ownership of the petitioner in the record of rights

Regarding " cause of action", contents of the plaint manifested that the petitioner had disclosed a cause of action clause, which was apparent in relevant para of the plaint, as such, the provisions of O.VII, R.11(a), Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would not be attracted in the present case

Moreover, the documents appended with the plaint reflected that the petitioner was the recorded owner of the land in dispute and the burden was upon the petitioner to substantiate his legal character and right enshrined under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, by adducing evidence at the Trial Court which was not a purely legal question, thus, the Courts below had erred in law while not dilating upon said aspect

Furthermore, O.XIV, R.1, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, demonstrates that it is a prime obligation of the Trial Court to frame issues of law and facts after receiving the pleadings of the parties, and thereafter decide the legal issue at first instance under sub-rule (2) of O. XIV, C.P.C., but in the present case Trial Court had not followed the mandatory provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, thus it committed an illegality and irregularity

Impugned order/judgment and decrees of the Courts below depicted that they had misinterpreted the provision of O. VII, R.11(a), Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which is a procedural provision

Trial Court had not followed the procedure provided under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, while delivering the impugned order and decree in a cursory and mechanical manner, thus the same were not sustainable in eyes of law

High Court set-aside the impugned orders and decrees and directed that the application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., would be deemed pending before the Trial Court, which would frame issues of law and facts in view of the pleadings of the parties, and thereafter proceed with the matter in accordance with law

Revision filed by the plaintiff was allowed accordingly.

Plaintiff/lady, apart from cancellation of mutation, sought second relief praying restoration of her possession over two rooms constructed by her claiming that she was forcibly dispossessed without adopting proper course of law

Civil Court rejected the plaint of the lady/ plaintiff allowing an application filed by the defendants, however, the Appellate Court partly allowed plaintiff's appeal remanding the case with a direction to decide the second relief/prayer on merit

Contention of the petitioners/defendants was that gift-mutation was admitted

Plea of the respondent /plaintiff was that evidence was required in respect of second limb /relief sought by her

Validity

While deciding an application under O. VII, R. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, only averments of the plaint were to be taken into consideration and every case was to be decided as per its own peculiar fact and circumstances

Respondent/plaintiff beside seeking cancellation of the impugned gift also sought relief for restoration of her possession of two rooms, which were allegedly constructed by her and said fact was also admitted in another suit filed by the petitioners which was already decreed

Since the respondent/plaintiff was allegedly forcibly dispossessed from the suit-property without adopting proper course of law, and in respect of second limb of her prayer the suit did not fall in the penal provision of O. VII, R. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Trial Court considered only one prayer/relief while deciding application filed by the petitioners/ defendants under O. VII, R. 11, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Suit could be considered and decided independently on the basis of pleadings and evidence of the parties with regard to the other prayer

Such partial rejection, as in the present case, was not permissible under the law

Appellate Court for justifiable reason had set-aside the order of the Trial Court, therefore, impugned order passed by the Appellate Court did not call for any interference by the High Court

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Suit for recovery of damages etc. against the director/principal of the college for his alleged inability of plaintiff's migration/admission to a foreign university

Trial Court rejected the plaint of the plaintiff allowing the application moved by the defendants, which judgment was maintained by the Appellate Court

Contention of the petitioner/plaintiff was that the contents of plaint were to be considered as true and the suit was to be decided on merit

Validity

For disclosure of cause of action, being one of the four grounds contained in the Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, it is the plaint and the plaint alone that must disclose a cause of action

Phrase 'cause of action' is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

A cause of action constitutes bundle of facts, which if traversed , the plaintiff has to prove

For rejection of a plaint condensed guidelines are: firstly, only requirement is that Court must examine the statement in the plaint prior to taking a decision ;secondly, the contents of the written-statement are not to be examined; thirdly, while carrying out an analysis of the averments contained in the plaint, the Court is not denuded of its normal judicial power to critically consider the averments of plaint as well as documents annexed to the plaint

In the present case, in view of the said guideline for the carrying out an analysis of the averments contained in the plaint, all the claims (request for migration, issuance of NOC, payments etc.) as averred in the plaint , all which he might prove, the same would not grant success to the petitioner/plaintiff entitling him to a relief including damages for mental Agony

Reason being that the petitioner/plaintiff having opted for admission abroad had nothing to do with mental shock and agony by the respondents

Petitioner/plaintiff had not annexed any documents in respect of the payments he made

Petitioner's plea for recovery of Rs. 7.0 million as fee of lawyer was an unbelievably exorbitant amount of money and miscellaneous expenses were not supported by any documentary proof, nor were the details of the damages jotted down in the plaint

No illegality or irregularity was noticed in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below while rejecting plaint of the petitioner/plaintiff

Revision filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, in circumstances.

Suit filed by the plaintiff regarding agreement to sell/ transfer of proprietary rights qua suit-property (state land) was concurrently decreed in his favour

Contention of the petitioners (vendors/defendants) was that the Province of the Punjab('the Province') had not granted proprietary rights of the suit-property to them yet

Validity

Record revealed that suit-property was still owned by the Province and the state retained its powers to deny the proprietary rights to the petitioners/defendants in case of any violation, hence both the Courts below, while passing the impugned judgments and decrees , failed to appreciate the material fact that the respondent/plaintiff had filed suit for specific performance before arising cause of action as the alleged agreement to sell could not be enforced until proprietary rights were confirmed by the Province to the petitioners/defendants

High Court set-aside the impugned judgments and decrees having been passed in favour of respondent/plaintiff; and rejected the plaint filed by the respondent/plaintiff under R. 11 read with Rule 13 of O. VII of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Revision was allowed, in circumstances.

Civil Court rejected the plaint of suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under O. VII, R.11(d) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and appeal preferred by him against the same was also dismissed

Validity

Petitioner / plaintiff did not disclose the date of knowledge and source of information of alleged fraud, which were essential and necessary to be pleaded in the plaint as required by O.VI, R. 4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Suit ought to have been filed within six years from the date of arising of cause of action or from the date of knowledge, but it had been instituted after about 21 years of inquiry proceedings, in which subject-matter(disputed mutation) was already settled against the petitioner/ plaintiff

In such scenario, the suit of the petitioner was barred by limitation

Besides, limitation runs even against a void order and if for the sake of arguments, it is admitted that the petitioner did not associate with the proceedings before the revenue hierarchy, he was bound to explicitly plead the date of his knowledge of alleged fraud, which was lacking in this case, so it could not be said that here in this case the limitation was a mixed question of law and facts

Present case had rightly been adjudged and the petitioner had rightly been non-suited

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Civil Court rejected the plaint of suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under O.VII, R. 11(d) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and appeal preferred by him against the same was also dismissed

Validity

Dispute in the present case was, admittedly, regarding the disputed mutation which had already been raised before the competent forum about two decades ago by way of application for inquiry which was concluded within a year or so vide an inquiry report, wherein it was determined that the disputed mutation was genuinely entered into and executed by the concerned parties; it was further determined in the said inquiry that the petitioner / plaintiff was a fake person and had no concern with the disputed property; meaning thereby the matter remained sub-judice before the competent forum and the petitioner / plaintiff was well aware of all the proceedings but he kept mum after report of the said inquiry because adverse remarks were passed against him and he did not challenge the same before any relevant forum further

Both the Courts below had accurately rejected the plaint under O. VII, R. 11 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Defendants sought rejection of plaint on the plea that in earlier suits portion of claim given up was again raised by plaintiffs

Validity

If a litigant is entitled to more than one relief in respect of same cause of action, he has to sue for all or he may sue for any of the relief he may opt but the leftover would count as an omission to sue

Provisions of O. II, R. 2, C.P.C., are penal in nature and precludes a litigant to sue for a portion of claim or remedy so ignored or omitted

Plaintiffs ignored and omitted to sue for all claims and reliefs to which they were entitled with regard to a cause of action that was "breach of trust" and hence were precluded to have a next round of litigation on the original cause of action

Plaintiffs could only ignore any of the matured relief at the risk of treating them as relinquished or ignored one

Purported breach of trust of one defendant gave rise to a common cause of action and for any relief arising out of that common cause of action, provision of O. II, R. 2(2), C.P.C., provided that plaintiffs cannot split the relief into parts where the cause had been consumed in an earlier litigation so as to bring separate suits in respect of those parts left behind

Pleadings of the two suits disclosed that there was one cause i.e. breach of trust which would cover all promises that were made under a transaction, whether oral or in writing

Suit was hit by provisions of O. II, R. 2(2) C.P.C. and was barred under the law

High Court rejected the plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Application was allowed, in circumstances.

Actual transaction took place in year 1992 when suit property was purchased in the names of predecessor-in-interest of parties who were wives of two business partners

Transaction was first time challenged by plaintiffs in that year 2018

It is also a common practice and custom of our society that a property is purchased in the name of wife merely to provide her a sense of security

Title of suit property was never questioned or title was never threatened even after passage of 15 (fifteen) years after the death of father of plaintiffs

Provision of Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 started running from the date of death of father, that was, 04-09-2003 and not April, 2018

High Court rejected the suit as it was barred by Limitation Act, 1908

Application was allowed, in circum-stances.

For purposes of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C, sole prerequisite was that Court, prior to rendering a judgment must analyze averments made in plaint

Through a requisite implication, it was evident that contents of written statement are not to be examined and put to juxtaposition with plaint to ascertain veracity or fallacy of the plaint's averments in which was expressly precluded

Court was not tasked with adjudicating correctness of plaint or written statement

Scope of section 100 C.P.C. was limited to appeals involving substantial questions of law rather than pure questions of facts

In second appeal it was essential to formulate questions of law which were inherent to the jurisdiction

In order to avoid unfairness and make sure justice was done, the ability to appeal had brought up the idea of highlighting two or even three layers of checks and balances

There was a clear difference between two appellate jurisdictions

First granted by S.96 C.P.C. allowed Appellate Court to consider factual issues

Second granted by S.100 C.P.C. did not allow it to interfere with factual findings recorded by first Appellate Court

Appellant / plaintiff failed to demonstrate any illegality or material irregularity in judgment / order passed by both the Courts below

Second appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Claim of the plaintiff was that due to criminal case lodged by the defendant , he lost his reputation in the eyes of general public as well as friends and he was also detained in jail for a sufficient period till he was bailed out by the Court and that after full-dressed trial, he was acquitted

Civil Court rejected the plaint , which order was maintained by the Appellate Court

Validity

From the record ( averment of plaint, the impugned orders, the judgment of acquittal ) it would not be possible to say that the plaint did not have any proof of the four elements required in a suit for malicious prosecution

Basic contentions of the appellant/plaintiff were clearly contained in the plaint

The question of proof would arise only after issues are framed and the opportunity to lead evidence is given to the parties

The plaint is to contain the facts, which it clearly contained and the manner in which the same would be proved was up to the appellant/plaintiff

This was not a case where on a plain reading of the plaints no cause of action existed for malicious prosecution, especially owing to the FIR which was lodged, the appellant/plaintiff faced full-dressed trial, the subsequent acquittal and the nature of allegations in the plaints

In view of the provisions of the O. VI, R.2, C.P.C., 1908 , the pleading is not a substitute of the evidence

In such circumstances, without providing opportunity to the appellant / plaintiff to prove his pleadings through evidence , it would not be just and proper to reject the plaint

Even , in such like cases, the Courts may not consider the defence brought by the opponent

Thus, the plaint , in the present case, was not liable to be rejected in a summary manner under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C

High Court set aside impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court as well as order passed by the Trial Court and remanded the back to the Trial Court with direction to decide the suit afresh after recording evidence of the parties

Appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed accordingly.

Appellants/ plaintiffs claimed to be owners of suit land and sought cancellation of sale deeds in favour of respondents / defendants

Judge in Chambers of High Court rejected the plaint as it was barred by time

Validity

Court could not read into the plaint what was not pleaded

If cause of action date was mentioned as 16-05-2003 and no one objected to it, then Court was to accept such date

Appellants/ plaintiffs in year 2016 sought cancellation of registered sale/ conveyance deeds dated 1992, 2005 and 2007

Judge in Chambers of High Court correctly applied law of limitation and rightly concluded that suit filed by appellants/ plaintiffs was time-barred

Onus was on appellants/ plaintiffs to show a prima facie case was made out based on plaint and documents filed in support thereof

Appellants/ plaintiffs were well aware of presumption of truth associated with a sale/conveyance deed that was duly registered under Registration Act, 1908

Appellants/ plaintiffs neither produced nor relied upon any document which prima facie could be deemed or interpreted to rebut such presumption

Such aspect of the matter did not help the cause of appellants/ plaintiffs

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court, as it did not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant / plaintiff had to establish such novation as burden was on him and that called for a trial and not summary rejection of plaint

Vendor of appellant / plaintiff had entered into a transaction with subsequent buyer, who was a proper and necessary party

Subsequent purchaser could plead his case before Trial Court, if he was a bona fide purchaser in terms of S. 27 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and could participate in trial of suit filed by appellant / plaintiff

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Plaint filed by petitioner/plaintiff was rejected by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court for want of cause of action when the case was fixed for recording of evidence

Validity

Once application was made under O. VII, R. 11 C.P.C., in a suit, it became responsibility of Court to independently determine all relevant legal inquiries, including whether the suit was barred by law or if the plaint disclosed a cause of action

Trial Court rejected plaint while considering a subsequent application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., contravening prevailing legal provisions

Omission of both the lower Courts regarding their failure to acknowledge that it would not be justifiable to reject the plaint when parties were at variance of factual issues, especially considering that the case had been scheduled for presentation of evidence

Once issues are framed and Court has entered upon recording of evidence, matter has to be taken its logical end instead of summary disposal

High Court set aside orders passed by two Courts below as both the Courts below committed material irregularity and illegality while rejecting plaint of petitioner/plaintiff under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C

High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court to conduct trialin accordance with law and decide the same on merits on the basis of evidence recorded during trial

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Suit filed by plaintiff in year 2016 was on the same subject matter in which an earlier suit filed in year 2009 was pending adjudication

Defendant / Federation of Pakistan sought rejection of plaint

Validity

Object of S. 10, C.P.C., is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of same matter in issue

Insertion of S. 10, C.P.C., is to avoid two parallel trials on same issues

Even if cause of action and some consequential relief prayed for is added and/or some of the issues in a former and subsequent suits may differ, that may not be a ground for non-application of S. 10, C.P.C., if it is being observed that the final decision in earlier suit may either operate as res judicata or would materially affect proceedings and trial of subsequent suit

Legislature has purposely carved out language of S. 10, C.P.C., to include all those issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit and does not talk about identical and similar nature of issues and reliefs

Relief claimed in subsequent suit was somehow directly and substantially linked with earlier one

Any formal or informal addition of a party having no substantial effect to proceedings and relief claimed, would not materially affect operation of S.10, C.P.C.

High Court stayed trial of the suit till decision of connected suit filed earlier in year 2009 by invoking provision of S. 10, C.P.C.

Application was disposed of accordingly.

Law requires that an incompetent suit should be buried in its inception in order to avoid parties from agony of trial and to save the precious time of the Court

Under O. VII, R. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Court is competent to reject plaint if the same does not disclose cause of action, or if the same is barred by any law.

Appellant attended the school for hardly a year and upon his expulsion sought issuance of a character certificate, which was issued stating that the appellant was caught cheating in an examination, cheating material was recovered from him, he lost his temper and abused and tore the exam paper, whereafter his name was stuck off from the school's record

Somehow the appellant managed to procure a clean character certificate

But, still he was not satisfied, and after almost two decades he sued for damages

Said suit was hopelessly time-barred, yet it was entertained

High Court had put a stop to the abuse of the process of the court, but the appellant remained incorrigible

Appellant initiated litigation, including present appeal, which was entirely frivolous

Appellant was unnecessarily accommodated and the school and its staff were involved in endless litigation

Court time and public resources were squandered

Present appeal was dismissed with costs throughout and by imposing costs of fifteen thousand rupees, which the appellant was directed to pay to the school.