Elections

2024 SCMR 775 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Arts. 17(2), 19, 62 & 63Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 62ElectionsRight to vote for a candidate of one's choiceScopeInterpretation of elections laws in favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisementNomination papers for electionsAcceptance or rejection

Principles.

2022 CLC 428 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

S.19Co-operative SocietyElectionsVoters' listInclusion of namesElection Officer, powers ofCooperative society in question filed application alleging that Election Officer included non-members in voters' listValidity

Duty of Election Officer was to assist Official Assignee in conducting fair and transparent elections, as directed by High Court through its earlier orders

Election Officer transgressed his powers in reviewing his own previous order and giving right to 61 non-eligible persons to cast their vote and for inclusion of their names in final approved list of 505 members

Manner in which Election Officer proceeded in the matter smacked of mala fide and arbitrariness on his part, as he had transgressed his jurisdiction and powers which were not available to him

High Court set aside order in question as the same was not a lawful order and inclusion of names of 61 non-members in final voters' list was set aside

Application was allowed, in circumstances.

2021 PLD 378 ISLAMABAD Judicial Precedent

Applicability

Aggrieved person has a choice to elect one of the many remedies concurrently invoked against one and the same issue, as multiple and simultaneous proceedings may be hit by principle of res subjudice

Where one of the proceedings is taken to its logical conclusion then other pending proceedings for similar relief may be hit by principle of res judicata

Giving choice to elect a remedy from amongst several co-existent and / or concurrent remedies does not frustrate or deny right of a person to choose any remedy, which best suits under the given circumstances

To prevent recourse to multiple or successive redressal of singular wrong or impugned action before competent forum / original appellate jurisdiction, such rule of prudence has been evolved by Courts of law to curb multiplicity of proceedings

As long as party does not avail of the remedy before Court of competent jurisdiction, all such remedies are open to be invoked

Once election is made then the party generally cannot be allowed to hope over and shop for one after another co-existent remedy

After exhausting remedies from the Court of law against impugned order or action, a person cannot be allowed to go on expedition to venture another remedy for the same malady which though available was not invoked

Permitting such course would be nothing but abuse of process of law and amount to encourage multiplicity of proceedings and the same cannot be approved.

2018 SCMR 1770 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UNITED-STATE Judicial Precedent

Freedom of speechElectionsBan on "political apparel" inside a polling placeConstitutionality

Election laws in the State (of Minnesota) prohibited individuals, including voters, from wearing a "political badge, political button, or other political insignia" inside a polling place on election day [Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017)]

Said "political apparel ban" covered articles of clothing and accessories with political insignia upon them

State election judges had the au¬thority to decide whether a particular item fell within the ban

Vio¬lators were subject to a civil penalty or prosecution

State distributed an 'Election Day Policy' to election officials providing guidance on enforcement of the ban

Election Day Pol¬icy specified examples of prohibited apparel to include items display¬ing the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a can-didate, items supporting or opposing a ballot question, "issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting," and "material promoting a group with recognizable political views"

Petitioners challenged the ban on the grounds, that it violated the freedom of speech and argued that it was unconstitutional on its face

Validity

[Per Roberts, C.J; (Majority view): Since political apparel ban applied only in a specific loca¬tion - the interior of a polling place - it implicated the Court's 'forum based' approach for assessing restrictions that the government sought to place on the use of its property

Polling place in State (of Minnesota) qualified as a non-public forum as such it may be subject to content-based restrictions on speech, so long as the restrictions were reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi¬cials opposed the speaker's view

Since the text of the impugned election law made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, the ques¬tion was whether the apparel ban was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum i.e. voting

Some forms of campaign advocacy should be excluded from the polling place in order to set it aside as an island of calm in which voters could peacefully contemplate their choices

Casting a vote was a weighty civic act, and the State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect the distinc¬tion between voting and campaigning, but the line the State drew must be reasonable

State therefore must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distin¬guishing what may come in from what must stay out

Unmoored use of the term "political" in the impugned statute providing the ban, combined with hap-hazard interpretations the State had provided in official guidance and representations to the Court, caused the State's restrictions to fail such test

Impugned statute did not define the term "political," a word that could broadly encompass anything "of or relating to government, a govern¬ment, or the conduct of governmental affairs"

Far from clarifying the indeterminate scope of the provision, the State's "electoral choices" construction introduced confusing line-drawing problems

First three categories of prohibited items in the 'Election Day Policy' were clear, but the next category - "issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting"- raised more questions than it answered

State took the position that any subject on which a political candidate or party had taken a stance qualified as an "issue" within the meaning of such category

Such a rule - whose fair enforcement required an election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and party on the ballot - was not reasonable

Next broad category in the 'Election Day Policy' - any item "promoting a group with recognizable political views"- made matters worse

State did not confine said category to groups that had endorsed a candidate or taken a position on a ballot question

Resultantly, any number of associations, educational institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could have an opinion on an "issue confronting voters"

State represented that the ban was limited to apparel promoting groups with "well-known" political positions, but such requirement only increased the potential for erratic application, as its enforcement may turn in significant part on the background knowledge of the particular election judge applying it

Indeterminate prohibition carried with it the opportunity for abuse, especially where it had received a virtually open-ended interpretation

Discretion that election judges exercised in enforcing the ban must be guided by objective, workable standards

Without such standards an election judge's own politics may shape his views on what counted as "political"

If voters experienced or witnessed episodes of unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the State's interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and disruption would be undermined by the very measure intended to further it

In such circumstances, if a State wished to set its polling places apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more discernible approach than the one offered by the ban provided by the impugned election law/statute

Impugned statute's political apparel ban violated the freedom of speech]

[Per Sotomayor, J, dissenting (Minority view): Impugned statute providing the political apparel ban should not be declared unconstitutional on its face without first affording the State's own highest court a reasonable opportunity to pass upon and construe and interpret the impugned statute

When confronting a challenge to the constitutionality of a State's statute, federal courts should be particularly hesitant to speculate as to possible constructions of the State law when the State courts stood willing to address questions about the impugned law

Fair possibility existed that the State court could ascertain a construction that would contain the impugned statute within constitutional bounds

Majority opinion of the present judgment recognized a substantial amount of speech that clearly qualified as "political," such as "items displaying the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a candidate, and items demonstrating support of or opposition to a ballot question"

Fact that the majority opinion had some difficulty deciphering guidance with respect to "issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting" and "material promoting a group with recognizable political views" did not mean that the statute as a whole was not subject to a construction that fell within Constitutional bounds

Furthermore the political apparel ban was enacted in the late 19th century, and present case was the first time the impugned statute had been challenged on the basis that certain speech was not "political

History of the impugned statute offered some assurance that the statute had not been interpreted or applied in an unreasonable or abusive manner

No evidence existed to show that any individual who refused to remove a political item had been prohibited from voting

No one had been referred for prosecution for violating the impugned ban

Present case should be certified/sent to the State's highest court for a definitive interpretation of the political apparel ban [under Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017)].

2018 SCMR 1664 CONSTITUTIONAL-COURT-OF-SOUTH-AFRICA Judicial Precedent

Access to informationScopeElectionsPrivate funding of political parties and independent candidatesSignificance of voter having access to information about private funding of candidates and parties

Appellant-organization sought information relating to the private funding of some political parties [in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (2 of 2002) (South Africa) ("the Act")]

Taking advantage of the certain provisions of the Act, some of those parties refused to disclose the funding information, which led to the appellant initiating an application in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act

Appellant argued that the Constitution [Republic of South Africa] imposed an obligation on Parliament to pass legislation that provided for the recordal and disclosure of information on the private funding of political parties and independent candidates; that the Act was national legislation to give effect to a citizen's right of access to information, but it had failed to do the same

High Court concluded that the Act's failure to provide for access to information on private funding was a deficiency that rendered the Act inconsistent with the provisions of Ss. 32, 7(2) & 19 of the Constitution [Republic of South Africa]

Validity

[Per Mogoeng CJ: State was under an obligation to do everything reasonably possible to give practical and meaningful expression to the right of access to information and the right to vote (sections 32, 19 and 7(2) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa)

Exercise of the right to vote must be an informed choice, and there was a vital connection between the proper exercise of the right to vote and the right of access to information

Without access to information, the ability of citizens to make responsible political decisions and participate meaningfully in public life was undermined

Any information that completed the picture of a political party or an independent candidate in relation to who they really were or could be influenced by, in what way and to what extent, was essential for the proper exercise of the voter's "will" on which the government was Constitutionally required to be based

For every citizen to be truly free to make a political choice, including which party to join and which not to vote for or which political cause to campaign for or support, access to relevant or empowering information must be facilitated

Not only must the information be "held" in one form or another, it must also be reasonably accessible to potential voters

Voters needed it to be able to make a quality decision to vote for a particular political party or independent candidate

Political parties and independent candidates should not be left to pick and choose what information would be "held", preserved and disclosed to those who depended on information to determine to whom to entrust their future, that of the nation and posterity

All information necessary to enlighten the electorate about the capabilities and dependability or otherwise of those seeking public office must not only be compulsorily captured and preserved but also made reasonably accessible

Unchecked or secret private funding from all, including other nations, could undermine the fulfilment of Constitutional obligations by political parties or independent candidates so funded, and by extension a nation's strategic objectives and sovereignty

Secrecy enabled corruption and conduced more to a disposition by politicians that was favourable towards those who funded them privately once elected into public office

Such corruption was likely to flourish even where information on private funding was withheld at the discretion of the funded and unlikely to be exposed to the light of publicity

Disclosure of private funding would help the public to detect as to whose favour political players were likely to return, once elected into public office

State was required to pass legislation that provided for the recordal, preservation and reasonable accessibility of information on private funding of political parties and independent candidates

Role of transparency and accountability, that were essential for rooting out corruption that could be enabled by undisclosed private funding, reinforced the need to record, preserve and disclose information

So important was the obligation to record, preserve and make private funding information reasonably accessible to the voting public, that it must also be easily accessible to the media, NGO's, academia and other political players

Such wide dissemination of information was essential for the proper functioning and vibrancy of a Constitutional democracy

Impugned Act was deficient because it did not provide that information on the private funding of political parties and independent candidates be recorded and preserved; that it be made reasonably accessible to the public; and that independent candidates and all political parties were subject to its provisions

Supreme Court of (South Africa) confirmed the order of constitutional invalidity against the Act and directed the Parliament to amend the Act and take any other measure it deemed appropriate to provide for the recordal, preservation and facilitation of reasonable access to information on the private funding of political parties and independent candidates within a period of 18 months]

[Per Froneman J; concurring: Constitutional obligation to record, preserve and make information on private political funding reasonably accessible was a systematic and continuous one

Every citizen had the right to free and fair elections, and there could be no fair and free elections if the press or other institutions of the civil society were prevented from access to information about private political funding

Such access to information was also justified on the ground that the recipients were acting in the public interest on behalf of the country's citizenry].

2014 PLD 330 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Arts. 140A(2) & 225ElectionsDispute relating to delimitation of constituenciesElection Tribunal, jurisdiction of

Dispute relating to delimitation of constituencies was not amenable to the jurisdiction of an Election Tribunal.

2009 CLC 986 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Elections could not be annulled or vitiated in absence of violation of electoral rules/law materially affecting electoral results.