Distinction

Departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings, though sometimes arising out of the same set of facts, operate indistinct legal domains and are governed by different standards of proof

The disciplinary inquiry is founded on the preponderance of probability, aimed at preserving the integrity and efficiency of public service, whereas a criminal trial proceeds on the stricter standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, intended to determine penalliability

Consequently, the pendency or outcome of one does not automatically affect the other, and both may lawfully proceed concurrently.

Briefly, the petitioner, who was a Police Constable (BPS-07), was nominated in a FIR registered under sections 302, 311, 147 and 148 P.P.C., whereupon departmental proceedings were initiated against him under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, leading to his dismissal from service

Upon preferring appeal, he was provisionally reinstated with directions for a de novo inquiry, during which period he was acquitted in the criminal case, yet upon conclusion of the de novo inquiry he was again dismissed from service, with his departmental appeal, revision, and subsequent appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal being dismissed, culminating in the filing of the present civil petition before the Supreme Court, raising the legal issue “whether a major penalty of dismissal could lawfully be sustained where departmental action was founded solely on the employee's involvement in a criminal case, notwithstanding his acquittal therein, and where no independent departmental misconduct was examined or established?”

Held: It had been a settled law that where departmental proceedings rested on independent and probe-able evidence of misconduct, an acquittal in the criminal case did not absolve the employee, and both proceedings could lawfully be run concurrently

However, where the departmental action was founded solely on the registration or pendency of an FIR, without any distinct charge of misconduct, the employee's subsequent acquittal extinguished that foundation, rendering any ensuing penalty legally untenable and constitutionally infirm

Impugned judgment was set aside as well as the order of dismissal of the petitioner and as a result he was re-instated into service

Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances.

Under invoicing is different from dumping which is based on selling below "normal value"- not just mis-declared customs values

Anti-dumping duty is not about under-invoicing in customs sense- it is about whether imported goods are being sold in Pakistan at "dumped" prices (i.e. below their 'normal value' in exporting country)

Such duties are meant to protect domestic industries from un-fairly low-priced imports

Under-invoicing is not required for anti-dumping duty to be imposed

Key distinction in basis of calculation of anti-dumping duty and customs valuation is that the former is calculated on the basis of margin of dumping (difference between export price and normal values of goods), whereas the latter is determined on the basis of price actually paid or payable (transaction value) or alternative methods of calculation envisaged by Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969

Anti-dumping duty, whether provisional or final, is imposed after investigation is carried out by National Tariff Commission whereas customs valuation is applied at the time of clearance of every consignment of goods imported into or exported out of Pakistan

Anti-dumping duty is a trade policy tool applied on top of normal customs duty when dumping is proved whereas customs valuation is a technical process to assess the value of goods for duty calculation applicable to all importers, regardless of whether dumping exists

Where issue is dumping, the remedy lies with National Tariff Commission under the provisions of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015

Where issue is under-invoicing, the remedy lies in customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969

They are parallel but distinct remedies

Customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969 protects revenue and ensures fair valuation for duty / tax purposes

Anti-dumping duty protects domestic industry from injury caused by unfair trade practice- selling goods below their normal value

Both remedies can co-exist but they address different harms.

Within a short span of time (of about eight and half hours) from the decision by the Commissioner Inland Revenue- Appeals and it being uploaded on the FBR's web portal, notice for immediate recovery from Bank was sought by the Department

Argument of the Department was that the notice of demand issued under Section 137 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') was the only requirement of notice

Held: Such argument / understanding is not in consonance with the law

The scheme of law envisions two distinct processes for the purposes of demanding the tax and for the purposes of recovery of tax

A demand notice is served under Section 137 of the Ordinance, 2001, whereby the taxpayer is informed of the amount due and is required to pay such tax by the due date set out in the notice

On receipt of notice, the taxpayer can either discharge the liability or challenge it in appeal under Section 127 of the Ordinance, 2001

If the liability is discharged the matter ends, however, in the event that an appeal is filed, the first proviso of Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 prescribes that the Commissioner shall not issue notice for recovery of tax due until the appeal is decided

Once the appeal is decided, the CIR Appeals is required to inform the taxpayer by notice of the decision in appeal under Section 129(4) of the Ordinance, 2001

In the event that the taxpayer fails to make payment, the Ordinance, 2001 provides for the recovery of tax through the modes prescribed under Chapter X Part IV, Collection and Recovery, each mode being an independent mode of recovery which can be enforced separately or simultaneously in terms of Section 146A(4) of the Ordinance, 2001

Each mode for recovery provides for the procedure to be followed

Consequently, the Petitioners' contention that once the demand notice under Section 137 of the Ordinance, 2001 has been issued, coercive measures can be adopted for recovery purposes, ignores this scheme of law where the notice under Section 140 of the Ordinance serves the very specific purpose of recovery from a third party and the due process which the third party is to be afforded when recovery is required

Additionally, while the recovery must be preceded by notice and a reasonable opportunity to comply, yet Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 operates as an independent recovery mechanism

Where recovery is sought from third parties under Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001, the requirement of notice and the setting of a future date are built into the provision itself ;it does not require prior invocation of Section 138(1) of the Ordinance, 2001, which governs direct recovery from the taxpayer

Hence, the specific requirement for Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 in the notice with a date set when recovery will be effected

Therefore, in view of the statutory framework and applicable Rules, Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 does not permit immediate coercive recovery in the absence of a date set in the notice

Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 expressly provides that the party holding money on behalf of the taxpayer must be afforded a notice with a due date to discharge its liability

In both present cases, the notices issued Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 seek immediate recovery, thereby blatantly violating the requirements of Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 , which is illegal

No case for interference was made out

As leave had already been granted, the Civil petitions were converted into appeals and dismissed.

Under invoicing is different from dumping which is based on selling below "normal value"- not just mis-declared customs values

Anti-dumping duty is not about under-invoicing in customs sense- it is about whether imported goods are being sold in Pakistan at "dumped" prices (i.e. below their 'normal value' in exporting country)

Such duties are meant to protect domestic industries from un-fairly low-priced imports

Under-invoicing is not required for anti-dumping duty to be imposed

Key distinction in basis of calculation of anti-dumping duty and customs valuation is that the former is calculated on the basis of margin of dumping (difference between export price and normal values of goods), whereas the latter is determined on the basis of price actually paid or payable (transaction value) or alternative methods of calculation envisaged by Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969

Anti-dumping duty, whether provisional or final, is imposed after investigation is carried out by National Tariff Commission whereas customs valuation is applied at the time of clearance of every consignment of goods imported into or exported out of Pakistan

Anti-dumping duty is a trade policy tool applied on top of normal customs duty when dumping is proved whereas customs valuation is a technical process to assess the value of goods for duty calculation applicable to all importers, regardless of whether dumping exists

Where issue is dumping, the remedy lies with National Tariff Commission under the provisions of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015

Where issue is under-invoicing, the remedy lies in customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969

They are parallel but distinct remedies

Customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969 protects revenue and ensures fair valuation for duty / tax purposes

Anti-dumping duty protects domestic industry from injury caused by unfair trade practice- selling goods below their normal value

Both remedies can co-exist but they address different harms.

Within a short span of time (of about eight and half hours) from the decision by the Commissioner Inland Revenue- Appeals and it being uploaded on the FBR's web portal, notice for immediate recovery from Bank was sought by the Department

Argument of the Department was that the notice of demand issued under Section 137 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') was the only requirement of notice

Held: Such argument / understanding is not in consonance with the law

The scheme of law envisions two distinct processes for the purposes of demanding the tax and for the purposes of recovery of tax

A demand notice is served under Section 137 of the Ordinance, 2001, whereby the taxpayer is informed of the amount due and is required to pay such tax by the due date set out in the notice

On receipt of notice, the taxpayer can either discharge the liability or challenge it in appeal under Section 127 of the Ordinance, 2001

If the liability is discharged the matter ends, however, in the event that an appeal is filed, the first proviso of Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 prescribes that the Commissioner shall not issue notice for recovery of tax due until the appeal is decided

Once the appeal is decided, the CIR Appeals is required to inform the taxpayer by notice of the decision in appeal under Section 129(4) of the Ordinance, 2001

In the event that the taxpayer fails to make payment, the Ordinance, 2001 provides for the recovery of tax through the modes prescribed under Chapter X Part IV, Collection and Recovery, each mode being an independent mode of recovery which can be enforced separately or simultaneously in terms of Section 146A(4) of the Ordinance, 2001

Each mode for recovery provides for the procedure to be followed

Consequently, the Petitioners' contention that once the demand notice under Section 137 of the Ordinance, 2001 has been issued, coercive measures can be adopted for recovery purposes, ignores this scheme of law where the notice under Section 140 of the Ordinance serves the very specific purpose of recovery from a third party and the due process which the third party is to be afforded when recovery is required

Additionally, while the recovery must be preceded by notice and a reasonable opportunity to comply, yet Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 operates as an independent recovery mechanism

Where recovery is sought from third parties under Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001, the requirement of notice and the setting of a future date are built into the provision itself ;it does not require prior invocation of Section 138(1) of the Ordinance, 2001, which governs direct recovery from the taxpayer

Hence, the specific requirement for Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 in the notice with a date set when recovery will be effected

Therefore, in view of the statutory framework and applicable Rules, Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 does not permit immediate coercive recovery in the absence of a date set in the notice

Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 expressly provides that the party holding money on behalf of the taxpayer must be afforded a notice with a due date to discharge its liability

In both present cases, the notices issued Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 seek immediate recovery, thereby blatantly violating the requirements of Section 140 of the Ordinance, 2001 , which is illegal

No case for interference was made out

As leave had already been granted, the Civil petitions were converted into appeals and dismissed.

Column 13 is titled 'amount of dower', which is generally construed as referring to dower in the form of amount of cash as being distinct from its other forms and does not refer to nor is construed as the value of the total dower agreed upon by the parties in all its forms because the parties may have intended and agreed to giving dower in its different forms i.e. cash as well as immovable property

Urdu version uses the expression 'raqam', which could be construed as cash only

Likewise, the headings of Columns Nos. 14 and 15 may also be understood as having reference to Column 13 and being distinct from Column 16

It is obvious from a plain reading of the expressions used in the heading of Column No.16 that it specifically refers to dower in the form of property

Expression 'in lieu' has been used in the context of the 'whole' or any 'portion' of the dower

Dower may only be agreed in the form of property and, therefore, it would amount to giving such a property in lieu of the whole dower, however, the property may also be agreed as portion of the whole dower and in such an eventuality it has been intended to be given in addition to dower in some other form e.g. cash

Expression 'in lieu' has definitely not been used with reference to the amount of dower recorded in Column 13 as has been erroneously construed by the High Court

Column 16 further requires the recording of 'specification' and 'valuation' of the property agreed between the parties as dower, which further highlights that the column is specifically meant for recording the dower in the form of property, whether agreed upon to be part or whole of the dower.

The latter ceases upon the termination of the marital bond, whereas, the former survives the marriage itself and is directly tied to the immutable bond of paternity.

Applicant / taxpayer was aggrieved of issuance of show-cause notice by authorities alleging misclassification and evasion / short-payment of sales tax on the basis of analysis of data / desk audit

Validity

Audit must be conducted under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

'Desk audit' or mere 'analysis of data' is not a substitute for a proper audit under law

Such analysis may generate information that can lead to a proper audit under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 but it cannot itself be the basis for imposition of tax liability

No notice for audit under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with STGO No. 3/2004 was ever issued to applicant / taxpayer

Commissioner Inland Revenue, under S. 14 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and R.5(3) read with R. 7 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006, could have initiated proceedings to alter registration status of applicant / taxpayer

Entire proceedings, from their very inception were without jurisdiction, without lawful authority, void and of no legal effect, as no such notice or proceedings were ever undertaken by authorities

High Court answered the reference in positive and the orders passed by the fora below were set aside, along with all consequential proceedings

Reference was allowed accordingly.

It is for this reason that word "admission" has been used in S.243, Cr.P.C. that requires issuance of show cause notice to accused

Word "admission" has been used for plead guilty

For issuance of notice to accused to show cause why he should not be convicted, is to ensure that his choice is voluntary and that he knows the consequences, including collateral ones, while admitting his guilt

In such process, Trial Court in fact informs the accused about nature of the offence and its consequences which he has to face on its admission

All confessions are admissions, but all admissions are not confessions

Confession ordinarily occurs during investigation or inquiry and it is for such reason that confessions are recorded by a competent Magistrate

In the present case neither Trial Court satisfied its judicial mind as to the voluntariness of accused in recording his guilty plea, nor did it follow in stricto senso the requirements of law

Accused was prejudiced in his defence, and was not treated in accordance with law

Accused was provided with no opportunity of a fair trial within the contours of Art.l0-A of the Constitution

High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and case was remanded to Trial Court for trial afresh in accordance with law

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Scope of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is fundamentally different from that of Microfinance Institution Ordinance, 2001

Provisions of Microfinance Institution Ordinance, 2001 are sector-specific, focused exclusively on microfinance institutions serving underprivileged and microenterprises segments

Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are broad in coverage and apply to wide range of financial institutions falling within statutory definition of a "financial institution" under S. 2(a) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Nature of respondent/complainant's business activities squarely fell within the ambit of the term "financial institution" under S. 2(a)(i) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Any obligations arising from financial accommodations extended by respondent/complainant fell within the jurisdiction of Banking Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

First Information Report registered by respondent/complainant under S. 489-F, P.P.C. stated that petitioner/ accused obtained a "loan" from it and gave cheque in question for its repayment which was dishonoured on presentation

Parties acknowledged that petitioner/accused was covered under the definition of "customer" and the cheque was given for the repayment of "finance" and fulfilment of an "obligation" as defined in S. 2 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Respondent/ complainant was a financial institution within the meaning of S. 2(a) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and cheque had been issued for the repayment of finance, the alleged offence fell exclusively under S. 20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the provision of S. 489-F, P.P.C. did not apply

Banking Court had exclusive jurisdiction over such matters under S. 7 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Any prosecution against petitioner/accused had to be initiated through a complaint before Banking Court as prescribed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

High Court in exercise of Constitution jurisdiction quashed the FIR registered against petitioner/accused

High Court clarified that respondent/complainant was not precluded from filing a complaint under S. 7 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 before Banking Court for prosecution under S. 20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Amendments introduced in S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 via the Amendment Act of 2024 and the Finance Act, 2025 are procedural in nature and do not define or alter substantive rights or liabilities of the parties

These amendments pertain solely to the forum and mechanism available for adjudication, thereby falling within the realm of procedural law

It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that procedural laws operate retrospectively unless expressly stated otherwise

The rationale underlying said principle is that no party has a vested right in procedural mechanisms

Where a legislative change merely affects the procedure or remedies and does not abridge substantive rights, it is applicable to all pending and future proceedings

Distinction must be drawn between substantive and procedural law

While substantive law establishes rights, duties, and liabilities, procedural law concerns the manner and forum in which those rights are enforced

Where there is a right, there is a remedy and the route to remedy is procedural

Therefore, amendments that merely modify the forum of appeal or procedure for redressal, and do not extinguish or curtail any vested or accrued rights, are not caught within the prohibition against retrospective operation

As no party has an inalienable right to a particular forum, such changes are generally presumed to apply to pending proceedings and "forum non conveniens" considerations do not override legislative intent in procedural changes

Indeed the amendment through Finance Act, 2025 will not affect those reference applications, which are already decided by the High Court against the orders of Commissioner (Appeals) or appeals are decided by Tribunal directly against the orders for amendment of assessment orders, as same will be governed by the well-established doctrine of past and closed transaction

Additionally , remedial and beneficial legislation in favour of tax payers are to be construed liberally and in several instances can be given retrospective effect

Notably, since no adjudication took place on merit, the court-fee was to be returned, however, requisite court fee would be paid before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal)

High Court directed the Office to transmit the present Reference Application along with its annexures to the Tribunal, to be treated as an appeal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals), for decision in accordance with law

Reference Application was disposed of accordingly.

Authorities cannot lawfully enter, inspect, or obtain records without first obtaining a magistrate's warrant under S. 40 of the Act, 1990, plea of

Whether proceedings under S. 38 can be undertaken without first invoking S. 40 of the Act, 1990

'Routine inspection'

'Search and seizure'

Distinction

Briefly, the inspection at petitioner's premises was carried out pursuant to an authorization issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, following information received from FBR Headquarters regarding an unusually large carry-forward of input tax declared by the petitioner in its sales tax return, necessitating verification of stock position and related records, and the inspection formed part of a structured desk audit and verification process undertaken by the tax authorities

Held: Section 38 facilitated routine, non-coercive inspections, whereas S. 40 governed intrusive searches justified by the statutory threshold of "reason to believe" and "relevant to any proceedings"

The statutory scheme therefore did not support the view that S. 38 was subordinated to S. 40; both provisions coexisted to serve distinct yet complementary purposes within the broader tax administration regime

In the present case, record did not disclose arbitrariness, mala fides, colorable exercise of authority or any overreach that might warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction

No coercive action had been taken against the petitioner, nor had it been deprived of property or subjected to any measure beyond a routine inspection

Petitioner had declared an exceptionally high carry-forward adjustment of Rs.185,352,613/- against stock values declared at Rs.1,029,736,739/-, necessitating verification which constituted a reasonable and legally sufficient foundation for initiating inspection proceedings

Verification of such discrepancies was a routine and essential function of the tax administration to ensure accuracy of declarations

Proceedings under S. 38 were neither irregular nor excessive

The Commissioner had a proper factual and statutory basis for issuing the authorization; the officers acted strictly within the scope of S.38; no measure of coercion, seizure, or forced retrieval was adopted; and at no stage were the intrusive mechanisms prescribed under S. 40 invoked

The petitioner, therefore, failed to demonstrate any infringement of legal rights

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Scope of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is fundamentally different from that of Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001

Provisions of Microfinance Institution Ordinance, 2001 are sector-specific, focused exclusively on microfinance institutions serving underprivileged and microenterprises segments

Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are broad in coverage and apply to wide range of financial institutions falling within statutory definition of a "financial institution" under S. 2(a) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Nature of respondent/complainant's business activities squarely fell within the ambit of the term "financial institution" under S. 2(a)(i) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Any obligations arising from financial accommodations extended by respondent/complainant fell within the jurisdiction of Banking Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

First Information Report registered by respondent/complainant under S. 489-F, P.P.C. stated that petitioner/ accused obtained a "loan" from it and gave cheque in question for its repayment which was dishonoured on presentation

Parties acknowledged that petitioner/accused was covered under the definition of "customer" and the cheque was given for the repayment of "finance" and fulfilment of an "obligation" as defined in S. 2 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Respondent/ complainant was a financial institution within the meaning of S. 2(a) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and cheque had been issued for the repayment of finance, the alleged offence fell exclusively under S. 20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the provision of S. 489-F, P.P.C. did not apply

Banking Court had exclusive jurisdiction over such matters under S. 7 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Any prosecution against petitioner/accused had to be initiated through a complaint before Banking Court as prescribed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

High Court in exercise of Constitution jurisdiction quashed the FIR registered against petitioner/accused

High Court clarified that respondent/complainant was not precluded from filing a complaint under S. 7 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 before Banking Court for prosecution under S. 20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

"Sin" is a moral or religious transgression, an act considered wrong according to divine command or ethical principles, judged by one's faith or conscience

Consequences of "sin" are spiritual or moral, such as guilt or divine punishment

In contrast, under the statutory framework of Pakistan, a "crime" is an act or omission that is made punishable by law

"Crime" is a public wrong that affects society at large, and offender may be punished by death, imprisonment, fine or other legal penalties

Courts established under the Constitution adjudicate only statutory offences and do not concern themselves with moral or religious conduct

Term "offence" is a technical expression that refers to any act (or omission) that violates the law

"Offence" encompasses both regulatory violations, such as traffic infractions and serious penal acts like murder

"Offence" is a broader concept than "crime", the latter being generally reserved for serious offences involving public wrongs

Every crime is an offence, but not every offence amounts to a crime in this sense

Under Shariah, crime is an act prohibited by divine injunction and punishable with Hadd or Ta'zir penalties.

"Title" refers to a legal right of ownership or entitlement to property which indicates who has the lawful authority or claim over the property in question amongst the contesting parties qua their entitlement

"Entitlement" is to be construed in a broader meaning and cannot be restricted to ownership only.

Brief facts were that the petitioner filed a suit for declaration and recovery of possession regarding suit property i.e. shop claiming it was allotted in his name during a municipal survey, while respondent No. 1 (petitioner's/ plaintiff's real brother) was allotted adjoining shop

Both the Trial court and the appellate court dismissed his suit, prompting him to institute the present civil revision

The record showed that the municipal corporation confirmed the allotment of suit property in the petitioner's/plaintiff's name, whereas the dispute between the brothers centered on who held the genuine entitlement to the suit property/shop

Core issue for determination before the High Court was as to "Whether, under S.42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the petitioner/plaintiff could lawfully be declared entitled to suit property/shop and recover possession when the allotment stood in his name which fact was not denied by the municipal authority, but was disputed by his brother claiming benami allotment"?

Held: It was evident from the written statement filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 that there was an admission regarding allotment in the name of petitioner/plaintiff

Allotment in the name of petitioner/plaintiff had not been denied but a specific plea was taken that petitioner was "benami" allottee and respondent/defendant in alternate spent money and got him a shop but did not bother to prove his plea taken in the written statement

Both the courts below failed to read the pleadings as well as evidence of parties and also failed to apply Art.113 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 which provided that "admitted facts need not to be proved"

It was clear from the record that the petitioner/plaintiff was the allottee of the suit property/shop

Both the courts below failed to interpret and evaluate the words "title" and "entitle" in its true perspective while judging the case between two competitors i.e. petitioner and respondent No.1

While doing so, both the courts below mis-interpreted the said expressions due to which petitioner was non-suited

Respective allotments in favour of petitioner and respondent No.1 were their entitlement and right and equated title as they could sell/transfer their allotment rights to any person by definitely informing the City District Government which was owner of the suit property

Judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below were result of mis-reading and non-reading of record and were not sustainable in the eye of law and same were set aside

Suit filed by the petitioner for declaration and possession was decreed

Present civil revision petition was partially allowed, in circumstances.

Rules of an organization if not approved by government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization are non-statutory.

Civil Court cannot be approached directly without exhausting the highest forum in the hierarchy under special law.

The phrase “burden of proof” has two meanings: one, the burden as a matter of law arising from pleadings, which remains constant; and the other, the burden of establishing a case, which shifts as evidence is adduced

The latter is described as “onus of proof”, which initially lies on the possessor under cl. 89(i) of S. 156(1) and S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969

Once the possessor produces prima facie evidence indicating lawful possession, the onus shifts to the prosecution

These provisions do not mean that the ultimate burden always remains on the possessor

For attracting Cl.89(i) of S. 156(1), there must exist at least a “reasonable suspicion” that the goods are smuggled

A similar condition of “reasonable belief” existed under S. 177-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878

Where goods are importable and available in the local market, a presumption arises that such goods are duty-paid

Therefore, an allegation of smuggling merely on the basis of foreign origin is insufficient without reasonable suspicion

The Respondent produced purchase receipts issued by local scrap vendors to show purchase from local market

In such circumstances, the onus shifted to the Applicant/Department to prove smuggling, which it failed to discharge

The contention of the Applicant that S. 187 absolved it from proving smuggling was misconceived

Therefore, the question of law was answered in favour of the Respondent and against the Applicant/Department

Special Customs Reference Application filed by the Department was dismissed.

The general damages are governed by the rule of thumb whereas special damages are required to be specifically pleaded and proved

General damages are those which the law implies even if not specially pleaded, which includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like, and if the injuries suffered are such as to lead to continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss of earning power in the future

Special damages are explained as actual but not necessarily the result of injury complained of

Special damages mean some specific item of loss which the plaintiff alleges is the result of the defendant's negligence in the particular case, although the law does not presume it to flow from the negligence as a matter of course

Special damage consists of out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings incurred down to the date of trial and are generally capable of substantially exact pecuniary assessment

The basic principle so far as loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses is concerned is that the injured person should be placed in the same financial position, so far as can be done by an award of money, as he would have been had the accident, not happened

In simple words, the damages are intended to put a person in the same position as he would have been in, had he not received the injury.

With constitutional jurisdiction, the Court cannot act as an appellate court, reviewing the decision for accuracy and deciding on the correct course of action or order to be made

Constitutional petitions are distinct from appeals, which are considered as a continuation of a trial/suit

The High Court does not have the authority to perform the duties of a Civil Court since its writ jurisdiction is distinct from its regular civil court powers

The only purpose of the High Court's jurisdiction is to rectify any mistake made by the lower body when exercising its jurisdiction, which differs from an action applied under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

The High Court is not a court of fact and will not question disputed facts and re-appreciate evidence by itself; it cannot sit as a Court of Appeal

The jurisdiction of the High Court is just remedial, not a cloak of appeal disguised to scrutinize every subject in depth

The High Court has no jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the decision, except-in writ of certiorari, especially when illegality and irregularity are apparent in the impugned judgment, but it cannot go either into review of evidence or appreciating the same as in the constitutional jurisdiction the court cannot sit as a court of appeal

The constitutional and appellate jurisdictions are completely distinct and different in nature, scope and consequences

The constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to question the legality of laws, regulations, or Governmental acts and enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, and it is to be filed when there is an infringement of constitutional rights, which is sometimes called a writ petition or a petition for a constitutional remedy under Art.199 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of a statute or executive or tribunal orders on the grounds that it infringes upon the petitioner's Constitutional rights

Conversely, an appeal is a procedural as well as substantive right which allows one party to file an appeal before a higher court to reconsider a judgment made by a lower court.

Order VII, R.11, C.P.C. refer only words the "rejection of plaint in suit" which ought to be applied by Trial Court having power and jurisdiction to adjudicate the lis and whenever any of the basic ingredients mentioned at (a) to (d) in O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. are available on examination of plaint including documents attached thereto

In contrast, the "dismissal of suit" connotes that it is a final determination of controversy between the parties

The power and jurisdiction to dismiss the suit can only apply by Trial Court when the parties have adduced evidence, produced documents on oath and undergone with the test of cross-examination by opposite party and finally fails to clear the test of "prove"

Another key difference between the "rejection of plaint in suit" and "dismissal of suit" is that the former keep opens the door for the plaintiff to re-try or re-file or re-institute a fresh suit or, in other words, the plaintiff cannot be precluded to file afresh suit on same cause of action or joinder of new cause of actions, against same parties or include other parties or on same subject-matter or with addition or subtraction of subject-matter where it is possible for him according to situation

In contrast, the later strictly prohibit the plaintiff to institute fresh suit

The plaintiff cannot file fresh suit against the same parties (including legitimate successor in interest or successor in office) or in respect of same subject-matter

The legal position is further tightened on the point of cause of action

In former case, the cause of action may be kept same for the plaintiff or he may join more cause of action to re-agitate or institute suit whilst the later omitted the point of cause of action and paved out another way to tackle the cases on examination of earlier subject matter decided either directly or indirectly in previous suit (case) and it can only be invoked when the evidence is recorded, the documents have been produced on oath and such document could be read as admissible evidence by Trial Court or otherwise while delivering the judgment

However, in both situations law provides statutory remedies against either Order of rejection of plaint in suit or dismissal of suit by way of judgment.

Group insurance is a type of insurance coverage provided by a group of people in a single contract typically issued by the employer, organization or association at a low cost of that individual insured while insurance policy is a legal contract between an insurer and the policy holder

The policy clearly states the terms, conditions, coverage, premium amounts and duration of the insurance agreement but in both the cases be it group insurance or individual insurance, the amount of insured money will be distributed according to the Muhammadan Law of Inheritance amongst the legal heirs of deceased

Deceased policy holder was survived by her three brothers (the petitioners) who were entitled to inherit from the insurance claim of policy holder according to their respective shares because respondents (Insurance Company) failed to produce convincing evidence in support of their assertions / stance; hence, the petitioners were entitled to receive the death claim

Insurance Tribunal decreed in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents (Insurance Company) to the tune of Rs.50,00,000/- with costs alongwith the liquidated damages

Insurance application was decreed accordingly.

Applicant / taxpayer was aggrieved of order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in holding that all shares of applicant / taxpayer were held by a non-resident company, therefore, it did not fulfill the requirements for the transaction to fall within the ambit of S.97 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Validity

What is taxable in terms of S.4 read with Ss.9 and 11 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and other related provisions, is the income of a taxpayer

Provision of Ss. 113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are exceptions to the rule that only income as determined in accordance with provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be subjected to tax

Provisions of Ss. 113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are in the nature of deeming provisions, where under S.113 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 turnover of a taxpayer is used as a measure to determine tax liability on a deeming basis, and under S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 the accounting income of a taxpayer is used as a measure to determine tax liability on a deeming basis

As such Ss.113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are artificial rules that impose a liability on a taxpayer to pay tax even where no real income arise in the hands of the taxpayer

Taxpayer under S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is accordingly liable to pay taxes calculated in terms of income of the company subject to tax under Division II of Part 1 of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or the minimum tax due in terms of S.113 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or the alternative corporate tax determined on the basis of accounting income in terms of S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 whichever is greater

Exclusions for the purpose of calculating Alternative Corporate Tax are mentioned in S.113C (8) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and do not state that any accounting income in relation to a S.97(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as disposal of asset transaction is required to be excluded therefrom

If it was determined by the Commissioner that applicant / taxpayer had generated income from imports in relation to which advance tax was collected in terms of S.148(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 only then the question of applicant / taxpayer being an industrial undertaking would become relevant

Applicant / taxpayer did not qualify as an industrial undertaking for purposes of tax year 2018

Transaction of disposal of tower business by applicant / taxpayer to its wholly owned subsidiary company, did not qualify for tax deferral in terms of S.97 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Applicant / taxpayer did not qualify as an industrial undertaking in terms of S.2 (29C) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in tax year 2018

High Court directed the Commissioner to undertake an analysis regarding advance tax collected under S.148 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 before generating any demand in terms of S.148(7) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

High Court further declared that appeals effect order passed in terms of S.124 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not include no demand in relation to S.148(7) read with S.148(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without such prior inquiry

Reference was disposed of accordingly.

Tribunal under S. 122 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 is empowered to adjudicate claims by policyholders against insurance companies in respect of or arising out of insurance contracts

Jurisdiction on Federal Insurance Ombudsman conferred under S. 127 of Insurance Ordinance, is to entertain complaints from any aggrieved person alleging maladministration by an insurance company.

Promotion or upgradation is not a vested right of any civil servant, rather it is a policy tool exercised by the Government to address service exigencies, restructure institutions, or alleviate stagnation in posts lacking promotional avenues

Distinction between promotion and upgradation was that "promotion" is a merit and seniority-based advancement, and "upgradation" is a policy-driven adjustment of posts for broad and systemic reasons

Upgradation is not to be conflated with promotion; it is a mechanism employed to address structural imbalances and cannot be claimed as an individual entitlement.

Special damages are defined as actual loss suffered by a party and a decree for special damages can be granted when the plaintiff succeeds to prove each item of loss with reference to the evidence brought on record

Special damages includes expenses and loss of earning incurred down the date of trial and capable of exact calculation

The general damages includes damage to the reputation and suffering mental torture, nervous shock which cannot be calculated, hence, the same are granted on the basis of thumb impression(sic).

Comparison of the two versions of Article 202A of the Constitution shows that, prior to Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 Constitutional Benches of High Courts were authorized to hear only those matters falling under Article 199(1)(a)(i) and Article 199(1)(c) of the Constitution, which corresponded to the well-known writs of mandamus, prohibition and to enforce fundamental rights envisaged in Part II, Chapter I of the Constitution

After Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, Article 202A of the Constitution has been expanded and Constitutional Benches of the High Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over the full range of matters exercised under Article 199 of the Constitution.

Hostility, in legal terms, refers to a deliberate intent to deviate from the truth or act against interests of the party calling the witness, whereas 'retraction' refers to the act of withdrawing or taking back a statement, testimony, or accusation often due to its inaccuracy, falsity, or unreliability

Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain excluding every hypothesis other than the guilt of accused

In the present case in absence of direct or corroborative evidence, reliance on circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

Uncertainty of complainant regarding identity of perpetrator introduced a reasonable doubt, which was sufficient to entitle accused to benefit of doubt

Retraction of a statement did not automatically equate to hostility and such crucial point was not sufficiently addressed by the lower fora

Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge

Appeal was allowed.

Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Service Tribunal in violation of the principle already laid down by Supreme Court

Effect

Doctrine of stare decisis, is a Latin term that connotes "let the decision stand" or "to stand by things decided"

Law declared by Supreme Court should be certain, translucent and rational, as most decisions not only constitute a determination of rights of parties but also set down a declaration of law that serves as binding principles in future cases, thereby contributing to development of jurisprudence

Doctrine of precedents, vis-à-vis stare decisis has fundamental value in ensuring an objective certitude and firmness in legal system

Rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds it expression in the doctrine of stare decisis, which posits that when a point or principle of law has officially been decided or settled by ruling of a competent Court in a case where it was directly and necessarily involved, it should no longer be considered as open to re-examination or to a new ruling

Such policy of Courts is conveniently termed as doctrine of stare decisis

Rational behind such policy is the need to promote certainty, stability and predictability in law

Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal as the same was passed against the law settled by Supreme Court

Appeal was allowed.

Authorities were aggrieved of direction issued by High Court in favour of respondents/civil servants regarding upgradation and redesignation of posts

Validity

Upgradation of a post is not a vested right, rather it stems from a policy decision intended to benefit a particular set of employees under the scheme embedded in the policy

Upgradation cannot be mixed up with promotion

In case of upgradation, employee continues to hold same post without any change in his duties but he is accorded a higher pay scale in order to mitigate distress associated with stagnation due to lack of progression of promotional avenues

Once Government announces a policy, it is also responsible for enforcing such policy across the board to accord benefit of policy to all those who are eligible under it and may benefit because of it

Court cannot interfere in policy making domain of government but when a widespread and comprehensive policy is announced to benefit employees, it should be implemented bigheartedly and generously, without adding any ifs and buts or discrimination that can stifle main objective of the policy

Similar laws, rules and polices should apply uniformly to all in similar situations, without any discrimination or distinction between one employee and another within the sphere of legislation or policy, provided that their status is substantially equivalent and indistinguishable

Even in cases of classification or categorization, such distinctions must not be arbitrary but should be based on reasons, qualities and characteristics that establish an intelligible differentia for those who have been left out of the arena or who have been excluded with clarity regarding the objective sought to be achieved

Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Procedural law initiates and guides the process and course of action through which the lawsuit progresses and the way in which court proceedings are undertaken

It also regulates and oversees the procedures employed

Substantive law, on the other hand, comprises statutory obligations relevant to the subject matter, declaring the applicable rights and obligations, and regulating the demeanor of an individual or government

Substantive law determines the conduct and relations of the parties inter se in respect of the matter litigated, whereas the procedural law regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation

Substantive law deals with the ends which the administration of justice contemplates while the procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which the ends of administration of justice are to be attained

The question as to what facts constitute a wrong is determined by substantive law, while what facts constitute proof of a wrong is a question of procedure

Substantive law defines the rights whereas the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of one to the other

Substantive law relates to the matter outside the Courts, whereas the procedural law regulates affairs inside the Courts.

Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Service Tribunal in violation of the principle already laid down by Supreme Court

Effect

Doctrine of stare decisis, is a Latin term that connotes "let the decision stand" or "to stand by things decided"

Law declared by Supreme Court should be certain, translucent and rational, as most decisions not only constitute a determination of rights of parties but also set down a declaration of law that serves as binding principles in future cases, thereby contributing to development of jurisprudence

Doctrine of precedents, vis-à-vis stare decisis has fundamental value in ensuring an objective certitude and firmness in legal system

Rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds it expression in the doctrine of stare decisis, which posits that when a point or principle of law has officially been decided or settled by ruling of a competent Court in a case where it was directly and necessarily involved, it should no longer be considered as open to re-examination or to a new ruling

Such policy of Courts is conveniently termed as doctrine of stare decisis

Rationale behind such policy is the need to promote certainty, stability and predictability in law

Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal as the same was passed against the law settled by Supreme Court

Appeal was allowed.

Authorities were aggrieved of direction issued by High Court in favour of respondents/civil servants regarding upgradation and redesignation of posts

Validity

Upgradation of a post is not a vested right, rather it stems from a policy decision intended to benefit a particular set of employees under the scheme embedded in the policy

Upgradation cannot be mixed up with promotion

In case of upgradation, employee continues to hold same post without any change in his duties but he is accorded a higher pay scale in order to mitigate distress associated with stagnation due to lack of progression of promotional avenues

Once Government announces a policy, it is also responsible for enforcing such policy across the board to accord benefit of policy to all those who are eligible under it and may benefit because of it

Court cannot interfere in policy making domain of government but when a widespread and comprehensive policy is announced to benefit employees, it should be implemented bigheartedly and generously, without adding any ifs and buts or discrimination that can stifle main objective of the policy

Similar laws, rules and polices should apply uniformly to all in similar situations, without any discrimination or distinction between one employee and another within the sphere of legislation or policy, provided that their status is substantially equivalent and indistinguishable

Even in cases of classification or categorization, such distinctions must not be arbitrary but should be based on reasons, qualities and characteristics that establish an intelligible differentia for those who have been left out of the arena or who have been excluded with clarity regarding the objective sought to be achieved

Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

The word "Domicile", derived from the Latin "domicilium," denotes a person's permanent legal home and establishes their legal affiliation with a specific territorial jurisdiction

It plays a central role in determining personal legal status, including matters of marriage, succession, and eligibility for region-specific rights and obligations

Domicile is not synonymous with residence or nationality; it is a unique legal concept rooted in both fact and intention

Classically, domicile consists of two elements: (i) factum; actual residence in a place, and (ii) animus manendi; the intention to remain there indefinitely

Three primary types of domicile are recognized: (1) domicile of origin, acquired at birth; (2) domicile of choice, acquired upon lawful settlement in a new place with intent to remain; and (3) domicile of dependence, which applies to minors and others under legal incapacity

A person may have several residences but only one domicile at a time, and a domicile persists until displaced by a new one through both residence and intent (facto et animo).

Rules and principle of appreciation of evidence in appeal against conviction are different to that of appeal against acquittal

In appeal against conviction the evidence has to be apprised and evaluated in a rigid and strict manner whereas in appeal against acquittal such stringent method of appreciation of evidence cannot be carried out.

Hostile witness is the one who, from the manner in which he gives his evidence, shows that he is not telling the truth and resiles from his earlier statement in order to damage the case of the calling party

While an unfavourable witness is one who, without any hostile intention, gives evidence which is contrary to the interest of the party.

Judgment in personam binds specific parties to the litigation.

Word "case" comprises various stages, i.e., the case at investigation stage, the case at inquiry stage, and the case at trial stage

Word "case" is not only trial but also other proceedings as well, e.g., physical as well as judicial remand of accused, order on application of Superdari (???????) of case property, application for bail and other allied matters.

Judicial Officer and Cooperatives Board are not mutually exclusive entity(ies) in the context of division of powers, though former isalter ego of the latter, but upon distribution, powers available with Cooperatives Board and those delegated may be termed mutually exclusive, for the purposes of achieving objectives and purpose of the law

Status of delegatee, in the context of exercise of delegated power has been acknowledged under S.11 of Punjab Undesireable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993

This is the power of determination of rights claimed against Cooperatives Board.

Provision of S. 167, Cr.P.C. allows a Magistrate, whether or not he has jurisdiction to try the case, to remand the accused to either police or judicial custody, depending on judicial determination

Remand to police custody under S. 167, Cr.P.C. is specifically for the purpose of investigation

In contrast, S. 344, Cr.P.C. applies where, due to absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary for Court to postpone commencement of any inquiry or trial

Court may, at its discretion, postpone or adjourn proceedings and if accused is in custody, remand them by warrant

No magistrate can remand an accused to custody under S. 344, Cr.P.C. for more than 15 days at a time

Remand under S. 344, Cr.P.C. is strictly to judicial custody and can only be to a judicial lock-up

Provision of S. 167, Cr.P.C. deals with detention during investigation, while S. 344, Cr.P.C. pertains to detention during inquiry or trial.

Anti-dumping investigations and anti-circumvention proceedings are both trade remedies, but they address different issues related to unfair trade practices

Anti-dumping investigations focus on whether a foreign exporter is selling goods in a foreign market at prices below their cost of production or below a comparable price in the exporter's home market, potentially harming domestic industries

Whereas anti-circumvention proceedings, on the other hand, investigate whether measures against dumping or subsidies are being circumvented, meaning thereby the product is being imported in a way that evades the original anti-dumping or countervailing duty

In essence, the anti-dumping investigations are about preventing unfair pricing practices, while anti-circumvention proceedings are about ensuring that existing anti-dumping measures are not bypassed through various methods

The word "anti-circumvention" has been defined in Blacks' Law Dictionary, as "Any act of fraud whereby a person is reduced to a deed by decreet" whereas anti-circumvention measures have been defined under S. 63 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ('the Act, 2015') which deals with the mechanism for final review of anti-dumping duties and outlines the procedure for handling the termination of anti-dumping duties; object whereof is to empower the National Tariff Commission (NTC) to investigate and address practices where exporters or importers attempt to evade imposed anti-dumping duties and includes actions such as change in pattern of trade, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification e.g. slight modifications of products, misclassification or routing goods through third countries to avoid imposed duties.

In contrast, S. 67(3) of Representation of the People Act, 1976 stated that any person aggrieved by a "decision" of the Tribunal may challenge it by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The "general damages" are implied or presumed to have accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they are its immediate, direct or proximate result or such that thus necessarily result from the injury, or such that they did in fact result from the wrong, directly or proximately

The term "special damages" is defined as those which are actual, but not the necessary result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in a particular case i.e. by reason of special circumstances or conditions

Such special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved

In a suit for damages, the wrong done to the plaintiff must be proved to be immediate, direct or proximate result of the act, or acts of negligence.

If a shareholder (whose name is entered as a member) sells his shares to another person, such seller has to be treated as member until his name is replaced with the name of purchaser in the Register

In case a person subscribes to shares of a company, he may not be treated as a shareholder until the shares are actually allotted to him

After allotment, such person is not a member until his name is entered in the Register of Members.

To ensure proper application of law,distinction between Punjab Vagrancy Ordinance, 1958 and Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2018 must be maintained as each statute addresses distinct aspects of criminal conduct

Provision of S.3 of Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2018 applies when coercion, fraud, or exploitation by third party is involved, focusing on systematic exploitation and control over victims

In absence of such elements, Punjab Vagrancy Ordinance, 1958 may apply to the situation.

Existence and enforcement of right of pre-emption are two distinct and different phenomena and merely having a superior right of pre-emption by itself is not sufficient to succeed in a suit for pre-emption

Pre-emptor has to establish the performance of necessary Talbs as required under S. 13 of the Act in order to succeed in a suit for pre-emption

Pre-emptor received information through PW.2 on 17.02.2011 at 10:00 a.m., when he was present in his house in presence of PW.3, however, while appearing as PW.1 the pre-emptor did not mention the time on which information was received from PW.2

Pre-emptor in his plaint stated that he attained knowledge about the sale of the suit land while sitting in his house, but plaint was silent about the exact portion of the house, which was a vast place and non-mentioning of the exact portion by itself was fatal to right of pre-emption

PW.3 did not make clear statement about the place of Talb-i-Muwathibat

PW-3 in his statement only deposed about the date of Talb-i-Muwathibat and did not state about the month and year regarding such material fact, which was fatal for pre-emption suit

Concurrent findings arrived at by both the courts below were based on proper appraisal of evidence and there was no misreading or non-reading of evidence on part of any of the court below

Revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by High Court while keeping in view the principles enshrined in S .115 of the C.P.C.

Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Facts of the case, in brevity, were that the petitioners were appointed on contract in 2007 in the 'Prosecution Service of Punjab' and their services were terminated later but the High Court held that they were entitled to regularization under the government's notification dated 10.11.2010

They were eventually appointed on a regular basis in 2022, but their appointments were treated as fresh appointments, whereas, the petitioners sought regularization from the dated of notification dated 10.11.2010 for seniority and benefits

Question before the High Court was as to "whether the date of regularization of the petitioners (employees) should be considered as 10.11.2010 (the date of the notification)"

Held: The notification dated 10.11.2010 served as a policy guideline for the prospective regularization of the contract employees and it did not confer an automatic or retrospective right to regularization

Rather, each case required evaluation based on specific criteria, including performance and the fulfillment of prescribed qualifications

The notification did not stipulate that regularization would be effective from the date of initial contract appointment or from the date of the notification

Instead, it provided a framework for considering the contract employees for regularization

Only upon regularization, the contract employees would enter the regular service stream anew, without retrospective benefits

Contractual employees enjoyed no vested right to regularization much less to be regularized from any particular date

The benefit of regularization extended to them under the regularization policy was prospective in nature and there was no legal justification to give it retrospective application

Any such step would have totally negated the purpose and significance of the contract appointment policy by leaving no distinction between a contractual and a regular employee

Regularization in service was to be treated as a fresh appointment to maintain the integrity of the civil service system and to protect the rights of the existing civil servants

Both regular and contractual employees were governed by two separate and distinct legal frameworks

Contractual appointments were governed by specific terms and conditions distinct from those applicable to the regular civil servants

Therefore, allowing the contract employees to claim seniority from the date of notification would have infringed upon the rights of existing regular civil servants, disrupting established hierarchies and entitlements

Therefore, date of regularization could not be the date of the regularization policy envisaged under the notification (i.e. 10.11.2010)

Present as well as connected petition being devoid of any merit, were dismissed, in circumstances.

On the other hand, "entitlement to relief" involves a claimant's substantive right to the remedy or relief sought in a lawsuit

Such determination is based on merits of the case, requiring Court to evaluate evidence and apply relevant laws to decide if claimant has a valid claim

Entitlement to relief is considered only after the Court has determined that the case is maintainable.