Nature

Such act amounted to the suppression of material facts, which reflected an abuse of process of law as the second petition effectively sought to re-agitate issues already adjudicated, thereby leading to multiplicity of litigation

Obtaining a judicial order based on inaccurate facts or misrepresented documentation constitutes a serious infraction within the legal framework, as it undermines the sanctity of judicial proceedings and may lead to substantial injustice

A party seeking relief has a legal duty to disclose all material facts with honesty and precision

Such obligation is rooted in the doctrine of uberrima fides, a principle mandating the utmost good faith in dealings with the court, which is essential for litigants to substantiate their claims with accurate and relevant document; reliance or irrelevant material represents a breach of such fundamental duty

Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution is an extraordinary, equitable, discretionary and prerogative remedy, which is invoked primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights and to rectify instances of illegality or irregularity committed by the Executive

Given the extraordinary nature of this jurisdiction, it is imperative that a petitioner approaching High Court must do so with clean hands, presenting all relevant facts fully and transparently, without any concealment or suppression

Failure to make an honest and complete disclosure of all material facts may render the petitioner guilty of misleading the Court, warranting the dismissal of the petition.

Nature of proceedings under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. are more in the nature of an executive function because the right of ownership nor that of possession is adjudicated

Exercise of the powers are subject to fulfilment of the jurisdictional pre-conditions, particularly the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace.

Provisions of O. XI, Rr. 8 & 9, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature as penal action has been provided in O. XI, R. 21, C.P.C., which speaks about striking out of the defence.

Purpose behind legal/codal formalities and procedure was nothing but only to ensure the safe administration of justice and avoid/thwart the chances of injustice/miscarriage of justice.

Proceedings before Justice of Peace are quasi-judicial and not executive, administrative or ministerial which could be dealt mechanically

Justice of Peace exercises quasi-judicial powers, and every case before him demands discretion and judicial observations.

Deputy District Officer (Revenue) cancelling a sale mutation carried out in jalsa-e-aam in the presence of witnesses on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation

Legality

Proceedings before the Revenue Officer or before the Revenue Courts were summary in nature and, therefore, complicated questions of law and disputed question of fact were not to be adjudicated in the hierarchy

Determination of complicated questions of law and disputed questions of fact fell within the sole domain of the civil Court

Plea that a mutation entry was procured through fraud, could not have been decided in proceedings which were summary in nature as such controversy required adjudication by allowing the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims

Section 172 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 only empowered the Revenue authorities to exercise administrative powers; the raison d'etre for the same was that the proceedings conducted by a Revenue Officer or a Revenue Court were summary in nature; they possessed a limited scope of enquiry and did not possess the characteristics of a civil suit that necessitated framing of the issues or recording evidence of the parties, as such matters fell within the sole domain of the civil courts

Besides, S. 172(2)(xvi) of the 1967 Act left the adjudication of plea of fraud to the competence of the civil courts

Deputy District Officer (Revenue) ['DDO(R)'] transgressed his limits in the present case by declaring the subject mutation as having been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation

Appeal was allowed.

Question before High Court was whether S.115(5), C.P.C. which was inserted by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018 and which barred revision under S.115, C.P.C. on orders passed by District Court in an appeal filed under 104, C.P.C.; would apply on cases which had already commenced in Trial Court/Original Court before such enactment/insertion came into force

Held, that legal pursuit of a remedy, appeal or second appeal or revision were steps in a series of proceedings all connected by intrinsic unity and were to be regarded as one legal proceeding

Right of appeal or revision or second appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right, and institution of a suit carried with it implication that all such rights then in force, were preserved to parties thereto till rest of career of such suit

Right of appeal or revision was vested right and such right accrued to litigant and existed as on and from date the lis commenced and although same may be actually exercised when adverse judgment was pronounced, however such right was to be governed by law prevailing as on date of institution of suit or proceeding and not by law that prevailed at date of decision or at date of filing of such appeal/ revision

Said vested right of appeal or revision or second appeal could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provided expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise

High Court held that right of revision vested in parties at such date when litigation commenced and such right was to be governed by law as it prevailed on said date which was that date the parties acquired right to seek remedy of revision under S.115, C.P.C., if unsuccessful in appeal under S.104, C.P.C.

Review was allowed, accordingly.

Petition under S.278 of Succession Act, 1925, is not a pleadings as defined under O.VI, C.P.C. nor a plaint as explained under O.VII, R.1, C.P.C.

Arrest of accused is not mandatory rather it has left to discretion of authorized person to exercise this power as and when necessary for achieving the intended object.

Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court over subordinate judiciary under Art.46 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974

Scope

Petitioners impugned establishment of State Judicial (Policy Making) Committee under Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Judicial (Policy Making) Committee Act, 2017 inter alia on ground that said committee was given statutory power to exercise supervisory control over subordinate judiciary which was in violation of Constitutional provisions, as such control only vested in High Court

Validity

Supervision and control over subordinate judiciary vested with High Court under Art.46 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, and same was exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation

Such supervisory control comprehended administrative powers as to working of subordinate courts and all matters relating to performance standards, including disciplinary jurisdiction over subordinate judicial officers

Any provision in a statute or rule or notification empowering any executive functionary to have administrative supervision and control over subordinate judiciary will be violative of Art.46 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974

Under S.4 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Judicial (Policy Making) Committee Act, 2017 such powers of superintendence and control which had been vested in High Court, had been transferred to said committee, which was contrary to Art.46 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974

Functions entrusted to impugned Committee were Constitutional functions of High Court and said subordinate Legislation had therefore practically amended Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 which was not permissible

High Court held that Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Judicial (Policy Making) Committee Act, 2017 was ultra vires the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and same was set aside with observation that actions taken in furtherance of provisions of said Act were to stand protected and validated

Writ petition was allowed, accordingly.

Section 16 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997 was both penal and remedial in nature as it prescribed penalties but also provided guarantee for enforcement of protection of rights of consumers and compensation for loss or damage to consumers

Strict liability for breaches was forthcoming under provisions of S.16 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997 however for presumption as to mens rea to be rebutted, it was required that strict liability must be essential to give practical effect to legislative intention and also that person charged with breach of statutory duty must have had some opportunity of furthering their observance

Under S.16 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997, no one was to be subjected to a burden which in normal course of events could not have been discharged by such person(s).

Findings of fact by Appellate Tribunal could not be displaced by High Court in exercise of advisory jurisdiction under S.133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

Power to repeal any law and to save any decision, order, proceeding, rules or regulations under the repealed law was a Legislative function and was done with intent to safeguard that which the Legislature deemed necessary from the repealing provision

Saving clause acted as restriction on the repealing provision exempting all saved items from the repeal.

Question before High Court was whether CDC, CSC and THC charges qualified within definition of "profits" from operations of ships in international traffic, falling within purview of Danish, and Belgian Double Taxation Treaties with Pakistan

Contention of Department, inter alia, was that such revenue receipts fell outside exemption provided by said Double Taxation Treaties

Validity

OCED Model Tax Convention, along with guidelines and commentary with respect to Art. 8 of same were an important tool to employ in interpretation of Double Taxation Treaties

Per said Art. 8 income derived, inter alia, from providing containers for transportation, transferring containers to and from a ship, transportation on board ship, unloading containers and providing containers for transportation from port of destination to customer were said to fall within broader category of "profit" from operation of ships as said income was considered auxiliary to core income

Such OCED guidelines therefore provided, inter alia, that profit from activities facilitating international shipping operations were encompassed in category of profits from operation of ships in international traffic so long as such activities were ancillary to international shipping operations

CDC, CSC and THC were ancillary to operation of ships in international traffic and profits derived therefrom also fell within category of "profits from operations of ships in international traffic"

Insertion of specific provisions in respect of Agreements for Avoidance of Double Taxation in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 demonstrated that said category was dealt with under an express provision of said Ordinance itself and thus it followed that provisions of S. 7 of the said Ordinance read with S. 107 of the same would provide statutory sanction for availing of benefits under such fiscal double-taxation treaties

While interpreting a double taxation treaty it was necessary to bear in mind as to which method had been adopted in relation to income under consideration and S. 107 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provided the statutory gateway through which a double taxation treaty was given effect in municipal law

High Court held that CDC, CSC and THC qualified as "profits from international shipping operations" and benefits of Danish and Belgian Double Taxation Treaties with Pakistan were applicable on the same

Reference was answered, accordingly.

Banking Suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was well-defined and controversies in such a suit were restricted to "availed", "claimed", or "dispute amounts" and facts in support thereof

Controversial details, unnecessary facts and time for the trial under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was curtailed by its provisions

Trial under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was restricted only to claimed or disputed amounts and therefore was a suit of accounts duly based on credit, debit and balance entries properly ledgered and maintained in Books of Accounts

Provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being mandatory, parties were compulsorily obliged not only to plead but also state nature of accounts otherwise such parties were bound to face legal consequences.

Whole transaction and each component part of scam needs to be viewed in a holistic manner and not in isolation.

Banking Suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was well-defined and controversies in such a suit were restricted to "availed", "claimed", or "dispute amounts" and facts in support thereof

Controversial details, unnecessary facts and time for the trial under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was curtailed by its provisions

Trial under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was restricted only to claimed or disputed amounts and therefore was a suit of accounts duly based on credit, debit and balance entries properly ledgered and maintained in Books of Accounts

Provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being mandatory, parties were compulsorily obliged not only to plead but also state nature of accounts otherwise such parties were bound to face legal consequences.

Money due under a "Life Insurance Policy" and payable to nominee of such policy was a debt for purpose of obtaining a succession certificate

Nomination was a mandate which came to an end and expired upon death of nominee.

Explanation increasing the liability of a taxpayer will operate prospectively and not retrospectively.

Retrospective liability is imposed when an Explanation attributes a meaning to a substantive provision or expression whereby the burden, obligation or liability of a person is increased for a past period.

Section 12(2) C.P.C. was a substitution of suit, if material alleged and produced by the applicant in support of allegations of fraud or misrepresentation was serious and specific then evidence ought to be recorded for just adjudication of the application under S.12(2) C.P.C.

Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.. was required to be decided after framing of issues and after providing a chance to respective parties to lead evidence

Such principle, however, was not to be followed in each and every case and was dependent on nature of assertions made in an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. along with material annexed thereto

Where allegation of fraud and misrepresentation was alleged and duly supported by evidence, in such eventuality, it was incumbent upon court to record evidence for disposal of such application under S.12(2), C.P.C.

Petitioner impugned procedural irregularities in constitution of Department Tenure Review Committee for the purpose of selection of candidates against post of Assistant Professor

Contention of University, inter alia, was that Constitutional petition against constitution of said committee was not maintainable

Validity

Per provisions of the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1986 it was clear that power to regulate terms and conditions of service of the International Islamic University's employees did not vest in Federal Government, as the same did not also play any role in making / framing of Statutes, Regulations and Rules framed under S.29 of the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985

Petitioner's service was therefore not regulated by any statute or statutory rules and Constitutional petition would only be competent if rules / regulations governing terms and conditions of service were statutory or where act or proceedings impugned were in violation of statutory rules or regulations

Constitutional petition being not maintainable was dismissed, in circumstances.

Medical evidence was not a corroborative piece of evidence rather confirmatory in nature, which could be used by the defence to confirm or contradict the medical evidence with the ocular evidence

Medical evidence could not identify the accused but confirm the locale, duration, kind of weapon used and timing of the injuries inflicted but in no way could be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence connecting accused with the crime.

Proceedings for contempt of Court were sui generis in their nature and being unique and one of a kind, contained some elements of both civil and criminal trial

Principle of criminal trial that the burden of proof barring few exceptions never shifted to the accused, hardly had any application in contempt proceedings

In such cases once the prosecution had brought on record all the incriminating and contemptuous material attributed to the alleged contemnor and confronted him while recording his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., then the burden shifted to the alleged contemnor to prove his innocence by showing his bona fide and proving that the offending statement was never meant to undermine the authority or obstruct/embarrass the administration of justice.

Department impugned order of Appellate Tribunal where interim relief was allowed to taxpayer and claimed that the same constituted a question of law for the purpose of adjudication under S.47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

Validity

Appellate Tribunal, in the present case, had not decided any legal issue which would invoke jurisdiction under S.47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990

High Court converted present reference under S.47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 into a Constitutional petition and held that Appellate Tribunal could not grant an indefinite stay in a sales tax matter

High Court directed the Appellate Tribunal to decide the matter within 30 days

Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Preamble of a statute could not be treated as a mandatory part of the same, and it was there to indicate intention of the Legislature

Provision of a statute if clear, then the same was to be given effect by applying plain and liberal meaning to words used therein and in such a situation, resort to preamble may not be made, however where there existed complexity and doubt in regard to giving effect to words of any provision of a statute, then the preamble would be considered as a vital key for removing doubts.

Petitioner was aggrieved of the order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace whereby he had not issued notice to the respondents though on the date fixed counsel appeared on behalf of respondents and submitted vakalatnama and Ex-officio Justice of Peace allowed him to submit arguments

Validity

Functions performed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace under S.22A, Cr.P.C. were quasi-judicial in nature and he had not committed any illegality or irregularity while accepting vakalatnama and allowing submission of arguments, as there was no bar to hear the other side before passing an appropriate order

Constitutional petition being, bereft of merit, was dismissed.

Taxpayer was receiving interest free loans extended by its directors which was declared as taxpayer's benefits by tax authorities

Taxpayer's appeal before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was dismissed ex-parte

Validity

No business relationship existed between taxpayer and its directors

Directors were managing taxpayers and had a fiduciary relationship with taxpayer, as such they were not engaged in business relationship with taxpayer hence, interest free loans given by directors given to taxpayer did not fall within meaning of "benefit derived during course of business relationship"

Provisions of S. 18(1)(d) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2011 were not applicable for the purposes of determining tax liability

High Court set aside order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue

Reference was allowed in circumstances.

Cumulative reading of Os.VIII and IX of C.P.C. along with O.XXXVII, C.P.C. signified that satisfaction of Trial Court was paramount for decision of a suit on negotiable instrument; and for such satisfaction Trial Court could call for evidence, appoint local commission, or appoint an expert in order to arrive at a just and proper conclusion

Trial Court in a suit under O.XXXVII, C.P.C. therefore could not be stopped from directing any party to produce evidence in order to prove his/her case.

Factual controversies or factual disputes raised in show-cause notice could not be decided in Constitutional jurisdiction but the same were dominion of a competent authority to decide the fate of a show cause notice after providing ample opportunity of hearing with right to fair trial and then pass orders in accordance with law

In matters of show-cause notice, High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution could not assume a supervisory role in every situation to pass an interim order with directions to an Authority to proceed but to not pass final order till decision of a Constitutional petition or to suspend the operation of show-cause notice for an unlimited period of time or to keep the matters pending for an indefinite period

Challenge to a show-cause notice under Art.199 of the Constitution must be sparing and cautious and High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction may take up writs to challenge show-cause notice(s) if it found such show-cause notice to lack of jurisdiction, be barred by law or if the same were abuse of process of the court or coram non judice and in such situation, High Court may quash such show-cause notice(s).

Factual controversies or factual disputes raised in show-cause notice could not be decided in Constitutional jurisdiction but the same were dominion of a competent authority to decide the fate of a show cause notice after providing ample opportunity of hearing with right to fair trial and then pass orders in accordance with law

In matters of show-cause notice, High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution could not assume a supervisory role in every situation to pass an interim order with directions to an Authority to proceed but to not pass final order till decision of a Constitutional petition or to suspend the operation of show-cause notice for an unlimited period of time or to keep the matters pending for an indefinite period

Challenge to a show-cause notice under Art.199 of the Constitution must be sparing and cautious and High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction may take up writs to challenge show-cause notice(s) if it found such show-cause notice to lack of jurisdiction, be barred by law or if the same were abuse of process of the court or coram non judice and in such situation, High Court may quash such show-cause notice(s).

Purpose of an order under O. I, R. 10(2) of the C.P.C. was primarily to address mis-joinder of parties and that too, as a step towards adjudication, and it was not to be the formal expression of adjudication by itself, which expression should be in form of a decree.

Application for arrest of a vessel filed in terms of R.731 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side) read with the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court, was not an injunction application at par with and under an application of injunction in terms of O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 C.P.C.

Parameters for grant of an application under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. as against an application under R.731 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side) were completely different and at variance

Admiralty Jurisdiction was totally separate and independent from common law jurisdiction or the civil jurisdiction of a Court

As a contrast to common law or civil jurisdiction, by way of arrest of a ship, it had the consequence of obtaining security in lieu thereof for the claimed amount, and to establish its jurisdiction, even if there was no substantive link between the claim and the jurisdiction, other than the presence of the arrested ship within the jurisdiction of the Court

With such peculiar facts and circumstances in mind, as well as the nature of the Admiralty Jurisdiction under the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, the Court was to decide application for arrest of a vessel or ship.

Matters under Companies Act, 2017 (Act) which the Court as defined in S. 2(23) of Companies Act, 2017 was empowered to determine by or under Companies Act, 2017

Ouster of jurisdiction of any other court on matters under Companies Act, 2017

Nature of ouster clause contained in S. 5(2) of the Companies Act, 2017

Scope

Appellant which was private limited company impugned the order of Civil Court whereby appellant company was, inter alia, restrained from transferring 50% of its share under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. ; and application of appellant company under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. for rejection of plaint of respondent, was dismissed

Contention of respondent/plaintiff was that through civil suit, he had sought transfer of shares in his name, on basis of settlement deed with the Chief Executive Officer of the Company

Held, that Legislative intent behind provisions of the Companies Act, 2017 was that all matters related to title or transfer of share of a juridical person incorporated under the Act were to be dealt with by Court vested with jurisdiction under S. 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 which was to entertain, or proceed to determine a controversy under Companies Act, 2017

Jurisdiction of the civil court had been expressly ousted under S. 5(2) of the Companies Act, 2017

Mechanism for transfer of shares and consequences of refusal to do so had been prescribed by Legislature in the Companies Act, 2017, along with statutory right of appeal

Suit filed by plaintiff / respondent sought transfer of shares on basis of a settlement deed, which ought to have been dealt with under Companies Act, 2017

Such suit was therefore barred by S. 5(2) of the Companies Act, 2017

Impugned order was set aside and plaint was rejected under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Under provisions of R.32(20 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules,1984, no doubt furnishing of certified copies was required but there existed exceptions to the said Rule, and when such documents were admitted by the other side then certified copies of documents were no longer required

Compliance to requirement of R. 32(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 must be determined at time of filing of writ petition before the same was admitted to hearing and once such petition was admitted and notices were issued then R.38 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 came into operation which empowered the High Court to pass any order it deemed fit or to follow any procedure that may before it appear to be just.

Held, no doubt that it was the prerogative of the Government to take administrative steps and formulate policy, but whilst formulating such policy, Government could not ignore public interests and rights accrued to state subjects or beneficiaries in any enforced policy.

Stoppage of proceedings under S. 249, Cr.P.C. has effect of discharging accused until such time when on availability of requisite evidence case could be revived against him

Such stoppage amounts to termination of case for the time being.

Law required the Authority to consider the entire service record of employee while assessing whether he/she could be compulsory retired

Case of a judicial officer was required to be examined treating him/her to be differently than other civil servants

Honesty and integrity of judicial officer was expected to be beyond doubt

Nature of judicial service was such that it could not afford to suffer continuance in service of a persons with doubtful integrity or the one who had lost his/her utility in order to keep the stream of justice unpolluted

Judge could not be stamped with the label of doubtful integrity in absence of tangible material

General impression of the Judge as a corrupt Judge in the mind of general public was alone sufficient for his/her compulsory retirement by the Authority

Officer remained an average officer throughout her service career and never improved

Judicial officer did not enjoy good reputation in the eyes of general public as well as her superiors

Compulsory retirement was a major penalty but differed from dismissal and removal from service as it did not involve penal consequences

Person compulsorily retired was entitled to pension and other retirement benefits proportionate to the period of service standing to his/her credit

Officer had already attained the age of superannuation

No chance to make allegation of non-application of judicial mind and mala fides in making the decision against the officer existed

Sufficient material was available to connect the officer with the commission of misconduct during her service

Inquiry Officer as well as Authorized Officer had appreciated the evidence in its true perspective

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Nature of power of Commissioner to amend assessment order under S. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as distinct from power of adjudication of refund claims under S. 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Scope

Question before the High Court was whether Commissioner had jurisdiction to amend an assessment order when on basis of same assessment order, a refund had been made to the taxpayer under S. 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Held, under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 power to amend assessment order was a different concept having its own parameters as provided under S. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 whereas claim of refund was to be adjudicated under S. 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which had its own attributes

Power under S. 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was inherent in its nature and was not para meteria to power of review by an authority

Such power was only exercised when Commissioner was of the opinion that an assessment order was erroneous or prejudicial to interests of the revenue

Claim for refund under S. 170 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had different parameters and limitations and thus, said section could not make power of Commissioner under S. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 redundant

Reference was answered, accordingly.

Under S. 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990; in order to be subject to further tax, a registered person must be making taxable supplies to an unregistered person and such tax was in addition to tax payable under Ss. 3(1),3(1B),3(2), 3(5) and 3(6) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990

"Further tax" was a specie of sales tax in view of the definition of "sales tax" given in S. 2(29A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and nothing existed in S. 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which took "further tax" outside the ambit of definition of "sales tax"

"Zero rating" facility granted to certain industrial sectors under S. 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was absolute and therefore they could not be burdened with "further tax" under S. 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990

Non-obstante clause contained in S. 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 made reference to S. 3 of the same, and therefore incident of making payment of tax at the rate of zero percent on supplies made to an unregistered person would not be attracted to levy of "further tax".

Tribunal or Commission appointed under the [Punjab] Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 did not decide any dispute but merely ascertained real facts, and there were neither any parties before the Tribunal nor any lis

Tribunal did not perform any judicial functions

Procedure of the Tribunal was inquisitional rather than accusatorial

Tribunal was not a Court and it was not competent to render any judgment

Tribunal had no power of adjudication in sense of passing an order which could be enforced "proprio vigore"

Inquiry or final report by Tribunal was not a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function.

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by the Single Judge of High Court as there was no illegality or perversity in the order

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner impugned the notification whereby respondent, after his retirement from post of Vice-Chancellor was appointed to the said post again on temporary basis and contended inter alia, that incumbent Vice-Chancellor, under the Pir Mehr Ali Shah Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi Act, 1995 could not be granted extension in tenure since under the statute, the functions of the Vice-Chancellor, if the said office fell vacant, were to be performed by Pro-Vice-Chancellor

Validity

Section 14(9) of the Pir Mehr Ali Shah Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi Act, 1995 provided that in case the office of Vice-Chancellor fell vacant, the Pro-Vice-Chancellor was to perform functions of the said office, however, in the present case office of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor was also vacant at the time of the impugned notification

Temporary arrangement was made only if at any time (the intervening period) there was a temporary dysfunctionality due to non-availability of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and as soon as, such dysfunctionality was cured or removed, intervening period and the corresponding temporary arrangement came to an end

High Court observed that notification assigning duties of Vice-Chancellor to respondent on temporary basis till the appointment of regular Vice-Chancellor was automatically superseded by the notification appointing the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and said newly appointed Pro-Vice-Chancellor shall perform the functions of the post of Vice-Chancellor till such time that a regular Vice-Chancellor was appointed, with immediate effect

Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Audit in itself was not an adverse action and / or order; particularly in a system where tax return was filed by taxpayer under self-assessment, which was to be treated as an assessment order of the Commissioner under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Conduct of audit was not even an inconvenience if taxpayer fulfilled its statutory duty by maintaining record under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

Procedure as provided in O. V, R. 20, C.P.C. regarding substituted service and the jurisprudence developed on its interpretation was not relevant for the purposes of banking suits as the only provision applicable thereto vis-à-vis effective service of notice(s) was S. 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.

Such suit was not a regular suit and civil court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issues between the parties when the court was seized of their application under S. 20 of the Act.

Contention of plaintiff was that he was owner in possession of suit land and defendants even after execution of agreement to sell refused to execute sale deed

Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court but Appellate Court decreed the same

Validity

Plaintiff had prayed for a declaratory decree with regard to ownership of land on the basis of agreement to sell

Plaintiff at the same time had requested for a decree for specific performance of contract

Agreement to sell was not a title document

Suit could be filed on the basis of oral sale

Agreement whether oral or written could be validly executed

Unregistered document could be executed between the parties and implemented by the Court

Executor of agreement to sell had already received consideration amount

Agreement to sell had been proved as per law

Executor of agreement to sell was bound to register sale deed in favour of plaintiff to the extent of his share

Impugned decree was modified to the extent that executor would execute sale deed in favour of plaintiff to the extent of his share failing which sale deed be registered through Nazir of the Court

Judgment and decree of the appellate court was modified in circumstances.

Remedy of reference before the High Court under S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was appellate in nature and must be construed and applied as such.

Remedy of reference before the High Court under S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was appellate in nature and must be construed and applied as such.

"Bipolar disorder" which was also known as 'manic-depressive illness', was a brain disorder that would cause unusual shifts of mind, energy, activity levels and the ability to carry out day-to-day tasks

Bipolar disorder was of four types and all of them involved clear changes in mind, energy and activity levels

Person suffering from Bipolar disorder, could not be declared a person of unsound mind; it was mental disease, which could be characterized by periods of depression and periods of elevated mood

Petition of accused claiming that he was of unsound mind being devoid of any force, was dismissed, in circumstances.