Pecuniary jurisdiction

Authorities assailed judgment passed by Single Member Bench on the plea of lack of jurisdiction as the matter was beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of Rupees five million

Validity

Only limitation imposed under S. 194-C (3) and (4) of Customs Act, 1969 is that the Benches consisting of Single Member can only hear class of cases as Federal Government may by order in writing specify

No such notification or order in writing for delegating authorities issued by Federal Government, notifying cases to be assigned to a Single Member Bench was available on record nor same was produced by respondents or rebutted by way of filing counter affidavit

Chairman himself or any other member of Customs Appellate Tribunal was authorized under S. 194-C (4) of Customs Act, 1969 to dispose of case, sitting singly, where value of the case related to duty, tax and fine not exceeding five million Rupees or where goods were confiscated without option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation under S.181 of Customs Act, 1969

High Court set aside judgment passed by Single Member Bench of Customs Appellate Tribunal, as the same was coram non judice

High Court remanded the matter to Customs Appellate Tribunal for decision afresh on appeal

Reference was allowed accordingly.

Dispute was with regard to determination of forum of appeal regarding matters where value of assessment of tax or refund of tax did not exceed Rupees 20 million

Held: Principle of continuing operation of a repealed law can only be applied where Legislature does not give the amending Act retrospective effect

Where Legislature gives retrospective effect to provisions of amending Act by express words or necessary intendment, then principle enshrined in S.6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 does not apply and express intention of Legislature in new enactment has to be given effect

High Court declared that cases where value of tax or refund, as the case may be, was less than Rupees 20 million, appeal against order would lie to Commissioner Appeals, and in cases exceeding such amount, appeal would lie to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, if the order had been communicated to affected parties after the date of commencement of Finance Act, 2024

High Court further declared that appeals having assessment value of tax, or refund of tax, as the case may be, pending before Commissioner appeals on 31-12-2024, stood transferred to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue by operation of law and were supposed to be decided by the Tribunal; that appeals having value of Rupees 20 million or less and pending before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue on or before 31-12-2024 would continue to be decided by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue; that reference against order of Commissioner Appeals filed on communication of the order after commencement of Tax Law (Amendment) Act, 2024 would be entertainable by High Court and would be decided in accordance with amended law; that all cases pending before High Court or sent back to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue would be dealt in accordance with the declaration made by High Court

High Court directed the parties to approach Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue for seeking sending back of those tax references which had been filed before High Court after Tax Law (Amendment) Act, 2024 and were sent to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue for re-transfer to High Court in accordance with the declaration so made by High Court, and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue would be at liberty to send back the cases, despite the earlier directions of High Court in those cases

Reference was disposed of accordingly.

Respondent/Bank filed suit for recovery of Rs. 109.460 million and after passing of consent decree, amount claimed by decree-holder bank was reduced to Rs. 64.900 million

Applicant/judgment debtor sought transfer of Execution Proceedings to Banking Court on the plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of High Court

Validity

Applicant/judgment debtor on one hand accepted concession of easy installments along with conditional waiving off the claims regarding amounts of costs of funds, charges, markups etc. while not objecting to original decree despite the same being less than Rs. 100 million and not even at subsequent stage of modified agreement while taking further concessions

Applicant/judgment debtor on the other hand took a totally different plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction at much belated stage

Such transfer application seemed to be an attempt to avoid scheduled and agreed upon payments/installments

If stance of applicant/judgment debtor was to be accepted as correct then as a necessary consequence initial consent decree was also liable to be set aside on the sole ground of being coram non judice and in that case applicant/judgment debtor was bound to pay Rs. 109.460 million claim of respondent/Bank

High Court declined to transfer execution proceedings to Banking Court on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction

Application was dismissed, in circumstances.

No provision in the Family Courts Act, 1964 exists for regulating or restricting jurisdiction of the Family Courts in terms of valuation of the subject matter involved in family suits

Provisions of appeal under S. 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, reaffirmed that no classification of jurisdiction on pecuniary basis is intended by the legislature for adjudication of matters relating to family affairs.

Appellants assailed order passed by District Judge whereby applications filed by them were returned to them under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. for presentation before the Court having pecuniary jurisdiction

Validity

Appellants had filed separate applications and not a joint application, and the entire subject property was not the subject matter of any of the applications as the appellants had sought the Letters of Administration only in respect of the share left by each of the deceased

Every deceased having a separate and distinct share in the subject property falling within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Trial Court, each of their respective legal representatives was entitled to file a separate application, particularly when there was no bar in law that separate applications in respect of separate and distinct shares or portions in the same property could not be filed

Separate applications could be filed before the Court having the pecuniary jurisdiction to the extent of the said shares of each of the deceased

Impugned orders were set aside and the applications were remanded to the Trial Court with the direction to decide the objections filed therein by all the objectors.

Section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 was substituted in 2017 and Ss.6 & 96 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were substituted in 2020 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province

Pecuniary jurisdiction of District judge to hear appeal was enhanced to Rs.10 Million

Under substituted S.6, pecuniary jurisdiction of District court was set as Rs.50 Million or above

Appeal against any final judgment/decree passed by civil Court was to be filed before District judge concerned and therefore jurisdiction of the latter stood enhanced to any amount less than Rs. 50 Million (albeit indirectly)

Held, that pecuniary limit for District Judge as appellate Court i.e. Rs.10 Million as provided by S.18 of the General Clauses Ordinance, 1962, could not prevent a District Court from hearing appeals of an amount of more than Rs.10 Million as provided in by S. 6 read with S.96 of C.P.C., for the reason that a non-obstante clause had been put in place in the substituted S.96 knowingly/intentionally so as to remove any doubts, which might have arisen because of conflict in the General Clauses Ordinance, 1962 and the amended provisions of C.P.C.

Jurisdiction of District Judge to hear appeals impugned judgments/decrees of Civil Judge stood vested despite subsequent amendments

Office (Registrar) was directed by High Court to transmit all the connected appeal separately to respective District Judges for deciding the same by himself or entrust it to any other competent Court for deciding according to law.

Deputy Collector of Customs (Adjudication) issued show-cause notice and Collector of Customs (Adjudication) passed order thereon

Validity

Powers had to be assumed on the basis of involved amount of duty and taxes

Power to adjudicate the case rested with the Principal Appraiser in terms of Cls. (vi) of S. 179, Customs Act, 1969

Show-cause notice in the present case was issued by Deputy Collector of Customs (Adjudication) and order in the case had to be passed by him and by none else

Collector of Customs (Adjudication) passed order in exercise of powers of Deputy Collector of Customs (Adjudication)

Action of authority had to be restricted to the specific sphere permitted by the statute

Appellate Tribunal held the issuance of show-cause notice and passing of order-in-original to be void ab initio, illegal and of no legal effect

Appeal was allowed.

Assistant Director, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit issued audit observations and framed contravention report

Deputy Collector (Adjudication) issued show-cause notice alleging mis-declaration of PCT heading and thereafter ordered for recovery of evaded amount of duty and taxes

Appeal filed before Collector of Customs (Appeals) was dismissed

Validity

Section 179, Customs Act, 1969 expressed that the powers of adjudication had to be determined by the authority adjudicating the case on the basis of "amount of duty and taxes involved, excluding the conveyance"

Amount of duty and taxes involved in the present case was Rs. 4,82,295/

Case of such amount fell within the powers of Assistant Collector of Customs in terms of clause (iv) of subsection (1) of S. 179, Customs Act, 1969

Deputy Collector had issued show-cause notice and passed order-in-original by usurping the powers of Assistant Collector

No one was allowed to usurp the powers of the adjudicating authority

Said usurpation rendered the act of issuance of show-cause notice and passing of order-in-original without power and jurisdiction, hence, null, void ab initio and coram non judice

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Expression of S. 179, Customs Act, 1969, was very clear in regards to determination of the powers of the Adjudicating Authority on the basis of amount of duty and taxes involved excluding the conveyance and not the amount of evaded duty and taxes

Present case involved amount of Rs. 22,00,880, competent authority was Additional Collector of Customs to adjudicate the case of said amount under clause (ii) of S. 179(1), Customs Act, 1969

Assistant Collector of Customs had issued the show-cause notice while usurping the powers of his superiors, show-cause notice, in circumstances, was issued without lawful authority and jurisdiction.

Petitioner sought transfer of their cases from Accountability Courts to other courts having jurisdiction due to low monetary value involved in their cases

Validity

Petitioners failed to produce any stay order issued by superior Courts preventing Accountability Courts from proceeding with National Accountability Bureau references filed before them

Accused were behind the bars while their cases had been stayed

Requirement of Preamble and S.16(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 provided for expeditious trials

Many trials before Accountability Courts had come to a grinding halt and were not serving interests of justice

High Court lifted/withdrew interim restraining/stay order in connection with any of proceedings related to petitions and directed to continue proceedings including hearing of final arguments and announcements of judgments by Accountability Courts and to proceed with any such references pending before court

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Objection to jurisdiction was a basic lacuna on assumption of jurisdiction, which could be raised at any stage of proceedings including appeal inasmuch as it went to the very roots of the matter and had rendered entire proceedings coram non judice

When a Court/ forum suffered from want of inherent jurisdiction, no act of consent or acquiescence in the proceedings could vest such forum/Court with such jurisdiction

No question of waiver or estoppel was attracted in such circumstances

Non-raising of such objection by parties, the forum taking cognizance of the matter must have at the first instance to decide question of its jurisdiction at the commencement of proceedings

Order passed or an act done by Court or Tribunal, incompetent to entertain proceedings, was without jurisdiction

Jurisdictional defect could not be removed by mere conclusion of proceedings and passing of order-in-original and order-in-appeal

When a law required an act to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner alone, not otherwise

High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue

Reference was dismissed in circumstances.

Trial Court dismissed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside consent decree but the same was accepted by the revisional court

Validity

Jurisdiction could be determined on the basis of plaint of the original suit

Revisional Court had exercised pecuniary jurisdiction not vested in it as the value of suit set out in the plaint on the basis of which the consent decree was passed for Rs. 55,00,000/

Impugned judgment passed by the Revisional Court was set aside

Constitutional petition was accepted, in circumstances.

In order to rule out misuse of discretion and to standardize selection procedure for consideration for cognizance of cases to be investigated by NAB, the Chairman NAB had framed Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) with the title "Priority for Cognizance of Cases"

Serial No.(iv) of said SOPs provided that NAB had pecuniary jurisdiction in cases involving interest of members of public at large, where number of defrauded persons was more than 50 persons and amount involved was not less than Rs.100 million.

Pecuniary jurisdiction being a procedural irregularity could not be taken into account unless objection was raised before Trial Court and evidence had been recorded about question of pecuniary jurisdiction

Appeal was allowed in circumstances by setting aside order of lower appellate court.

Dispute between the parties was whether after determination of pecuniary jurisdiction plaint was to be returned or rejected

Validity

Suit filed by plaintiff was barred by virtue of S. 7 of Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction

Court was either supposed to reject the plaint for want of pecuniary jurisdiction or it was to be returned to plaintiff

Rule of propriety demanded that when there was a Court having jurisdiction to try the suit and plaint was wrongly filed in another Court, which had 'no jurisdiction' either on the ground of pecuniary value of the suit or territorial limits, to be tried by Court where it was filed, instead of rejecting the plaint, such Court should return the plaint to plaintiff for presentation before a Court having both pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction, as if the suit had never been instituted; it was not the case of propriety alone, rather it was necessary to return the plaint because even order of 'rejection of plaint' was a case of implied exercise of jurisdiction by the Court in a case where cognizance was expressly barred by S.7 of Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962

Division Bench of High Court returned the plaint and allowed plaintiff to present the same before Court of competent jurisdiction resultantly order passed by Single Judge of High Court was set aside

High Court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Petitioner was running a manufacturing business and claimed bogus sales tax refund against fake filing and bogus sales tax invoices for a small amount of Rs. 4.37 million, which was contrary to Standing Operating Procedure of NAB

Validity

NAB through opening of proprietorships bank account form, bank statements and cheques paid to proprietorship, other documents on record (including banking) and statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. was able to produce sufficient material to show that there were reasonable grounds to link accused to the offence

Amount involved was only approximately Rs.43 lacs and below the amount generally specified in the new Standing Operating Procedure, such aspect was covered by Para. ix of the Procedure

High Court directed Trial Court to complete trial expeditiously keeping in view the provisions of S. 16(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Bail was declined in circumstances.

In Para. (ix) of Standing Operating Procedure, expression "any other case falling within the purview of NAB irrespective of the amount involved and status of accused person, with prior approval of the Chairman" is added because there may be cases falling below Rs.100 million which cannot be prosecuted by any other agency and as such rather than letting the culprit off Scott free, he should be prosecuted by NAB at the discretion of the Chairman

In cases below Rs.100 million which can be dealt with by other agencies such as Federal Investigation Agency and Anti-Corruption Establishment, High Court expected NAB to send such cases to such alternate agencies for prosecution by virtue of S. 18(d) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

Appellant/Land Acquisition Officer contended that appeal should be heard by Division Bench of the High Court since amount of compensation involved was more than Rs.10,00,000/

Land owners contended that it was practice since long in the Province of Sindh that appeals in the matter of land acquisition were heard by Single Bench of the High Court and High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders were not applicable to province of Sindh

Validity

High Court(Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol.-V, Part-B, Chap.-III, R. 2(I)(B) provided cases to be heard by a Division Bench which included appeal under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 if the amount involved in the appeal exceeded Rs. 10,00,000/ while in the Province of Sindh such appeal was being heard by Single Bench of High Court

Matter was ordered to be put before the Chief Justice of Sindh High Court with the request that to constitute larger bench of the court to decide questions as to i) whether R. 2(I)(B), Vol.-V, Chap.-III, Part-B of High Court(Lahore) Rules and Orders was applicable to the High Court of Sindh; ii) whether R. 2(I)(B), Vol.-V, Chap.-III, Part-B of High Court(Lahore) Rules and Orders was amended by any Rule by the High Court of Sindh; iii) whether the appeals under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 if the amount involved in the appeals, exceeded Rs. 10,00,000/- would be heard and disposed of by Division Bench of High Court of Sindh and iv) what should the order be

Order accordingly.

Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of money claiming that he was owner of vehicle which he had rented out to defendant company, who later informed him that said vehicle had been snatched from defendant-driver of company, but it was later turned out that driver himself was involved in theft of vehicle

Defendant, after amicable settlement through arbitration, paid part of total value of said vehicle but failed to pay the remaining amount

Trial Court dismissed the suit

Plaintiff filed appeal before Additional District Judge, which was returned for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction; whereafter present appeal was filed before High Court

Defendant took plea that appeal was filed with lapse of thirteen days after return thereof, and no sufficient cause was given for said delay

Contention raised by plaintiff was that he had filed present appeal before court below well before expiry of limitation period, but same was returned after expiry of limitation, so he should not have suffered for act of court

Validity

Appellate court, in oblivion to High Court Rules and Orders, not returning appeal on very first day when it was filed, had committed irregularity and illegality

If first appeal was properly checked in light of High Court Rules and Orders, it would have been returned forthwith, so that it could be re-filed within prescribed period of limitation before competent court

First appeal, having been filed well within time, remained pending before court for nine months before the same was returned for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction

Plaintiff had performed his obligation by applying for certified copies on next day of pronouncement of order of return

Plaintiff, who remained vigilant and showed no negligence, should not have suffered by act of court

Omission on part of court in not returning appeal in time, which was reason for re-filing present appeal beyond limitation, was sufficient cause under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay

Objection that plaintiff had re-filed present appeal after return with delay of twelve days was not sustainable as said delay had no adverse effect

Delay in re-filing present appeal was condoned

Plaintiff had not produced any document regarding registration of vehicle to prove that he was owner thereof

Plaintiff, in his pleadings, had mentioned himself as owner of vehicle but during cross-examination he stated his son to be owner of the same

Plaintiff's son had not asserted right to vehicle before any court

Plaintiff failed to prove purchase of said vehicle

Plaintiff had not produced any document regarding renting out of vehicle to defendant

Documents produced by plaintiff were not properly executed

Award of arbitration was not admissible in court as same had not been signed by defendant

Plaintiff had not lodged FIR for alleged theft of vehicle

Findings of court below were based on correct appreciation of evidence

Appeal was dismissed in circumstance.

Preemption suit was filed on 27-04-1997 and first time decree was passed in that suit by Lower Appellate Court on 23-12-1982 was having no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal

Decree was set aside by High Court and the order was maintained by Supreme Court while refusing to grant leave

No decree existed in favour of pre-emptors to make their case in the ambit of S.34(2) of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, to continue in accordance with the provisions of repealed Act

Decree granted by Lower Appellate Court dated 23-12-1992 could not help pre-emptors as the same was void ab initio and it could not be deemed to have ever passed before 01-08-1986

High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court resultantly suit filed by pre-emptors was dismissed

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Plaintiff sought recovery of damages under Defamation Ordinance, 2002, and suit was filed before High Court in its original civil jurisdiction

Validity

Deliberate use of words 'the District Court' in S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002, with word 'shall' was sufficient to establish intention of lawmakers that no other court would have jurisdiction to try cases filed under Defamation Ordinance, 2002

High Court was 'Civil Court' but such could not be confused that, High Court while exercising its original civil jurisdiction had become 'District Court' or could dress it up as a 'particular court'

When law itself did not confer jurisdiction, no Court could legally create such jurisdiction, even the High Court

Law could permit Courts to interpret law but not to step onto the domain of Legislature i.e. 'making of law'

To confer jurisdiction was function of lawmakers and the suit was triable by 'District Court' concerned which jurisdiction could not be taken away even on the ground of `pecuniary jurisdiction'

Case under Defamation Ordinance, 2002, was to be tried by District Court, as directed by special law

Suit filed before High Court was barred by law

Plaint was returned in circumstances.

Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal but High Court was the forum where such appeal lays.

Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 under which the notification S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 was issued had been repealed without any saving clause for said notification

If contention of the taxpayer that the notification would have continued notwithstanding the repeal of S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was accepted, that would be in conflict with S.24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Judgments on the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction were silent regarding implications of the "Finance Amendment Ordinance, 2009", "Finance Amendment Ordinance, 2010", Finance Act, 2010" and the substitution of S.30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, whereunder, jurisdiction was vested in the authorities of Inland Revenue Service to exercise the powers irrespective of any restriction of pecuniary jurisdiction

Appellate Tribunal while rendering such judgments was not properly assisted by the taxpayers and the referred judgments were "per incuriam"

Law of precedent was not applicable to per-incuriam decision

Contention of the taxpayer regarding issuance of Show Cause Notice was rejected and the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue in terms of S.30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for issuance of Show-Cause Notice dated 10-5-2010 and passing of order-in-original dated 16-8-2010 was affirmed

S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 had lost its validity when the provision of subsection (3) of S.11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was repealed/omitted by virtue of Finance Ordinance, 2000.

After creation of Inland Revenue Services, S.30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was substituted through Finance Act, 2010 which only empowered Commissioner Inland Revenue to direct their subordinate Officers to perform functions in respect of such persons or class of persons or such areas as the Commissioners may direct

Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue had rightly passed the order-in-original dated 16-8-2010, whereas S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 was inconsistent with the provisions of S.30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and dealt only with the officers of defunct Customs, Excise and Sales Tax group cadre.

Contention on behalf of Collector Customs (appellant) was that jurisdiction of Single Member of Appellate Tribunal to hear an appeal was Rs.100,000 at the relevant time, whereas the valuation of seized goods exceeded Rs.500,000, therefore, Appellate Tribunal was not competent to have passed the impugned order

Contention on behalf of vehicle owner (respondent) was that Single Member of Appellate Tribunal was competent to hear appeals where valuation of smuggled items did not exceed Rs.500,000, and that his appeal was found competent by the Appellate Tribunal as valuation of seized goods was Rs.361,000

Validity

At the time of appeal in question Single Member of Appellate Tribunal was authorized to hear matters involving amounts up to Rs. 100,000 but this was subsequently amended to Rs.500,000

Amendment could not be given retrospective effect and a jurisdictional defect could not be rectified on the same basis

Valuation of smuggled goods collectively exceeded Rs.500,000

Single Member of Appellate Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter at the relevant time

Appellate Tribunal had set-aside the original order but the appellate order still occupied the field

Impugned order of Appellate Tribunal was set-aside and case was remanded to the Tribunal for decision in accordance with the law.

Conduct of parties were also to be taken into consideration.

Matter of pecuniary jurisdiction was to be determined on the basis of value of suit as mentioned in the plaint and not on the basis of value fixed with reference to the disputed amount / value determined by the Trial Court.

Taxpayer contended that issuance of show cause notice and on the basis thereof passing the order-in-original was without jurisdiction as having been issued/passed by an officer of Inland Revenue not competent in terms of S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-6-1996 holding the field at the relevant time on omission of S.45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 vide Finance Act, 2010; that pecuniary jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner was to deal with the cases involving amount of tax not exceeding one million rupees whereas the show cause notice was issued for alleged inadmissible input tax adjustment exceeding such limit; and that Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue was not competent to issue show-cause notice or adjudicate the matter or pass original order being beyond the said monetary limit

Validity

Show cause notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction in terms of S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 and being so it was an order coram non judice and without lawful authority

Act of omission and commission taken without jurisdiction were illegal, void ab initio and no action could be taken against the taxpayer in pursuance thereof

Show cause notice, orders of the authorities below were annulled and the appeal of the registered person was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal.

Taxpayer contended that order had been passed by the Deputy Commissioner who did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice and pass the order

Validity

Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue who issued the show-cause notice and passed the assessment order, could not assume the jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice and pass the assessment order under the law

Said order was without lawful authority and void ab initio.

Admittedly the tax involved was much beyond the monetary limit prescribed for adjudication of the cases by the Assistant Commissioner, Inland Revenue at Serial No.2 of the table to S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 and the said S.R.O. remained in field till 1-6-2012 when it was rescinded by the Federal Government vide S.R.O. 594(I)/2012 dated 1-6-2012

Federal Government specifically mentioned that rescinded S.R.O. shall take effect on and from the 2nd day of June, 2012 meaning thereby that the earlier notification prescribing the pecuniary jurisdiction of various officers was very much in the field till 1-6-2012

Show-cause notice and superstructure built theirupon by way of original order and order of First Appellate Authority was without jurisdiction and coram non judice

Show-cause notice and order-in-original passed by the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue were beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction as mentioned in S.R.O. 555(I)/1996 dated 1-7-1996 and being so it was an order coram non judice and without lawful authority

Acts of omission and commission taken without jurisdiction were illegal, void ab initio and no action could be taken against the taxpayer in pursuance thereof

Appeal was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal

Order passed by the First Appellate Authority was set aside and order-in-original was declared null and void and of no legal consequence.

Accused company impugned seizure and confiscation of consignment of "black tea" by Customs Authorities which was upheld by Adjudicating Officer and Deputy Collector (Appeals)

Contentions of accused inter alia were that accused had purchased goods form a Sales Tax Registered Person and its possession of the same was not illegal and that accused was a bona fide purchaser of the goods in question

Validity

Evidence on record was that accused had purchased the goods (foreign origin black tea) from a "registered person" under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and that said transaction was made in accordance with S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and in compliance with S. 22 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990; the accused had entered said transaction in the company purchase and stock register (Inward and outwards)

Accused subsequently sold the goods and had paid the input tax at purchase stage and output tax at supply stage

Goods were seized on 5-12-2009 and show-cause notice was issued to the accused on 5-1-2010 to which accused had replied on 13-1-2010; whereafter the Adjudicating Officer confiscated the goods on 25-1-2010

Adjudicating Officer had, therefore, without providing a further opportunity of hearing to accused, confiscated the goods

Validity

Further opportunity of hearing especially after accused had submitted a detailed reply to the show-cause notice (which required further investigation) was a fundamental and legal right of the accused and therefore, the order-in-original on this score was illegal

Customs Authorities failed to produce any written consent of accused in regard to auction of goods when it was mandatory upon them to obtain written consent of the owner of goods or person from whose possession the same were seized; under S. 201 of the Customs Act, 1969

Vehicle of accused had not been detected by Anti-Smuggling Unit but instead by the Police

Vide Customs Notification S.R.O. 913(I)/2005 dated 30-7-2005 the powers of Customs Authorities entrusted on Police under S.6 of the Customs Act, 1969 had been withdrawn and Police had no power to detain or seize goods having documents of lawful possession and legal import

Only officers notified under S. 6 of the Customs Act, 1969 could seize goods and give it in custody of Customs Authorities whereas Police officers were neither notified nor authorized officers of Customs within the meaning of Ss. 2(b), 3, 4 and 6 of the Customs Act, 1969

Seizure of goods by Police Officers, in the present case, was therefore illegal

Total value of the goods exceeded pecuniary jurisdiction of Deputy Collector under S.179 of the Customs Act, 1969

No deviation from the pecuniary jurisdiction could be made and if an action had been taken or order had been passed without having competency given under S. 179 of the Customs Act, 1969, same could be declared illegal and without jurisdiction

Deputy Collector, in the present case, wrongly assumed jurisdiction and any transgressions by Customs Authorities from S. 179 of the Customs Act, 1969 vitiated the entire proceedings

Investigations did not prove that documents produced by accused were bogus and burden of proof under S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 was an evidentiary burden requiring accused to establish a prima facie case only and ultimate burden or legal burden remained on Customs Authorities to prove the case against accused beyond reasonable doubt

In the present case, accused had proved said burden and then responsibility shifted on the Customs Authorities and mere allegations presented by Customs Authorities were not sufficient

Accused produced lawful import and purchase documents for the seized consignment

Customs Authorities seized black tea which was neither a notified item nor was banned and was freely importable and was not prohibited or restricted under the Import Policy

Customs Authorities, had therefore, failed to produce any evidence which could prove that import of said black tea was prohibited or restricted and had thus failed to prove the charge of smuggling

Order-in-original and order of Customs Collector were set aside and direction was given by the Tribunal to immediately work out payable sales proceeds for the goods payable to the accused

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Taxpayer contended that by virtue of subsection (1) Cl.(iii) of S.33, Assistant Collector could have adjudicated upon the cases falling under subsection (2) of S.11 and S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 provided that the amount of tax involved the amount exceeding ten thousand rupees but not exceeding one million rupees and in the present case the amount involved was quite higher than the limit of the amount mentioned in the clause

Revenue contended that proceedings taken by the Assistant Collector (Refund) Sales Tax, were not adjudicated within the ambit of S.45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and in these were the proceedings taken by him under Rr.30 & 37 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 and subject matter of the proceedings did not fall within any of the cases involving assessment of tax, charging of default surcharge, imposition of penalty and recovery amount erroneously refunded or any other contravention under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and that rather, it related to sanction and payment or otherwise of refund claimed mentioned under R.30 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 and to action on inadmissible claims mentioned in R.37 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006

Validity

Expression "assessment of tax" mentioned in subsection (1) of S.45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did include the claim of input tax credit or refund which was not admissible under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, when the provisions of subsection (2) of S.11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were consulted

Case of the appellant could not be excluded from the purview of the then S.45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which provided pecuniary limits for various officers to make adjudication especially in the absence of any further proceedings having not been suggested by R.37 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 referred by the Revenue

Proceedings taken by the Assistant Collector could safely be held to have squarely fallen in and to have been made under S.45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Assistant Collector could not adjudicate upon the matter with regard to the amount exceeding one million of rupees in the face of the limits fixed for various officers

Adjudication made by the Assistant Collector was held to be illegal, void ab initio and coram non judice

Appeal was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal and orders in original and in appeal were annulled by the Appellate Tribunal.

Plea raised by authorities was that judgment in question was corm non judice and suffered from absence of pecuniary jurisdiction

Leave to appeal was granted to consider the plea raised or any other question which would arise at the time of hearing of appeal.

Plaintiffs valued their suit at Rs.200 but affixed a sum of Rs.15,000 as court-fee-Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiffs

Appellate Court, in exercise of power under O.XLI, R.25, C.P. C., remanded the case to Trial Court for determination of value of the suit only

Trial Court fixed the value of the suit as Rs.2 million and returned the file to Appellate Court

Objection raised by plaintiffs was that at the time of remand, Appellate Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter and appeal should have been returned to defendant

Objection raised by plaintiffs was overruled by Appellate Court

Validity

Plaintiffs had valued the suit at Rs.200 for the purposes of jurisdiction

Trial Court did not resolve the question of jurisdictional value in the first instance and simply .stated that since Rs.15,000 court fee had been paid, the matter was over

Matter was ultimately determined after remand, by which time pecuniary jurisdiction of Appellate Court, where in fact appeal was pending, was enhanced to Rs.2.5 million

High Court found it an exercise in futility to direct Appellate Court to return the appeal to be again entrusted to it for decision on merits

Revision .was dismissed in circumstances.