Reinstatement in service

Respondent was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk, under Prime Minister's Assistance Package for the Families of Deceased Government Employees but later on her services were terminated on the ground of her remarriage

High Court reinstated the respondent in service

Validity

Constitution secures fundamental rights for individuals as equal citizens not as appendages of patriarchal roles or marital identities

Women are not defined by the men in their lives; they are autonomous and rights-bearing individuals

Denying a woman right to employment on the basis of her remarriage is a blatant reinforcement of patriarchal control, seeking to subordinate her legal identity to societal expectations

Financial independence is not a concession to women, it is the foundation of their Constitutional agency, dignity, and full participation in public life

Law must dismantle, not perpetuate, the structures that reduce women to secondary citizens in the eyes of society

Impugned office order was discriminatory as it singled out widows, the female spouses of deceased government employees for disqualification from compassionate employment upon remarriage, without imposing a corresponding restriction on widowers, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's Assistance Package which offered compassionate employment to both a widow and a widower

Gender-specific disqualification amounts to direct discrimination based on sex, contravening Articles 25(1) and 25(2) of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex

Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court, whereby respondent was reinstated in service

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Respondent was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk, under Prime Minister's Assistance Package for the Families of Deceased Government Employees but later on her services were terminated on the ground of her remarriage

High Court reinstated the respondent in service

Validity

Constitution secures fundamental rights for individuals as equal citizens not as appendages of patriarchal roles or marital identities

Women are not defined by the men in their lives; they are autonomous and rights-bearing individuals

Denying a woman right to employment on the basis of her remarriage is a blatant reinforcement of patriarchal control, seeking to subordinate her legal identity to societal expectations

Financial independence is not a concession to women, it is the foundation of their Constitutional agency, dignity, and full participation in public life

Law must dismantle, not perpetuate, the structures that reduce women to secondary citizens in the eyes of society

Impugned office order was discriminatory as it singled out widows, the female spouses of deceased government employees for disqualification from compassionate employment upon remarriage, without imposing a corresponding restriction on widowers, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's Assistance Package which offered compassionate employment to both a widow and a widower

Gender-specific disqualification amounts to direct discrimination based on sex, contravening Articles 25(1) and 25(2) of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex

Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court, whereby respondent was reinstated in service

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Petitioner after his acquittal in criminal case sought his reinstatement on the plea that no notice was ever served upon him under the law

Validity

Departmental and criminal proceedings have no overlapping effect on each other rather the same carry their independent status

No inquiry was conducted against petitioner prior to imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service and departmental proceedings conducted at his back could not be considered as sacrosanct

Both forums below failed to appreciate such facts of the case in their true perspective and did not apply law on the subject, judicially

High Court set aside the order dismissing petitioner from service and remanded the matter to authorities for decision afresh

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Petitioner company aggrieved of reinstatement of respondents / employees in service by National Industrial Relation Commission preferred constitutional petitions which were dismissed as withdrawn

Petitioner company invoked jurisdiction of S.12(2), C.P.C. to seek setting aside of orders passed by High Court

Validity

There was no ground for a case of fraud or misrepresentation and application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was bereft of any assertion that could validly support a plea on either score

Failure to exercise jurisdiction was a concept far removed from that of a want of jurisdiction, which High Court did not suffer from

Petitioner company could not raise such a plea when it had itself came forward to invoke such jurisdiction and was seeking a decision on merits

High Court did not fail to exercise jurisdiction as the matter was heard and it was during the course of hearing when a certain view was tentatively expressed as to merits of the case that counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner company saw fit to stage what could, at best, be called a strategic retreat by withdrawing the petition, so as to fall back on the matter then pending before another Bench of High Court as a device to forestall encashment guarantees

High Court declined to interfere in the orders passed earlier, as application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was devoid of merit and misconceived

Application was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appointment letters were cancelled through an omnibus order without disclosing any reason, providing any opportunity of hearing or issuing any show cause notice

Legality

In the present case all the appointment letters were issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police with the approval of the Inspector General of Police after fulfillment of and contentment of required codal formalities including the recommendation of Departmental Selection Committee, constituted by the competent authority

All the respondents/employees were appointed on different posts in BPS-1 as admissible under the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009 ('the 2009 Rules') against the existing vacancies

Appointment letters did not reflect that all the appointments were made for one District only, but names of other various districts were also mentioned

No convincing or persuasive raison d'être was brought forward to assume the ground of debarring the respondents from selection in view of the rigors of Rule 9(6) of the Rules, which did not seem to have been violated in any way while appointing the respondents on the recommendation of the Departmental Selection Committee

Nothing was articulated to allege that the respondents by hook and crook managed their appointments or committed any misrepresentation or fraud or their appointments were made on political consideration or motivation or they were not eligible or not local residents of the district advertised for inviting applications for the job

Despite that, an omnibus order was issued by the DIG Police for cancellation of appointments without disclosing any reason for cancellation or withdrawal and without issuing any show cause notice or providing any opportunity of audience to the respondents

Appointing authority had, therefore, violated the principle of natural justice and due process

Respondents were appointed after fulfilling codal formalities which created vested rights in their favour that could not have been withdrawn or cancelled in a perfunctory manner on mere presupposition and or conjecture which was clearly hit by the doctrine of locus poenitentiae

Appeal was dismissed with the observation that some strenuous action should have been taken against persons involved in the selection and appointment process who allegedly violated the rules rather than accusing or blaming the low paid poor employees of downtrodden areas who were appointed after due process in BPS-1 for their livelihood and to support their families.

Appointment letters were cancelled through an omnibus order without disclosing any reason, providing any opportunity of hearing or issuing any show cause notice

Legality

In the present case all the appointment letters were issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police with the approval of the Inspector General of Police after fulfillment of and contentment of required codal formalities including the recommendation of Departmental Selection Committee, constituted by the competent authority

All the respondents/employees were appointed on different posts in BPS-1 as admissible under the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009 ('the 2009 Rules') against the existing vacancies

Appointment letters did not reflect that all the appointments were made for one District only, but names of other various districts were also mentioned

No convincing or persuasive raison d'être was brought forward to assume the ground of debarring the respondents from selection in view of the rigors of Rule 9(6) of the Rules, which did not seem to have been violated in any way while appointing the respondents on the recommendation of the Departmental Selection Committee

Nothing was articulated to allege that the respondents by hook and crook managed their appointments or committed any misrepresentation or fraud or their appointments were made on political consideration or motivation or they were not eligible or not local residents of the district advertised for inviting applications for the job

Despite that, an omnibus order was issued by the DIG Police for cancellation of appointments without disclosing any reason for cancellation or withdrawal and without issuing any show cause notice or providing any opportunity of audience to the respondents

Appointing authority had, therefore, violated the principle of natural justice and due process

Respondents were appointed after fulfilling codal formalities which created vested rights in their favour that could not have been withdrawn or cancelled in a perfunctory manner on mere presupposition and or conjecture which was clearly hit by the doctrine of locus poenitentiae

Appeal was dismissed with the observation that some strenuous action should have been taken against persons involved in the selection and appointment process who allegedly violated the rules rather than accusing or blaming the low paid poor employees of downtrodden areas who were appointed after due process in BPS-1 for their livelihood and to support their families.

In exercise of powers under S.O. 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ('the 1968 Ordinance'), where power of termination was "in simpliciter", and such order met and fulfilled the criteria given in S.O. 12(3), a workman could not be reinstated into service on the ground that charges of misconduct had not been established and that no regular inquiry was held against him

Requirement of law was limited to the extent of communication of the order in writing explicitly stating the reasons for such action

Such action could not be set aside or declared illegal simply on the ground that termination of service could only be made on proof of misconduct after issuance of a show cause notice, conducting a regular inquiry and by orders of the employer after granting him a personal hearing

Such interpretation would negate the very object and purpose of S.O. 12(3) of the 1968 Ordinance which envisaged that under certain circumstances, the employer could terminate the services of a workman "in simpliciter" by giving explicit reasons justifying such termination.

In exercise of powers under S.O. 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ('the 1968 Ordinance'), where power of termination was "in simpliciter", and such order met and fulfilled the criteria given in S.O. 12(3), a workman could not be reinstated into service on the ground that charges of misconduct had not been established and that no regular inquiry was held against him

Requirement of law was limited to the extent of communication of the order in writing explicitly stating the reasons for such action

Such action could not be set aside or declared illegal simply on the ground that termination of service could only be made on proof of misconduct after issuance of a show cause notice, conducting a regular inquiry and by orders of the employer after granting him a personal hearing

Such interpretation would negate the very object and purpose of S.O. 12(3) of the 1968 Ordinance which envisaged that under certain circumstances, the employer could terminate the services of a workman "in simpliciter" by giving explicit reasons justifying such termination.

In exercise of powers under S.O. 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ('the 1968 Ordinance'), where power of termination was "in simpliciter", and such order met and fulfilled the criteria given in S.O. 12(3), a workman could not be reinstated into service on the ground that charges of misconduct had not been established and that no regular inquiry was held against him

Requirement of law was limited to the extent of communication of the order in writing explicitly stating the reasons for such action

Such action could not be set aside or declared illegal simply on the ground that termination of service could only be made on proof of misconduct after issuance of a show cause notice, conducting a regular inquiry and by orders of the employer after granting him a personal hearing

Such interpretation would negate the very object and purpose of S.O. 12(3) of the 1968 Ordinance which envisaged that under certain circumstances, the employer could terminate the services of a workman "in simpliciter" by giving explicit reasons justifying such termination.

Orders of the competent authority as well as departmental appeal were on the basis that they agreed with the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer; they had not scrutinized the evidence available on the file themselves, but awarded major penalty of dismissal from service by relying upon the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer and ignored the fact that no specific allegation through evidence was proved against the respondent-civil servant

Prosecution was duty bound to prove the allegations for which the respondent was charge sheeted

Service Tribunal had rightly reinstated the respondent in service

Appeal was dismissed.

Orders of the competent authority as well as departmental appeal were on the basis that they agreed with the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer; they had not scrutinized the evidence available on the file themselves, but awarded major penalty of dismissal from service by relying upon the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer and ignored the fact that no specific allegation through evidence was proved against the respondent-civil servant

Prosecution was duty bound to prove the allegations for which the respondent was charge sheeted

Service Tribunal had rightly reinstated the respondent in service

Appeal was dismissed.

Service Tribunal reinstated employee in service with option to the department to conduct de novo inquiry within a specific period

Department having failed to complete de novo inquiry within a period provided by the Service Tribunal

Non-compliance of judgment of Service Tribunal

Effect

Petitioner-employee was reinstated in service by the Service Tribunal and Department was directed to conduct de novo inquiry within a period of ninety days after receipt of judgment

Employee was reinstated in service but de novo inquiry was not completed within a period provided by the Service Tribunal

Contention of petitioner was that no inquiry proceedings could be conducted after expiry of period provided by the Service Tribunal

Validity

Compliance of order of Court in letter and spirit was not only the responsibility of general public but government departments too were required to honour the verdict of the Courts and Tribunals

Sufficient time had been granted to the Department to conduct de novo inquiry but they had adopted dilatory tactics to delay the implementation of judgment of Service Tribunal

Impugned order for de novo inquiry had been passed after expiry of period for completion of inquiry proceedings provided by the Service Tribunal

Inquiry proceedings had become void being violative of judgment of Service Tribunal in circumstances

Departmental action against a civil servant was an executive discretion of the authority and High Court in order to protect the administration of justice could examine and judicially review the said discretion

Acts done by the authority in violation of judgment of Service Tribunal could not be given cover under Art. 212 of the Constitution

Act of non-compliance with the orders of the Court or Tribunal by itself was an illegal act and High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction could review such act of the Executive

Inquiry conducted by the department after expiry of period provided by the Service Tribunal was illegal, contumacious and against rule of law

Departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner were declared null and void, in circumstances

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Labour Court accepted the respondent's grievance petition and set aside order of his dismissal but at the same time directed holding of inquiry against the respondent

Back benefits were not allowed by the Labour Court

Labour Appellate Tribunal reinstated respondent in service but without back benefits

High Court upheld order of reinstatement of respondent and also allowed him back benefit on the basis that the respondent remained on sanctioned leave

Legality

Record showed that there was no sanction of leave to the respondent by the employer

Respondent's very application for grant of leave was not signed by him and it also did not contain the order of the competent authority sanctioning the same

Respondent had remained absent from duty not only for the period for which he sought leave but also beyond that period, therefore, the High Court was not justified to hold that the respondent had remained on sanctioned leave

Both the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal exercised discretion in not granting back benefits to the respondent, and such exercise of discretion was not without lawful authority

Where the Court concerned reinstated the employee in service, it was not bound to grant back benefits automatically rather it was within the discretion of that Court to grant back benefits or not

Exercise of such discretion could not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless it was shown that such discretion had been exercised without lawful authority and was of no legal effect

Impugned order of the High Court in the present case to the extent of granting back benefits to the respondent could not be sustained in the eyes of law being in excess of the jurisdiction vested in it, and was accordingly set aside

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and partly allowed.

Both parties (i.e. the relevant department and the respondent-government servant) were interested in the holding of a proper inquiry in relation to the allegations leveled by the department against the respondent

Service Tribunal in the impugned judgment had overlooked such aspect of the case and directed reinstatement of respondent as an immediate consequence of merely the compromise between the parties

Supreme Court directed that the department was to conduct a fresh inquiry in accordance with the provisions of law, which inquiry shall be completed within two months, and that the respondent shall have no entitlement to back benefits unless the allegations against him were dismissed in the inquiry.

Both parties (i.e. the relevant department and the respondent-government servant) were interested in the holding of a proper inquiry in relation to the allegations leveled by the department against the respondent

Service Tribunal in the impugned judgment had overlooked such aspect of the case and directed reinstatement of respondent as an immediate consequence of merely the compromise between the parties

Supreme Court directed that the department was to conduct a fresh inquiry in accordance with the provisions of law, which inquiry shall be completed within two months, and that the respondent shall have no entitlement to back benefits unless the allegations against him were dismissed in the inquiry [Majority view].

Petitioners were appointed in a Corporation during years 1975 to 1984 and were released under Voluntary Retirement Scheme in year 1998

Petitioners sought their reinstatement on grounds that they had never opted for their release under Voluntary Retirement Scheme

Validity

Provisions of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 and Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 were applicable only to employees who fell within very limited category, i.e., recruited during November-1993 to November-1996 and removed during November-1996 to December-1998

Word used between two described periods was 'and' therefore, unless an employee of the Corporation could meet the two conditions, he was not entitled to benefit of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 and Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010

Action was taken against petitioners by the Corporation before its merger in an other Corporation

Nothing was available on record to show any mala fide on part of corporation for retiring petitioners from service

High Court declined to interfere in the matter under provisions of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Practice of obtaining such consent from employee was deprecated by the Supreme Court.

Practice of obtaining such consent from employee was deprecated by the Supreme Court.

Contention of department was that employees did not possess the required qualification at the time of their initial appointment

Validity

Employees in question had obtained the required qualification after termination of their services, they were entitled to be reinstated under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees (Appointment) Act, 2012 like other similarly placed employees

Authorities were directed to reinstate the employees into service

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Contention of civil servant was that he was falsely charged for a criminal offence wherefrom he was acquitted after trial and was reinstated in service by the department but was denied the arrears of pay and benefits for the intervening period

Validity

Civil servant had failed to explain period of his absence by misinterpreting Fundamental Rules No.54 and remained fugitive from law and absconder

Extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution was to be exercised for rule of law and safe administration of justice and civil servant was not entitled to the relief asked for

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

According to R.6, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011 after proceedings were initiated under R.5 of the said Rules, a civil servant, he may be placed under suspension for a period of 90-days, and after the lapse of said period, if no extension of suspension order had been made by the competent authority within the stipulated period of 1-month as per R.6, then at the expiry of initial period of suspension the person suspended shall be deemed to be reinstated .

Petitioner being sacked employee was offered to join his duty on reinstatement but he could not join duty within ninety days and offer was cancelled

Validity

Petitioner did not join the employer company (Government owned) within the stipulated time period of ninety days

No provision existed in Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 to condone delay in joining the service

Medical certificate of fitness was the basic requirement for entry into service

Employee was offered to join service after gap of fifteen years from his previous medical examination

No premium could be given to the petitioner on the ground that previously he was declared fit as employee had admitted that he was suffering from Hepatitis "C"

Sub-Committee (regularization of contract/daily wages employee) had no power in the cases of reinstatement

Claim of petitioner was rightly rejected by the employer company due to non-joining of duty within statutory period of ninety days

Petitioner had failed to undergo medical examination as required under R.30(5) of Oil and Gas Development Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Provisions of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 and Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 were applicable only to employees who fell within the very limited category i.e. recruited during November 1993 to November 1996 and removed during November, 1996 to December, 1998

Unless an employee of a corporation concurrently met both these conditions he was not entitled to the benefit of the Ordinance and the Act

Petitioner at the time of his retirement was paid full and final dues

No illegality or irregularity was pointed out in the impugned order passed by the Review Board

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioners were civil servants who were arrested in year 2000 by National Accountability Bureau but they were released as they entered into plea bargain

On departmental side, petitioners were proceeded under Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and dismissed from service but Service Tribunal reinstated them in service

National Accountability Bureau once again initiated investigation against petitioners on the allegation that they sought illegal reinstatement in their service

Petitioners sought quashing of the proceedings on the ground that amendments in S. 15 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 had no retrospective effect

Validity

Amendments in National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 were not applicable to the case of petitioners nor National Accountability Bureau authorities could be given a free hand to initiate proceedings in a case at such a belated stage at their own whims especially when it had attained finality at a proper forum

Under plea bargain, petitioners were released before any trial, therefore, they could not be vexed twice by National Accountability Bureau authorities as to why they were reinstated in service when at the time of their release, no such provision of cessation of public office in field existed in National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and relevant amendments in law were made thereafter

High Court declared actions initiated by National Accountability Bureau as null and void and inquiry/investigation/ proceedings against the petitioners were quashed

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Police official filed revision petition before the Inspector General of Police, which was kept pending till the decision of F.I.R. case and civil suit by the court

Subsequently police official was acquitted from the F.I.R. case and as a result his revision petition was allowed and he was reinstated in service

Service Tribunal allowed payment of back benefits to the police official for the period during which he remained out of service

Validity

Grant of back benefits to an employee who was reinstated by a Court/Tribunal or the department was a rule and denial of such benefits was an exception on the proof that such person had remained gainfully employed during such period

Entitlement of back benefits of a person had to be determined on the basis of facts of each case independently

Police official could not be held responsible for the period during which his revision petition was kept pending due to the F.I.R. and civil suit, because such pendency was on account of the act of the police department

Revision petition filed by police official was kept pending till the decision of the criminal as well as civil case, which had no relevance because unless he had been found guilty by the Court, he was not debarred from performing his duty

Police official was entitled to back benefits, as it was the police department, which on basis of a wrong opinion kept him away from performing his duty

Police official was entitled to back benefits from the date of filing revision petition till his reinstatement in service

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Police official filed revision petition before the Inspector General of Police, which was kept pending till the decision of F.I.R. case and civil suit by the court

Subsequently police official was acquitted from the F.I.R. case and as a result his revision petition was allowed and he was reinstated in service

Service Tribunal allowed payment of back benefits to the police official for the period during which he remained out of service

Validity

Grant of back benefits to an employee who was reinstated by a Court/Tribunal or the department was a rule and denial of such benefits was an exception on the proof that such person had remained gainfully employed during such period

Entitlement of back benefits of a person had to be determined on the basis of facts of each case independently

Police official could not be held responsible for the period during which his revision petition was kept pending due to the F.I.R. and civil suit, because such pendency was on account of the act of the police department

Revision petition filed by police official was kept pending till the decision of the criminal as well as civil case, which had no relevance because unless he had been found guilty by the Court, he was not debarred from performing his duty

Police official was entitled to back benefits, as it was the police department, which on basis of a wrong opinion kept him away from performing his duty

Police official was entitled to back benefits from the date of filing revision petition till his reinstatement in service

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Services of the employee were terminated on the charge that he being extremely irresponsible and negligent had caused irreparable loss to the employer-company by damaging its property

Employee after termination of service, had received all his legal dues in full and final settlement, including one month's salary in lieu of notice and one year's gratuity

Employee after receipt of all his said legal dues, sought his reinstatement in service by filing grievance petition alleging that he had been illegally dismissed from service without holding any inquiry

Validity

Employee after willingly receiving his legal dues in full and final settlement, had accepted the termination of his service

Employee who had voluntarily severed his relationship with his employer, was left with no cause or grievance to agitate before Labour Court

Order of Labour Court whereby grievance petition of the employee was accepted and he was reinstated in service, was set aside, in circumstances.

If the period from date of announcement of impugned judgment of the Labour Court and after delivery of certified copy of impugned judgment was excluded, even then the appeal was filed with a delay of 54 days and that period of delay had not been explained

Even void order could be set aside by process of law, but within reasonable period

Delay of each and every day was to be explained, but same had not been done in the case

Point of limitation and condonation of delay was a pure question of law, and courts were under legal obligation to take notice of the same, even if the point had not been raised by the parties

Appeal filed by the employers was hopelessly barred which accurated a right in favour of employee and same could not be condoned without any sufficient cause

Impugned order was upheld and appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner was employee of police who was convicted and sentenced in two different cases one for keeping illegal arms and other for accepting illegal gratification

Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Courts in both the cases were maintained by High Court

After lapse of about five years, petitioner sought review of judgments passed in criminal cases and authorities reinstated him in service

Validity

Any police officer sentenced judicially by competent court of law to rigorous imprisonment exceeding one month should be dismissed from service, provided such sentence was not quashed on appeal or revision

Criminal appeals filed by petitioner in High Court were dismissed in years 2002 and 2004 respectively and no appeal or revision was pending before any appellate or revisional forums on 9-5-2009, when he was re-instated in service

No occasion was left with police authorities to reinstate petitioner in service

Review petitions were filed on 16-4-2009, by petitioner after an unexplained delay of about five years, just to create ground for his reinstatement in service, which smacked mala fide on the part of petitioner and concerned police authority

High Court declined to interfere in convictions and sentences awarded to petitioner

Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Service Tribunal set aside the order passed by authorities on the ground that since first Inquiry Officer did not prove the guilt against civil servant, there was no reason for holding four more inquiries on the same charge, and major punishment was awarded on an anonymous complaint without providing the civil servant an opportunity of cross examining complainant or any witness, which was not warranted under the law

Validity

Authorities failed to bring anything to the notice of Supreme Court to dislodge the view so expressed by Service Tribunal

Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Service Tribunal

Leave to appeal was refused.

Civil servant was dismissed from service as he remained absent from duty during the period in detention but Service Tribunal allowed the appeal and reinstated him in service

Plea raised by authorities was that payment of Diyat was equated with conviction in crime

Validity

Period of absence of civil servant was treated by competent authority as extraordinary leave, therefore, ground of his illegal absence was no more available for awarding any punishment to him

Offence was lawfully compromised and disposed of, whereby civil servant was acquitted

Such acquittal of civil servant could not be taken as his disqualification, coming in the way of his reinstatement in service

Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Service Tribunal

Appeal was dismissed.

On one hand university contended that petitioner was allegedly involved in offence of serious moral turpitude and on the other hand authorities stated that petitioner was on Probation and therefore, his employment had been terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory performance

No material was placed by university that performance of petitioner was assessed independently of any allegation which subsequently became subject matter of F.I.R. and thereafter university came to conclusion that petitioner's performance was not satisfactory and thereafter, decided to terminate his service

What prompted the termination during probation period was not performance of petitioner but certain allegations against him

Termination of petitioner was a case of colourable exercise of power

High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside termination order of petitioner and was ordered to be reinstated in service

High Court directed that petitioner would be on probation and it was available to authorities to take disciplinary action against petitioner and if he would be proved guilty in accordance with rules, to take action in accordance with rules

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Employees opted for voluntary retirement but before any order was passed by the authorities, employees withdrew their options

Authorities enforced the option already given by the employees and retired them

Service Tribunal, on challenging such order by employees, reinstated the employees in service

Validity

Judgment of Service Tribunal was in consonance with the law

Principle of equity, fair play and justice .required that since employees in earlier appeals were reinstated in service by Service Tribunal, the case of present employees being on the same footings should also be accepted

Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment passed by Service Tribunal

Leave to appeal was refused.

Order of removal from service passed against appellant was set aside by Service Tribunal directing appellant to be reinstated in service with the condition that Authority would hold de novo inquiry proceedings within a period of six months from the date of judgment of Service Tribunal and that in case inquiry was not conducted and completed within six months, appellant would be entitled to all back-benefits provided appellant would file affidavit to the effect that he did not work for gain anywhere during period of his removal from service

Judgment of Service Tribunal was upheld by Supreme Court

As soon as Supreme Court declined to interfere with judgment of Service Tribunal, it became obligatory for the Authority to implement judgment of Service Tribunal and de novo disciplinary proceedings should have been held against appellant according to direction of Service Tribunal in its judgment, but same had not been done by the Authority

Authority had contended that six months period for commencement and completion of de novo inquiry proceedings against appellant would start from the judgment of Supreme Court as judgment of Service Tribunal stood merged in the judgment of Supreme Court

Contention of Authority was repelled because doctrine of merger was not applicable in the present case as Supreme Court had not changed directions contained in the judgment of Service Tribunal and did not give airy direction contrary to those contained in judgment of Service Tribunal

Non-implementation of judgment of Service Tribunal within stipulated period of six months had flouted the directions as prescribed therein

Charge-sheet, show-cause notice and removal order issued after expiry of said prescribed period-of six months, were void, non-existent and of no legal value

Setting aside order of removal from service passed against appellant, Authority was directed to ensure implementation of order within specified period.