Administrative law

2022 CLC 550 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN Judicial Precedent

S.2Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002, R.104AAdministrative LawRoyalty to be on daily basisIncidental intervening period occurred between two auctionsColourful exercise of powerBetween two auctions the respondent/department accumulatively granted extension for period of one yearRespondent exercised the authority not vested in himProvisions of Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002 were brought for the augmentation of the Government revenue

Such was a check that Government revenue would not be made to suffer on account of unguided discretion because such course could not be in the public interest.

2021 PLD 499 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Quasi-judicial acts/functions of an administrative authorityDetermination as to whether an action by an authority was "quasi-judicial" in natureDuty to act fairly and judiciallyScope

While distinction between an authority's purely administrative and quasi-judicial acts may be difficult however "duty to act judicially" was the real test

Duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances, which would be impossible to attempt to define exhaustively

Where the statute itself required administrative authority to act judicially, there would be no doubt that its function was quasi-judicial

Even where an authority performed pure administrative functions, it was required to act honestly and fairly

Duty to act fairly was an expansion of principles of natural justice denoted an implied procedural obligation, contents of which may fall considerably short of essential elements of a trial or a formal inquiry accompanying performance of a function that could not be characterized as judicial in nature.

2021 MLD 2129 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

State land to be considered as trustDuty of ExecutiveVigilance at the time of allotment and currency thereofState land was not a bounty which could be given away to any one rather it was to be considered as trust

Disposal/transfer of the state land in accordance with law, in a fair and transparent manner was the higher public law consideration; it was imperative not only for the executive authorities but the courts of plenary jurisdiction to ensure that while adjudicating the matter pertaining to the state land, higher public law consideration qua state land must be at the forefront.

2018 SCMR 967 SUPREME-COURT-OF-CANADA Judicial Precedent

Administrative body[Government] Transportation AgencyComplaintMaintainabilityStanding (locus standi) of complainant'Public interest standing' and 'private interest standing'Discretion of administrative body to dismiss complaintScope

Complainant alleged that a certain air carrier's practices regarding transportation of obese persons were discriminatory and filed a complaint before the Transportation Agency ("the Agency")

Agency dismissed the complaint on basis that complainant failed to meet the tests for private interest standing and public interest standing as developed by and for courts of civil jurisdiction; that complainant lacked private interest standing because he was not himself obese, and so could not claim to be aggrieved or affected or to have some other sufficient interest; that complainant lacked public interest standing because his complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of legislation or the illegal exercise of an administrative authority

Appellate Court allowed complainant's appeal and held that a strict application of the law of standing as applied in courts was inconsistent with the Agency's enabling legislation, and directed that the matter be returned to the Agency to determine, otherwise than on the basis of standing, whether it would inquire into, hear and decide the complaint

Validity

[Per McLachlin C.J. (Majority view): Relevant statute (Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996) bestowed broad discretion on the Agency to hear and determine complaints

In the present case, the Agency did not reasonably exercise its discretion to dismiss the complaint

Decision was reasonable if it was justifiable, transparent and intelligible, and fell within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes

Agency's decision that the complainant lacked standing did not satisfy the requirements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility for two reasons; first, the Agency presumed public interest standing was available and then applied a test that could never be met

Any valid complaint against an air carrier would impugn the terms and conditions established by a private company

Such a complaint could never, by its very nature, be a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation or the illegality of administrative action

Imposition of a test that could never be met could not be what Parliament intended when it conferred a broad discretion on an administrative body such as the Agency to decide whether to hear complaints

Agency's application of the test was also inconsistent with the rationale underlying public interest standing, which was for the court to use its discretion, where appropriate, to allow more plaintiffs through the door

Agency did not maintain a flexible approach to said question and in so doing unreasonably fettered its discretion

Secondly, the total denial of public interest standing was inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Agency's legislative scheme

Applying the tests for private and public interest standing in the way the Agency did in the present case would preclude any public interest group or representative group from ever having standing before the Agency, regardless of the content of its complaint

In effect, only a person who was himself/herself targeted by the impugned policy could bring a complaint, which would be contrary to the scheme of the relevant statute [(Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996)

Parliament had seen fit to grant the Agency broad remedial authority and to allow the Agency to act to correct discriminatory terms and conditions before passengers actually experienced harm

To refuse a complaint based solely on the identity of the group bringing it prevented the Agency from hearing potentially highly relevant complaints, and hindered its ability to fulfil the statutory scheme's objective

Appellate Court should not have held that standing rules could not be considered by the Agency in its reconsideration of the matter

Better approach would be to send the matter back to the Agency for reconsideration in its entirety

Deference required that the Agency determined for itself how to use its discretion, provided it did so reasonably

Supreme Court (Canada) remitted the matter to the Agency to reconsider the matter in whole, whether on the basis of standing or otherwise]

[Per Abella, J, dissenting (Minority view): Nothing in the Agency's mandate circumscribed its ability to determine how it would decide what cases to hear

Parliament had given the Agency wide discretion to choose, according to its own institutional constraints and demands, how it would promote its overall mandate to regulate and adjudicate national transportation issues

Agency's power to process and resolve complaints was framed in discretionary language, giving the Agency the authority to make its own rules about how it carried on its work, as well as the manner of, and procedures for, dealing with matters before the Agency

In the present case, the Agency developed its standing rules in full accordance with its legislative mandate, and there is no basis for interfering with them

Agency was entitled to apply a gate keeping or screening mechanism which enabled it to balance, in a transparent and effective manner, the Agency's various competing interests and demands, such as access and resources

Complainant brought a complaint with no underlying facts, no representative claimants and no argument; his complaint was purely theoretical, his interest in the issues was academic, and the proposed suit did not constitute an effective and reasonable means of bringing the issue before the Agency

Agency's decision to deny the complaint on the basis that the complainant lacked standing was reasonable in the circumstances, thus, it was unnecessary to remit the matter to the Agency]

Appeal was partly allowed.

2018 SCMR 967 SUPREME-COURT-OF-CANADA Judicial Precedent

Administrative body/TribunalComplaintStanding (locus standi) of complainantScope and principles

Standing rules existed to enable a court or tribunal to economize and prioritize its resources, and ensure that it benefited from contending points of view that were advanced by those best placed to advance them

Requiring a tribunal to adjudicate even marginal or inadequately substantiated complaints would grind the operation of a tribunal to a halt and could be "devastating" to private litigants

Tribunals were not required to follow the same procedures courts used, but when a tribunal choose to apply and exercise its broad legislative mandate by borrowing an approach to standing long sanctioned by the courts as an effective and principled way to determine which cases it would hear, reviewing courts should not interfere merely because the court might have applied the mandate differently

Where the adopted standing procedures flowed from the same concerns and rationales as those relied on by courts, there was no reason for a tribunal to be immunized from access to a procedure courts had endorsed

Access to justice demanded that both courts and tribunals be encouraged to develop screening methods to ensure that access to justice would be available to those who needed it most in a timely way

Fact that a Tribunal's governing legislation had a public interest dimension did not preclude it from adopting similar rules of standing to those used by the courts.

2018 SCMR 1544 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Discretionary power, exercise ofScope

Discretionary statutory power could only be exercised on a ground or to achieve an object or purpose that was lawfully within the contemplation of the statute.

2018 SCMR 1544 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Discretionary power, exercise ofScopeLaw recognizes no such thing as an unfettered discretion

All discretionary powers, especially that as conferred by statute, must be exercised in terms of well-established principles of administrative law, which were of longstanding authority and had been developed, enunciated and articulated in many judgments of the Supreme Court.

2018 PTD 1559 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Discretionary power, exercise ofScope

Discretionary statutory power could only be exercised on a ground or to achieve an object or purpose that was lawfully within the contemplation of the statute.

2018 PTD 1559 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Discretionary power, exercise ofScopeLaw recognizes no such thing as an unfettered discretion

All discretionary powers, especially that as conferred by statute, must be exercised in terms of well-established principles of administrative law, which were of longstanding authority and had been developed, enunciated and articulated in many judgments of the Supreme Court.

2016 PLD 699 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Executive decisions

Aphorism that "justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" equally applied to all public law decisions

Rules of administrative law had been formulated to ensure that all executive decisions were made justly and lawfully.

2013 SCMR 817 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Administrative authorityDiscretion, exercise ofScope

Administrative authority had to exercise discretion by applying an independent mind uninfluenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations.

2012 MLD 1045 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Opinion/recommendations of a subordinate official regarding a matterLegal status

Such opinion/recommendations would culminate into an enforceable order conferring right to its beneficiary only after when same was accepted by competent authority and final order was communicated to its beneficiary, otherwise its status would be that of an official noting or a correspondence between an official and competent authority not creating any enforceable right in favour of its beneficiary

Competent authority could either accept or reject such opinion/recommendations and would not be bound to accept the same

Illustration.

2012 PLC(CS) 968 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Statutory power, exercise of

Principles.

2010 GBLR 467 SUPREME-APPELATE-COURT-GILGIT Judicial Precedent

Action by administrative authoritiesScope and extent'Administrative' and `quasi judicial power'

Distinction.