Definition

Historically, 'natural justice' has been used in a way which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evident and unarguable truth

Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules

Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules

But two fundamental maxims of natural justice are pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially, objectively and fairly

Described in the form of Latin tags these twin principles are, (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua.

A tortious breach is where one party (the tort-feasor) breaches the legally protected rights of another party (the claimant)

Torts tend to fall within four categories

They are: 1) torts of physical integrity; 2) torts of interests in property; 3) torts of use and enjoyment of land and; 4) torts of reputation.

Term "employee" includes persons employed through any other person for wages or otherwise to do any work in or in connection with the affairs of an industry and establishment under a contract of service or apprenticeship whether written or oral, express or implied

Such definition has following components: (i) employed, whether directly or through any other person; (ii) for wages or otherwise; (iii) to do any skilled or unskilled, supervisory, clerical, manual or other work in or in connection with the affairs of the industry or establishment; and (iv) under a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether written or oral, express or implied.

Urban area ordinarily means city or town based upon buildings, metropolitan areas, where population beyond 50,000 or more was settled for on account of provision, trade and community services were provided in the area

Such are the features of urban concept generally and widely used in common parlance.

Word 'maintenance' was derived from Arabic word 'Nafaq' which means 'to spend' and in literal sense, the word 'nafaqah' means what a person spends on his family

It is an inclusive explanation of the concept, not exhaustive and is only indicative in nature

Other liabilities are also included within the sweep of the concept of maintenance i.e. medical expenses, education expenses etc.

Right of maintenance does not limit itself only to food, raiment and lodging but also entails all the other necessary expenses for the mental and physical wellbeing of the recipient

Maintenance paid by a father to his child is not a courtesy rather a religious, legal, moral and social duty which cannot be put aside on frail grounds, therefore, it would be absolutely safe to include marriage expenses also within the sweep of the concept of maintenance of an adult unmarried daughter

Responsibility of the Muslim father was to act as guardian of his unmarried daughter

Even when a woman has attained puberty/majority she needs the help and assistance of her father to formally enter matrimony

Father must function as guardian on her behalf in such marriage to enable his daughter into the contract of marriage

Paramount responsibility of the father as guardian at the time of marriage of his daughter must necessarily bring with it the corresponding obligation to ensure that all necessary expenses in connection with the marriage were met by him

Father has the indisputable obligation to maintain his unmarried daughter and he has the obligation to ensure that the unmarried daughter under his charge is given away in marriage properly, as such the legal obligation to meet the reasonable marriage expenses of his daughter, is part of his obligation to pay maintenance to her

Admittedly, a father is bound to maintain his daughter till her marriage but such burden of 'maintenance'/monetary obligation cannot be shifted to a mother, who does not figure , anywhere in the compulsion to provide 'maintenance' to the children; this will not only financially burden the mother to bear the marriage expenses of her daughter but also will be against the legal norms.

Terms Intersex (Khusra), Eunuch, Transgender Man, Transgender Woman and KhawajaSira included in the definition of “transgender person” under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018

Repugnancy to injunctions of Islam

Five terms (Intersex (Khusra), Eunuch, Transgender Man, Transgender Woman and KhawajaSira), which are included in the definition of “transgender person” in S. 2(1)(n) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018 ('the impugned Act'), are not identical and similar

Combining the said five terms under one definition of 'transgender person' can be considered a circular definition fallacy as it implies that all these terms are the same or interchangeable

Terms Intersex, Eunuch and KhawajaSira refer to biological variations in sex characteristics, while 'Transgender man' and 'Transgender woman' refer to individuals whose self-perceived gender identity differs from the sex they were assigned at birth or from the sex they have biologically

Not only are all persons who fall within the category of any of the five terms used in S. 2(1)(n) different physically but the ruling of Islamic injunctions according to Quran and Sunnah about them are also different

Section 2(1)(n)(i) of the impugned Act which defines the term Intersex (Khusra) is not against the injunctions of Islam

Section 2(1)(n)(ii) of the impugned Act, which mentions Eunuchs is also not against the injunctions of Islam but needs clarity as according to Islamic injunctions a person cannot undergo castration to become eunuch at his will

However, S. 2(1)(n)(iii) of the impugned Act is against the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) because many Islamic injunctions and direction are subjected to and are based on the biological sex of a person (male or female) which cannot be based on the basis of the innermost feelings or self-perceived identity of a person (male or female) about his or her “gender” being different from the sex he or she has since birth.

Any person against whom an accusation was made could not be dubbed as an accused unless and until he was found involved by the Investigating Officer and in this regard a specific order for his arrest was made by him.

Injury accruing from one's acquiesces in another's action to his prejudice creates estoppel.

Frivolousness is a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support litigant's position.

No criminal case could be registered against designation because trial could not take place against a designata but against a "person"

Official designate did not fall within the meaning of person as defined by S.11, P.P.C.

Offence could be committed by the "person" and not by designate.

"Estoppel" is a doctrine of law which precludes a person from denying the truth of statement formally made by him.

In context of a company or corporation the word "oppression" was defined as unfair treatment to minority shareholders by those who controlled the corporation or the company.

Essential ingredients of S.2(23) of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 were firstly, any mechanically propelled Vehicle adapted for use upon road was a 'Motor Vehicle'; secondly, any mechanically propelled Vehicle not adapted for use upon roads but running upon fixed rails was not a 'Motor Vehicle'; thirdly, Any mechanically propelled Vehicle adapted or not adapted for use on roads but used solely upon remises of the owner was not 'Motor Vehicle'; fourthly, Adapted for use upon roads was a sine qua non for any Machine to qualify in the definition of 'Motor Vehicle'; and fifthly, Construction and earth moving Machine which could be mechanically propelled and adapted for use upon roads could qualify to be registered as 'Motor Vehicle' subject to physical examination of the Machine by the Registration Authority to his satisfaction.

Definition of 'landlord' under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 was different from the one under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959

Under S.2(g) of the Ordinance, 2001, "landlord" inter-alia meant 'the owner of the premises'

Such phrase was conspicuously absent from the definition of "landlord" under Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.

Contention of the petitioner/bank was that the status of employees/respondents did not fall in the definition of "worker" or "workman"

Validity

Employees were, undisputedly, working as Qasid and Typist with the petitioner/bank, thus they were, admittedly, not engaged for managerial or administrative supervisory work and had no authority to hire or fire any employee

Keeping the nature of their duties and designation, plea of the petitioner was not found convincing

Workman was a person who was not an employer and he was not engaged in managerial or administrative capacity

Status of a workman was determined not by his designation but the nature of the duties performed by him which must be skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical in nature

No illegality or irregularity was found in the concurrent judgments passed by NIRC

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Such wages were covered under the definition of wages provided under S. 2(vi) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

Such wages were covered under the definition of wages provided under S. 2(vi) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

Definitions of the term 'bidder' provided in various dictionaries stated.

Word "mineral" had a contextual connotation and had no fixed meaning.

Respondent was elected member/Chairman of Sindh local government but was not appointed/employed by Local Government and their positions did not come in definition of 'Service of Pakistan' under Art. 260 of the Constitution

Post of Mayor/Chairman of any council was not declared by Provincial or Federal Government or any court of law being 'Service of Pakistan' but were out of definition provided under Art. 260 of the Constitution

Firstly it had to be established that office in question, i.e., "service of Pakistan" was an office of profit, controlled by Provincial Government, having authority to appoint and remove Chairman

Contesting candidate was firstly elected representative and secondly, after his election as member of District Council or Town Committee, he was further elected as Chairman by elected members and could only be removed from such post through a no confidence motion as provided under law

High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Election Tribunal as it had rightly allowed respondent to contest elections

Claim of petitioner was rejected through valid and sound reasons

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner was an international company, which had outsourced non-core functions to service providers who appointed respondents as "workmen"

Plea raised by petitioner was that Registrar of Trade Unions had registered respondents as trade union of petitioner company

Validity

Agreements between petitioner and service providers provided for such workers to work under supervision and control of service providers

Nothing was available on record to show that it was representatives of service providers at premises of petitioner under whose orders or dictation such workers performed their duties

Definition of 'worker' and 'workman' included person employed directly or through a contractor and workmen who were members of the upon were working against posts of permanent nature and such workmen were working at premises of petitioner since several years

High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by Registrar Trade Union as there was nothing on record to show that representatives of service providers were supervising duties performed by such workmen at premises of petitioner

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

"Cadre" means the strength of service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit.

Import, export, manufacting and sale of spurious, counterfeit, misbranded, substandard, unwarranted, unregistered, smuggled drugs

"Drug"

Definition

Scope

Quashing of FIR

Scope

Petitioner, a private limited company was engaged in business in Pakistan for the last thirteen years and imported products including perfumes, cosmetics, healthcare devices, food supplements

Such products were based on five thousand years of traditional Chinese healthcare culture and traditional methods based on plants and herbs, which being food supplements were neither drugs nor medicines, not covered by definition of "drugs" under the Drugs Act, 1976

Provincial Inspector of Drugs made a report to the FIA that petitioner company was engaged in selling, supplying, distribution of suspected spurious, counterfeit, sub-standard, unwarranted, unregistered drug products under the garb of food supplements, healthcare products which was a cognizable offence under the Act and requested FIA for joint action for inspection/raid and investigation, which was without jurisdiction

Joint Team of FIA and Provincial Inspectorate of Drugs, while acting promptly, conducted a raid at the premises of the petitioner-company and warehouse, seized various products, arrested employee and distributor of company and registered the FIR

Validity

Record showed that department had attempted to justify the lodgment of the FIR with reference to Drugs Act, 1976 as Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012

Definition of 'drug' provided under the Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 was not different but included word Chinese with ayurvedic, Unani, homeopathic, biochemic system of treatment

Definition of "drugs" with reference to Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 would also be of no help for the department to include the "food supplement" into category of "drugs" unless the same were shown to be meant for treatment which was not the case with products of petitioner

Petitioner had claimed that in response to a letter, sent by the petitioner, the Ministry of Health had communicated that Drugs Act, 1976 was not applicable to such products

Prosecution had not denied the claim of the petitioner that companies, including petitioners, made applications for registration under the Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012, but the authority concerned, being unable to cope with volumes of applications, issued notification dated 12.10.2015, exempting all such products from the provision of S. 7 of the Act, till 31.12.2015

Record showed that present FIR was lodged on 12.9.2015 though prior to said notification/letter but when the Authority itself exempted such products from registration then the allegation of dealing with unregistered product would not be an offence nor such allegation with reference to Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 could result into conviction

Facts and circumstances of the case suggested that prosecution initiated against the petitioner, was nothing but an abuse fo process of law and would never end into conviction and it would serve no purpose to let the prosecution continue

First Information Report along with all the subsequent proceedings/ consequences were quashed under Art. 199 of the Constitution accordingly.

Hazardous is defined as risky and dangerous.

Definition of 'manufacture' provided in S. 2(16) of Sales Tax, 1990 suggested that it was a process where an article singly or in combination with other articles, materials, components, was either converted into another distinct article or product; or an article was so changed, transformed or reshaped that it became capable of being put to use differently or distinctly; and included any process, incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product.

Forest Development Corporation retired its employees under "Golden Hand Shake Policy" and were re-employed on contract basis for completion of remaining and ongoing activities of the Corporation

Employees sought regularization of their service under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009

Validity

Forest Development Corporation had recruited ex-employees on contract basis for completion of remaining and ongoing activities of the Corporation on fix pay

Petitioners were employees of Corporation on regular basis and they had availed the option of "Golden Hand Shake" by receiving the retirement benefits

Contractual employment was given as a matter of grace to the petitioners

Petitioners were not "civil servants" and they could not be given the benefit of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009

Prayer of petitioners was not tenable and their services could not be regularized under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Bank filed recovery suit against appellant before Banking Court on the ground that appellant had received payment in its account from a foreign Bank, through fictitious cheque which the Bank had returned to the foreign Bank

Suit filed by Bank was decreed against defendant

Plea raised by defendant was that Banking Court did not have jurisdiction to try the matter

Validity

Any person, other than as defined in S. 2(c) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not come within the definition of a 'customer'

Merely being account holder of Bank, appellant could not be considered as customer

Amount allegedly credited in the account of appellant on deposit of a cheque did not come within the purview of 'finance'

Any facility defined in definition provided by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was covered within the ambit of 'finance'

Opening of account and depositing of amount by an account holder could not be considered as finance

Banking Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit between account holder and banking company where there was no dispute with banking company in fulfilling any obligation with regard to any loan or finance

Dispute under Ss. 7(4) & 9(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, with regard to fulfilment of conditions of loan and liability arising out of contract executed by Bank and customer could be agitated in Banking Court

High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Banking Court which was without jurisdiction, as the appellant did not avail any financial facility from Bank and was merely an account holder

Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Laches is a French term which has been derived from (Law French, "remissness, slackness"); unreasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim; always an equitable one and in a way that prejudices party against whom relief is sought.

Laches in law is neglect to do something which by law a man is obliged to do.

Employee filed disability claim before Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for Mines on having fallen from 20 feet height and hurt

Commissioner awarded compensation to workman

Validity

Employer alleged that Commissioner had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matter as employer ran a gypsum quarry which was not a "mine" and employee did not fall under the definition of 'workman' as defined in Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Held, that quarry was an "open pit mine" which fell under definition of "mine" under the Mines Act, 1923

Employee was a "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for Mines had jurisdiction in the matter

Constitutional petition of employer was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner, impugned compulsory deduction of Zakat from their investments in the National Saving Schemes, on the ground that being a recognized provident fund, they were exempt from compulsory deduction of Zakat

Contention of department inter alia was that National Saving Schemes was a separate class of asset upon which the petitioner was liable to pay Zakat, and no certificate claiming exemption from the same was provided by the petitioner for National Saving Schemes

Validity

Provisions of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 did not limit or restrict or identify assets of a person, who was excluded from definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" which would subjected to compulsory deduction of Zakat and S.2(xxiii) of the same provided that a "recognized provident fund" was excluded from the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" and its assets could not be subjected to compulsory deduction of Zakat

Section 3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 started with a non obstante clause, therefore, other provisions of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 including Ss.2(xx) and 2(xxiii) of the same would exclude a "recognized provident fund" from definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" and per R.21 of the Zakat Collection and Refund Rules, 1981, Zakat shall not be deducted in respect of assets of a person claiming an exclusion from the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab"

Investment made by a "Sahib-e-Nisab" in National Saving Schemes was included within meaning of assets per the first Sched. to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 but Zakat could not be deducted from the same if such assets belonged to a person excluded from meaning of "Sahib-e-Nisab"

High Court observed that on account of being a recognized provident fund, petitioners did not come within the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab", and their assets, whether or not mentioned in the First Sched. to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980; were not liable to compulsory deduction of Zakat and directed the Administrator General Zakat, Ministry of Religious Affairs etc., to process petitioners' case for refund of the Zakat deducted

Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly.

Allegation of abuse of dominant position by Management of a Residential Colony by depriving the residents of alternate C.I.T. Cable Operator

Definition of "dominant position" of an undertaking as was envisaged under S.2(1)(e) of the Competition Act, 2010, stipulated to identify the relevant market with reference to the relevant product market and relevant geographic market to assess the dominant position of the undertaking

Management of the Residential Colony, had exclusive right to administer the Colony including a grant of "R.O.W." for provision of "C.I.T." services and it had 100% of market share in the relevant market

Besides, the conduct of Management of the Colony inter alia refusal to grant 'R.O.W.' for provisions of 'C.I.T' services to competitors suggested that it had the ability to behave to an appreciation extent, or to any extent, whatsoever, independently of the customers or suppliers, including the resident of the Colony and alternate service provider in the relevant market

Competition Commission, concurred with the determination of dominant position adopted in the enquiry report, both terms of the qualitative and quantitative test

Management of Residential Colony could behave apparently independent of its competitors, customers, consumers and suppliers.

Access to justice had been defined as an equal right to participate in every institution where law was debated, created, found, organized, administered interpreted and applied

Broadly it had been described as an integral part of the rule of law in constitutional democracies and was a hallmark of civilized society.

State counsel contended that the objection that the accused, being juvenile, could not be tried by the ordinary court, was not sustainable before the appellate court, as the same had not been raised before the Trial Court

Said objection, being a legal ground, could be agitated any time

Accused, as per the card of his arrest and formal charge sheet, was of 16/17 years of age

Section 2 (b) of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 defined a "child" as a person, who, at the time of commission of an offence, had not attained the age of eighteen years, and S. 7 of the Ordinance dealt with the determination of age

Trial Court, in such circumstances, was required to first determine the exact age of the accused before proceeding with the case, and in terms of S. 5 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, the accused, if found below the age of eighteen years, could not be tried together with his adult co-accused

High Court, setting aside the impugned judgment, remanded the case with the direction that the Trial Court would first determine the age of the accused and then proceed with the case de-novo.

Petitioner company assailed order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib, on the ground that it did not fall within the meaning of 'Agency' as defined under S. 2(a) of Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013

Petitioner instead of availing remedy by preferring representation to the President within 30 days, directly approached High Court

Validity

Federal Government through NEPRA exercised over all control over petitioner company so much so that Chief Executive of petitioner company had assumed office after a nod by Federal Government, or worked in his office at the pleasure of Federal Government

Mere shrugging off shoulders by petitioner company could not take it out of the domain of NEPRA or the overall control and watchful eyes of Federal Government

Petitioner company squarely fell within the definition of 'Agency' as per S.2(a) of Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013

High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib

Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Person dealing with collection of rent, enhancement of rent and negotiation with the tenant for evicting the premises fell within the expression "landlord" and ejectment application filed by such person was maintainable.

Co-owner fell within the expression "landlord" and ejectment application filed by such person was maintainable.

Written account of some act, transaction, or instrument, drawn up, under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates; term 'records' means accounts, correspondence, memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books and other documents or transcribed information of any type whether expressed in ordinary or machine language; complete record, encompasses clerk's record, record of proceedings and all evidence; Court record proceedings means official collection of all the trial pleadings, exhibits, orders and word-for-word testimony that took place during the trial and Judicial record, means precise history of civil or criminal proceedings from commencement to termination.

Under S.6 of Allopathic System (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance, 1962, only two categories of persons could prescribe antibiotics or dangerous drugs

Firstly, Registered Medical Practitioner or person authorized in that behalf by Provincial Government; secondly, those who were authorized by Provincial Government under Allopathic System (Prevention of Misuse) (West Pakistan) Rules, 1968 [since repealed]

Said Rules having already been repealed, only the Medical Practitioners could dispense and prescribe anti-biotic and dangerous drugs

Section 2(q) Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962 provided that "Registered Medical Practitioner" meant Medical Practitioner whose name had been included in register maintained under section 23 of Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962.

Trial Court had restrained the defendant from using its trade mark 'Health Shield', holding the same identical and deceptively similar with the plaintiff's trade mark 'Shield' products

Plaintiff's mark 'Shield' was functioning as a trade mark; whereas, the defendant's mark 'Health Shield' was not being used as a trade mark

Actual damage or loss to the plaintiff on account of the defendant's use of impugned trade mark could not be imagined, as products of both parties were very much different in nature, sold to different customer needs and usually kept at different locations in shops

Plaintiff, in support of his 'dilution' claim, had to prove the highest degree of fame of his trade mark required under S. 86 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001

Once a trade mark had been (honestly) adopted by a trade, the mark would not always remain the property of the said trader, and he would remain the owner of the mark, as long as, he was using the mark in course of trade, and, having abandoned the use of the trade mark, he would eventually lose all rights to the mark

Trade mark registration certificate was, therefore, not a licence to stop other trade indiscriminately

Plaintiff had the reputation and goodwill in its trade mark, however, the same was only limited to the goods falling in Classes 3, 21 and 10, which were toothbrushes, toothpastes, baby feeders, etc. and the plaintiff did not manufacture or sell goods falling in Class 29, which was banaspati ghee, oils, etc. under its trade mark

Defendant had made no attempt to misrepresent or disguise itself as the plaintiff or to sail close to it

Court applying the test 'Moron in a Hurry' found that even a moron in a hurry would not pick a bottle of Dalda Cooking Oil instead of Shield toothpaste

Actual damage or loss to the plaintiff on account of the defendant's use of impugned trade mark could not be imagined, as products of both parties were very much different in nature, sold to different customer needs and usually kept at different locations in shops

Classic Trinity test was, therefore, passed in favour of the defendant

Plaintiff's trade mark could not be construed to have been misused in any way by the non-trademarked type use of the impugned mark by the defendant

High Court, finding all allegations as to infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark as baseless, vacated the injunction

Principles.

Key-terms were always to be taken as deliberate one by legislature, hence, should always be given their due meaning and weight and such key-terms, would be required to be given the same meaning as the said statute/Act itself defined.

Contention of petitioner was that impugned notices served upon him by authorities under S.73 of Stamp Act, 1899 on the ground that petitioner being a Banking Company registered under Companies Ordinance, 1984 fell within definition of a public office as contemplated by S.73 of Stamp Act, 1899 was invalid

Authorities contended that petitioner being a Banking Company registered under Companies Ordinance, 1984 was a commercial concern having more than 20 employees and was a "public office company" within the meaning contemplated by S.22A of Stamp Act, 1899

Held, that a Banking Company fell within definition of a "public office" by virtue of S.22A of Stamp Act, 1899 and by virtue of S.22B of Stamp Act, 1899, a "public officer" included an officer-in-charge of a public office for the purpose of Stamp Act, 1899, therefore, authorities were legally competent to issue notices for inspection of record chargeable with stamp duty under Schedule to Stamp Act, 1899

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Interested witness was one who was established to have such a motive on account of enmity, or any other consideration, which could convince him to place his finger on an innocent at cost of real accused.

Appellant was a company engaged in business of cellular phones and was aggrieved of show cause notice raising demand for recovery of central excise duty

Validity

Mobile phones were covered in the definition of telephone therefore, expression 'telephone' given in the First Schedule of Central Excise Act, 1944, included cellular phones and all kinds of fixed line phones, V-phones and satellite phones

Such were the different kinds of telephones and covered under the definition of 'telephone'

Appellant company was receiving excess charges at the tariff rates which fell under central excise duty as there was no exemption on such charges which were part of telephone/telecommunication services

Excess charges were part of telephone charges liable to duty under the law

High Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Appellate Tribunal as no question of law was raised and all forums had rightly decided questions relevant to law

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Question before the High Court was whether the petitioners had the locus standi to challenge the cabinet decision as well as notifications issued in pursuance thereof for upgradition of educational institutions

'Aggrieved person' was although not to necessarily qualify that right in strict sense yet the person must have, at least, shown that he had some interest that the authorities should have acted in accordance with law

In presence of well-organized and fully functional department, no outsider or stranger had the locus standi to approach the Court for protection of the department's interests

Court could not assume the function of policy making or determine the priority of the various development projects in the State, as the same was in the exclusive domain of the Executive/Government

Court was to refrain from interfering with the policies launched by the public authorities for the smooth working of the public institutions, until and unless the same were proved to have been repugnant to the Fundamental Rights of the citizens of the State

Court had to guard against frivolous petition, in the garb of public interest litigation

Matters were brought before the Court which were neither of public importance nor relatable to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights or public duty

Public interest litigation was a weapon which had to be used with great care and circumspection and the Judiciary had to be extremely careful to see behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest, and/or publicity seeking was not lurking

High Court, however, ordered the authorities that in future, for the purpose of up-gradation of institutions in the education sector, there would be a high level committee, who would recommend the up-gradation of the institution on need basis in order to eliminate the impression of political involvement and that motivated decisions or some policy or guidelines would be framed in that regard

Writ petition was dismissed in circumstances.

According to the terms of the guarantee, employee/director's responsibility under the guarantee was that of a principal debtor and he was liable under the guarantee until all moneys due from the company had been paid, therefore, once the company defaulted in its liability to repay the loan amount, it was the obligation of the said employee/ director to repay the loan amount

High Court was not right in holding that said employee/director, despite being a guarantor, was not liable for prosecution before the Accountability Court

Judgment of High Court was set aside in circumstances

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

According to the terms of the guarantee, employee/director's responsibility under the guarantee was that of a principal debtor and he was liable under the guarantee until all moneys due from the company had been paid, therefore, once the company defaulted in its liability to repay the loan amount, it was the obligation of the said employee/ director to repay the loan amount

High Court was not right in holding that said employee/director, despite being a guarantor, was not liable for prosecution before the Accountability Court

Judgment of High Court was set aside in circumstances

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Degree is a specific identifiable position in a continuum, series, especially in a process and in fact an award conferred by the college or University signifying that the recipient has satisfactorily completed a course of study.

Contention of pre-emptor was that sale had been effected through registered sale deed and he had right to pre-empt the same after registration of deed through fresh suit

Validity

Suit was dismissed both on points of law and facts

Pre-emption suit was filed over the complete sale effected through unregistered sale deed

Point raised by the pre-emptor was not a new point

Right of pre-emption would come into force if transaction was "sale" notwithstanding the fact that registration or mutation had effected or not

What had been finally and conclusively determined by a competent court should be followed as legal truth

Law did not provide opportunity to re-open the matter at any time after it had been finally decided by a court of law

Litigation should be brought to its logical end

Principle of estoppel was also available against such litigation

Pre-emptor himself indulged the respondents by claiming pre-emption right over the impugned sale

Pre-emptor could not allege at this stage that he had instituted suit on premature sale and had right to re-adjudicate or re-open the case as one could not approbate or reprobate in the same breath

Review petition was dismissed in limine.

Plaintiffs filed suit for declaration claiming that they, along with defendants, all being legal heirs of deceased, who had embraced martyrdom, were entitled to their shares in amounts on account of shahada package, gratuity and pension

Both trial court and appellate court dismissed the suit on ground that only widow and children were entitled to share in disputed amount

Contention raised by plaintiffs was that as Guardian Court had issued succession certificate in favour of said persons regarding amount left by deceased, which was lying with Bank, so they were also entitled to share disputed amount

Respondents took plea that under Rr.4.7 & 4.10 of West Pakistan Civil Servants Pension Rules, 1963, only wife and children of deceased civil servant were entitled to pension and gratuity, and that disputed amount on account of shahada package was in shape of grant which had been awarded after death of deceased and the same, therefore, could not be treated as inheritable by all legal heirs of deceased, except widow and children of deceased

Validity

Shahada package was service benefit and was not due to deceased during his life, and the same was in nature of grant payable after his death

Shahada package, therefore, could not be treated inheritable by all legal heirs, except widow and children, who were nearer beneficiaries and remained dependent mainly on deceased

Widow and children of deceased deserved to receive benefit of shahada package to exclusion of other legal heirs, including plaintiffs

Amount on account of shahada package , gratuity and pension were not legacy of deceased employee as he was not owner of the same during his life, and only widow and children were entitled to the same

Under Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme, 1954, word 'family' had been defined as consisting of husband, widow and children, who were entitled to gratuity and pension in case of death of employee

Plaintiffs, as parents of deceased employee, were not entitled to get any share in shahada fund, pension and gratuity

No illegality, infirmity misreading or non-reading was pointed out in concurrent findings of courts below

Revision petition was dismissed in circumstances.