Essentials

If a person openly professes belief in or adherence to a particular faith, no further inquiry or evidence is ordinarily required to verify its genuineness

In Islam, no specific rituals are required to be performed by a non-Muslim before he or she is regarded as having renounced a previous faith and embraced Islam

What is required is a declaration to that effect and the recitation of the Kalma, along with belief in the Oneness of Allah, the Finality of the Prophethood of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and the Holy Qur'an.

Most important ingredient of a valid judgment was the result/reasons/grounds of the decision because the validity of the judgment was to be seen from the reasoning and the same was to be challenged by the aggrieved party

Trial Court had to decide each/every issue, whereas, the Appellate Court was not required to record findings issue-wise

Sufficient for the Appellate Court to deal with all issues which mattered for disposal of the controversy accepting those abandoned by the appellants.

Provisions of Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, are only applicable in cases where execution of a document is disputed between maker of document and the person in whose favour purportedly the same is executed only then such document is to be proved by producing two marginal witnesses.

No estimation and clear calculation had been given by the appellant as to how and which act of the defendant caused financial loss, mental agony and defamation to the appellant which was not clear by the appellant in his plaint/suit

Report submitted by the police officials before the competent court of law did not come within the definition of "defamation"

No disclosure in plaint as to on which words/actions of the respondents petitioner/plaintiff received mental agony and defamation which disrepute him in public at large or to his friends and relatives

Appellant/plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory requirements of Rr. 2 & 4 of O.VI of C.P.C.

Legal notice was given to the SHO of police station with a delay of more than eleven months

Plaint did not disclose any cause of action

No date/month had been mentioned in plaint as to where/when the respondents caused financial loss and before whom reputation was disrepute and damaged

Suit appeared to be barred by limitation, so plaint should have to be rejected under O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C

Impugned judgment of the Trial Court had rightly been passed

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Claimant had to prove its possession; such possession must have been dispossessed; such dispossession must be from immoveable property without consent of person in possession, without due course of law; and suit was to be filed within six months of such dispossession.

In a suit for possession under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, the plaintiff has to establish at trial: firstly, that he was in possession of specific immovable property; secondly, that he was dispossessed by the defendant; thirdly, that he was dispossessed without his consent and not in accordance with law; and fourthly, that such dispossession took place within a period of six months prior to the institution of the suit.

Where subsequent vendee conducted no inquiry regarding the title of property in question, he would not be deemed to have purchased property in question for value, in good faith and without notice of original contract.

Appellant allegedly approached few days prior to mutually extended date for payment of balance money, but one of the respondents refused to accept the same and disclosed that the suit property was sold out to third party

Said "third party" entered the suit by moving application under O.I, R.10 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Third party asserted that he purchased the suit land vide four mutations (numbers given in written statement); that he was owner in possession of suit land; and that one of the defendants in collusion with appellant was trying to take possession after sale; and that real brother of one of the respondent filed suit for possession on basis of pre-emption against third party

Appellant's suit was concurrently dismissed

Validity

Appellant's agreement to sell and payment of earnest money was undisputed and concluded by both Courts below

Emerged on record through evidence that parties were residents of same vicinity and well known to one another

Agreement between appellant and one of the respondent must had been in knowledge of inhabitants of village

Nothing on record to show whether "third party" had made inquiry about existence of said agreement even in summary manner

Third party had not exhibited alleged four mutations in his favour to prove that same were sale mutations for value

Passing of consideration was also not proved on record

No confidence inspiring evidence germane to making of inquiry about original contract by third party was made as required by law/settled principles

Appeal was allowed and suit of appellant/plaintiff was decreed with direction to deposit remaining sale price within 30 days, otherwise the same would be deemed to have been dismissed.

For grant of interim injunction, all three ingredients, i.e. (i) prima facie arguable case (ii) irreparable loss and (iii) balance of inconvenience must co-exist and if one ingredient was missing, injunction could not be granted.

Document would be regarded as promissory note if it fulfilled the requirements to the effect that (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay, (ii) the sum should be a sum of money and should be certain, (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer, of the instrument, (iv) and the maker should sign it.

Document would be regarded as promissory note if it fulfilled the requirements to the effect that (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay, (ii) the sum should be a sum of money and should be certain, (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer, of the instrument, (iv) and the maker should sign it.

While considering a writ in nature of quo warranto, it was imperative to consider intent and motive of petitioner(s), and if it was manifest that petitioner had invoked Constitutional jurisdiction with ulterior motive, then exercise of such jurisdiction ought to be declined

Exercise of jurisdiction to issue writ of quo warranto was an extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction and High Court was not bound to exercise same in each and every case, especially in matters of minor discrepancies, sheer curable technicalities or where approach was doctrinaire unless it was shown that non-interference would result in grave injustice or would amount to endorsing retention of illegal gains.

In order to constitute an offence under S. 409, P.P.C., there must not only be entrustment but dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one's own use or dishonest disposal of property by accused and when such elements were missing, accused was liable to be acquitted

In the present case, neither the prosecution had proved its charge that accused was entrusted with certain quantity of fertilizer bags nor had been brought on record that accused had actually converted said fertilizer to his own use

No official document was produced by prosecution through which it could be deduced that any entrustment was made to the accused.

Witnesses of jumping demand were required to sate such details in their evidence to establish the performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat

Witnesses of Talb-i-Muwathibat had omitted the time of performance of such talb

Said witnesses had contradicted the point of place of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat which was fatal for the suit

Pre-emptor, in circumstances, had failed to prove the time and place of performance of jumping demand therefore, was not entitled for decree

Nothing was on record as to who had dispatched notices of Talb-i-Ishhad to the vendees

Even one of vendees was residing abroad but notice of Talb-i-Ishhad had been addressed to him at his Pakistan address

Nothing was on record as to when notices of Talb-i-Ishhad were dispatched to the defendants

Pre-emptor was bound to prove the performance of talbs in a comprehensive manner

Scribe of notices of Talb-i-Ishhad had not been examined and person who had dispatched the said notices had not been produced in the Trial Court

Postal acknowledgement-due card had not been produced before the Trial Court

Pre-emptor was obliged to produce evidence to prove the dispatch of notices of Talb-i-Ishhad and examine the postman to prove the delivery of said notices to the vendees

Pre-emptor failed to produce postman

Plaintiff having not fulfilled the legal requirement of sending notices of second talb through registered post with acknowledgment-due card

Courts below had erred in decreeing the suit of pre-emptor

Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were result of mis-reading and non-reading of evidence which were set aside

Suit filed by the pre-emptor was dismissed

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Prosecution department is to ensure that investigation carried out and evidence collected is of such a nature and strength that it can withstand closer scrutiny when the case is in court.

Copies of documents produced by the plaintiffs did not dispense with the requirements of formal proof of documents by primary evidence

Secondary evidence could be admitted only on one or more conditions laid down in Art.76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 having been satisfied by the party tendering such evidence

Secondary evidence could not be admitted on the contents of document without the production of original having first been accounted for

Receiving of secondary evidence without objection by the party against whom it was tendered or required to be used in evidence could not ordinarily object to the admission of such evidence at any subsequent stage subject to provisions of Art.162 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

Admitting copy of a document in evidence and reading the same without observing legal requirements of Art.76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 would be illegal

Neither executants of the documents nor the witnesses nor such documents in original had been produced in the Trial Court for inspection purposes

Such documents without formal proof could not be relied upon

Trial Court placing reliance upon such documents had proceeded to pass the impugned judgment and decree, which could not be allowed to hold field

Trial Court, in the present case, had received documents in evidence improperly without production of their originals and without permitting secondary evidence

Mere consent or omission to object to the reception of inadmissible evidence could not be treated as a valid and legal piece of evidence

Matter was remanded by High Court to the Trial Court for decision afresh, rendering its findings as per mandate of O.XX, R.5, C.P.C.

Impugned judgment and decree were set aside

Suit of plaintiffs was to be deemed to be pending before the Trial Court for decision afresh

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs filed suit for declaration that defendants had orally gifted suit property in their favour whereas defendants filed suit for possession that they were owners of suit land and plaintiffs had refused to vacate the same

Trial Court consolidated both the suits and dismissed suit of plaintiffs and decreed that of defendants

Validity

Plaintiffs being donees were bound to prove offer, acceptance and delivery of possession

Evidence of witness produced on behalf of plaintiff to prove alleged gift was not admissible as he was his real brother

Said witness had not stated even a single word with regard to acceptance of gift and delivery of possession of suit property

Even said witness was mentally retarded person and no declaration of gift had been made in presence of impartial witnesses

Alleged oral gift was defective and invalid, in circumstances

Plaintiffs had failed to produce convincing, reliable and cogent evidence to prove the alleged oral gift

Suit land had been allotted in favour of defendants by the Government

No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plaintiff was bound to establish that transfer of suit property was effected by a person having title or authority to create a right backed by sale consideration and delivery of possession

When value of sale transaction was over and above one hundred rupees then it could be made only by a registered instrument

Mere registration of document by itself would not furnish proof of elements of sale which must co-exist prior to execution and registration of sale deed

Plaintiff while seeking declaration was bound to implead vendor as defendant without whom suit would have no forbearance for a valid decree

Sale agreement, in the present case, was an unregistered document which required registration under the law

Sale would not be complete without registration of the deed

Sale consideration, in the present case, was Rs. 3,37,871.25/- which required registration and suit for declaration for fulfilment of such contract of sale was not competent

Where sale between the parties had not been completed, declaration could not be sought rather only course available was to file a suit for specific performance for completion of sale

Plaintiff would be at liberty to file a fresh suit for specific performance of contract under the same cause of action on the basis of alleged agreement under the ambit of limitation

Revision was disposed of in circumstances.

Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property ought to plead and prove not only his willingness, which was a mental process, but also his/her readiness which was something do with translating will into action, and such suit should have been preceded by necessary preparation by plaintiff for being a position to be ready financially to pay the purchase price.

Set-off must be where a suit was one for recovery of money and amount in regard to such set off must be an ascertained sum of money, which must be legally recoverable by defendant(s)

Such amount must be recoverable by defendant from plaintiff(s) and must not exceed pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the court in which the suit was brought

Both parties must fill, in the defendants claim to set off, the same character they fill in the plaintiff's suit

Set off claim must be pleaded in the manner prescribed in law and within period of limitation prescribed in law.

Defendant had not alleged anywhere that after execution of gift deed possession of suit property was delivered to him by the donor

Where possession of property was already with the beneficiary then in order to make a valid gift donor was to perform any of the overt act to disassociate himself from the property in order to let the surviving legal heirs know that the property would now solely rest with the donee

No such overt act was done by the deceased in the present case to inform the remaining legal heirs that he had gifted suit land to his nephew

Offer, acceptance and delivery of possession of gifted property did not take place in absence of such overt act

Gift, in such circumstances, had become invalid and no rights could be claimed on the basis of that void gift

If donor had not handed over the possession or if he was still reaping the benefit then the delivery of possession conditionality was not fulfilled and gift remained invalid

Gift would take effect from the date on which the requisite possession of the property was delivered to the donee and not from the date on which declaration was actually made

Gift would be void without delivery of possession of the property to the donee even if it was made through a registered document

Delivery of possession was not necessary in case of father/mother and son (being donor and donee), both in possession of the property being gifted, however, to make such a gift complete the donor had to perform some overt act through which he would indicate his intention to transfer possession and to divest himself of all control over the gifted property

Courts below had committed illegality and irregularity while passing the impugned judgments and decrees

Impugned judgments and decrees were set aside and suit was decreed

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Petitioner/tenant contended that he did not receive notice and as he had denied the said fact on oath, the burden of proof had shifted to the landlords

Respondents/landlords contended that sending of notice to the tenant through courier and Registered Post was sufficient proof of the same

Validity

Address, in the present case, was stated to be correct and the registered post acknowledgement was also available on record

Respondents/Landlords appeared to have discharged their burden when an acknowledgement receipt was produced to establish that notice under S. 18 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was sent and served which presumption was governed by Art. 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

Denial on oath could only shift the burden upon landlord if tenant/addressee had himself appeared before the Court whereas, in the present case, attorney of the tenant appeared to adduce evidence

Negative oral evidence could lean for presumption of truth under S.27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 and Art. 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

Best evidence was withheld by petitioner/tenant

Where a fact was required to be proved through oral evidence , such evidence must be direct and of primary source within the meaning of Art. 71 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 which provided instances of direct oral evidence regarding proof of fact

Landlords could not be deprived of their legitimate right once the notices had been served upon the tenant

If the Rent Controller was required to extract the intention of a wilful or non-wilful default it would end up every case as non-wilful default as every tenant would have some legitimate reasons/excuses like financial crises or payment of rent to the previous owner etc.

At times technical default was being considered by the Court but that was limited to the extent that the same was being deposited in the name of same landlord which depended upon the nature, circumstance and controversy of each case

No illegality or infirmity having been noticed in the judgments and the decrees passed by the two Courts below

Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

Affected party needs to be confronted with specific provisions of law under which it is intended to be penalized.

Essential ingredients of gift were declaration of gift by the donor; acceptance of said gift by the donee and delivery of possession of subject matter by the donor to the donee

If said conditions were fulfilled then gift was complete

Plaintiffs, in the present case, had not accepted the gift and possession of gifted property had not been delivered to them by their father/donor in his life time

Alleged gift was not complete in accordance with law

Plaintiffs had filed the present suit after lapse of more than forty nine years which was time barred

Suit land had been gifted in favour of defendant and he had become owner of suit property during life time of his father

No illegality, irregularity or infirmity had been pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below

Second appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff, in a suit under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was bound to prove that he was in possession of the suit property and had been dispossessed by the defendant other than in due course of law

Such dispossession should have taken place within six months of filing of suit

Court was not to appreciate the question of title which had been raised or looked into in a case filed under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Nothing was on record that plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and had been dispossessed forcibly

Plaint in the present case had been drafted under the provisions of S.8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Courts below had erred in law to decree the suit of plaintiff

Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below were set aside

Plaintiff could seek possession under S. 8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 if he was declared owner of suit the property

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Perusal of O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. showed that it consisted of two distinct parts: First, required the filing of application for leave to appear and defend the suit on affidavit, whereas the second part gave power to the Court to grant leave to appear and defend the suit on such other facts as the Court deemed sufficient to support the application

Word 'or' after comma (,) occurring after the word "consideration" in O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. indicated the intention of Legislature that word 'or' was used in disjunctive sense

Legislation could not be alleged to have a careless attitude in use of word 'or' therein

Trial Court, in the present case, had failed to interpret the provision of O.XXXVII, R. 3(1), C.P.C. and had non-suited the defendant only on account of non-submission of the affidavit in support of the petition for leave to appear and defend, without determining other facts, which were placed before Trial Court explaining the reasons for non-submission of the affidavit, thus, a jurisdiction clearly vested in the Trial Court in view of the second part of O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. had not been exercised

Perusal of both the pronotes exhibited by the plaintiffs created impression that the same were not "negotiable instruments" and could not be termed "pronotes" for the reason that the stated transaction through such documents was shown as a loan which was settled to be returnable with a certain amount of profit

Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 stipulated essentials of "promissory note" as an "unconditional undertaking to pay"

Pronotes, in the present case, had been entered into on two separate dates but the plaintiffs had claimed decree on the strength of two distinct documents by filing one and the same suit

Execution of two distinct documents on two different dates gave rise to two separate causes of action to claim amount separately on different dates and recovery of both the pronotes could not be claimed by filing a joint suit

Trial Court, while refusing leave to appear and defend the suit to the defendant had, thus, committed an illegality by not attending to the "other facts", which provided a power to such Court to grant leave even in absence of an affidavit of the defendant supporting the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and therefore, the case of the defendant had been prejudiced and miscarriage of justice had been caused to the defendant

High Court remanded the case to the Trial Court and appeal was allowed accordingly.

Perusal of O.XXXVII, R. 3, C.P.C. showed that it consisted of two distinct parts: First, required the filing of application for leave to appear and defend the suit on affidavit, whereas the second part gave power to the Court to grant leave to appear and defend the suit on such other facts as the Court deemed sufficient to support the application

Word 'or' after comma (,) occurring after the word "consideration" in O. XXXVII, R. 3, C.P.C. indicated the intention of Legislature that word 'or' was used in disjunctive sense

Legislation could not be alleged to have a careless attitude in use of word 'or' therein

Trial Court, in the present case, had failed to interpret the provision of O. XXXVII, R. 3(1), C.P.C. and had non-suited the defendant only on account of non-submission of the affidavit in support of the petition for leave to appear and defend, without determining other facts, which were placed before Trial Court explaining the reasons for non-submission of the affidavit, thus, a jurisdiction clearly vested in the Trial Court in view of the second part of O.XXXVII, R. 3, C.P.C. had not been exercised

Perusal of both the pro-notes exhibited by the plaintiffs created impression that the same were not "negotiable instruments" and could not be termed "pronotes" for the reason that the stated transaction through such documents was shown as a loan which was settled to be returnable with a certain amount of profit

Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 stipulated essentials of "promissory note" as an "unconditional undertaking to pay"

Pro-notes, in the present case, had been entered into on two separate dates but the plaintiffs had claimed decree on the strength of two distinct documents by filing one and the same suit

Execution of two distinct documents on two different dates gave rise to two separate causes of action to claim amount separately on different dates and both the claims could not be made by filing a joint suit

Trial Court, while refusing leave to appear and defend the suit to the defendant had, thus, committed an illegality by not attending to the "other facts", which provided a power to such Court to grant leave even in absence of an affidavit of the defendant supporting the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and therefore, the case of the defendant had been prejudiced and miscarriage of justice had been caused to the defendant

High Court remanded the case to the Trial Court and appeal was allowed accordingly.

No bar existed in filing second complaint; however, in the second or subsequent complaint, fresh facts and circumstances were to be disclosed.

Essentials of being "worker" were that firstly, he should not be an employer; secondly, he should have no managerial capacity and thirdly, he should have no administrative capacity.

Donees had not proved the essential features of a valid gift in circumstances.

Unless some consequences of non-compliance of the provision were provided in the statute, the same could not be termed as mandatory despite use of word "shall" in the same

Even the words "may" and "shall" were also interchangeable.

Suit should qualify status of administration suit when administration of a property/estate under decree of court was required as temporary arrangement till payment of debts, liabilities and distribution/partition of residue among legal heirs if it strictly revolved around credit, legates and legal heirs alone.

Essentials of valid gift were declaration of gift by donor; acceptance by donee and delivery of possession by the donor.

General allegations in such regard are not sufficient.

Plaintiff filed suit for declaration and mandatory injunction on basis of pro note and agreement under which defendant was alleged to have borrowed money from him

Defendant took plea that said pro note and agreement had been procured by use of arms and harassment

Defendant after filing written statement was proceeded ex parte for his absence

Trial Court decreed the suit ex parte

Defendant filed objection petition in execution of ex parte decree, which was dismissed

Defendant challenged ex parte decree under S. 12(2), C.P.C., which the court accepted, and revisional court declined interference in order of acceptance

Validity

Execution of pro note and agreement had not been denied by defendant

Defendant having participated in the proceedings of suit and having knowledge as to pendency of the same, instead of contesting the suit, opted absence from trial proceedings

Defendant failed to follow legal course by applying for setting aside the ex parte decree, and instead filed objection petition under S. 47, C.P.C., which was dismissed both by executing court and appellate court

Objections raised in application filed under S. 12(2), C.P.C. were not sustainable as the same objections had been raised in objection petition filed under S. 47, C.P.C.

No justification existed for filing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. after the objection petition under S. 47, C.P.C. had been dismissed

Application filed under S. 12(2), C.P.C. did not contain any reference to fraud which was pre-requisite for maintainability thereof

No justification to entertain and proceed with application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. existed as the same did not fulfil essential requirement of disclosing fraud and misrepresentation in the impugned decree

Orders of courts below being on wrong premise were set aside and application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed

Constitutional petition was allowed.

For successful exercise of right of pre-emption, performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat, Talb-e-Ishhad and then (existence of) superior right of pre-emption, in their respective chronological order is essential

Any deficiency in said legal requirements will render pre-emption suit liable to outright dismissal.

Decree passed by the Family Court had to be executed either by the court which had passed the same or by any other civil court as directed by the District Judge through a special or general order

Executing Court had to follow the procedure contained in Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Decree for restitution of conjugal rights would become inapplicable of execution if wife had proved non-payment of dower on demand

Only attachment of property of wife could be made in execution of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights

Wife could not be compelled to go and live with her husband in a decree for restitution of conjugal rights

Executing Court had committed an error by giving direction for personal appearance of wife in execution of decree for restitution of conjugal rights

Impugned order passed by the Executing Court for personal appearance of wife was set aside

Constitutional petition was accepted in circumstances.

Document to be a promissory note should be an unconditional undertaking to pay; the sum should be a sum of money and should be certain; the payment should be to or to the order of a person who was certain or to the bearer of the instrument and maker of the same should sign the said document.

Plaintiff filed suit for declaration and possession through partition regarding suit property asserting that suit property was owned by his father and after his death parties became owners-in-possession of the same and that defendant (one of the sons) had obtained affidavit in his favour for sanction of site plan from the other legal heirs/parties

Defendant resisted said claim on grounds that he was actual owner of suit property, whereas father of parties was only a Benami owner thereof and that all other legal heirs had surrendered their legal share in his favour by executing an affidavit

Suit was dismissed concurrently

Contention of plaintiff was that defendant had neither pleaded motive of alleged Benami transaction in his written statement nor had he asserted the same in his evidence

Defendant, alleging Benami title and surrender of shares by other legal heirs through affidavit, had taken contradictory defences

Said affidavit could not be termed as sale deed as the same was executed only for sanction of site plan and transfer of shares could only be made through registered document

Plea taken by defendant was that suit property was transferred in name of his father as ostensible owner and all legal heirs, acknowledging said transaction as Benami, had surrendered their rights regarding suit property in his favour

Validity

Suit property had admittedly been transferred in name of father of parties, and defendant had never filed suit against his father in his life time on basis of Benami transaction

Defendant failed to prove any motive in his written statement as to why suit property had been got transferred in name of his father

Permanent Transfer Deed issued by Settlement Authorities in favour of father of parties contained price/consideration for transfer

Defendant neither produced previous owner nor any documentary evidence to prove that sale consideration had been paid by him

Defendant through oral evidence had proved payment of sale consideration but the same could not be preferred over documentary evidence in shape of "Permanent Transfer Deed" to which strong presumption of truth was attached

No agreement to sell or mode of payment was brought on record to prove that defendant had purchased suit property

Defendant's witnesses were contradictory

Original Permanent Transfer Deed was not produced by defendant

Defendant failed to prove necessary elements of Benami

Defendant also failed to prove that other legal heirs had surrendered their share in his favour

Mere production of copy of affidavit was insufficient to hold that rights of plaintiff had been surrendered in favour of defendant

Affidavit had admittedly been executed for sanction of site plan and the same was submitted to concerned Authority for said purpose, but original affidavit was not summoned from custody of said Authority

Plaintiff was not confronted with affidavit during cross-examination

Affidavit was not a public document and the same was to be proved in terms of Art.79 of Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984

Party relying on affidavit must produce deponent for cross-examination and if deponent fails to submit to cross-examination, affidavit would lose all its force as probative piece of evidence and the same could not be acted upon

Onus to prove the affidavit was on defendant but neither stamp vendor nor scribe, Notary Public, Oath Commissioner were produced to prove contents of the affidavit

Affidavit got exhibited under O. XIII, R. 4, C.P.C. on statement of witness who was not related to said affidavit

Admission of document in evidence under O. XIII, R. 4, C.P.C., was not binding on parties

In cross-examination, it was suggested to plaintiff that an affidavit had been executed by him but on his denial that he did not intend to surrender his rights, it was required under the law that he should have been confronted with the writing of said affidavit

Under Art.140 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, such confrontation was mandatory

Non-confrontation of affidavit to plaintiff had damaged the case of defendant

Affidavit could not be proved under Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and the same could not be made basis of dismissal of suit

Defendant failed to prove the defences set up by him

Findings of courts below regarding said affidavit were not sustainable under law

Courts below fell in legal error while dismissing suit of plaintiff who had fully proved his claim

High Court, allowing revision petition, set aside judgments and decrees of courts below and remanded the suit to Trial Court with direction to pass preliminary decree after determining legal shares of parties

Revision petition was accepted in circumstance.

For determining that whether title vesting with opposite party in disputed property was merely benami, absence of motive always goes against the claimant.

Essentials for proof of Benami transaction were that what was the source of consideration for Benami transaction, that in whose custody original title documents were and who was in possession of Benami property; and that what was the motive of Benami transaction

Essential elements must exist to prove Benami transaction between ostensible owner and purchaser for purchase of property in name of ostensible owner for benefit of person who was to make payment of consideration

Existence of motive for creation of Benami title was relevant

For determining as to whether title vesting with opposite party in disputed property was merely Benami, absence of motive always goes against claimant.

Pre-emptor received information of sale at 8.20 a.m, while intention to pre-empt was made at 10 a.m., which demand could not be termed as "jumping demand"

Laxity in performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat which was a jumping demand be seen with rigor

Glaring contradictions in testimonies of witnesses in respect of time, date, place of making the Talb showed that Talb-e-Muwathibat was not performed in accordance with law

Delivery of notice, its receipt and acknowledgment-due had not been proved which were requirements of Talb-e-Ishhad

Orders of courts below did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity

Revision was dismissed.

When a stamp paper for an agreement had been issued by a person, who was neither stamp vendor nor had a right to issue the stamp paper and agreement was not signed by plaintiff himself then such agreement was not enforceable under law.

When an agreement was denied by defendant in written statement then plaintiff was required to produce stamp vendor with his record of register of stamp vending in order to prove purchase of stamp at specific date by specific person

In order to prove writing of agreement on specific date, petition writer was to be produced and marginal witness of agreement and plaintiff should appear himself in witness box.

Any judicial findings without discussing necessary facts, case law, legal issues involved therein and material available on record was not a judicial order and consequently was not sustainable in eyes of law

Onerous duty was on adjudicating and appellate authorities to discuss all issues and dispose off what had been argued

Orders which were not speaking orders and devoid of reasons were not sustainable in law.

Orders which did not contain rebuttal on grounds advanced and not containing substantial reasons also did not show that such orders were passed on objective consideration should be treated as illegal, void, arbitrary and a result of misused of authority vested in public functionary

No room was available for such illegal, void and arbitrary orders in any system of law

If any authority, Court or Tribunal gave a finding of fact which was not based on material available on record was illegal and arbitrary without discussing it became perverse and such finding of fact which was violative of established principles of appreciation of evidence on record was not sustainable in law

Every judicial or quasi-judicial finding should be based on reasons containing justification for finding in order itself

Adjudication order was being violation of basic principle of good governance and mandatory requirements of S. 24A of General Clauses Act, 1897 was not only illegal and void but also not sustainable in law.

Show-cause notice must disclose material facts on basis of which charges of mis-declaration, connivance, suppression or fraud were intended to be raised.

Perusal of S. 80 of Customs Act, 1969 indicated that during process of assessment it was duty of the Department to not only examine goods and to consider any extra information available on Goods Declaration in order to arrive at a correct assessment of duty and taxes

Assumption that quoting a wrong PCT Heading amounted to mis-declaration would not be a correct approach in view of S. 32 of Customs Act, 1969, where emphasis was on the word "material particulars" which meant something "going to the root cause of basic declaration".

Order which did not contain rebuttal on ground advanced and judgments relied upon by appellant and also were not containing substantial reasons and did not show that these were passed on objective consideration would be treated as illegal, void and arbitrary and result of misuse of authority vested in public functionary

No room was available for such illegal, void, arbitrary and perverse order

Perverse finding of fact was violative of principles of appreciation of evidence and as such not sustainable in law

Every judicial or quasi-judicial finding should be based on reasons containing justification for finding in order

Order being in violation of basic principles of good governance and mandatory requirements of S. 24A of General Clauses Act, 1897, , appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Plaintiff filed suit for declaration, specific performance and injunction claiming that defendants executed agreement to sell in his favour to sell suit property and thereunder not only received possession of suit property but also raised construction over the same, and defendant refused to enter mutation in name of plaintiff

Trial court decreed the suit, but appellate court dismissed the same

Validity

Contract had been duly executed and signed by predecessor of defendants, and the same was produced and exhibited in evidence without any objection and remained undisputed

Possession had been delivered to plaintiff as part performance of contract, which was an admitted fact

Plaintiff had not only remained in possession of suit property but also raised construction over the same to the notice of defendants

Plaintiff was bona fide purchaser and had been in possession against valid consideration right from the day of transaction

Admitted characteristics of contract attracted provisions of S.53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which was illegally withheld by appellate court

Appellate court while dealing with objection as to non- registration of document was ignorant of provisions of S.53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and remained oblivious of proviso (1) of S. 50 of Registration Act, 1908, which provided that person in possession of property under unregistered documents prior in date, would be entitled to rights under S.53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Trial court had neither impounded the instrument under Ss.33 & 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 nor refused to admit the same in evidence

No objection was raised during admission of contract in evidence

Once contract had been admitted in evidence, legality and validity of such admission with reference to provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 was beyond competence of appellate court

Appellate court failed to visualize S.36 of Stamp Act, 1899 which prima facie barred, restrained and prohibited appellate court to question admission of instrument even if the same had been admitted erroneously

Appellate court had no option but to endorse the admission of contract

Document, either understamped or unstamped once admitted in evidence, appellate court was not supposed to entertain any controversy except to the extent as permitted under S.61 of Stamp Act, 1899

Since trial court had not passed any specific order regarding sufficiency or otherwise of stamp of instrument, the appellate court could not pass any order under S.61 of Stamp Act, 1899

Suit to sustain under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and remain competent and maintainable was required to reveal and reflect claim of right to or interest in subject matter, and denial or interest to deny the same by defendant

Present suit was competent and maintainable

Findings of appellate court regarding maintainability of suit were absolutely unwarranted and unjustified

Plaintiff's suit was not hit by provision of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

To attract penal provisions of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., contents of plaint must have been accepted as the same were and thereafter it was to be ascertained as to whether plaint was hit by any provision of clauses of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

If suit was liable to be rejected in view of any clause of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., then appellate court should have rejected the same without discussing merits of the case, which course was not adopted by appellate court

No counter-claim for possession and cancellation of agreement was filed by defendants

Evidence produced by plaintiff was consistent, coherent and straightforward

Relief on undisputed claims could be refused

Attorney of defendants had admitted plaintiff's right to mutation regarding suit property, which was sufficient for a decree in favour of plaintiff

High Court by setting aside judgment and decree of appellate court, upheld decree of trial court

Revision petition was allowed in circumstances.