Essential ingredients

When a party seeks a decree of specific performance for the sale of immovable property based solely on an oral agreement, the onus is on that party to demonstrate that there was a mutual agreement and consensus between both parties regarding the terms of the oral contract

A person entering into an oral agreement has to prove the oral agreement according to the definition of agreement in Section 2(h) of the Contract Act, 1872

A party claiming the existence of an oral agreement must clearly specify the date, time, place, and names of witnesses in their pleadings, such as the plaint or written statement

These requirements are sine qua non to prove an oral agreement to sell.

A transaction which is based on an oral gift has two parts, namely the fact of the oral gift which has to be independently established by proving through cogent and reliable evidence the three necessary ingredients of a valid gift i.e. (1) declaration of gift, (2) acceptance of the gift and (3) delivery of the possession of the subject of the gift; however, this is not enough

The second ingredient i.e. mutation on the basis of an oral gift has to be independently established by adopting the procedure provided in the Land Revenue Act and the Rules framed thereunder as well as the evidentiary aspects of the same in terms of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.

This doctrine applies, when the things that inflicted the damage was under the sole management and control of the defendant; secondly, the occurrence was such that it would not have happened without negligence; and thirdly, there must be no evidence as to why or how the occurrence took place

In such circumstances the defendants have to persuade the court that the accident did not occur on account of their negligence

In simple words, res ipsa loquitur means an inference of negligence in civil proceedings; it permits an inference of a defendant's negligence from the happening of an event and thereby creates a prima facie case of negligence sufficient for submission to a Court

To warrant submission of the inference for the court's consideration, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (ii) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (iii) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff

However, it is equally important to register that a defendant may rebut the inference of negligence with evidence that tends to cast doubt on the plaintiff's proof; and more importantly, the doctrine permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of the accident

The rule simply recognizes that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without negligence

Res ipsa loquitur does not create a conclusive presumption in favor of the plaintiff but merely permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances of the occurrence

Mere happening of an accident or injury will not give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on the defendant's part, even in a strict liability context

It is insufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of negligence , or to prove negligence as a matter of law

Stated another way, proof of an accident does not equate with proof of negligence

In an action based on negligence, the maxim res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence effecting onus; it does not alter the general rule that the onus to prove negligence rests upon the claimant

The doctrine has been applied to situations where a motor vehicle mounted the footpath , where a vehicle struck a pedestrian who was walking alongside the highway , where it was shown that the brake pipe of the vehicle was beyond repair, and where a vehicle of unsound condition was being driven on a poor road on a dark night.

The instant matter brought into focus the jurisprudential and evidentiary imperatives surrounding the alleged oral transfer of immovable property by way of gift, particularly where such a claim was advanced to circumvent the vested inheritance rights of a female legal heir

Petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant were real siblings and the only legal heirs of their deceased father, who passed away on 08.10.1998

The dispute concerned agricultural land (the "Suit Property")

The petitioner/plaintiff (sister of respondent/defendant who was the beneficiary of the gift) filed a suit on 24.02.2011 seeking cancellation of mutation No. 600 dated 29.04.1998, recorded as a gift in favor of her brother (respondent/defendant) and alleged that the gift mutation was obtained fraudulently and without knowledge, consent, or valid intention of their deceased father

It was contended by the petitioner that after their father's death, the petitioner trusted her brother's assurance that her share had been included in an inheritance mutation; that she accepted small payments under the impression they were her share of the property income; that upon facing financial hardship and requesting to sell her share, the brother refused and she discovered the alleged mutation of gift; that she had no knowledge of such a gift, asserting it was forged and not in accordance with law

It was the case of the respondent that his claim was firmly anchored in lawful entitlement under a gift dated 18.04.1998 from his father which was made during his life

He alleged that all requirements of a valid gift (offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession) were fulfilled

Held: Present case was a typical case where a woman was deprived of her rightful inheritance under the pretense of an alleged oral gift made by the deceased father to her brother

Such claims were often used by male heirs to exclude female relatives, prompting courts to remain vigilant against fraudulent practices involving oral gifts, which were frequently employed to deny women their legal entitlements

The essential legal requirements for validating such transactions, by now, have been firmly established in our jurisprudence and require no further elaboration

While juxtaposing the facts of the case in hand, High Court was of the opinion that both the courts below had acted illegally and with material irregularity while exercising jurisdiction

The respondent as the principal beneficiary and direct participant in the purported gift was the most vital witness to establish its essential elements, yet he conspicuously chose not to appear before the court, offering no reasonable justification for his absence, and instead relied on the testimony of his son, "TS" (DW-7), who appeared merely as his attorney

In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the unequivocal position in terms of Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, it did not behoove to reason as to how such fatal and inherent defect escaped the attention of both the Courts below

Respondent/defendant's son was in no position to testify on behalf of his father regarding offer and acceptance of gift

The written statement filed by the defendant/respondent did not find mention the presence of DW-7 on the alleged occasion of oral gift, thus, the mandatory ingredients of offer of gift by the donor and acceptance thereof by donee, had gone abegging in this case

Therefore, non-appearance of defendant/respondent was an incurable defect in his quest to prove the gift

Concurrent findings of the courts below fell within the exception of interference for exercising revisional jurisdiction of the court and the same were therefore set aside

The civil revision was allowed and the suit filed by the petitioner (plaintiff) was decreed as prayed for.

Basic ingredients for a valid gift are, offer, acceptance and delivery of possession.

To constitute an offence under S. 489-F, P.P.C. three ingredients have to be there: (a) cheque issued with dishonest intention; (b) towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation and (c) the cheque is dishonoured on presentation.

Essential ingredients for the offence of criminal breach of trust are (a) entrustment; (b) dishonest misappropriation or conversion to his own use by the person in whom the confidence is reposed; (c) dishonest use or disposal of property in violation of any direction of law; and (d) dishonest use or disposal of property in violation of any legal contract.

Acceptance may be implied in certain circumstances, for instance, by simply saying thank you or by some other act signifying acceptance, such as a nod of the head.

To constitute a valid gift, it is settled that three essential ingredients must exist; first, declaration of gift; second, acceptance of the gift, and third, delivery of the possession of the subject of the gift.

Document in question did not describe the land, its area, the total sale consideration and when the balance of the sale consideration was payable and the transaction to be completed

Such a document did not constitute a contract to sell land, therefore, it would be void for uncertainty in terms of S. 29 of the Contract Act, 1872

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and suit filed by respondent was dismissed.

Monetary loss could not be termed to be "irreparable loss".

Any party seeking interim injunction under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. must satisfy the court on having a prima facie case; that irreparable loss will occur to such party if injunction was not granted, and that balance of convenience was in favour of such party

"Irreparable loss" meant such loss which could not be adequately remedied by award of damages and balance of convenience meant balance of mischief or inconvenience to parties

Where claim of loss and recovery was ascertainable, then such loss could not be said to be "irreparable" and a monetary loss could not be considered to be an irreparable loss for purpose of grant or refusal for application for temporary injunction

Loss, therefore, if same was measurable in terms of money, then question of suffering "irreparable loss" did not arise

Burden of proof existed upon applicant seeking temporary injunction to satisfy court regarding existence of essential ingredients

Apprehensions, dishonour, and humiliation were irrelevant considerations for granting or refusing of application under O.XXXIX, C.P.C.

Where there existed a threat of infringement of right vested in a litigant, then temporary injunction could be granted

Temporary injunctions were not be granted solely on basis of prima facie cases and other ingredients must be taken into account including S.56 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 where applicable

Grant of temporary injunction was a discretionary relief to be exercised upon sound reasons and by application principles after assessing all circumstances and was to be issued in aid to equity and justice.

Monetary loss could not be termed to be "irreparable loss".

Onus to establish the factum and ingredients of the gift was on the beneficiary who claimed such gift and which was denied or challenged by the other legal heirs.

Brother (petitioner) attempting to disinherit his sisters (respondents) through an alleged oral gift deed made by their father

Petitioner failed to mention the date, time and place of the alleged gift

Further, he omitted to mention the names of witnesses in whose presence his father allegedly gifted the property in his favour and disinherited his sisters

Likewise, there was no mention of acceptance of the gift in presence of witnesses in the written statement as required by law

Gift mutation as well as the alleged oral gift were fictitious and the result of fraud

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Contention of plaintiff was that defendant had not paid all the consideration amount of suit property and impugned sale mutation was null and void

Suit was decreed concurrently

Validity

Plaintiff had alleged non-payment of sale consideration of suit property and had relied upon an agreement

Defendant had not specifically denied the said agreement in his written statement

Plaintiff had not only exhibited the alleged agreement but had also produced its scribe, marginal witnesses, notary public and stamp vendor

Defendant was required to prove the payment of entire sale consideration but he had failed to produce any witness in that regard

Statement of defendant with regard to payment of consideration amount was self-contradictory

Defendant had not come in the Court with clean hands and was not a truthful witness

Plaintiff was still in possession on the suit property and defendant had failed to prove the payment of sale consideration

Essential ingredients of "sale" were missing and there was no sale in the eye of law

Mutation was not a title deed and it did neither confer any title nor take away any right

Transfer of suit property in favour of defendant and impugned sale mutation as well as registered deed had automatically became null and void

Trial Court had decreed the suit with regard to recovery of outstanding sale consideration and had declared impugned mutation null and void despite the fact that plaintiff was entitled to any one of the two reliefs

Impugned mutation being void one could not sustain legally, in circumstances

Decree to the extent of recovery of outstanding sale consideration was set aside and findings to the extent of declaration of impugned mutation as null and void were maintained

Revision was disposed of accordingly.

Common law (in United Kingdom's jurisdiction) had abandoned the search for a general principle capable of providing a practical test applicable in every situation in order to determine whether a duty of care was owed and, if so, what was its scope

Ingredients of foreseeability of damage, proximity and fairness did not require a re-evaluation of whether those criteria were satisfied on every occasion on which an established category of duty was applied

Where the existence of a duty of care had previously been established, a consideration of justice and reasonableness had already been taken into account in arriving at the relevant principles and it was, normally, only in cases where the court was asked to go beyond the established categories of duty of care that it would be necessary to consider whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty.

Essential elements for sale of immovable property were payment of sale price of the property or promise to pay the same by the buyer to the seller, and delivery of possession of the property

In case, said two essential terms of sale of immovable property could be determined with certainty on the basis of contents of the agreement between the parties, it may constitute a valid agreement of sale between the parties which, subject to discretion of the Court, could be directed to be specifically performed.

Essential ingredients relating to mens rea and actus reus explicitly mentioned in S.6(1)(b) or (c) and S.6(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 respectively must coexist and coincide.

For constituting the offence under S.365-B, P.P.C., two essential ingredients must be fulfilled i.e. firstly, removal of a woman from one place to another place, and secondly, the object behind such removal should be to compel her to marry against her will or that she would be seduced to sexual intercourse against her will.

Three ingredients for determination of offence of terrorism were (i) taking of action specified in S. 6(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ii) action committed with design, intention and mens rea (iii) causing intimidation, awe, fear and insecurity in the public or society.

Possession of un-licensed manufacture, sale or repair of arms and ammunition, unauthorized transportation of arms and ammunition, unlicensed possession of arms and ammunition terrorism

Appreciation of evidence

"Terrorism"

Essential ingredients

Complainant (police) alleged that they received information about transportation of a huge lot of arms and ammunitions by a car which was apprehended and recovery of ammunition was made from its secret cavities

Effect

Mere recovery of huge quantity of ammunition without producing the cogent and concrete evidence showing that accused belonged to a terrorist organization would not saddle accused for commission of an offence attracting "terrorism"

Ingredients for determination of offence of terrorism were first taking of action specified in S. 6(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, second action committed with design, intention and mens rea and third causing intimidation, awe, fear and insecurity in the public or society

All such ingredients were not attracted to the facts and circumstances of present case

Prosecution had based its opinion with regard to use of ammunition for the purpose of terrorist activities merely on assumption and presumption which in the given circumstances could not be acceded to

Appeal was allowed and case was remanded accordingly for decision afresh.

In order to constitute defamation in a suit under Defamation Ordinance, 2002; allegations levelled against a plaintiff should be false, baseless and unfounded; the wording used and allegation levelled against a plaintiff should on the face of it be defamatory and derogatory in nature, and such allegations should have been published in widely circulated newspapers or spoken in large gathering and said publications made or wording used should have been with malice without any reasonable excuse and justification and such allegations should have been directly attributed to plaintiff by specifically mentioning his/her name

In cases of defamation, falsehood was presumed on part of the defendant unless proved that the published/broadcasted materials were true and plaintiff could only be burdened to prove malice in case defendant succeeded in proving that defamatory words were true and privileged otherwise court shall presume that defamatory materials published or broadcast were false and male fide existed on part of the defendant

Article 19 of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of speech but it also imposed certain restrictions and limitations and did not provide licence to any person to make personal attempt on an individual to disgrace his/her dignity and reputation

Print and electronic media were in no way vested with unfettered liberty and impunity to public and telecast any material which was prejudicial to interest of any person or harmed or caused damage to a reputation, honour, prestige of a person

Author or broadcasting agency were not free to telecast anything for promotion of a company or corporation or on instruction of some quarter or according to its desires but their freedom was subject to a moral code of conduct and such reasonable restrictions as may be legitimately imposed under law in public interest and glory of Islam

When an untrue statement or scene was broadcast, and added to an evil act of person, the law of defamation would plunge into the rescue of such a person.

Gift by a Muslim would be complete, if three necessary and inseparable ingredients were proved (offer by donor; acceptance of offer by donee and delivery of possession under the gift)

Delivery of possession was an essential ingredient to constitute a valid gift and gift without possession was void ab initio.

Subject cheque had to be issued by the accused with dishonest intention to defraud towards repayment of loan or fulfillment of an obligation and accused was well in knowledge that requisite amount was not available in account against which said cheque had been issued by him and same would be dishonoured on its presentation before the concerned Bank.

Legislature had put two conditions for invoking S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 firstly, act of dispossession, grab, control, occupy without lawful authority and secondly, intention to dispossess, grab, control, occupy property from the actual owner.

If any authority, Court or Tribunal gave a finding of fact which was not based on material available on record, the same becomes perverse and such finding of fact was violative of the established principles of appreciation of evidence on record which was not sustainable in law

Every judicial or quasi-judicial finding be based on reasons which contained the justification for the finding in the order itself.

Any person claiming a benami transaction had to prove four elements which were; firstly, the source of income, secondly from whose custody the original title deed and other documents came in evidence, thirdly, that who was in possession of the suit property; and fourthly the motive behind the alleged benami transaction

Party who raised plea of benami transaction was duty bound to prove such plea by adducing cogent, legal, relevant and unimpeachable evidence of definitiveness and the court was not required to decide such plea on basis of suspicions, however strong such suspicions may be

Court was to examine as to who had supplied the funds for a property in dispute and if it was proved that purchase money was from some person other than the person in whose favour the sale was made, then such circumstance, prima facie, would be strong evidence of the benami nature of a transaction

Character of a transaction was to be ascertained by determining the intentions of the parties at the relevant time which were to be gathered from all surrounding circumstances, that were; the relationship of the parties, the motive underlying the transaction and any other subsequent conduct

Possession of property and custody of the title deed was also an essential consideration

Transaction could not be termed benami simply for the reason that one person happened to make payment for or on behalf of another

Challenge to a transaction was not bona fide when a husband and wife were amicably living, and the transaction was accepted as valid, but subsequently when the relationship strained, title was claimed exclusively by one party.

Essential ingredients for invoking said exception were that transferor was the ostensible owner (of the property); that such transfer was made by consent of the real owner; that such transfer was for a consideration, and that the transferee while acting in good faith had taken reasonable care before entering into the transaction.

Party seeking interim injunction must show that a prima facie case existed in his favour, the court be satisfied that if injunction is not issued, irreparable damage or injury would be caused to such party and the balance of convenience has to be in favour of the grant of injunction.

Fraudulent and dishonest intention and inducement at the time of performing act are essential ingredients for offence of cheating and criminal breach.

Party making application had to satisfy the court firstly that there was an agreement to refer, secondly that the suit related to any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration and thirdly that there was a "dispute" between the parties which was covered by the agreement; and unless this was shown, the suit could not be stayed

In a dispute that arises on basis of an agreement which contained an arbitration clause, mere fact that the defendant was not prepared to pay the amount for which he was liable under the agreement, did not mean that there was a "dispute" between the parties

When an application is moved under S.34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of proceedings and the defendant fails to state the "dispute" between the parties, but makes only a reference to the arbitration clause, said shortcoming was sufficient to cause dismissal of the application

Essential consideration weighing with the court in refusal was on its satisfaction, there were no sufficient reasons for making reference to arbitration and substantial miscarriage of justice would take place or inconvenience would be caused to party if stay is granted.

Party making application had to satisfy the court firstly that there was an agreement to refer, secondly that the suit related to any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration and thirdly that there was a "dispute" between the parties which was covered by the agreement; and unless this was shown, the suit could not be stayed

In a dispute that arises on basis of an agreement which contained an arbitration clause, mere fact that the defendant was not prepared to pay the amount for which he was liable under the agreement, did not mean that there was a "dispute" between the parties

When an application is moved under S.34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of proceedings and the defendant fails to state the "dispute" between the parties, but makes only a reference to the arbitration clause, said shortcoming was sufficient to cause dismissal of the application

Essential consideration weighing with the court in refusal was on its satisfaction, there were no sufficient reasons for making reference to arbitration and substantial miscarriage of justice would take place or inconvenience would be caused to party if stay is granted.

In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit under S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R., record of the case and surrounding circumstances; it was also necessary to examine whether the ingredients of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss.6, 7 & 8, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Whether a particular act was an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind said act, and whether the said act had created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, or any section of public or community or in any sect was to be seen

Striking of terror was sine qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which could not be determined without examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence.