Double jeopardy

When the punishment has already been awarded on the allegation while considering removal, on the basis of past and closed transaction, to it amounts to violation of Art. 13 of the 'Constitution' and is considered double punishment.

Case of protection was firmly embedded in Art.13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guaranteed that "no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once"

Said constitutional safeguard was reinforced by S.403 Cr.P.C., which barred retrial for the same offence or upon the same facts once a person had been acquitted or convicted

Additionally, S.26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that although a single act might have constituted offence under multiple enactments, the offender may be prosecuted under any one of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

No one can be vexed twice for the same cause.

Applicant was aggrieved of an order passed by Trial Court whereby DPO was directed to register a case against the petitioner/ complainant in respect of offence under S.302 P.P.C

Held, that perusal of the record revealed that the petitioner got registered case FIR. in respect of offences under Ss. 302, 324, 186, 427 & 34 P.P.C, stating therein that deceased had died due to firing made by accused "AA" and after investigation of the case, report under S.173 Cr.P.C. was submitted against said "AA"

Said "AA" was tried by the trial Court, however, he was acquitted of the charges but while passing the judgment, the trial Court issued a direction to the D.P.O. to register a case against the petitioner in respect of offence under S.302 P.P.C with regard to qatl-i-amd of deceased

It was an admitted fact that "AA" also filed a private complaint against the petitioner as well as eleven other co-accused in respect of offences under Ss.302, 364, 149, 148 and 109,. P.P.C with the allegations that the petitioner and his co-accused had committed the qatl-i-amd of deceased after abducting him

Petitioner and co-accused were summoned to face the trial of the said case and after completion of trial, the trial Court acquitted the petitioner and other co-accused of all the charges against them

Case which was lodged by the petitioner himself in respect of the offences under Ss.302, 324, 186, 427 & 34 P.P.C with regard to qatl-i-amd of deceased was also decided on the same day by the trial Court, however, while passing the said judgment it was directed that a case be registered against the petitioner in respect of an offence under S.302, P.P.C. for committing qatl-i-amd of the deceased

It was apparent from the perusal of record, case FIR and the private complaint, that both related to the allegation regarding the abduction and qatl-i-amd of deceased and the petitioner was acquitted after trial of the charge of abduction and qatl-i-amd of deceased, however, by way of the judgment in the case instituted upon the police report, a direction was issued to register a case against the petitioner for the qatl-i-amd of deceased which simply could not have been done under Art.13 of the Constitution, as well as provisions of Section 403 Cr.P.C.

Both Art.13 of the Constitution as well as provisions of S.403 Cr.P.C. provided that a person could not be tried for the allegation of committing an offence more than once for the same offence

Said provisions of law had been based on the legal maxim "nemo debet dis vexari pro una et eadem causa" (it is a rule of law that no person shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause)

In the present case, the impugned direction as issued by the Trial Court militated against both Art.13 of the Constitution and S.403 Cr.P.C.

Petition was allowed by setting aside the impugned order.

Present matter raised an intriguing question of whether the competent authority, which initially disagreed with the recommendation of removal from service proposed by the inquiry officer and imposed a lesser penalty of demotion, could later on, upon remand of the matter by the appellate authority and after holding de-novo inquiry, inflict a major penalty of removal from service

Facts in brevity were that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (the "PEEDA Act, 2006") on charges of non-accomplishment of official assignments

Initially, the inquiry officer recommended removal from service, but the competent authority imposed a lesser penalty of demotion

In appeal, the appellate authority remanded the matter for a de-novo inquiry due to procedural lapses

After fresh inquiry, the competent authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service

Held: It was not a case where the earlier penalty was deemed inadequate, rather, the procedure adopted by the respondent-department was considered improper, requiring rectification

Therefore, the fresh inquiry was meant to validate the procedural fairness and not to reconsider the proportionality of the punishment

By imposing a harsher penalty (removal from service), the competent authority acted in an unfair and unjust manner

Once the competent authority, in its wisdom, imposed a lesser penalty (demotion), the petitioner had a legitimate expectation that the disciplinary matter was conclusively determined to the extent of quantum of punishment

Moreover, as per the principle of proportionality in service law the punishment must have corresponded to the gravity of the misconduct

The competent authority, in the first instance, determined that demotion was an appropriate response to the alleged misconduct

There was no aggravated misconduct in the de-novo inquiry and therefore, imposing a more severe penalty, upon rehearing the same set of allegations, violated the principle of proportionality and created an impression of double jeopardy in the disciplinary proceedings

Competent authority had not given any reason whatsoever from deviating from its earlier decision to impose the lesser punishment

Once a particular penalty of demotion had been imposed by the competent authority, and the petitioner had assailed the said findings before the appellate forum, which remanded the matter for de-novo inquiry, the imposition of harsher punishment by the competent authority, during post remand proceedings, on the basis of same set of allegations and charges ran contrary to the principle of fairness

Matter could be examined from another angle; had the petitioner not preferred an appeal, his punishment would have remained as demotion

It is untenable and unjust to penalize an individual for exercising his legal right to prefer an appeal by subjecting him to a harsher penalty, on the same set of allegations

Impugned orders were set aside and the Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Setting aside of penalty order by the Federal Service Tribunal with the observation to reconsider the matter within a period of 02 months

Disappearance of alleged offence

Initiation of de novo proceedings against the petitioner upon the direction of the Prime Minister with a delay of 07 years

Validity

Prime Minister's reference to R. 6-A of Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973, (Rules-1973) in the order was misconceived as his power only flowed to the extent of revision under R. 11(3) of the Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 2020, (Rules, 2020), which specifically barred the Prime Minister to call for a disposed of case if that case had been disposed of for more than one year

In the case the delay was 7 years and as such the Prime Minister's order to reopen the case against the petitioner on a de novo basis was misconceived based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case and particularly under the proviso to R. 11 (3) of Rules-2020

Exercise of such power might be contrary to Art. 13 (a) of the Constitution as it would lead to a person, who had served out his punishment again being subjected to a further and potentially greater punishment based on the same allegations/offences which he had already been exonerated from, which might prima facie amount to a case of double jeopardy

Prime Minister should have been more cautious in exercising his power of review under R. 11(3) of Rules, 2020 even if he was acting within the stipulated time limit of one year by seeking proper assistance from the concerned department keeping in view the particular facts and circumstances of each case

Department failed to act upon the order and did not lodge any appeal against the same which had attained finality

Order was passed 3 years after the notification awarding the minor penalty on the petitioner which punishment had already been served/carried out by the petitioner albeit he was later exonerated

Petitioner was promoted by the department after serving out his punishment from which he was later exonerated and the Company which allegedly had been illegally benefitted by the petitioner's alleged inefficiency, misconduct and corruption had been exonerated of any wrong doing

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Protection given under Article 13(a) of the Constitution is against prosecution and punishment, which means the trial and its proceedings followed by a conviction

If the first prosecution results in an acquittal, so far as Article 13(a) of the Constitution is concerned, the second prosecution is not prohibited

Concept of double jeopardy essentially means that a person cannot be tried multiple times for the same offence on which there is a conviction based on the same set of facts as they should not be put in peril twice

It is based on the rule of conclusiveness and finality which requires that once a court has taken cognizance of an offence, tried a person and convicted them, then for the same offence that person cannot be tried again

So, the basic question is that in the case of double jeopardy, the second trial should be on the same set of facts of the first trial which resulted in a conviction for the same offence, which would require the same evidence before the court

Basically, this means that the case has to be the same as the one that has already resulted in a conviction but if the proceedings are different in substance and law then it will not be a case of double jeopardy.

Petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the concerned authorities wherein he made certain allegations against the respondent (lady)

On the basis of the said Letter, an inquiry was initiated against the respondent, who was exonerated from the complaint

In the meantime, respondent filed a suit for recovery of damages against the petitioner under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (2002 Ordinance) on the grounds that the petitioner defamed and damaged her reputation on the basis of the letter

Said suit was decreed in favour of respondent

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), which was inquired into and the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct as he had levelled false and fabricated allegations against respondent in the letter, and, major penalty of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years was imposed upon him

During this time, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ("2010 Act") on the grounds of sexual harassment before the Ombudsperson alleging therein that the petitioner came to her office unnecessarily on one pretext or the other

Petitioner was found guilty of harassment and major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was imposed upon him

Contention of the petitioner was that the orders under PEEDA, the 2010 Act and the 2002 Ordinance were hit by the principle of double jeopardy

Validity

There were three different decisions under three separate laws against the petitioner

Each of these laws are special laws which operate within their given jurisdiction and can result in penal consequences if the requirements of the law are fulfilled

Hence, a conviction under any of these laws will not prevent or bar a conviction under the other two laws which operate within their own domain for a specific purpose

Respondent initiated a claim of sexual harassment at the workplace against the petitioner based on instances and evidence of harassment, which was considered by the Ombudsperson, who concluded that he caused harassment to respondent

In the suit for defamation, the court determined that the contents of the petitioner's letter fell within the definition of defamation

So the court awarded her damages

Finally, so far as action under PEEDA was concerned, the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the basis of the letter, which he had specifically written in his official capacity and the said inquiry discovered that the same was false and incorrect, hence, punishment for his misconduct was awarded in the form of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years

Even though the parties were the same, the cause of action was separate in each case before different forums with distinct penal consequences emanating out of its respective statutory laws

Argument of double jeopardy was misplaced and without any basis

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Protection given under Article 13(a) of the Constitution is against prosecution and punishment, which means the trial and its proceedings followed by a conviction

If the first prosecution results in an acquittal, so far as Article 13(a) of the Constitution is concerned, the second prosecution is not prohibited

Concept of double jeopardy essentially means that a person cannot be tried multiple times for the same offence on which there is a conviction based on the same set of facts as they should not be put in peril twice

It is based on the rule of conclusiveness and finality which requires that once a court has taken cognizance of an offence, tried a person and convicted them, then for the same offence that person cannot be tried again

So, the basic question is that in the case of double jeopardy, the second trial should be on the same set of facts of the first trial which resulted in a conviction for the same offence, which would require the same evidence before the court

Basically, this means that the case has to be the same as the one that has already resulted in a conviction but if the proceedings are different in substance and law then it will not be a case of double jeopardy.

Petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the concerned authorities wherein he made certain allegations against the respondent (lady)

On the basis of the said Letter, an inquiry was initiated against the respondent, who was exonerated from the complaint

In the meantime, respondent filed a suit for recovery of damages against the petitioner under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (2002 Ordinance) on the grounds that the petitioner defamed and damaged her reputation on the basis of the letter

Said suit was decreed in favour of respondent

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), which was inquired into and the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct as he had levelled false and fabricated allegations against respondent in the letter, and, major penalty of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years was imposed upon him

During this time, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ("2010 Act") on the grounds of sexual harassment before the Ombudsperson alleging therein that the petitioner came to her office unnecessarily on one pretext or the other

Petitioner was found guilty of harassment and major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was imposed upon him

Contention of the petitioner was that the orders under PEEDA, the 2010 Act and the 2002 Ordinance were hit by the principle of double jeopardy

Validity

There were three different decisions under three separate laws against the petitioner

Each of these laws are special laws which operate within their given jurisdiction and can result in penal consequences if the requirements of the law are fulfilled

Hence, a conviction under any of these laws will not prevent or bar a conviction under the other two laws which operate within their own domain for a specific purpose

Respondent initiated a claim of sexual harassment at the workplace against the petitioner based on instances and evidence of harassment, which was considered by the Ombudsperson, who concluded that he caused harassment to respondent

In the suit for defamation, the court determined that the contents of the petitioner's letter fell within the definition of defamation

So the court awarded her damages

Finally, so far as action under PEEDA was concerned, the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the basis of the letter, which he had specifically written in his official capacity and the said inquiry discovered that the same was false and incorrect, hence, punishment for his misconduct was awarded in the form of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years

Even though the parties were the same, the cause of action was separate in each case before different forums with distinct penal consequences emanating out of its respective statutory laws

Argument of double jeopardy was misplaced and without any basis

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Membership in housing scheme, allotment of plots and further amenity services meant for the army personnel cancelled after dismissal from service

Legality

Double jeopardy

Whether withdrawal of all such facilities fell within the ambit of 'double jeopardy'

Dismissal from service squarely takes away all the perks, privileges and amenity services from an army personnel conferred in lieu of his induction into the Pakistan Army

All these benefits are subject to service and any action contrary to service structure takes away not only perks and privileges rather the privilege of salary, pension, gratuity etc for which he was otherwise entitled

After dismissal from service, the present appellant/petitioner cannot claim any benefit as their termination was in pursuance of the defiance of the discipline and order of the institution discretely

Case of the appellant/petitioner does not fall within the ambit of Article 13 of the Constitution or section 403, Cr.P.C, hence the claim of the appellant/ petitioner that they are victims of double jeopardy is without any legal foundation

Appeal and Constitutional petition were dismissed.

Petitioners were facing trial who sought quashing of proceedings against them at the stage when cross examination on investigating officer as last prosecution witness was under process

Plea raised by petitioners was that penalty in the matter had already been imposed against proceedings initiated under show cause notice therefore, trial was a double jeopardy

Validity

Case of prosecution was almost over and at such stage expressing opinion into merits of the case especially based on evidence that too under discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction was not only to prejudice case of parties but was likely to deprive both of them an appellate forum which otherwise in the wake of final decision by Trial Court was available to aggrieved party

Petitioners were not the only accused in reference but were arraigned therein along with other accused persons

Nature of allegations and overlapping role of each accused in causing effect leading to alleged loss to national exchequer was such that separating attribution to one accused from the other was not possible without undermining the whole prosecution case

Such approach would amount to resolving controversy in piecemeal which had never been the scheme of law

Commission of any offence by petitioners could only be settled after deep and at minuscule level examination of evidence

Such exercise was not permissible under Constitutional jurisdiction and was tantamount to stretching things beyond prescribed limits

Penalty imposed under show cause notice was not outcome of any proceedings held in trial and in respect of same offence by competent Court of law to attract principle of double jeopardy enshrined under Art. 13 of the Constitution and S. 403, Cr.P.C.

Proceedings in terms of show cause notice were not equal to the ones held in trial which were basically meant to find out guilt or otherwise of an accused in alleged offence on the basis of evidence

Show cause notice followed quite distinct procedure than the one held in regular trial where mandatorily evidence of parties was to be recorded and appreciated, whereas in the former no such exercise was restored to

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Cheating by personation, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery for valuable security, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document

Petition for quashing of FIR

Double jeopardy

Scope

Petitioner sought quashing of FIR lodged against him on the grounds that the complainant registered FIR against the petitioner with the allegation that the petitioner had managed to manipulate a forged mutation in respect of disputed property about which both the parties claimed ownership

Investigation was carried out and challan was filed

Petitioner was acquitted of the charge after trial

Complainant for the same alleged act had succeeded to register another FIR, therefore, petitioner filed petition for quashment of the said FIR

Validity

Record showed that the petitioner had filed a declaratory suit against the father of complainant, which was finally decided and decree was assailed but appeal was dismissed

Petitioner was prosecuted for producing the abstract of false mutation entries and during the trial he produced photocopy of the purported agreement in his defence

Said forged Mutation entry was based on agreement, therefore, dragging the petitioner in the impugned FIR was not only a unique example of exploitation, but also amounted to mockery of law

Present was a fit case falling within the definition of "double jeopardy", which was against the principles of law and the stipulation contained in Art.13 of the Constitution

Complainant had lodged the subsequent FIR but no proceedings in respect of already adjudicated allegation could be re-prosecuted in the second FIR

Petition for quashing of FIR was accepted, in circumstances.

Petitioner assailed order of Deputy Commissioner whereby his father was detained under S. 3 of Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960

Allegations against detenu were general in nature and no solid or cogent evidence was produced before the Deputy Commissioner

No material was available against the detenu except the report of City Police Officer to establish that he was about to act in a manner which was prejudicial to the public safety or maintenance of public order

Petitioner's father could not be detained merely on the basis of registration of FIRs, which were not of serious nature and the impugned order itself revealed that the detenu had been bailed out in those cases

Impugned order had been passed without application of independent mind and was also hit by Art. 13(a), of the Constitution

Constitutional petition was accepted and the detention order was set aside.

Taxpayer was a registered person who was audited by tax authorities and was imposed surcharge and penalty on account of discrepancies against which taxpayer filed appeal before Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) who remanded matter to the assessing authority

Taxpayer filed second appeal on grounds that Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) could not remand matter and that entire assessment proceedings were presumptive because he was already audited before

Validity

Audit for alleged tax periods had already been carried out by department, subsequent audit carried out by department under S.72-B of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and consequential assessment order passed was not sustainable being sheer violation of Federal Board of Revenue on instructions contained in Exclusion of Audit Policy, 2015

Sales made to end-consumers were excluded and exempted for purpose of levy of further tax in terms of Notification SRO No. 648(I)/2013 dated 09-07-2013 issued under first Proviso to S.3(1A) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 therefore, no further tax was payable by taxpayer against supplies made to end-consumers

Detecting agency had raised exorbitant demand of sales tax merely on assumptions and presumptions without tangible basis and failed to provide documentary or any other corroborating evidence regarding physical delivery of goods, receipt of any consideration of money and more so, existence of any buyer without no supply could be effected under S.3 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declared that case was totally based on hypothetical calculations without any solid proof which established beyond shadow of doubt that liability of sales tax was based on figures and calculations, which were imaginary and presumptive, without any logical and legal basis and no tax could be levied on basis of presumption and assumption

Sales tax imposed on presumption or presumption not warranted in law was to be struck down

Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue cancelled show-cause notice and consequent orders by two authorities below as same were illegal, void ab initio and without jurisdiction

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Person cannot be vexed twice for the same matter.

Assessing Authority, on physical stock taking of registered person under S.38 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, observed considerable difference between declared closing stocks and physical closing stocks of finished goods

Assessing Authority held that difference of stocks was sold out by the registered person without payment of sales tax

Validity

Commissioner Inland Revenue passed impugned order on the basis of stock taking carried out on 11-12-2017 under S. 38 and passed the impugned order pertaining to the tax periods starting from April 2015 to October 2017, whereas the department in earlier proceedings initiated under S. 38 had passed an order on 6-3-2017 wherein sales tax amount of Rs. 5,530,183 was adjudged as payable by the appellant

Issuance of second show-cause notice regarding the same tax periods was imposition of double taxation and double jeopardy which could not be given legal credence

Second show-cause notice offended the Fundamental Right set out in Art. 13 of the Constitution which provided that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once

Doctrine of double jeopardy corresponded to the principle of "autre fois acquit and autre fois convict" which prohibited a duplicate trial and a duplicate punishment for the same offence

Re-agitating of the same issue by the tax functionaries was against the principles of administration of justice and fair play

Appellate Tribunal observed that in the presence of earlier order, another order of the adjudicating authority could not hold the field for the simple reason that two contrary orders could not exist at one and the same time

Appellate Tribunal declared the subsequent proceedings initiated with issuance of second show-cause notice and adjudication thereon to be patently illegal, null and void ab initio having no legal effect.

Appellant imported compost (non-commercial furtilizer) and claimed exemption from payment of sales tax under Entry No. 99 of Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990

Goods of appellant were released after acceptance of declaration in all aspects

Deputy Collector of Customs after lapse of about a year conducted audit on his own and thereafter framed contravention report with the allegation that the appellant had availed benefit of sales tax exemption which was not available on imported goods

Additional Collector of Customs accordingly issued show cause notice and vide order-in-original upheld the charges

Validity

Initial assessment order had attained finality by virtue of expiry of stipulated period expressed in subsection (2) of S. 81, Customs Act, 1969 and as such held field and no subsequent order could be piled upon assessment order as the same was not permitted besides being tantamount to double jeopardy barred under Art. 13 of the Constitution

Appellate Tribunal set aside the order-in-original passed by Additional Collector of Customs and allowed the appeal.

After passing of assessment order by competent authority, it could not be disturbed by any authority by preparing contravention report and overlapping the existing assessment order for initiation of adjudication proceedings

Only course available before Customs authorities was to challenge the assessment order before Collector of Customs (Appeals)

Customs authorities were entitled to incorporate all apprehensions, misreading of facts and contraventions of provisions in appeal

Collector of Customs (Appeals), if considered that duty and taxes had been either not levied or short paid on the basis of goods found subsequent to clearance, was empowered to issue show-cause notice

Deputy Collector of Customs Intelligence Units reopened the assessment and clearance order under S. 195, Customs Act, 1969 which power was not vested in him or Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication)

Where the right of appeal had been accorded by the legislature, S.195 became un-operational and could not be exercised even by the authority defined therein

Transaction in question stood past and closed by virtue of non-filing of appeal against assessment order

Action of issuance of show-cause notice and passing of order-in-original fell under the ambit of "double jeopardy" as envisaged in Art. 13 of the Constitution

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Assistant Director, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit, after delivery of consignment, issued audit observations and framed contravention report

Deputy Collector (Adjudication) issued show-cause notice alleging mis-declaration of PCT heading and thereafter ordered for recovery of evaded amount of duty and taxes

Appeal filed before Collector of Customs (Appeals) was dismissed

Validity

Assessment order passed under S. 80, Customs Act, 1969 and R. 438, Customs Rules, 2001 and thereafter passing of clearance order under S. 83, Customs Act, 1969 and R. 442, Customs Rules, 2001 by the authority could not be disturbed by any authority for the purpose of preparing contravention report and adjudication proceedings

Only course left for Assistant Director, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit, was to challenge the clearance order before Collector of Customs (Appeals) under S. 193, Customs Act, 1969 in exercise of powers delegated upon him through SRO No.500(I)/2009, dated: 12-06-2009

Assistant Director, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit, could incorporate all the apprehensions, misreading of facts and contravention of the provisions of Customs Act, 1969 or Customs Rules, 2001 in the appeal

Collector of Customs (Appeals) could issue show-cause notice, where the duty and taxes had either not been levied or short paid, under S. 193A, Customs Act, 1969

Assistant Director, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit, instead of adhering to the prescribed method available in Customs Act, 1969 reopened the assessment/clearance order under S. 195, Customs Act, 1969 under which no power was vested with him or Deputy Collector

Where the right of appeal had been accorded by the legislature in the provision of S. 193, Customs Act, 1969, the provision of S. 195, Customs Act, 1969 was un-operational and could not be exercised even by the authority defined therein

Transaction stood passed and closed and attained finality and could not be disturbed by virtue of non filing of appeal

Issuance of show-cause notice and order-in-original fell under the ambit of "double jeopardy" not permitted under Art. 13 of the Constitution

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Assessment order passed by competent authority, cannot be disturbed by any authority by preparing contravention report and overlapping the existing assessment order for initiation of adjudication proceedings

Only course available before Customs authorities is to challenge the assessment order before Collector of Customs (Appeals)

Customs authorities are entitled to incorporate all apprehensions, misreading of facts and contravention of provisions in appeal

Collector of Customs (Appeals), if considers that duty and taxes have been either not levied or short paid on the basis of goods found subsequent to clearance, is empowered to issue showcause notice

In the presence of an appealable order, fresh order cannot be passed even in the shape of reassessment order or through issuance of show-cause notice

Passing of assessment order in such a way falls within the ambit of "double jeopardy" not permitted under Art. 13 of the Constitution.

Person though involved in criminal case if acquitted was to be considered as a person against whom no case was ever registered

Any condition creating impediment on the job in the department on the basis of acquittal in criminal case would not and should not be read as disqualification

Impugned order passed by the department was set aside and Authority was directed to decide the representation of candidate in accordance with law which should be deemed to be pending before him

Constitutional petition was disposed accordingly.

Accused was tried and acquitted under Ss. 302/324/109/34, P.P.C. but not under S. 15 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013

Held, that accused might not be punished for same offence twice

In the presence case, accused was tried and acquitted under Ss. 302/324/109/34, P.P.C. and sending his trial before Judicial Magistrate under S. 15, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 was in accordance with law

Offences for which accused was acquitted, were independent, and proceedings under S. 15 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 had no nexus with offences under the Penal Code, 1860

Petition under S. 561-A was dismissed accordingly.

Subsequent prosecution and punishment in presence of former prosecution and consequential acquittal or conviction must exist to avail the protection of Art.13 of the Constitution

Court while applying the principle of double jeopardy and extending protection under Art.13 of the Constitution, had to see, whether accused was being prosecuted twice for the same offence, or otherwise

No body could be prosecuted and punished for an offence, when he had already been prosecuted and acquitted or punished for the same offence by the competent court of law

Constitutional guarantee, and legal protection existed against double jeopardy

Accused proposed to be tried second time for the same offence for which he had already been tried and acquitted or convicted, could legitimately plead autre fois acquit or autre fois convict

If case of accused, did not come within the ambit of barring clause and fell within the exception embodied in clauses (2)(3), (4) of S.403, Cr.P.C., he could legitimately be tried for the same offence.

Petitioner/taxpayer sought direction to set aside second show-cause notice issued to petitioner in respect of matter in which appeal of Department was pending before Appellate Tribunal

Validity

Appeal of the Department was pending in the same matter with respect to which second show cause notice was issued, therefore, no occasion existed to issue a fresh show cause notice to petitioner

High Court set aside impugned show-cause notice and directed Department to pursue appeal before Appellate Tribunal

Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Rule known as 'double jeopardy' is also embedded in the doctrine of finality of proceedings.

Consignments had undergone procedure of assessment/clearance under provisions of Ss.80 & 83 of Customs Act, 1969 and Rr.438 & 442 of Customs Rules, 2001 by authority defined in S.2(a) of Customs Act, 1969 in exercise of powers conferred upon by Federal Board of Revenue through SRO No.371(I)/2001 dated 15-6-2001

Such orders were appealable and could be assailed either by importer or department under S.193 of Customs Act, 1969 within 30 days of said orders

No appeal was in fact filed and resultantly, said orders attained finality through limitation and could not be disturbed by any authority, however, department, in the present case, opted to issue show-cause notice under S.180 of Customs Act, 1969

Validity

Department was not empowered to issue said show-cause notice because such an act tantamounted to piling upon yet another order on existing assessment orders passed by competent authority under S.80 of Customs Act, 1969

Once an order was passed, which had attained finality, the same could not be subject to another show-cause notice, considering that no appeal or revision was filed against the first order

By virtue of non-filing appeals by department against assessment orders within stipulated period, the said transaction stood past and closed and had attained finality and could not be disturbed through subsequent order-in-original because it was not permitted under the law and also such exercise was also an act of double jeopardy barred under Art.13 of the Constitution

Impugned show-cause notice was set aside

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Person could not be tried on the same offence by two forums, and he could be tried only where clear cut provisions of law were available

According to S.148 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 power of recovery in case of default vested with Income Tax Department and Commissioner of Income Tax as prescribed officer could go for recovery

Power to collect advance Income Tax under S.148(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not have the effect of converting Income Tax into Customs duty

Merely by providing the manner of collection advance tax under any tax enactment the nature of said tax could not be changed, hence, short recovery of any tax collectable under Ss.148(5) & 148(6) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to a person in form of short collected, short levied or not so collected, either on account of mis-declaration of importer or on account of error, inadvertence or under mistake vested with Commissioner of Income Tax under S.162(I) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Collector of Customs did not have the authority to go for recovery of said tax and it was the Commissioner of Income Tax who could start proceedings of recovery against the person in case of default on short collected, short levied or not so collected, either on account of mis-declaration of importer or on account of error, inadvertance or under mistake, hence, adjudication by Customs Officials to the point of recovery of Income Tax against the import was illegal, unjustifiable and not tenable in the eye of law.

Convict awarded death sentence undergoing a period of custody equal to more than a full term imprisonment for life during pendency of his legal remedy against his death sentence

Question was as to whether maintaining of death sentence by the Supreme Court would amount to double punishment

Held, when the conviction or acquittal of a person was under challenge in appeal or revision, the proceedings were neither fresh prosecution nor there was any question of second conviction or double jeopardy.

Petitioner was accused before National Accountability Bureau who entered into voluntary return and deposited Rs.2.1846 million

Subsequent to issuance of "No Objection Certificate" by NAB as well as Quetta Development Authority and after execution of registered sale deed with petitioner, National Accountability Bureau issued freezing order with regard to same property

Plea raised by authorities was that remedy with petitioner was filing of appeal and not Constitutional petition

Validity

Such freezing order against same property amounted to double jeopardy which was prohibited under Art. 13 of the Constitution

Remedy of filing appeal within ten days was provided under S. 13(c) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, to an aggrieved person whose claim or objection against freezing of property had been dismissed by Accountability Court

No appeal was provided under S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, against an order passed under S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

No objections were filed by petitioner against freezing of his property and order was passed by Accountability Court under S.12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, against which no appeal was provided under S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Petitioner was an aggrieved person having no remedy of appeal provided against order in question, therefore, he rightly invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution

Powers of superior Courts under Art. 199 of the Constitution remained available to petitioner to their full extent notwithstanding anything contained in any legislative instrument

High Court set aside freezing order passed by National Accountability Bureau and approval by Accountability Court, as the same were null, void and of no legal effect

High Court de-freezed the property owned by petitioner

Petition was allowed in circum-stances.

Versions contained in both the FIRs with regard to initiation of occurrence, motive of occurrence, participation of accused in the occurrence, roles played by the accused during the alleged occurrence were different

Version contained in the present FIR was not an elaboration, explanation or amplification of first FIR and there was no legal bar for registration of second FIR

Grounds for quashing FIR were jurisdictional defect patent on the record; patent violation of some provision of law and that allegations contained in the FIR did not constitute an offence

No ground for quashing of impugned FIR was on record

Accused could not be allowed to avoid ordinary course of trial before competent court of jurisdiction if prima facie offence was made out against him by resorting to constitutional jurisdiction

Quashing of FIR during investigation would amount to throttling the investigation process which was not permissible in law

Quashing the proceedings summarily would amount to interfere in sphere allotted to the executive organ; there might be likelihood of injustice in summary disposal and if case was quashed at initial stage then same would create law and order situation

If conduct and manner of investigation was scrutinized through constitutional jurisdiction then same might amount to interfere in police investigation

High Court could not interfere with the duties of the police by quashing FIR on the ground that such was with regard to same occurrence and case was false

Investigation Officer had to collect the evidence connected with the case and if he found that no offence was committed then he might submit report to the Illaqa Magistrate under S.173, Cr.P.C and if he found otherwise then he had to submit report accordingly

If police was restrained from investigating the matter then same would tantamount to act against the spirit of law

Investigating agency had not only to investigate the matter in a manner to connect the accused with the commission of offence but also to save the innocent persons from the agony of endless investigation and trial

High Court was bound to protect life, liberty, dignity and honour of every citizen

When the statute law was not sufficient to meet a situation then High Court must take extraordinary measures and provide protection to the citizen

Constitutional jurisdiction should be exercised as an aid or safeguard for citizen

Inherent jurisdiction of High Court under S.561-A. Cr.P.C. was neither alternative nor additional and same was to be invoked in the interest of justice when there was no other procedure

Inherent jurisdiction should not be used to circumvent the ordinary course of criminal procedure

Accused had no case to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

No material or substance was available for quashment of impugned FIR

Present case was not a case of double jeopardy nor a case of double incrimination

No infirmity was found in the registration of FIR

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Perpetual succession of trials and prosecution would have resulted in a constant jeopardy, if not to a person proceeded against, at least to the court, made to undertake the ritual

Court could not be made to hear and rehear the successive complaint of the same complainant about the same episode till the complainant lived or accused died

Exception

Accused though was not before the court at the time of recording the preliminary statements of the complainant and of the witnesses under Ss.200 & 202, Cr.P.C., and he was not being tried, yet that process, if allowed to be repeated infinitely, would result in consumption of the court's time by the same person, a time that was to be equitable amongst all craving for the resolution of their disputes

Although a second complaint, or the successive complaints about the same episode at the instance of the same person, or at the instance of another person competent to file a complaint, unless the earlier one had ended in acquittal or conviction, were not barred by law, yet that endless succession had to be bridled with reasonableness; and there had to be exceptional circumstances for filing and entertaining the successive complaints; for instance where the previous order was passed on the incomplete record, or on a misunderstanding about the nature of the complaint, or the order passed in the previous complaint refusing to summon accused was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish, or where some facts which could not, even with reasonable diligence be brought before the court were being put forth in the second complaint.

Theft in dwelling house, theft by clerk or servant, criminal breach of trust, criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant, public servant

Double jeopardy

Appreciation of evidence

Case against accused was bifurcated in three parts, on direction of Trial Court, and challan was submitted in three counts respectively

Case under Ss.380 & 381, P.P.C. was challaned and submitted in the court of Judicial Magistrate at place 'S', while offence under Ss.406, 408 & 409, P.P.C. in court of Special Judge Anti-Corruption at place 'L' and for offence under Ss.9(c), 14 & 15 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 in the court of Special Judge (Control of Narcotic Substances) at place 'S'

Accused, had been finally acquitted in first two challan cases regarding theft and misappropriation of charas lying in the Record Room of a court

Section 9(c) of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, which was punitive clause, would come into play only when contravention of Ss.6, 7 & 8 of the Act, was made by accused

Person who was found in possession of narcotic, or was indulged in import and export of narcotic, or was found involved in trafficking of narcotic, could be convicted and sentenced under S.9(c) of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997

Present case of the prosecution was not that accused was found importing or exporting the contraband narcotics in any manner

Contraband charas, was allegedly kept in "Malkhana" of which accused being Police Official was incharge of charas in question, which was allegedly misappropriated for monetary gains

Accused had been acquitted of the charges of misappropriation and theft by both the Trial Courts respectively

Prosecution having failed to prove the primary charges of the theft and misappropriation case of prosecution could not succeed on the same set of evidence in view of Art. 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, merely for the reason of the act of possessing and trafficking the contraband charas

Accused having already been acquitted by two different courts of the charges of theft and misappropriation in the same crime, therefore, rule that no one would be vexed twice for the same offence, was fully applicable in the present scenario of the case

Conviction and sentence awarded to accused by the Trial Court, were set aside, and accused was acquitted of the charge and his bail bond stood cancelled and surety was discharged, in circumstances.

Subsequent trial of accused was not prohibited under the law on same facts, and same set of witnesses, where he was being tried for different offence

Provision of S.403, Cr.P.C., nowhere prohibited subsequent trial of accused on same facts, and even on same set of evidence, but prohibition would come into play only where one was being vexed twice for same offence for which one had already been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Procedure of inquiry against government servants working on deputation outside their department or service to which they belong

Reinstatement in service due to procedural flaws in conducting inquiry

Whether such reinstatement amounted to exoneration

Double jeopardy

Scope

Appellant joined government service in Commerce and Trade Group (parent department/lending authority), however he was transferred to Central Board of Revenue ("borrowing authority"), by whom he was posted as Assistant Commissioner, income tax

Appellant while serving as Assistant Commissioner was accused of extorting illegal gratification from tax payers

Inquiry was conducted by the borrowing authority and appellant was found guilty of misconduct and corruption

Borrowing authority dismissed appellant from service under S. 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 but later on he was reinstated in service for the reason that he had been removed without following certain conditions laid down under S. 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973

Appellant was retransferred/sent back to his parent department i.e. lending authority

Subsequently parent department of appellant issued him a show cause notice based on the previous allegations of extorting illegal gratification, and removed him from service

Contention of appellant that he had been subjected to double jeopardy as borrowing authority removed him from service on allegations of extorting illegal gratification, and then his dismissal order was set aside and he was reinstated in service, but on the basis of same allegations a show cause notice was issued by the parent department and he was once again dismissed from service; that parent department had been directed by Establishment Division to conduct its own fresh inquiry, but same was not done and instead he was dismissed from service on basis of earlier inquiry conducted by the borrowing authority

Validity

Section 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (as it stood before its amendment in the year 2001) provided that borrowing authority could take action against an officer of the lending authority by initiating proceedings against him under the Rules subject to certain conditions

Borrowing authority, in the present case, took action against the appellant without fulfilling the said conditions and therefore, appellant was reinstated into service

Appellant was reinstated into service not because he had been exonerated from the allegations but because there were certain procedural flaws in the procedure adopted for his dismissal, therefore contention regarding double jeopardy was without weight

After reinstatement by borrowing authority appellant was sent back to his parent department/lending authority and entire material on basis of which appellant was removed was sent to the parent department

Upon appellant's retransfer to his parent department, Establishment Division had issued a direction to the parent department to conduct fresh disciplinary proceedings against appellant from the stage the borrowing authority was required to transmit to the lending authority the records of proceedings, which included the inquiry already conducted, therefore contention that entire disciplinary proceedings including inquiry had to be conducted afresh was without force

Proceedings against appellant had been conducted in accordance with S. 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and principles of natural justice had been followed and the appellant had been provided opportunities to reply to the show cause notices and statements of allegations at both stages and also given a chance of personal hearing

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Procedure of inquiry against government servants working on deputation outside their department or service to which they belong

Reinstatement in service due to procedural flaws in conducting inquiry

Whether such reinstatement amounted to exoneration

Double jeopardy

Scope

Appellant joined government service in Commerce and Trade Group (parent department/lending authority), however he was transferred to Central Board of Revenue ("borrowing authority"), by whom he was posted as Assistant Commissioner, income tax

Appellant while serving as Assistant Commissioner was accused of extorting illegal gratification from tax payers

Inquiry was conducted by the borrowing authority and appellant was found guilty of misconduct and corruption

Borrowing authority dismissed appellant from service under S.9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 but later on he was reinstated in service for the reason that he had been removed without following certain conditions laid down under S. 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973

Appellant was retransferred/sent back to his parent department i.e. lending authority

Subsequently parent department of appellant issued him a show-cause notice based on the previous allegations of extorting illegal gratification, and removed him from service

Contention of appellant that he had been subjected to double jeopardy as borrowing authority removed him from service on allegations of extorting illegal gratification, and then his dismissal order was set aside and he was reinstated in service, but on the basis of same allegations a show-cause notice was issued by the parent department and he was once again dismissed from service; that parent department had been directed by Establishment Division to conduct its own fresh inquiry, but same was not done and instead he was dismissed from service on basis of earlier inquiry conducted by the borrowing authority

Validity

Section 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (as it stood before its amendment in the year 2001) provided that borrowing authority could take action against an officer of the lending authority by initiating proceedings against him under the Rules subject to certain conditions

Borrowing authority, in the present case, took action against the appellant without fulfilling the said conditions and therefore, appellant was reinstated into service

Appellant was reinstated into service not because he had been exonerated from the allegations but because there were certain procedural flaws in the procedure adopted for his dismissal, therefore contention regarding double jeopardy was without weight

After reinstatement by borrowing authority appellant was sent back to his parent department/lending authority and entire material on basis of which appellant was removed was sent to the parent department

Upon appellant's retransfer to his parent department, Establishment Division had issued a direction to the parent department to conduct fresh disciplinary proceedings against appellant from the stage the borrowing authority was required to transmit to the lending authority the records of proceedings, which included the inquiry already conducted, therefore contention that entire disciplinary proceedings including inquiry had to be conducted afresh was without force

Proceedings against appellant had been conducted in accordance with S. 9 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and principles of natural justice had been followed and the appellant had been provided opportunities to reply to the show-cause notices and statements of allegations at both stages and also given a chance of personal hearing

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Contention of defendant was that both the pro-notes were taken as security by the arbitrators from the parties and no cash transaction took place between them

Both plaintiff and defendant filed suits for recovery of money on the basis of pro-notes which were dismissed, however, Trial Court imposed special cost and directed for initiation of proceedings under S.476, Cr.P.C. against the plaintiff

Validity

Both the parties executed pro-notes to each other as a security for arbitration purposes

No cash payment was proved by producing oral or documentary evidence by either party

Pro-notes were not proved as required under the law

Though presumption was attached to negotiable instruments and rebuttal had to be produced but initial burden would lie upon the plaintiff which was lacking in both the present cases

Findings of Trial Court to such effect were not open to exception which were maintained

Ordering proceedings against the person under S.476, Cr.P.C. was discretion of the court who had made wrong claim in the contents of plaint

Circumstances of the case were to be seen

Court had to take extra care and caution to initiate said proceedings

Conduct of both the parties was not up to the mark and they had taken different stances at different occasions

Such conduct of parties would not mean to impose huge special costs and to initiate proceedings under S.476, Cr.P.C. against one of the party

No plausible reasons were given to initiate proceedings against the plaintiff

Importance was to be given to the fact as to whether probability of conviction could be expected and there were reasonable grounds for conviction

No action could be initiated under the law in case of refusal of the plaintiff

Cogent and strong evidence/proof was required to initiate proceedings which was lacking in the present case

Trial Court had ordered the initiation of proceedings on presumptions and conjectures

Imposition of special cost on plaintiff had no support from the available record and same could not be imposed without any rhyme or reason and same amounted to double jeopardy

Plaintiff had been burdened with special cost as well as initiation of proceedings under S.476, Cr.P.C. on account of same allegations

Appeal of plaintiff was partially accepted and findings of Trial Court to the extent of imposition of special cost and initiation of proceedings under S.476, Cr.P.C. were modified.

Complainant, initially got registered F.I.R. against respondents/accused persons for causing injuries to him and his brother

Complainant being dissatisfied with the investigation of the Investigating Officer filed private complaint against accused persons in the court of Magistrate

Challan had been submitted in the F.I.R. case

State case and the private complaint, both were consolidated by the Trial Court and charge was framed

After framing of the charge, evidence was recorded, whereafter complainant made a statement for withdrawal of private complaint

Trial Court, granted permission to withdraw case and acquitted accused persons

No person would be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts after acquittal while such acquittal remained in force; as S.403, Cr.P.C. contemplated a situation where a person had once tried by a court of competent jurisdiction and acquitted he could not be tried again for the same offence, nor for any other offence based on similar facts

Criminal charge once having been adjudicated upon by a competent court and that adjudication was final, whether it ended in acquittal or conviction

Complainant having withdrawn his private complaint after recording of the prosecution evidence and accused were acquitted in view of S.248, Cr.P.C., they could not be tried in State case in view of S.403, Cr.P.C. being double jeopardy

Accused could not be tried a second time for the same offence in presence of the acquittal, as acquittal would bar the trial of the acquitted accused in accordance to the provision of subsection (1) of S.403, Cr.P.C.

Impugned order of the Trial Court was quite legal warranting no interference.

Pre-conditions for attracting the provisions of S.403, Cr. P. C., were that there must have been an earlier trial of the accused seeking protection against second trial for the offence charged; that the facts alleged in the earlier trial were the same sought to be proved in the second prosecution/trial; that the trial must have been conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction and that the trial must have ended in a judgment of conviction or acquittal.

Contention of the accused was that the Provincial Quality Control Board had penalized him and recommended for the suspension of the Registration Certificate of the drugs and he could not be vexed twice for the same offence

Accused moved application for his acquittal but the same was dismissed by the Trial Court

Validity

Accused had not been tried for the offence of keeping and selling sub-standard medicines by competent court of law and only charge had been framed in the complaint against him and evidence was yet to be recorded and the final order of acquittal or conviction was yet to be passed

Principle of double jeopardy, in circumstances, could not be said to be attracted in the case

Order passed under S.42 of the Drugs Act, 1976, regarding the cancellation or suspension of registration of registered drug was an administrative order and the penalty of suspension of registration did not amount to acquittal or conviction of the accused persons for the offence committed by them for manufacturing, keeping and selling the sub-standard drugs

Principle of double jeopardy could not be made applicable while deciding the charge against an accused person by the Drug Court and penalizing him under S.27 of the Drugs Act, 1976

Suspension of licence of the accused under S.41 of the Drugs Act, 1976, was a penalty under administrative domain of the Central Licensing Board and said Board had the authority to proceed against him

Revision was dismissed.

Cheating by personation, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, common intention, illegal entry into Pakistan

Bail, grant of

Further inquiry

Double jeopardy

Scope

Allegation of being a foreign national

Accused in possession of Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) and passport of Pakistan

Effect

Said documents belonging to accused were available on record and supported his contention that he was a national of Pakistan-Brother of accused i.e. co-accused had been involved in a similar case in the past but was ultimately , acquitted by Trial Court, thus family of accused had been involved in similar case on the same set of facts (and allegations)

Double jeopardy in rem would thus be attracted in the present case

Under S.9 of Foreigners Act, 1946 burden of proof shifted upon accused upon determination of nationality of foreign country, however in the present case accused could not be burdened as such in the presence of his CNIC and Passport of Pakistan

Case against accused fell within the purview of further inquiry

Offence alleged also did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.

Accused was granted bail accordingly.

Convict who was sentenced to death had undergone a period of custody equal to or more than a full term of imprisonment for life during the pendency of his legal remedy against his conviction

Question was as to whether sentence of death awarded to convict could be maintained by the Supreme Court despite the fact that he had already served out one of the two legal sentences provided for in S.302(b), P.P.C.

Plea of accused was that in such a situation the Supreme Court must not, affirm the sentence of death and might reduce the same to imprisonment for life in view of provisions of S.403, Cr.P.C

Validity

Principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict contained in S.403(1), Cr.P.C. forbid a new trial after a conviction or acquittal on the basis of the same facts had attained finality but it was equally obvious that the said principle had no application to the present situation wherein holding of a new trial was not in issue

Principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict contained in S.403(1), Cr.P.C. had no relevance to a case wherein the question under consideration in an appeal was not as to whether a new trial of the convict should be held or not but the issue was as to which sentence would be the appropriate sentence for a convict.

Concept of double jeopardy was attracted where the accused had been tried for the offence charged with by a competent court and there was a judgment or order of conviction or acquittal

Punishment provided in S.3(2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, appeared to be in addition to the one that a person might entail under any other law

Mere lodging of F.I.R. and filing of complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, would not attract the rule of double jeopardy.

When the conviction or acquittal of a person- is under challenge in appeal or revision, the proceedings are neither fresh prosecution nor there is any question of second conviction or double jeopardy, as an appeal or revision is a continuation of trial and any alternation of sentence would not amount to double jeopardy.