Limitation period

Since the "relevant tax period" did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no "time period"

If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive "time periods" that had become operative after the end of the exemption

For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period

Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption

Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred

Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/

Appeal was dismissed.

Since the "relevant tax period" did not (and could not) exist in the period of exemption, no date within that period could serve as the starting point of limitation envisaged by section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

End of the period of exemption did not mark the last day for the start of limitation since up to that point in time there was in law no "time period"

If at all any question of limitation could arise under Section 66 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the date for its starting would (and could only) lie in the successive "time periods" that had become operative after the end of the exemption

For purposes of computing limitation, time did not begin to run from the end of the period of exemption or any other date prior thereto located within that period

Period of exemption ended on 05-09-2000 and application for refund was made by end August/beginning September 2001, which was well within (or at most towards the end of) a period of one year from the end of the exemption

Limitation did not begin to run from 05-09-2000 (or any date prior thereto) but rather (if at all) from the successive time periods after that date; the claim was well within time and could not be defeated or denied on the ground of being time barred

Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had correctly concluded that respondent / taxpayer was entitled to refund of remaining amount of Rs. 6,439,608/

Appeal was dismissed.

Period of limitation for filing an application for restoration of a civil revision (dismissed in default) is three years under Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed with the Supreme Court expressing its concern that for applications for restoration of a suit and an appeal, the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908 is 30 days, whereas the period for filing an application for restoration of a civil revision is three years; that the logic for such differentiation is not clear and may be taken up in some appropriate case for consideration.

Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply to applications filed under the company law including one for rectification of company's register of members or denture-holders

Legislative intent is not to prescribe a period of limitation for filing such rectification application.

Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply to applications filed under the company law including one for rectification of company's register of members or debenture-holders

Legislative intent is not to prescribe a period of limitation for filing such rectification application.

Provisions requiring a party to lis to do certain act within a prescribed limitation are introduced in order to curb long standing litigation, save precious public time and inconvenience to the parties.

No principle of general application was laid out in the jurisprudence pursuant to which the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 could be held to be not applicable to a claim asserted on the basis of right to inheritance or on the basis of fraud

Party must clearly declare the date when it acquired knowledge of the false entry in mutation record or fabrication/forgery of record, the limitation period would run from such date if the party could discharge the onus to prove the emergence of cause of action on such date through evidence.

In carrying out such exercise, no general standards could be set out, and such time was and shall be dependant again on the purpose of the law to be achieved by an act or function to be performed.

Whether in the absence of a limitation period prescribed under S. 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 ('the Act') the said omission could be supplied with reference to the limitation period under S. 25(1) of the Act

Held, that S. 25(1) of the Act provided a revisional remedy to the assessee for obtaining an order that was net prejudicial to his interest

Prescribed limitation period for invoking said remedy was one year

On the other hand, S. 25(2) of the Act (since omitted) conferred a suo motu power on the Commissioner to revise orders in the interest of the revenue for which no limitation period was prescribed in the Act

Thus, Ss. 25(1) & 25(2) of the Act served different purposes

Purpose of S. 25(2) was to protect the interest of the revenue and to prevent wealth from escaping assessment

Same purpose was also served by Ss. 17A & 17B of the Act, and the limitation period for both said sections was four years

In particular S. 17B , which was almost a verbatim copy of S. 25(2) provided for the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Inspecting Additional Commissioner to protect the interest of the revenue

Section 25(2) was only omitted from the Act in the year 1992 after S. 17B was inserted into the Act

Section 17B was then the successor to S. 25(2), therefore, it was only logical that the limitation period governing section 17B, i.e. four years, should also govern S. 25(2) of the Act.

In carrying out such exercise, no general standards could be set out, and such time was and shall be dependant again on the purpose of the law to be achieved by an act or function to be performed.

Whether in the absence of a limitation period prescribed under S. 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 ('the Act') the said omission could be supplied with reference to the limitation period under S. 25(1) of the Act

Held, that S. 25(1) of the Act provided a revisional remedy to the assessee for obtaining an order that was not prejudicial to his interest

Prescribed limitation period for invoking said remedy was one year

On the other hand, S. 25(2) of the Act (since omitted) conferred a suo motu power on the Commissioner to revise orders in the interest of the revenue for which no limitation period was prescribed in the Act

Thus, Ss. 25(1) & 25(2) of the Act served different purposes

Purpose of S. 25(2) was to protect the interest of the revenue and to prevent wealth from escaping assessment

Same purpose was also served by Ss. 17A & 17B of the Act, and the limitation period for both said sections was four years

In particular S. 17B , which was almost a verbatim copy of S. 25(2) provided for the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Inspecting Additional Commissioner to protect the interest of the revenue

Section 25(2) was only omitted from the Act in the year 1992 after S. 17B was inserted into the Act

Section 17B was then the successor to S. 25(2), therefore, it was only logical that the limitation period governing section 17B, i.e. four years, should also govern S. 25(2) of the Act.

Incumbent upon a party claiming the order to be void to establish invalidity of the said order and also to prove that the order was without jurisdiction.

No specific period of limitation was envisaged in the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ('the Act') for filing of harassment complaint against the accused

No complaint of harassment could be discarded or disbelieved on the account of limitation nor any offender could claim his innocence for not filing the complaint instantly after its occurrence

Delay of 178 days in the present case for lodgment of harassment complaint would not be fatal to its merits, when same was based on valid and strong grounds

Appeal filed before Ombudsperson was dismissed accordingly.

No statutory period of limitation was provided for grant of any succession certificate under S. 372 or its revocation under S. 383 of the Succession Act, 1925, but even then it had to be availed within a reasonable time.

Question as to whether the limitation period contained in the first provisos to the erstwhile Ss. 11(4) & 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the current S. 11(5) of the Act for passing an order thereunder was 'mandatory' or 'directory' in nature; held, that provisions of S. 11 and the erstwhile S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("the Act") were mandatory in nature, and any order passed beyond the time period stipulated therein would be invalid

Collector/Commissioner had the power to extend the time within which an order under provisions of S. 11 or the erstwhile S. 36 of the Act was to be passed

Such time could also be extended in a particular case or class of cases by the Federal Board of Revenue ("the Board") or the Commissioner if empowered by the Board, as per the provisions of S. 74 of the Act

Power to extend time in terms of S. 74 of the Act must be exercised within a reasonable time period of 'six months' from the date when the time period provided in the first provisos to S. 11 and the erstwhile section 36 of the Act and the extension granted thereunder had lapsed, and such power could only be exercised (by the Board under S. 74) to grant an extension of not more than a reasonable time period of 'six months'.

Notice purportedly issued by the Department under the provisions of S. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was akin to the notice/proceedings which the Department would initiate in terms of Ss. 66 & 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 as the said notice was issued on the ground that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue

Period of limitation provided under Ss. 66 & 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was four years and the notice issued by the Department in the present case was beyond such period

Notice in question could not be held to be issued under S. 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as it was not issued on the basis of some definite information

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Period of limitation of one year started from the date of execution of the sale deed and not from the date of its registration.

Article 10 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 was bifurcated into two parts; where the purchaser took physical possession of the property; 'or', where the instrument of sale had been registered

'First part' dealt with cases where the sale had taken place and possession of the sold property had been delivered to the vendee pursuant thereto

Period of limitation in such situation would start from the date of delivery of physical possession

In order to successfully defend a suit for pre-emption falling in this category on the point of limitation (if it was beyond one year from the date of delivery of possession) the defendant-vendee would be obliged to prove that physical possession was delivered prior to the date of execution of the registered sale deed

Object behind this was that the prospective pre-emptor must have notice that the sale had taken place and possession of the property had been delivered or that there was a change of possession

Such factum of possession, was considered to be adequate notice of sale of the property, enabling the pre-emptor to file a suit

Positive evidence had to be led by the vendee where the date of delivery of physical possession was different from the date of registration of the sale deed

Mere mention of delivery of possession in the sale instrument would not be a positive proof of such fact, which had to be independently established by the vendee when his defence of limitation was founded upon such fact

In those cases where possession had not been delivered and/or the sale deed had been executed but not registered as yet, a pre-emptor would have no notice that sale had taken place, thereby enabling him to exercise his right

In such cases the 'first part' of Art. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would have no application, rather the case(s) would fall within the 'second part' of Art. 10 of Limitation Act, 1908

Period of limitation for cases falling in the 'second part' of Art. 10 was one year from when the sale instrument/deed was registered and not its date of execution.

For all pre-emption suits which fell within the purview of Art. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, S. 30 of the Pre-emption Act, 1991 would not apply.

Question as to whether the limitation period contained in the first provisos to the erstwhile Ss. 11(4) & 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the current S. 11(5) of the Act for passing an order thereunder was 'mandatory' or 'directory' in nature; held, that provisions of S. 11 and the erstwhile S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("the Act") were mandatory in nature, and any order passed beyond the time period stipulated therein would be invalid

Collector/Commissioner had the power to extend the time within which an order under provisions of S. 11 or the erstwhile S. 36 of the Act was to be passed

Such time could also be extended in a particular case or class of cases by the Federal Board of Revenue ("the Board") or the Commissioner if empowered by the Board, as per the provisions of S. 74 of the Act

Power to extend time in terms of S. 74 of the Act must be exercised within a reasonable time period of 'six months' from the date when the time period provided in the first provisos to S. 11 and the erstwhile section 36 of the Act and the extension granted thereunder had lapsed, and such power could only be exercised (by the Board under S. 74) to grant an extension of not more than a reasonable time period of 'six months'.

Notice purportedly issued by the Department under the provisions of S. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was akin to the notice/proceedings which the Department would initiate in terms of Ss. 66 & 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 as the said notice was issued on the ground that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue

Period of limitation provided under Ss. 66 & 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was four years and the notice issued by the Department in the present case was beyond such period

Notice in question could not be held to be issued under S. 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as it was not issued on the basis of some definite information

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Period of limitation to challenge a fraudulent transaction ran from the date of knowledge.

When a departmental representation was barred by time, then without disclosing any sufficient reason for delay, no subsequent order of disposal of such incompetent representation could create fresh cause of action and that the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal would be incompetent.

When a departmental representation was barred by time, then without disclosing any sufficient reason for delay, no subsequent order of disposal of such incompetent representation could create fresh cause of action and that the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal would be incompetent.

Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney, sale agreement and sale deed and recovery of possession of immoveable property

Property transferred under a void and fraudulent agreement

Suit filed by owner of such property for its possession

Limitation period

Scope

Plaintiff, who was owner of suit property, allegedly executed and got registered an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the defendant/attorney

Defendant on basis of such power of attorney sold out the suit plot to a third person, who in turn sold it to the appellant

About 16 years after the date of execution/registration of the general power of attorney in favour of defendant, plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of documents and possession of the suit land alleging that the power of attorney, sale agreements and sale deeds were obtained by fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and manipulation

Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis that it was barred by limitation, as limitation period for filing a suit for cancellation of documents was three years

High Court, however, decreed the suit on the grounds that suit being for possession of immovable property was filed within twelve years and was thus within the time limit

Legality

Appellant did not prove any of the documents on which he based his claim

Appellant neither proved the general power of attorney nor the deeds witnessing the alleged sale transactions nor confronted the respondent therewith

Plaintiff, in such circumstances, did not need to institute a suit for declaration or cancellation of documents, which had no existence

Plaintiff needed to institute a suit for possession on the basis of title within a period of 12 years, and that was what he did

Appellant who was left with sheer possession could not defend it in a possessory suit instituted by the plaintiff on the basis of title

Failure to question a transaction within the period of limitation would certainly matter, if it had any existence and effect, but where it had no existence and effect, it could not in any manner have life breathed into it, and passage of time or length of years could not give it any existence and effect

Building a castle of limitation in defence of such a transaction or its beneficiary on the basis of documents which were neither produced nor proved, would amount to building a castle in the air

Such exercise would be all the more unwarranted when the beneficiary (i.e. appellant) himself did not stir even a straw to prove his claim

Although the law of limitation ensured order in the society but it could not be used as a bulwark to perpetuate a gain having its origin in fraud which not only vitiated the most solemn transaction but the very fabric of the society

Shielding a transaction based on fraud and forgery would be more chaotic and disorderly than undoing it

Limitation could not shield a transaction having no effect and existence on account of fraud and forgery

Plaintiff, in the present case thus could not be non-suited on account of his failure to institute a suit for declaration or for cancellation of documents within the time provided by the statute

High Court had rightly held that plaintiff's suit was for possession of suit property, which was filed within the limitation period of twelve years

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.[Minority view].

Where an aggrieved party sought redressal against the judgment or order through the revisional powers of the court under S.115, C.P.C. it had ninety (90) days to make such application, failing which the application was liable to be dismissed (as being time barred).

Period of limitation prescribed under law does not extend under S.4 of Limitation Act, 1908, but it simply permits a suit, appeal or application to be filed on re-opening of Court, if period of limitation expires on a day when Court is closed.

Plaintiff (appellant) filed a suit against respondent-company in the year 1985 claiming that the latter had illegally and forcibly encroached upon his land and made some construction upon it

Plaintiff alleged that on account of assurance of respondent-company to give compensation to him, he did not pursue his suit, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 9-8-1988; that respondent-company failed to fulfil its assurance because of which he filed a second suit against the respondent-company in 2001; that second suit was not barred by time as present case was one of continuing breach in terms of S. 23 of Limitation Act, 1908, therefore fresh period of limitation was available to plaintiff at every moment during which breach continued

Respondent-company disputed ownership of plaintiff and alleged that it had purchased the disputed property from the Provincial Government, and that it had not given any assurance to the plaintiff during the pendency of the earlier suit, and that the second suit filed by plaintiff was hopelessly time barred

Second suit of plaintiff was decreed by Trial Court, which decree was maintained by the First Appellate Court

High Court set aside judgments and decree of courts below on the basis that second suit was time barred

Validity

Had any assurance been given by the respondent-company to the plaintiff, the more appropriate and logical way of having the earlier suit disposed of would have been an application, made either by the plaintiff or both parties before the Trial Court reflecting the purported assurance of the respondent-company

Dismissal of earlier suit for non-prosecution on its own did not reflect that it might have resulted on account of an assurance of out of court settlement

Respondent-company at no period of time admitted the claim of the plaintiff

Cause of action to the plaintiff against his alleged dispossession commenced from the year 1985

Section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 provided for two eventualities where breach or wrong might be continuing, one where there was breach of a contract and the other where there was a wrong independent of the contract

Admittedly there was no contract between the parties in the present case

Purported assurance given by respondent-company was also not a contract as requirements of making a contract were absolutely not available on the record

Respondent-company raised a permanent structure on the disputed property in the year 1985, which amounted to purported complete dispossession of the plaintiff from the property and matured the cause of action with no element of continuity

Only provision that dealt with a case of dispossession was Art. 142 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, which provided a period of 12 years during which a suit against dispossession could be filed

Admittedly, in the present case second suit was filed by plaintiff after almost 16 years from the day he claimed to have been dispossessed from the property in question, thus second suit was barred by time

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Civil servant claimed that he filed departmental appeal on 19-8-2001 (i.e. within the period of limitation) and also sent a notice to the department through his counsel

Department replied by a letter stating that it did not receive the memo of appeal, whereafter civil servant claimed that he sent a letter to the department enclosing copy of memo of appeal

Department contended that appeal was filed on 20-12-2001, which was beyond the period of limitation, and not on 19-8-2001

Validity

Postal receipt submitted by civil servant was dated 19-8-2001

Postal receipt coupled with letter sent by civil servant and the reply thereto, prima facie, reflected that departmental appeal was filed on 19-8-2001, i.e. within the period of limitation

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Defendant (respondent) filed petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 31-3-2005 and leave was refused

Execution petition was filed by plaintiff on 3-12-2007 but it was dismissed by the Executing Court being time barred

First Appellate Court and High Court upheld order of Executing Court and dismissed appeals filed by plaintiff

Contention of plaintiff was that after dismissal of defendant's petition for leave to appeal, he filed execution petition within the allowed time of three years, and that under Ss.47 & 48(2), C.P.C. execution petition could be filed within six years

Validity

Defendant's petition for leave to appeal was dismissed on 31-3-2005 and no stay was granted by the Supreme Court

Plaintiff could have filed execution petition within three years w.e.f. 17-3-2003, the date of judgment of the High Court which had attained finality

Under Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, period of limitation of three years for filing of execution application would commence from the date of accrual of right, which, in the present case, was 17-3-2003 when partial decree was passed by the High Court

Mere pendency of civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court was not a ground for enlarging the period of filing of execution petition as it was an admitted fact that no stay was granted by the Supreme Court

Decree of High Court attained finality on 17-3-2003 and plaintiff admittedly filed execution petition after one year, eight months and 17 days of the prescribed period of three years under the Limitation Act, 1908

First application for execution must be made within the period prescribed (three years) by the Limitation Act, 1908 and S.48, C.P.C. would only apply to any subsequent application for execution, therefore, said section had no applicability to the facts of the present case

Plaintiff failed to approach the court within the time limit prescribed in law, therefore, he could not take benefit of his own wrong and a right had accrued in favour of the defendant after the lapse of the prescribed period of three years, which could not be taken away

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Section 48, C.P.C. provided a period of limitation (six years) for subsequent execution applications after the first one

Where no execution application was filed at all within the period (three years) prescribed by Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the execution application made thereafter would be barred by limitation and as such there would be no occasion to avail the benefit of extended time provided in S.48, C.P.C.

First application for execution of a decree could be filed within three years under Art.181 of Limitation Act, 1908.

Pre-emptor challenged sale price of suit property mentioned in the sale deed/mutation claiming that the same was inflated

Trial Court determined probable value of suit property for purpose of depositing Zar-e-Soem

Pre-emptor challenged value determined by Trial Court before Revisional Court, which remanded the matter back to Trial Court to determine the probable value of suit property and for reassessment of Zar-e-Soem

High Court set aside order of Revisional Court and restored that of the Trial Court

Effect

Trial Court had exercised its discretion to fix the probable value of the suit property for purpose of depositing of Zar-e-Soem

Statutory period for depositing Zar-e-Soem was 30 days, and assuming probable value of suit property determined by Trial Court was incorrect and case was rightly remanded by the Revisional Court, after the order of High Court, the order of Trial Court resurrected, i.e. it re-emerged and became operative at once, therefore, the pre-emptor should have deposited the amount of Zar-e-Soem within the remaining days which were left out of the statutory period of 30 days

Even if no days were left and there was no fault on part of the pre-emptor, he could have deposited the amount the very next day

Pre-emptor being aggrieved of the order of the High Court, should have deposited the amount of Zar-e-Soem as fixed by the Trial Court and approved by the High Court and then he should have approached the Supreme Court to get the order suspended in order to save himself from the consequences of S.24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991

In the event of a favourable decision from the Supreme Court, pre-emptor could have always sought refund of any excess amount paid by him or adjustment of the same towards the pre-emption money

Since pre-emptor had not complied with S.24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, his suit for pre-emption was liable to be dismissed

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Probable value of suit property determined by the court for purpose of depositing Zar-e-Soem challenged by the pre-emptor before Revisional/Appellate Court

Question as to whether statutory period of 30 days for depositing Zar-e-Soem would continue during such period (of challenge)

Where pre-emptor had challenged the probable value of suit property determined by the court, and in the process prescribed period of 30 days elapsed and deposit of Zar-e-Soem was not made, the suit should be dismissed as per S.24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, however if (Revisional/Appellate Court) suspended order of Trial Court, the time period would stop, and on the final decision of the (Revisional/Appellate) court, the time would automatically start from where it stopped

Where probable value of suit property determined by Trial Court was upheld or some modification was made in it, the pre-emptor would not be entitled to any further/fresh time, rather he would be bound to deposit the amount of Zar-e-Soem within the unexhausted period left with him out of the 30 days statutory period provided for such purpose.

Trial Court was obliged and duty bound to require the pre-emptor to deposit with the Court 1/3rd of the sale price of the property pre-empted

Period within which such amount could be ordered to be deposited was left to the discretion of the court, which discretion was not unbridled, rather was circumscribed by a span of 30 days from the date of institution/filing of the suit

Court should provide adequate time to the pre-emptor to make the deposit, but under no circumstances it had the discretion to allow the pre-emptor to make the deposit beyond the period of 30 days from the filing of the suit

Even where the court on account of omission or some lapse failed to specify the time in such behalf, it shall be deemed that full 30 days period had been allowed by the court to the pre-emptor to make the deposit, and not withstanding such omission/lapse, it would be the duty of the pre-emptor to make the deposit within a period of 30 days from the institution of the suit.

Constitutional bar of limitation was not applicable to the proceedings under Art.199 or Art.184 of the Constitution, however, insistence was placed on initiating proceedings promptly and within a reasonable time to avoid the question of laches.

Period of filing a Reference (to High Court) had been prescribed under S. 196 of Customs Act, 1969, which was 90 days of the date on which the aggrieved person or Collector, as the case might be, was served with the order of the Appellate Tribunal

Where limitation was provided by any special enactment, other than the Limitation Act, 1908, then S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable for purposes of condonation of delay

Application was dismissed accordingly.

Tax department filed appeal before Appellate Tribunal, which remanded the assessment back to the Assessing Officer for re-assessment

During re-assessment proceedings complainant filed (present) complaint before Federal Tax Ombudsman on 17-5-2012 on the basis of his apprehension that Tax Department was likely to repeat the same treatment accorded during the first assessment

Present complaint was filed on 17-5-2012 but it was registered on 23-5-2012

Re-assessment of complainant was shown by the Tax Department to have been made on 22-5-2012 i.e. a day before registration of present complaint

Tax Department contended that first assessment order was passed on 29-6-2009 , present complaint was filed on 17-5-2012 and registered on 23-5-2012 , therefore, same was late in terms of the time limitation laid down in S. 10(3) of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000

Validity

Re-assessment finalized on 22-5-2012 was nothing but a repeat performance of the first assessment finalized on 29-6-2009 and as the two events were interlinked the present complaint covered both

Complainant filed an appeal before the Commissioner (appeals) who annulled the first assessment

Tax Department then filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal that resulted in remand of the case for re-assessment

Complaint was not filed earlier before the Federal Tax Ombudsman as the complainant had received relief from the Commissioner (appeals) when he annulled the first assessment dated 29-6-2009, but when the complainant realized that the Department was likely to repeat the earlier assessment he had no option but to file present complaint in which a specific request was made that the Department be asked to stay re-assessment till disposal of complaint

Present complaint was filed on 17-5-2012 and the Department finalized the re-assessment on 22-5-2012, before the complaint was even registered in the Federal Tax Ombudsman office on 23-5-2012, therefore present complaint covered both the first assessment made on 29-6-2009 as well as the second re-assessment finalized on 22-5-2012 and given the sequence of events, there was no delay in filing the complaint in terms of the limitation given in S. 10(3) of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000.

Limitation period of 90 days for filing revision application was relevant only when same was filed by some person or party to the proceedings but such impediment was non-existent when court itself exercised the power of revision under S.115(1), C.P.C.

When merits of the case demanded that challenged order be set aside, High Court should not avoid hearing the same under S.115(1), C.P.C., for which no limitation was provided, merely because the application was filed by somebody who was bound by limitation.

Section 30 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, had four parts/components, each of which was a separate and independent provision in itself contemplating different eventualities for the purpose of limitation of four months

Section 30(d) of the Act was not an exception to sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said section, rather it was a residual provision and would only come into play where none of the preceding clauses to it were applicable/attracted

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Contention of the pre-emptor (appellant) was that S.30(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, was subject to provisions of S.31 of the said Act, as no notice of sale had been published/issued as required by S.31 of the said Act, the limitation period would commence from the date of pre-emptor's knowledge as per S.30(d) of the said Act

Validity

Sections 30 and 31 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, were independent of each other having no effect and impact on each other

Although S.31 of the said Act mandated that a public notice must be issued in terms thereof, but by no stretch of the imagination S.31 of the Act could be held to regulate and control the period of limitation prescribed by S.30 of the Act

If the intention of the legislature was to make the period of limitation subject and subservient to the requirements of S.31 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the legislature would have clearly indicated its intention by use of appropriate expression and/or words in either of the two sections

Section 30 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, could not be read into by implication or on the basis of any other rule of interpretation

Requirement of notice under S.31 of the Act was not a condition precedent for computing the period of limitation and it could not be held that in the absence of the notice, the date of knowledge should be the starting point of the four months limitation period

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.