Constitutionality

Clause (1) of Art. 24, without equivocation, states that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law

The right to hold on to property, thus, is a fundamental right and can only be infringed if the law so permits

If the rule-making power of the Provincial Government does not extend to the impost of mark-up then Art. 24 is triggered and judicial review must be employed to undo the essential wrongness of the action.

Briefly, the petitioners were aggrieved of inaction of the public functionaries to take action against the repeated newspaper advertisements across Pakistan restricting recruitment for sweepers and sanitary workers to persons of a particular religion, predominantly Christians

Despite a formal request to the Ministry of Human Rights seeking issuance of directions to stop such advertisements and to ensure future recruitment notices were religion-neutral, no response was received, prompting the filing of the writ petition

Held: Phrases such as "the candidate must be Christian", "preference shall be given to Christians" and "only candidates from the Christian community may apply" were inherently discriminatory and offended the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Arts.36 and 25 of the Constitution, which ensured equality, protection of minorities and non-discrimination

This discriminatory practice not only violated the fundamental rights of the minorities but it also reinforced negative stereotypes and prejudices against them, which could lead not only to further marginalization and discrimination but also affected their dignity

The advertisement of public posts on the basis of religion was degrading since it unfairly singled out a segment of society solely on the basis of religious identity and violated human dignity

Neither the Constitution nor any law permitted any authority, institution or individual to predicate appointments to the posts of sanitary workers or sweepers on religious affiliation

Such practice infringed upon fundamental rights and resulted in humiliation, exclusion and deprivation within the targeted community, contrary to the Constitution's commitment to dignity and equality

Consequently, any appointment process grounded in religious identity stood condemned and could not be upheld

All the respondents were directed to issue appropriate directions, notifications or office orders to their subordinate departments and organizations to ensure that in the future, no recruitment advertisement or appointment policy for sweepers or sanitary workers would be based on religion, ethnicity, community and that no segment of society is singled out for such posts on religious grounds

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Any recruitment policy or advertisement prescribing eligibility criteria linked to a particular faith or community is plainly illegal, unconstitutional and devoid of lawful justification.

Employee re-instated in service by the Service Tribunal after his acquittal in the criminal case on basis of a compromise

Legality

It was not disputed that not only at the time of issuing show cause notice but even at the time of the alleged inquiry, the respondent was incarcerated

Obviously, then, it was not within his control or domain to face and defend the charges of misconduct or his involvement in a criminal case as a free man

It is a most valuable and instinctive human right of every Under Trial Prisoner (UTP) and a convicted person to defend or challenge his indictment and conviction in accordance with the law

Right of proper defence is a vested right and not providing ample opportunity of defence is also against Article 10-A of the Constitution

In order to answer and defend the allegations of misconduct, the personal appearance of the delinquent ought to be ensured and he should be afforded not only a right to adduce evidence and call witnesses to support his innocence, but he should also be given a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him

In the present case during the ex-parte departmental proceedings the inquiry officer predominantly believed the police reports and challan of criminal cases and conducted the inquiry when the respondent was behind bars and his request for deferring the inquiry proceedings till the outcome of the criminal case was not accommodated and a major penalty of removal from service was recommended and imposed

Conducting ex parte proceeding, knowing that the employee (respondent) was unable to defend the charges of misconduct was nothing but a sheer violation of due process and the principles of natural justice, thus, rendering the entire exercise ineffectual and inconsequential

Petition was converted into an appeal and partly allowed, with the directions that the order of reinstatement with back benefits passed by the Service Tribunal, shall be subject to the outcome of de novo inquiry and in this regard the competent authority of the petitioner's department shall appoint an inquiry officer who should conduct an impartial regular inquiry, and during the inquiry proceedings, the respondent should be afforded ample opportunity of defence.

Constitution prohibits discrimination as stated in Article 25 and further stipulates and entrenches the principle in respect of service of Pakistan in Article 27

In preferring the children of a government servant or reserving seats for them offends the Constitution

Same also detracts from a merit based system of employment

Taxpayers hard earned monies pay for the salaries, benefits and pensions of government servants

People's interest lies in having the best person for the job, and not to suffer at the hands of those who secure employment on the basis of a filial relationship.

Admission for fellowship training to enroll doctors for FCPS Part-II training in various specialties of affiliated public sector hospitals

Policy requiring married women to follow their husband's domicile

Constitutionality

Exclusion from purview of Art. 27 of the Constitution

Consistency of policy with the principles enunciated in Succession Act, 1925

Provincial autonomy

Contention of the petitioner was that since she had joined the training, therefore, the same could not be terminated

Validity

Provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over devolved subjects, including health and can impose conditions like domicile or residence for appointments in these areas

Policy of Medical institution in question i.e., PGMI regarding domicile of married women was not hit by Art.27(2) of the Constitution, as it was excluded from its purview

Policy was consistent with the principles enshrined in Ss.15 & 16 of the Succession Act, 1925

Order obtained through concealment of facts could be rescinded under S.21 of the General Clauses Act and the authority granting the order was not barred from taking corrective action

Policy of PGMI requiring married women to follow their husband's domicile was rational, logical, and reasonable

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Regulation 4(7)(b) of the Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations, 2023 ('the Regulations, 2023')

Constitutionality

Petitioner / candidate challenged Regulation 4(7)(b) of the Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations 2023

Petitioner misconstrued the scope of the impugned Regulation, and he might have been physically present in Pakistan but failed to show that he was resident of a foreign country at the time of making of the application

Petitioner admited his status as a Pakistani citizen, and not being resident of foreign country

Thus , the petitioner, for all intent and purposes, was a Pakistani student, eligible to compete on general seats on merit, but was ineligible for admission on reserved seats

Petitioner sought advantage of his stay in Saudi Arabia, and time spent there in acquiring HSSC (12th grade) without fulfilling the requirement of an "Overseas Pakistani" (a Pakistani citizen permanently resident in a foreign country)

No case of any discrimination or exclusion of any particular foreign country was plausibly made out

High Court observed that in recent years a sinister practice had developed that a person, who did not meet the requirements of any rule, throwed challenge to the constitutionality of the disadvantageous rule; this called for disapproval

In absence of any defect in the constitutionality of impugned Regulation, the High Court found no reason to judicially review the plausibility, rational and foundational basis for criterion for admission against foreign seat quota

No arbitrariness or perversity was found in exercise of discretion

High Court rejected the challenge to the legality / constitutionality of impugned Regulation

Constitutional petition , being merit-less, was dismissed.

As per verses of Holy Quran as well as provisions of the Constitution a Muslim widow cannot be prevented or discouraged from contracting marriage rather such action of hers is appreciable which is duly safeguarded by Shariah

Widow, at the time of death of her husband, is given her due share from the estate left by her husband and there is no embargo on her to contract second marriage after the completion of stipulated period of Iddat

Government in contravention to the aforesaid principles of Shariah as well as Constitution of Pakistan issued Memorandum dated 15.12.2015 that a widow, who was granted employment (job) on the ground of demise of her husband during service, would be disentitled to continue her service on account of her solemnizing of second marriage

After receipt of her termination order, the appellant filed an application to the respondent contending therein that she had contracted second marriage as per Shariah and the Memorandum in question had been declared illegal by the Superior Courts as such she could be reinstated into service

Respondents, despite knowledge of the dictum of the Superior Courts on the matter in issue, instead of reinstating the appellant into service, remained adamant to follow the illegal and unlawful instructions of the Establishment Division and declined the request of the appellant for reinstatement

Memorandum in question had already been declared illegal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, as such under Art.189 of the Constitution, compliance of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court was mandatory for all the organs of the state

Termination order of the appellant on the ground of re-marriage was arbitrarily issued by the respondent-department in violation of the principles of Shariah, Constitution as well as dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, as such same was held to be nullity in the eyes of law and was liable to be set aside

Appeal was accepted, in circumstances.

Articles 66 & 69 of the Constitution, make it clear that Courts ought not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament and Parliamentary Privilege is accorded to Inter Parliamentary Communications; even the proceedings of a formally constituted Committee of either House falls within the ambit of internal proceedings of the Parliament, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Court in terms of Art. 69 of the Constitution

Impugned Letter was prima facie Inter Parliamentary Communication

Plaintiff remained unable to demonstrate that High Court had any jurisdiction to entertain the pertinent relief claimed

Plaint merited rejection forthwith

Suit was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner-company (Textile Manufacturing Unit) challenged the order passed by Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board to deposit adjudged amount in cash in compliance of S. 23C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 ('the Act, 1947')

Argument of the petitioner was that said requirement was violation of fundamental rights of petitioner especially fair trial

Validity

The petitioner exported goods and was under the obligation to repatriate the outstanding proceeds in foreign exchange, which it failed to do within the stipulated period from the date of shipments

Consequently, the four points as framed by the Adjudicating Officer were adjudged against the petitioner and its directors under the law

The repatriation of the export proceeds was the sole responsibility of accused as foreign exchange was involved

There was no evidence of genuine efforts for the repatriation of the amount, as adjudged by Adjudicating Officer, however, this was subject to outcome of appeal before the Board ; this was contravention of S. 12(1) of the Act, 1947, and was liable to be dealt within the frame work of the Act, 1947

The failure to repatriate the amount had triggered subsection (4) of S. 23B of the Act, 1947 and the amount was adjudged payable

Article 10-A of the Constitution was in respect of trial and not appeal

Original proceedings were initiated by Adjudicating Officer and no such restrictions were imposed at that point in time; hence requirements of Art. 10-A of the Constitution were not violated

The appeal before the Board was filed under the relevant law which required the appellant to secure the amount by way of deposit of a cash

The law was clear and no interference was required

Appeal, for the purposes of re-appreciating the evidence and record, was considered as continuation of trial but financial restriction for the appellate stage was the lawful / statutory cap as legislated

Appeal was a creation of statute and although right of appeal was a fundamental right but conditions attached could not be deemed to be unconstitutional

If the restriction was considered a violation of fundamental rights then the litigation involving finances would never be secured

Summary chapter trial imposed condition even during trial but was not adjudged a violation of fundamental rights ; so were the cases covered under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, where leave was inevitable to contest the case

Pre-requisites of appeals, requiring leave, security, or deposits, did not violate the right to fair trial and due process

When legislature could give right of appeal it could attach conditions with such appeal, provided they (conditions) were reasonable; were uniformly applied, and were not excessively onerous

These measures struck a balance between preventing frivolous litigation and ensuring access to justice, thereby upholding the principles of fairness and due process, especially in financial matters

Thus, the fair trial and due process was to be adopted as per the relevant statute/law and Constitution, and not otherwise

Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.

Constitution prohibits discrimination as stated in Article 25 and further stipulates and entrenches the principle in respect of service of Pakistan in Article 27

In preferring the children of a government servant or reserving seats for them offends the Constitution

Same also detracts from a merit based system of employment

Taxpayers hard earned monies pay for the salaries, benefits and pensions of government servants

People's interest lies in having the best person for the job, and not to suffer at the hands of those who secure employment on the basis of a filial relationship.

High Court exercised suo motu powers under Article 199 of the Constitution to declare the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 ('the 2013 Act')to be ultra vires

Constitutionality

Case record showed that neither the petitioners (contract employees) approached the High Court to challenge the vires of the 2013 Act nor did any other person challenge it

On the contrary, the 2013 Act was in field since 2013 and under the same law, various cases of numerous contractual or ad-hoc employees must have been dealt with by the government

In order to examine the competency and antecedents of the contractual employees, Scrutiny Committees were also constituted

It was also not disputed by the Government that the petitioners in the High Court claimed to have been performing their contractual obligations since 2009 regularly

Petitioners approached the High Court for regularization on the backing of the 2013 Act, therefore, the observation of the High Court deducing the relationship of master and servant is not the correct exposition of law

When a notice under Order XXVII-A, C.P.C., was issued to the Advocate General, Sindh, on the issue of maintainability, he allegedly argued that the 2013 Act is ultra vires despite knowing the fact that it is not a new law but is in field since 2013 and various employees have acquired the benefit of this law

High Court by striking down the 2013 Act in its suo motu jurisdiction has, in fact, passed a judgment in rem which literally binds the world as opposed to affecting only the rights and judgments inter parties

Importantly, High Court under Article 199 could not assume suomotu jurisdiction

Case before the High Court was to consider whether the petitioners are entitled for regularization of their services and obviously, if no case was made out, the petitions could have been dismissed

However, not only were the petitions dismissed but the law was also declared ultra vires which disturbed and traumatized a long chain of employees who are regularized or were being regularized since 2013 by the Government of Sindh in its different departments/ministries under the same law

Impugned judgment has deprived a long chain of employees and virtually made them jobless without providing any right of audience to them which was a grave violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution and also amounts to the contravention of the principle of natural justice and due process of law

Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for deciding the Constitution Petitions afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to all the parties

Appeals were allowed.

Plain reading of Article 199(4) of the Constitution shows that where the making of an interim order would have the effect of impeding the assessment or collection of public revenues, the High Court shall not make an interim order unless: (i) the prescribed law officer has been given notice of the application for interim relief and he or any person authorized has had an opportunity of being heard; and (ii) the High Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, is satisfied that the interim order would have the effect of suspending an order or proceeding which on the face of the record is without jurisdiction

Use of the negative language, i.e., "shall not", in Article 199(4) leaves no doubt that its provisions are mandatory and an interim order passed without adhering to the procedure provided therein will be illegal and without jurisdiction

In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the High Court did not give notice of the application for interim relief and provide an opportunity of hearing to the prescribed law officer, i.e., the Attorney-General, nor did the High Court record its finding, and the reasons therefor, that the interim order would have the effect of suspending an order or proceeding which on the face of the record is without jurisdiction

Both the mandatory requirements of Article 199(4) were not complied with by the High Court in making the impugned orders, which failure makes these orders illegal and without jurisdiction

Present case, thus, involves a flagrant violation of law and a clear wrongful exercise of jurisdiction, which warrants interference by the Supreme Court in theimpugned interim order

Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; the impugned orders were set aside with the directions that the respondents' (tax payers') applications for interim relief shall be decided by the High Court after affording a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing as envisaged under Article 199(4) of the Constitution; that the High Court shall also identify the order or proceedings under challenge in terms of Article 199(4)(b)(ii) of the Constitution; that the High Court will also attend to the other contention of the counsel for the petitioner (tax department) regarding suspension of legislation through an interim order in the light of the law cited by her.

View taken in the case reported as Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) ("the Sami Ullah Baloch case) and in all those cases in which the returning officers, election tribunals, the High Courts and the Supreme Court had issued declarations pursuant to Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and held such disqualification to be permanent/life time are not sustainable

Parliament has enacted section 232(2) in the Elections Act, 2017 stipulating that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution cannot exceed five years, and there is no need to examine its validity in the present case

Interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution in imposing a lifetime disqualification upon a person through an implied declaration of a court of civil jurisdiction while adjudicating upon some civil rights and obligations of the parties is beyond the scope of the said Article and amounts to reading into the Constitution

Decision in the Sami Ullah Baloch case does not conform to the Constitution and is accordingly overruled.

Extent of lack of qualification of a member of the Parliament, as envisaged under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, is neither lifelong nor permanent, and the same shall remain effective only during the period the declaration so made by a Court of law remains in force

Period of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, as determined by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nousherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) ("the Sami Ullah Baloch case"), would prevail over the five-years disqualification period for Article 62(1)(f), as provided under section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017

Therefore, the conclusion so drawn by the Supreme Court in the Sami Ullah Baloch caseis legally valid, hence affirmed.

Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is not a self-executory provision and is to be made operative through enacting a law that specifies the court of law which is competent to make the declaration mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) and provides for the manner and procedure of making such declaration

Until such law is enacted, Article 62(1)(f) only serves as a guideline for the voters in exercising their right to vote

Neither the Constitution nor any law specifies the court of law that is competent to make the declaration mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and provides for the manner and procedure of making such declaration

Decision given in the case reported as Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) ("the Sami Ullah Baloch case") that the declaration made by a court of civil jurisdiction regarding breach of certain civil rights and obligations is a declaration mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) and that such declaration has a lifelong disqualifying effect, is not based on any constitutional or statutory provision but rather amounts to legislating and reading into the Constitution and is therefore found to be 'plainly and palpably wrong'

Thus, such statement of law made in Sami Ullah Baloch case is not correct and is therefore overruled.

No compensation was paid for the land on which the road was constructed nor was it acquired pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act')

Land was taken without compensating the respondents (owners)

Respondents filed a suit and though the suit was dismissed the appeal against the same was allowed and the judgment of the appellate court was upheld through the impugned judgment of the High Court

Held, that the respondents who were deprived of their land must have spent money and time with regard to a case which should have never seen a court of law, provided the petitioners (Provincial Government and its concerned departments) had abided by the Constitution and the law

Present case is a classic example of frivolous litigation, and that too by those whose salaries are paid by the taxpayers of the country

It appears that the ability to take a decision, whether to assail or not a decision does not exist in senior officers

They deemed it fit to challenge a matter of little financial significance and do so contrary to the provisions of the Constitution which guarantees as a fundamental right the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property (Articles 23 & 24), and being oblivious to the fact that a person can only be compulsorily deprived of property provided compensation therefor is paid

Present matter has been brought before the fourth Court before which the Provincial Government is a party, and it pleads by disregarding the Constitution and the law

Not only have public resources been wasted, but also Court time, both of which are a trust held on behalf of the people

Provincial Government and every employee of it, including those in the office of the Advocate-General run on public funds, therefore, one expects a much higher standard from them

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and Provincial Government was directed to pay to the owners of the land, requisite compensation, within a period of thirty days and in addition also pay to them one million rupees as costs.

Plain reading of Article 199(4) of the Constitution shows that where the making of an interim order would have the effect of impeding the assessment or collection of public revenues, the High Court shall not make an interim order unless: (i) the prescribed law officer has been given notice of the application for interim relief and he or any person authorized has had an opportunity of being heard; and (ii) the High Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, is satisfied that the interim order would have the effect of suspending an order or proceeding which on the face of the record is without jurisdiction

Use of the negative language, i.e., "shall not", in Article 199(4) leaves no doubt that its provisions are mandatory and an interim order passed without adhering to the procedure provided therein will be illegal and without jurisdiction

In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the High Court did not give notice of the application for interim relief and provide an opportunity of hearing to the prescribed law officer, i.e., the Attorney-General, nor did the High Court record its finding, and the reasons therefor, that the interim order would have the effect of suspending an order or proceeding which on the face of the record is without jurisdiction

Both the mandatory requirements of Article 199(4) were not complied with by the High Court in making the impugned orders, which failure makes these orders illegal and without jurisdiction

Present case, thus, involves a flagrant violation of law and a clear wrongful exercise of jurisdiction, which warrants interference by the Supreme Court in the impugned interim order

Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; the impugned orders were set aside with the directions that the respondents' (tax payers') applications for interim relief shall be decided by the High Court after affording a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing as envisaged under Article 199(4) of the Constitution; that the High Court shall also identify the order or proceedings under challenge in terms of Article 199(4)(b)(ii) of the Constitution; that the High Court will also attend to the other contention of the counsel for the petitioner (tax department) regarding suspension of legislation through an interim order in the light of the law cited by her.

Civilians accused of assault on military and defense installations; desecration of monuments commemorating martyrs of the nation; and ruination of the official residence of a Corps Commander

Decision of the Federal Government to conduct trials of such civilians by courts martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952

Constitutionality

Concept of a civilian facing military trial is violative of the fundamental right of fair trial and due process

There is a lack of impartiality and independence within a military trial and the concept of fairness and due process is missing from the procedure

Trial of a citizen by a military court for an offence which can be tried before the ordinary courts established under Article 175 of the Constitution offends the principles of independence of the judiciary and of fair trial

Decision of the Federal Government to try civilians before military courts totally defies the constitutional command and is in derogation to the rights contained in Articles 4, 9, 10A, and 14 read with Article 175 of the Constitution

Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution specifically applies to members of the Armed Forces and laws related to them and the argument that a person can be deprived of any of their fundamental rights especially the right to fair trial and due process because they have been made otherwise subject to the Army Act would mean that the Constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights can be taken away by ordinary legislation

This would totally defeat the purpose of Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 8(5) of the Constitution

In the present case none of the 103 persons detained were reported for offences under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, yet applications were made under Section 549 Cr.P.C. for their delivery to military authorities

Sections 2(1)(d) and 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 were ultra vires the Constitution

Detailed reasons for declaring Sections 2(1)(d) and section 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 as ultra vires the Constitution stated.

High Court exercised suo motu powers under Article 199 of the Constitution to declare the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 ('the 2013 Act')to be ultra vires

Constitutionality

Case record showed that neither the petitioners (contract employees) approached the High Court to challenge the vires of the 2013 Act nor did any other person challenge it

On the contrary, the 2013 Act was in field since 2013 and under the same law, various cases of numerous contractual or ad-hoc employees must have been dealt with by the government

In order to examine the competency and antecedents of the contractual employees, Scrutiny Committees were also constituted

It was also not disputed by the Government that the petitioners in the High Court claimed to have been performing their contractual obligations since 2009 regularly

Petitioners approached the High Court for regularization on the backing of the 2013 Act, therefore, the observation of the High Court deducing the relationship of master and servant is not the correct exposition of law

When a notice under Order XXVII-A, C.P.C., was issued to the Advocate General, Sindh, on the issue of maintainability, he allegedly argued that the 2013 Act is ultra vires despite knowing the fact that it is not a new law but is in field since 2013 and various employees have acquired the benefit of this law

High Court by striking down the 2013 Act in its suo motu jurisdiction has, in fact, passed a judgment in rem which literally binds the world as opposed to affecting only the rights and judgments inter parties

Importantly, High Court under Article 199 could not assume suo motu jurisdiction

Case before the High Court was to consider whether the petitioners are entitled for regularization of their services and obviously, if no case was made out, the petitions could have been dismissed

However, not only were the petitions dismissed but the law was also declared ultra vires which disturbed and traumatized a long chain of employees who are regularized or were being regularized since 2013 by the Government of Sindh in its different departments/ministries under the same law

Impugned judgment has deprived a long chain of employees and virtually made them jobless without providing any right of audience to them which was a grave violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution and also amounts to the contravention of the principle of natural justice and due process of law

Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for deciding the Constitution Petitions afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to all the parties

Appeals were allowed.

Interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution in imposing a lifetime disqualification upon a person through an implied declaration of a court of civil jurisdiction while adjudicating upon some civil rights and obligations of the parties is beyond the scope of the said Article and amounts to reading into the Constitution

View taken in the case reported as Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) treating the declaration made by a court of civil jurisdiction regarding breach of certain civil rights and obligations as a declaration mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and making such declaration to have a lifelong disqualifying effect amounts to reading into the Constitution and is therefore overruled.

Election processes must contribute to a level playing field in which all the political parties and the candidates feel enabled to communicate their message to the people through all the available medium of communication

If the parties and candidates in the run up to the elections are not provided free and fair entrée to the available public forums the resultant choice expressed by the people shall not fairly reflect the free formation of voter preference

Government has no right to prevent the media from covering certain candidates or political parties

Free and fair election requires freedom of speech, assembly, movement, and information through an independent media

Without these freedoms, no election can be called free, fair and democratic

High Court directed PEMRA to strictly ensure that the petitioner and candidates of all the political parties are given free and unrestricted access to media platforms/channels without any constraints from any quarter.

Intra Court appeal filed before a Division Bench of the High Court against a decision made by a Single Judge in a Constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution

Whether a remedy of appeal could be provided to an aggrieved person either through an Ordinance (i.e. Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972) or parliamentary legislation in respect of matters decided under the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court under Article 199 of the Constitution

[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J: Present issue is a constitutional issue regarding the provision of statutory right of appeal through the Ordinance against the order of a High Court passed under Article 199 of the Constitution and is also a matter of public importance

His Lordship issued notices to the Attorney General for Pakistan, the Advocate General, Islamabad, the Prosecutor General, Islamabad and the Advocate General, Punjab as provided by Order XXVII-A of the C.P.C., and also to the State

As the issue involved in present petition is identical to the issue involved in certain other Constitutional petitions, therefore, let the matter be placed before the Chief Justice to pass an appropriate order as to whether this case be heard along with said petitions or otherwise]

[Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting: Clause (2) of Article 175 of the Constitution provides that "no Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law"

Supreme Court and the High Courts have been established by the Constitution; they have such jurisdiction as has been conferred upon them by the Constitution, and also such other jurisdiction as is or may be conferred upon them by or under any law

Expression 'law' here has been used to distinguish it from 'Constitution' and obviously means an ordinary or sub-Constitutional law made in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution

Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was promulgated on 14.04.1972

Later, it was validated through Article 269 of the Constitution

Despite lapse of more than fifty years from the promulgation of the Ordinance, no question qua the legality of the Ordinance has been raised by any party, lawyer, any High Court or the Supreme Court

This question has also not been raised in the present case but it has been taken up by the other Member of this Bench (i.e. Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J) on his own

Such question is not related to the issue involved in this case, and thus, it cannot be brought under debate, nor can any conclusion be drawn thereon

Further, the case in hand is required to be decided first instead of referring such a delicate constitutional question to the Chief Justice which has not been raised before us and which could be decided in any other appropriate proceedings].

Proceedings initiated and actions taken by the Prime Minister's Performance, Delivery Unit ('Unit') and Pakistan Citizen's Portal ('Portal')

Constitutionality

High Court declared the working and functions of the Unit and the Portal to be unconstitutional and opined that the working of both the forums was transgression of the executive authority of the Province

Validity

Unit and the Portal merely receive complaints and they are automatically transmitted to the concerned authorities for consideration

Neither the Unit nor Portal exercises any power that would amount to prejudicing the rights of the citizens or treated as interference in the executive domain of the province

Transmission of information to the concerned authorities of a province, by no stretch of imagination, can be construed as interference or transgression in its domain

After receiving the information transmitted by the Unit or the Portal as the case may be, the concerned provincial authorities are expected to consider the same and thereafter proceed in accordance with the law; they are not bound to act in a particular manner nor can any direction or order be passed by the Unit or the Portal

High Court had not appreciated the working and functioning of both the forums

Moreover, the transmission of a complaint or information by the Federal Government to the concerned authorities of a province does not constitute interference or transgression in the executive domain of that province

Impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, has not correctly appreciated and interpreted the status and functioning of the Unit and the Portal

Petitions for leave to appeal were disposed of accordingly.

Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts (framed by the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209(8) of the Constitution), Art. IV

Trials of civilians under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952

Constitutionality

Judicial impartiality, principle of

Formation of Bench to hear present petitions

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court not consulting two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court before forming the Bench

Delay in deciding the petitions challenging the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023

Pattern in the Supreme Court of constituting Special Benches of some Judges (and not Full Court Bench) in cases of immense public importance

Recusal of a Judge from the Bench due to his relation with one of the petitioners

Observations, objections and notes recorded by certain Members of the Bench on different dates of hearing to the very constitution of the Bench hearing the present petitions provided.

Purpose and exercise of powers conferred under section 45 of the National Highways Safety Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance 2000) encompasses the responsibility of supervision, superintendence and administration including the power to restrict the entry of motorcyclists on motorways with the solitary cautiousness and intelligence of maintaining safety and protection vice versa

Ban imposed on motorcycles was within the precincts and parameters of law which could neither be construed as the violation of any fundamental right to life or liberty, nor said section was challenged before the High Court as being ultra vires the Constitution or the Ordinance 2000.

Tobacco development cess that was levied was in the nature of fee, and the amounts collected were to be spent for the benefit of the tobacco manufacturers and the tobacco growers, who sustained the tobacco manufacturing industry

Appeals were dismissed.

Deputy Speaker of Provincial Assembly by relying on short judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 488) read with Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution gave a ruling to exclude ten votes cast in favour of one of the candidates on the basis that they were cast against the direction of the Party Head

Constitutionality

Language of Article 63A of the Constitution is manifestly clear that the vote cannot be cast contrary to any direction issued by the Parliamentary Party

Article 63A(1)(b) excludes the Party Head from being the decisive person/authority that issues the direction on how to vote

Supreme Court in the (detailed) judgment reported as Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 42) did not recognise the Party Head as the competent authority under Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution to issue a direction to members of the Parliamentary Party on how to vote

Deputy Speaker's reliance on the language of Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution and the short order reported as Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 488) to discard the 10 votes cast by the members of a political party on the direction of the Party Head was erroneous since the said direction was issued by an unauthorised person namely, the Party Head contrary to the express language of Article 63A(1)(b)

Consequently, on account of the inclusion of the 10 votes, the petitioner having secured 186 votes as opposed to the respondent candidate's 179 votes was declared the duly elected Chief Minister, and the Provincial Governor was directed to administer oath of office to the petitioner and on his failure to do so the President may administer such oath to the petitioner

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

'Prohibition Order' issued by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ('PEMRA') forbidding all Satellite TV Channel Licencees from telecasting anything 'against state institutions' and from discussing the conduct of the sitting judges of High Court and Supreme Court, in any manner

Constitutionality

No Court should try any question and also pass order thereon which is not directly and substantially in issue in a case pending before it

In the present case the question relating to the validity of the Prohibition Order was neither raised in the pleadings nor agitated by any lawyer during the proceedings of the case, on the contrary, it was brought under discussion by a Member of the present Bench and copies of the Prohibition Order was also presented by his Law Clerk to the other Members of the Bench, the Attorney General and to counsel for a party

In fact, no party was on notice to address on this question

PEMRA was also not in attendance to present the rationale of the Prohibition Order

Question relating to the Prohibition Order is not related to the issue involved in the present case, and thus, it cannot be brought under debate, nor can any conclusion be drawn thereon

Therefore, the principle of fairness obliges the members of the present Bench not to express a definite opinion on the question of the Prohibition Order until all concerned have had an opportunity of being heard.

Neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 grant to the Chief Justice (or to the Registrar) the power to make special benches, select Judges who will be on these benches and decide the cases which they will hear - Furthermore, there is also no additional, incidental, ancillary, or residual power with the Chief Justice which could be used to do this

When benches are tailored and Judges of a particular understanding or inclination are placed together to hear a particular case, then doubts, suspicion, and misgivings arise

Decision from an adjudicatory process, which is perceived to be structured to obtain a particular decision, invariably results in severe criticism

Such matter assumes criticality when objections taken on the constitution of Special Benches, and requests made for hearing by the Full Court, are not attended to, and no order disposing of such objections and requests is passed.

Fundamental right of fair trial which the Constitution guarantees is violated if any accused is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness deposing against him

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and the Trial Court was directed to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.

In determining the constitutionality of a levy it is its substance that will be considered, regardless of the name or label attached to it.

Double taxation is not beyond the scope of the relevant legislature, if in substance the levy in question is otherwise properly within its domain

Correct rule is that there is a very strong presumption against double taxation and a heavy burden is cast on the State to show that it has been resorted to

However, if the language of the statute is otherwise clear then the levy cannot be declared unconstitutional on such basis.

Appointments in BPS-17, as per law, made under Art. 242 of the Constitution, had to be made by the Provincial Public Service Commission, therefore, no contract employment could have been made on the posts in question

Appointments of the petitioners were on their very face illegal and, therefore, no right whatsoever existed with the petitioners to continue with the employment, more so, when the very contract appointments were not in accordance with law

Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.

In the present case, the requirements regarding consultation process as stated in the Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the precedents of the superior Courts were not fulfilled

Consultation had not been made in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of Art. 43(2-A) of the Constitution and the dictum laid down by the superior Courts

Supreme Court declared the appointments of the respondent-Judges, as ultra vires the Constitution and without lawful authority, but directed that validity shall be given to all the acts done by them as Judges on the basis of principle of de-facto doctrine including the drawing of the financial benefits etc.; and that the appointing authority shall initiate the fresh process for appointment against the vacant positions strictly in the light of the guidelines given in Muhammad Younas Tahir's case (PLD 2012 SC AJ&K 42).

Held, that the President receiving advice of the Council without completion of the consultative process with the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Chief Justice of the High Court was unconstitutional

On the basis of such advice no one could be validly appointed as a Judge of the High Court

For appointment of the appellant as Judge of the High Court, the advice of the Council was tendered without consultation of the Chief Justice of the High Court

Furthermore the record showed that when the Chief Justice of the High Court was consulted, he simply replied to the President that the appellant qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court and there was nothing against him in the official record

Such reply could not be termed as effective, meaningful, purposive and consensus-oriented consultation as it did not disclose whether the appellant was comparatively suitable or preferable or had such comparative qualities to be preferred among others

Appointment of the appellant as Judge of the High Court and thereafter as Chief Justice of the High Court was set-aside.

Given the fact that the legislature itself was subservient to the Constitution, a non-obstante clause could not be deemed to override the provisions of the Constitution itself

Section 4 of the Act of 2010 (non-obstante clause) also excludes the application of the judgments of the Supreme Court or any High Court

Effect of the non-obstante clause, was, in essence, to nullify a judgment of the Supreme Court, but a legislature could not destroy, annul, set aside, vacate, reverse, modify, or impair a final judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction

Section 4 of the Act of 2010 (non-obstante clause) failed to provide unfettered protection to the said Act and was rendered ineffective through the very judicial pronouncement it sought to oust.

Legislation put in place by the competent legislature for redressal of under representation of any class or area in the service of Pakistan was neither ultra vires nor violated Art. 27(1) of the Constitution.

Appointments in BPS-17, as per law, made under Art. 242 of the Constitution, had to be made by the Provincial Public Service Commission, therefore, no contract employment could have been made on the posts in question

Appointments of the petitioners were on their very face illegal and, therefore, no right whatsoever existed with the petitioners to continue with the employment, more so, when the very contract appointments were not in accordance with law

Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.

Person having dual nationality was neither ineligible nor barred from appointment as a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM)

Counsel for petitioner conceded that disqualifications mentioned in Arts. 62 & 63 of the Constitution were not attracted to the case of SAPMs

Special Assistants to the Prime Minister (SAPMs) were neither members of the Cabinet nor Parliamentarians or persons in the 'Service of Pakistan'

Person did not have to be a Parliamentarians in order to be appointed as SAPM

Post of SAPM was neither the creation of the Constitution nor could it be termed as a constitutional post

In view of the fact that the qualifications and antecedents for appointment of a SAPM were neither mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Rules of Business, 1973 it appeared to have been left at the discretion of the Prime Minister on the basis of his subjective assessment about the ability of a person to perform the functions that the Prime Minister required him to perform for such appointment

Further in view of absence of a settled criteria, standards or benchmarks, it was not possible to test the qualifications, antecedents and experience of incumbent SAPMs against such standards, therefore, it was appropriate to defer to the judgment and discretion of the Prime Minister in the hope that such discretion had been and shall in future be exercised in a fair, transparent and unbiased manner in the interest of better and more efficient functioning of the affairs of the Government

Supreme Court, however, observed that the Parliament may at an appropriate time consider laying down some criteria, minimum standards, educational qualifications, fields of expertise and levels of experience for appointment as Special Assistants to the Prime Minister in order to ensure that the exercise of discretion by the Prime Minister in such regard was properly structured, streamlined, circumscribed and systemized

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

In the judgment under review while interpreting Entry No.51 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List contained in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the majority took a view contrary to that of a Bench of co-equal strength expressed in Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Petroleum and Natural Resources v. Durrani Ceramic (2014 SCMR 1630 : PLD 2015 SC 354: 2014 PTD 2016) ('the Durrani Ceramic case') by stating that "the National Assembly was fully competent to impose tax on natural gas through a Money Bill on the strength of Entry No. 51 of the Federal Legislative List."

Said finding was against settled principles of the law of precedent and needed to be recalled

Review petitions were allowed.

Powers of Food Safety Officer (FSO) to impose fines, issue Improvement Notice or issue Emergency Prohibition Orders under the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 ('the 2011 Act')

Constitutionality

All said powers enjoyed by the FSO provided a supporting remedial forum for the aggrieved party

Said powers and their corresponding provisions in the 2011 Act not only met the requirement of Art.10A of the Constitution regarding fair trial and due process, but they also gave the FSO the choice to make risk analysis and then adopt a proper risk management strategy by either issuing a Notice of Improvement or imposing a fine or taking a more stern action by seizing the food item which contravened the provisions of the 2011 Act or if the risk to human health was imperative, to issue Emergency Prohibition Order and restrain the food operator from carrying on food business under S. 18 of the 2011 Act

The enforcement interventions by the FSO under the 2011 Act were laid out in a manner that highlighted the concept of proportionality and must be applied in such spirit on case to case basis.

Given the fact that the legislature itself was subservient to the Constitution, a non-obstante clause could not be deemed to override the provisions of the Constitution itself

Section 4 of the Act of 2010 (non-obstante clause) also excludes the application of the judgments of the Supreme Court or any High Court

Effect of the non-obstante clause, was, in essence, to nullify a judgment of the Supreme Court, but a legislature could not destroy, annul, set aside, vacate, reverse, modify, or impair a final judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction

Section 4 of the Act of 2010 (non-obstante clause) failed to provide unfettered protection to the said Act and was rendered ineffective through the very judicial pronouncement it sought to oust.

Legislation put in place by the competent legislature for redressal of under representation of any class or area in the service of Pakistan was neither ultra vires nor violated Art. 27(1) of the Constitution.

Notification providing that remissions were not available to prisoners convicted of heinous crimes (murder, espionage, etc.)

Constitutionality

Accused/petitioner was charged for murder and was awarded death sentence by Trial Court, however, in appeal, the death sentence was converted into life imprisonment, which was upheld by the Supreme Court and attained finality

Petitioner sought remission in his sentence on account of his educational qualification acquired in jail

Scope

Notification through which special remissions had been granted itself categorized the applicability of the remissions to a particular class of prisoners

Since, there was an intelligible differentia and substantial distinction between the two classes of convicted prisoners, as the President of Pakistan had excluded the applicability of remissions to those convicted prisoners who were involved in heinious crimes, therefore, petitioners was not at par with the ordinary prisoners

Presidential remission under Art. 45 of the Constitution would not be applicable to the prisoners who had been specifically excluded by the Notifications granting remissions

Constitutional petition having no merits was dismissed, in circumstances.

Whether the Tribunal performed judicial functions and was a court or tribunal in terms of Art. 175 or 212 of the Constitution

[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J (Minority view) Competition Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') exercised quasi-judicial functions but it was neither a 'court' as contemplated under Art. 175 of the Constitution nor a tribunal as provided under Art. 212 of the Constitution

Subject of enlargement of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Federal Legislative List ('the FLL'), was a subject which exclusively fell within Parliament's domain, so Parliament could confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, by law, if the Constitution permitted it

If Parliament could make a law on the subject of competition to regulate trade, commerce and industry, it could also confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court on the said subject

Joint reading of Arts. 175(2) & 184(3) of the Constitution with Entry 55 of Part I of the FLL, showed that Ss. 43 & 44 of the 2010 Act were not ultra vires the Constitution

Federal Government should take all necessary steps to issue the required rules as per S. 43(3) of the 2010 Act with respect to the terms and conditions of service of the members of Tribunal]

[Per Shahid Jameel Khan, J; Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J agreeing (Majority view): Jurisdiction of Competition Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') was to determine disputes relating to rights and liabilities, recognized by the Constitution and law, by discovering the relevant facts in light of the evidence produced by the parties in their presence, therefore, it was a judicial tribunal, and its separation and independence from the Executive was mandatory under the constitutional command

Provisions of S. 43 of the Competition Act, 2010, to the extent of appointment of Chairperson, Members and financial control by the Executive, were ultra vires the Constitution.

Transfer of certain hospitals and a national museum from the Federation to the Provinces in light of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution

Constitutionality

Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, Karachi ("JPMC"); National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, Karachi ("NICVD"); National Institute of Child Health, Karachi ("NICH"); National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi ("NMP"); and Sheikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institute, Lahore ("SZPMI")

[Per Ijaz ul Ahsan, J (Majority view): Transfer of said Institutions from the Federal to the Provincial Government was unconstitutional, in that the Institutions did not fall within the Concurrent Legislative List as required by Cl. (8) read with Cl. (9) of Art. 270AA of the Constitution

Implementation Commission, which was constituted to implement and give effect to the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, went beyond its constitutional mandate in such regard

Consequently, any purported transfer/devolution of the said Institutions (to the Provinces) by the Federal Government and the subsequent notifications and orders issued pursuant thereto were unlawful and of no legal effect

Order accordingly.

Transfer of certain hospitals and a national museum from the Federation to the Provinces in light of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution

Constitutionality

Supreme Court declared the transfer/devolution of Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, Karachi ("JPMC"); National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, Karachi ("NICVD"); National Institute of Child Health, Karachi ("NICH"); National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi ("NMP"); and, Sheikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institute, Lahore ("SZPMI") (to the Provinces) to be unconstitutional, without lawful authority and of no legal effect and gave certain directions to that effect.

Transfer of certain hospitals and a national museum from the Federation to the Provinces in light of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution

Constitutionality

Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, Karachi ("JPMC"); National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, Karachi ("NICVD"); National Institute of Child Health, Karachi ("NICH"); National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi ("NMP"); and, Sheikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institute, Lahore ("SZPMI")

[Per Ijaz ul Ahsan, J (Majority view): Entry No.16 of Part I to Fourth Schedule of the Constitution ('Entry No. 16' of the Federal Legislative List) had two basic requirements; first, the agency or institute in question must be "federal"; and second, such federal agency or institute must be for the purposes of research, professional training, technical training, or the promotion of special studies

Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, Karachi ("JPMC") was a federal agency/institute and therefore satisfied the first limb of Entry No.16 of the Federal Legislative List

As regards the second limb, the hospital and institute aspects of 'JPMC' were interdependent and mutually supporting

Bearing in mind that legislative lists ought to be construed liberally and be given the widest amplitude possible, 'JPMC' did fall within Entry No.16

National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, Karachi ("NICVD") was also a federal agency/institute

Research/training aspect of 'NICVD' was not ancillary or incidental to the functioning of the hospital and therefore, it too fell within Entry No.16

Admittedly, the National Institute of Child Health, Karachi ("NICH") was separated from JPMC in the year 1990 and made an attached department of the Federal Ministry of Health, thereby satisfying the first limb of Entry No.16 being a federal agency/ institute

While NICH had hospital facilities, it was an established fact that it was also a teaching/training institute offering various degrees/diplomas including 'FCPS', 'MCPS', nursing programs and paramedical courses

Furthermore, 'NICH' also had facilities for clinical research, resulting in the production of numerous research papers in the relevant field

Like 'JPMC' and 'NICVD', such aspects as a whole brought 'NICH' within the purview of the second limb of Entry No.16

Prior to its purported transfer/devolution, National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi ("NMP"), was a museum controlled/ financed by the Federation and therefore squarely fell within the ambit of Entry No.15 of Part I to Fourth Schedule of the Constitution

In any case, there was no relevant entry in the Concurrent Legislative List within which 'NMP' would fall

Features of the 'Resolution' dated 29.05.1986 through which the Sheikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institute, Lahore ("SZPMI") was established made it clear beyond any doubt that it was a federal agency/institute in terms of Entry No.16 of the Federal Legislative List

Objectives/functions of the 'SZPMI' as identified in the Resolution showed that it had a predominant research/training aspect which was far from ancillary or incidental to the functioning of Sheikh Zayed Hospital, Lahore and therefore, without any doubt 'SZPMI' fell within Entry No.16

Besides, at the time of the purported transfer to the Province, the administrative control of 'SZPMI' along with its staff and equipment vested with the (Federal) Ministry of Health and was given to the Cabinet Division, therefore falling strictly within the domain of the Federal Government (i.e. Cabinet Division), it could not have been transferred to the Provincial Government through the impugned notification which mentioned that the "Prime Minister has been pleased to order transfer of administrative control of…" 'SZPMI' to the Provincial Government

Prime Minister alone did not have the power or authority to make such transfer without the approval of the Federal Cabinet

Even otherwise there was nothing on record to indicate that the said transfer was approved by the Federal Cabinet

Transfer of 'SZPMI' to the Province was clearly in excess of the powers available to the Prime Minister under the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Business, 1973

Entry No.37 of the Federal Legislative List allowed the Federal Government to exercise its executive authority with respect to works, lands and buildings vested in it or in its possession (apart from military, naval or air force works) but with a caveat, that if such works, lands and buildings were situated in a Province, then they shall be subject to Provincial legislation unless Federal law provided for otherwise

Intention behind the 18th Amendment to the Constitution could not have been to prevent the Federal Government from opening healthcare facilities in any of the Provinces, for concluding so would be tantamount to attributing absurdity to a constitutional provision

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Continuation of Laws in the Erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas Act (XXIV of 2019), Preamble

Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011, Regln. 11 & Chapt. V

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance (V of 2019), S. 11 & Preamble

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, Art. 9(4)

Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 8, 9, 10, 10A, 15, 17, 19 & 25 & Fourth Sched., Pt.1, Sr. No. 1-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 61

Internment centers operating in erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Constitutionality

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance, 2019, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Continuation of Laws in the Erstwhile Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Act, 2018, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Continuation of Laws in the Erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas Act, 2019 coupled with Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011 were ultra vires of the Constitution

High Court directed the relevant Provincial Secretary to notify all the Internment Centers, as Sub-Jails in accordance with law and Provincial Inspector General of Police was directed to take control of all such sub-jails so declared

Constitutional petitions were allowed with certain directions.