Restoration
Restoration legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Respondent/returned candidate resisted restoration on the plea that Election Tribunal had become functus officio after dismissal of petition and remedy was to file an appeal before the Supreme Court
Validity
Right of appeal has not been expressly provided under S. 145(1) Elections Act, 2017
Rejection made after application of judicial mind constitutes a "final decision" and thus attracts appellate mechanism under S. 155 of Elections Act, 2017
Where a judicial determination terminates lis before Election Tribunal, it cannot be excluded from the ambit of a "decision" merely due to absence of express language
Dismissal in default is procedural termination/disposal of matter without application of judicial mind, leaving room for the petitioner to revert back and seek restoration of the petition by invoking inherent powers of the Tribunal, subject to show sufficient cause
Such procedural terminations do not constitute a final decision
Deliberate use of term "final decision" in S. 155 of Elections Act, 2017 reinforces and supports such interpretation
Provisions of Elections Act, 2017 aim at ensuring expeditious and effective adjudication of election disputes and such legislative objective is advanced - not defeated, by recognizing Tribunal's authority to restore petitions dismissed for non-prosecution, provided sufficient cause is shown
In the present cause list of cases of counsel for applicant exhibited that he was busy before other Bench of High Court on the fateful day
Medical certificate of applicant reflected that he was suffering from respiratory problem
When main petition was dismissed in December, 2024, there was smog and/or fog across the province and such respiratory problem had become severe, making it difficult for a patient suffering from respiratory disease to travel
Application was well within time and duly supported by affidavit and no serious objection was raised from the other side
Election Tribunal set aside the order dismissing election petition for non-prosecution and restored the same
Application was allowed.
Conduct of the applicant/ petitioner and his counsel showed their disinterest in pursuing the case and delaying/lingering on the matter without any plausible justification
Order of dismissal can be set aside by the court if the applicant satisfies the court as to sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called for hearing and if the court has come to the conclusion that there is sufficient cause for non-appearance of the party, it may pass an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit
Although the term sufficient cause has not been defined in CPC nor can a specific yardstick be put in place for determining what constitutes sufficient cause and what does not, it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be left to the judicial conscience of the court to make and form assessment as to whether the cause disclosed by the applicant is a reason good enough to satisfy the court that it was beyond the reasonable control of the party concerned to appear before the court on the date fixed for hearing
In the present case reasons mentioned in the application were based on unspecific, vague and generalized assertions, which could not by any stretch of the language be termed as sufficient cause
No sufficient cause or reason of non-appearance of the applicant or his counsel was mentioned in the application
Application for restoration was dismissed, in circumstances.
Provision of S. 68-A of Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, specifically related to powers of Divisional Canal Officer and procedure to restore uninterrupted supply of water
Divisional Canal Officer was authorized under S. 64-A of Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, on an application, to conduct enquiry, as he deemed necessary, and could order interim restoration of dismantled water-course
High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as relevant law was available to redress grievance of petitioner and the matter fell within the domain of Divisional Canal Officer
Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Despite two opportunities having been given to her to bring the child to the Court, she failed and she wished to keep the child "underground" and intended to hide herself from red warrants issued against her
Respondent/mother of minor was not a fit person to take care of the best interests of the minor
High Court directed respondent/mother to hand over custody of the minor to petitioner/father or concerned authorities acting on his behalf, and the concerned authorities shall also afford all facilities to petitioner/father to take the child back to US
High Court further directed that in case respondent/mother wished to follow suit, appropriate facilities also be provided to her as and when requested
Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.
Suit filed by appellant/Bank was dismissed due to its absence on the date it was fixed for attendance of respondents/defendants
Validity
Suit could not be dismissed, if date was not for hearing
Such dismissal had no legal effect and there was no limitation to run against such order, which was void, a nullity and not permissible
Such order of dismissal could be set aside by invoking provision of S. 151 C.P.C.
No limitation provided elsewhere in Limitation Act, 1908 or under S. 151, C.P.C., therefore, in the light of Art. 181 of Limitation Act, 1908, period of three years was available for such type of applications
Appellant/Bank moved application for restoration of the suit and condonation of delay which was supported by affidavit and there was no reason for Banking Court to disbelieve that affidavit
Law favours adjudication on merits and dismissal for non-prosecution should be an exception and not a rule
Court was not to be very strict in such regard
Litigant was not to be deprived of hearing unless there has been something equivalent to misconduct or gross negligence on his part
High Court set aside the order passed by Banking Court as there was no such finding against appellant/ Bank and suit was restored
Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.
Counsel for the petitioner had admitted in his application that he was well aware about the date of the fixation of captioned petition but he could not inform the petitioner as he had gone to his native place where according to him sometimes telephone signals remained unavailable
Stance taken by the counsel for the petitioner about his absence did not carry any weight and it was his professional obligation that he should have informed the petitioner about the date and it was for the petitioner to be vigilant in pursuing his case
Application for restoration of constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Within Civil Procedure Code, 1908, time frames are provided to regulate cycle of a dispute that enters adjudicatory process
If such time frames are not abided by, the cost inflicted on public interest is debilitating
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, confers penal powers on Court to enforce prescribed time lines to move along adjudication of suit in order to conclude proceedings within a reasonable period of time
Entire scheme is meant to ensure that justice is delivered according to law within time lines prescribed by law
Order of restoration of suit absolved respondent / plaintiff of his obligation to establish sufficient cause as required under O.IX, R.9, C.P.C.
Trial Court did not bring into consideration the question of whether or not respondent / plaintiff had sufficient cause for his non-appearance while allowing his application
Trial Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction under law
Trial Court was under obligation to apply test of sufficient cause and had documented its reasons as to why its conscience was satisfied that non-appearance of respondent / plaintiff before Trial Court on date fixed was excusable in accordance with law
High Court set aside order restoring the suit and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on application
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990, with regard to Reference to High Court could not be equated with powers of Appellate Court
Under scheme of Sales Tax Act, 1990, there was no power with High Court to dismiss Reference for non-prosecution
High Court was to adjudicate Reference on merits, made to it by an aggrieved person or an appropriate government authority
Once Reference was made, it had to be answered on its own merits and not to be dismissed for non-prosecution
If there was no provision for restoration of Reference dismissed for non-prosecution, then it was equally true that there was no provision for dismissal of Reference for non-prosecution
Petitioner had lingered on proceedings for a long period of about 7 years for no plausible justification
Petitioner wanted to enjoy fruits of interim order passed on first date of hearing i.e. 22-4-2010
High Court keeping in view the deliberate negligence on the part of petitioner, burdened the petitioner with heavy cost
High Court set aside order in question and restored Reference for decision on merits
Application was allowed in circumstances.
Order passed by Banking Court dismissing suit for non-prosecution partook character of an intermediate order which related to procedure and not to substance of dispute involved in the case
Such order, by its very nature, could not finally dispose of rights of parties on merits and also did not deal with ancillary and incidental matters
Powers were granted to Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to dismiss for non-prosecution any suit in which plaintiff had not appeared and a remedy was also provided to delinquent plaintiff to approach to court for recall of such order in case he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing on appointed date
Such order and remedy provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 related purely to procedure and did not entail any adjudication by court on rights of parties
Order dismissing suit for non-prosecution was not within definition of 'final order' as contemplated by S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001
Bar contained in S. 27 read with S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 could not have any application for excluding powers that inhered in Banking Court to make use of provisions of O. IX, R.9, C.P.C. for recalling of an order dismissing suit for non-prosecution
Term 'final order' appearing in S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 should, therefore, be interpreted in a manner that was consistent with scope, context and principle for which Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was promulgated
Order through which suit or application for leave to defend was dismissed for non-prosecution did not fall in either of the two categories of orders and such was an intermediate order which fell in between the two
Bar contained in S. 27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was not applicable to such kind of intermediate orders
Banking Court as defined in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had necessary power to allow application to restore suit/application for leave to defend dismissed for non-prosecution on sufficient grounds being shown for non-appearance of counsel/party in terms of O. IX, R. 9, C.P.C.
Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Contention of petitioners was that their counsel, without any authority or permission got recorded his statement for withdrawal of the suit
Validity
Counsel for the applicants was duly appointed counsel in the suit, who was vested with the authority to do any act on their behalf
Statement of counsel was recorded who appended his signature in token of correctness of the same
Said statement was binding upon the applicants in circumstances
Authority of a pleader duly appointed by a person to act on his/her behalf in a Court would be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or pleader and filed in Court or until client or the pleader died or until all proceedings in the suit ended
Party was bound by the statement of his counsel unless there was contrary in the power of attorney placing restriction on the authority of counsel to compromise or abandon the claim on behalf of his client
Suit was decided with the consent of the parties on the basis of statement of counsel for the applicants
Such a consenting order/decree was not appealable in terms of S.96, C.P.C.
Appeal against the order of withdrawal of suit was not maintainable in circumstances
Nothing was on record that statement recorded by the counsel on behalf of applicants lacked authority
Presumption of truth was attached to the judicial proceedings which could not be altered or swayed at the whims of the parties
Applicants had approached the Court with mala fide intention and their act of accusing their duly appointed counsel would give a bad taste to the legal profession
Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the applicants
No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned orders passed by the Courts below
Revision was dismissed with costs in circumstances.
Contention of appellant was misconceived as time for readmission of appeal for non-prosecution was 30 days as provided under Art.168 of Limitation Act, 1908
In the present case, after about 14 months, application for restoration was filed and nothing had come on record if the court-fees amount was paid to advocate
Affidavit of counsel for the appellant showed that brothers and sisters of appellant were ready to pay court fee, which legally could not be allowed after a long period of about more than three years from the date of preferring appeal
For seeking condonation of delay sufficient cause was to be shown for default and each day's delay was to be explained before the court which had not been done
High Court declined to condone the delay in filing restoration application and consider application filed by appellant for payment of court-fee
Application was dismissed in circumstances.
Section 72 of the Ordinance had provided powers to the Election Tribunal for dismissal of election petition for non-appearance of petitioner but no provisions to set aside such order had been stipulated in the Ordinance
Election petition was fixed for evidence but neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before the Election Tribunal
Petitioner was required to furnish sufficient cause for his non-appearance when petition was called for hearing
Non-appearance of counsel for the petitioner had not been explained in the application for restoration of election petition
Such non-appearance of counsel for the petitioner was deliberate and wilful which did not constitute a sufficient cause
Application for restoration of petition was not worth consideration as counsel for petitioner could not furnish sufficient cause for his non-appearance
Election Tribunal was not vested with the powers to restore an election petition dismissed for default of appearance of petitioner
Application for restoration of election petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Plaintiff would be obliged to show sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance and explain delay of each and every day
Principles.
Connotation.
Connotation.
Plaintiff would be obliged to show sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance and explain delay of each and every day
Principles.
Grievance of petitioner was that supply of her domestic Sui-gas was disconnected on the ground that it was being used as commercial
Validity
Dispute of petitioner required factual inquiry as to whether petitioner was using domestic gas connection for commercial purposes and in constitutional jurisdiction detailed inquiry could not be undertaken
Provisions of Complaint Resolution Procedure Regulations, 2003, provided for an adequate remedy to petitioner in relation to her dispute of wrongful disconnection of service in supply of gas
Remedy of statutory appeal was adequate and effective and there was no basis to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court
Petition could not be decided without factual inquiry on the issue whether petitioner was using domestic connection for commercial purposes and also because an efficacious and adequate remedy was available to petitioner, which she might avail, if so desired
High Court declined to interfere in the matter
Petition was dismissed in circumstances.
"Restoration", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124938897
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Restoration"
2012 C L C 229
Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys and 2 others — Appellants Versus Messrs PLASTIC PACK (PVT) LIMITED and 4 others — Respondents
Court: Sindh2012 C L D 239
Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys and 2 others — Appellants Versus Messrs PLASTIC PACK (PVT) LIMITED and 4 others — Respondents
Court: Sindh2022 C L C 2007
AKHTAR HUSSAIN through Special Power of Attorney — Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD JAMAL and 4 others — Respondent
Court: LahoreP L D 1961 W P (Rev
NOOR MUHAMMAD‑Appellant Versus THE STATE‑Respondent
Court:P L D 1992 Karachi 329
HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION‑‑Applicant Versus Mrs. SARWAR JEHAN‑‑Respondent
Court: ‑‑‑‑ Art. 181 ‑‑‑ Applicability ‑‑‑ Application. for restoration of revision applica tion ‑‑‑ No limitation prescribed for application for restoration of revision application ‑‑‑ Residuary Art. 181, Limitation Act,. 1908, which prescribes limitation of three years from date when right to sue accrued would be applicable in application for restoration of revision.‑‑Limitation Revision2004 C L D 920
MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED‑‑‑Appellant Versus TARIQ SAEED and another ‑‑‑Respondents
Court: Lahore2016 S C M R 2082
INAYAT BIBI — Petitioner Versus REHANA KAUSAR through L.Rs. and others — Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan1985 C L C 1063
SHARAFAT ALI-Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD BOOTA and another-Respondents
Court: Lahore2010 Y L R 170
IRFANUDDIN — Plaintiff Versus PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. — Defendant
Court: Karachi1984 P L C 1664
MUHAMMAD MUNIR Versus BASHIR TANNERIES LTD.
Court: Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab