Precedential value

Earlier decision of a bench of a High Court, or of the Supreme Court, on a question of law is binding on another bench of equal numeric strength when dealing with the same question, in the sense that the latter bench cannot decide the same question contrary to the first decision

However, the latter bench is not precluded from examining the correctness of the earlier decision or forming a different view

In such a case, the proper course of action is to refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court, or in the case of the Supreme Court to the Bench-Constitution Committee, with a request for the constitution of a larger bench to examine the correctness of the earlier decision and, if necessary, to reconsider and redecide the question.

Plurality opinion lacks the support of the majority; and this has a decisive effect on its precedential value.

Said principles are exceptions to the doctrine of precedent and permit the Court to overrule the ratio decidendi of the incorrect decision (per incuriam) or to ignore the same (sub silentio).

Leave-refusing order which neither decides any question of law nor enunciates any principle of law in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution does not constitute binding precedent

Impression that a leave-refusing order endorses the statements of law made in the impugned orders and thus enhances the status of those statements as that of the Supreme Court is fallacious

Such impression is based on inference drawn from the leave-refusing orders, while 'a case is only an authority for what it actually decides' and cannot be cited as a precedent for a proposition that may be inferred from it.

Important to distinguish between two types of short orders; those, which decided the question of law in clear and operative terms, and others which only adjudicated the matter and no question of law was clarified in terms of Arts.189 & 201 of the Constitution

Short orders covered under the first category had precedential value, however, those falling under the second had none.

Order refusing leave was not an enunciation of law.

Order granting and/or refusing leave which did not lay down a rule of law should not be followed necessarily and imperatively, however such an order might be shown obeisance on the basis of propriety provided it was strictly in line with the clear mandate and true spirit of law and did not impinge the rules of justice.