Intra Court Appeal

Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court declaring sub clause (d) of Notification SRO No.77(I) of 2013 dated 07-2-2013 illegal and not in consonance with the decision of Economic Coordination Committee

Validity

Power envisaged under S. 3(4) of Federal Excise Act, 2005 was of an executive and fiscal in nature, conferred exclusively upon the "the Board with the approval of the Federal Minister In-charge," as was the position in the relevant year, 2013

As such the provision empowered the Board, not subordinate officers, through notification concerning the levy, exemption, or modification of excise duties

No policy-making authority was delegated under S. 3(4) of Federal Excise Act, 2005 to Commissioner Inland Revenue

No express authorization was granted to the Commissioner Inland Revenue to challenge judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court, nor was any sanction obtained from competent authority i.e., Federal Government/Revenue Division or any other concerned authority for filing of instant Intra-Court Appeal

Notification SRO No.77(I) of 2013 dated 07-2-2013 was issued specifically to enhance and facilitate export of sugar in accordance with the policy approved by Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the Cabinet

Reliance placed by appellant on notification SRO No.767(I)/2009 dated 04-9-2009 was misplaced and legally untenable, which pertained to general export regulation under Export Policy Order, 2009, and did not conflict with the fiscal incentive framework or policy direction approved by ECC with respect to sugar exports

Provision of notification SRO No.767(I)/2009 dated 04-9-2009 could not serve as a legal basis for the inclusion of clause (d) in notification SRO No.77(I) of 2013 dated 07-2-2013

Judge in Chambers of High Court rightly set aside sub-clause (d) of notification SRO No.77(I) of 2013 dated 07-2-2013 inserted by FBR, holding it inconsistent with the ECC decision and beyond the powers conferred under S. 3(4) of Federal Excise Act, 2005

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as the appeal was not filed by a competent person/authority and the same was not maintainable in the eyes of law

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Authorities withdrew appointment letter of respondent / candidate on the plea that his height was not up to the required criteria

Judge in Chambers of High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction directed the authorities to issue appointment letter to respondent / candidate in view of dictum laid down in case titled Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017

Validity

Mere recommendation of Punjab Public Service Commission was not enough to secure appointment as certification under R. 12.16 of Police Rules, 1934 was mandatory

Respondent / candidate did not assume a vested right in his favour as verification of physical standards was condition precedent to such appointments

Order passed by High Court in case titled Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017 had been rendered without reference to the applicable statutory provisions and was in disregard to relevant legal framework, as such the same was per incuriam

Case relied upon by Judge in Chambers of High Court did not constitute a binding precedent and could not be relied upon

Full Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as the same was founded on reasoning adopted in Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017, which judgment could not be sustained in law

Intra Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Order in question was passed on 27-09-2023 and appellants without waiting for its certified copy filed appeal within twenty days

Seal affixed at opening form reflected that it was diarized on 17-10-2023 upon receiving sanction letter from Solicitor Department

After removal of objections including but not limited to submission of Court fee and attestation of affidavits, Intra Court Appeal was re-submitted on 23-10-2023

Respondent raised objection to maintainability of Intra Court Appeal barred by limitation

Validity

Intra Court Appeal was not barred by time

Objection was overruled in circumstances.

Appellants / plaintiffs filed suit for possession, declaration, partition and injunction regarding an ancestral house to the extent of their shares whereas respondents / defendants claimed to be owners having sale deed registered in their favour

Suit was rejected by Judge in Chambers of High Court on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation as the same was filed beyond period of three years from registration of sale deed

Validity

Matter pertained to entitlement of appellants / plaintiffs to have the instrument cancelled and it was not dependent upon knowledge of litigant about registration of the instrument

There was an agreement that was executed by three brothers as sons of deceased i.e. appellants / plaintiffs and respondent / defendant

Agreement was available on file and was signed by one appellant / plaintiff for self and on behalf of other two brothers

Defiance of such understanding could be a cause of triggering time under Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908 entitling appellants / plaintiffs to have the instrument cancelled

Division Bench of High Court set aside order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as such aspect of the matter was not at all considered while rejecting the plaint

Division Bench of High Court remanded the matter to Judge in Chambers of High Court for decision afresh on merits after framing of issues

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Objection was raised by respondents on maintainability of Intra Court Appeal against order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court

Validity

If original statute governing dispute already gives a remedy of appeal, revision or review and despite that remedy a Constitutional petition was filed then the order of Judge in Chambers of High Court in such Constitutional petition cannot be further appealed before Division Bench of High Court

Object of proviso to S.3 (2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is to prevent a second layer of appeal within High Court where the statute itself already provides an appellate or revisional remedy

Such provision discourages bypassing statutory forms and prevents multiplication of proceedings

In the present case one of the essential preconditions for attracting the bar was missing, namely that the law applicable provided at least one appeal, revision or review against original order

General rule under S.3 (2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 remained operative and Intra Court Appeal was maintainable

Objection was overruled in circumstances.

Right to pension flows from statute and the terms of service, not from subjective assessment by authorities, of employee's litigious conduct

Act of approaching Courts for redressal of grievances cannot be equated with misconduct warranting forfeiture of pensionary entitlements

Authorities failed to provide any substantive explanation for withholding pension, coupled with reliance on irrelevant and extraneous factors, which reflected complete disregard of its legal obligations and rendered its report devoid of evidentiary or legal value

Judicial forums exist precisely to examine and rectify allegations of illegality, arbitrariness or denial of rights

Courts are guardians of constitutional guarantees and it is their solemn obligation to hear grievances of aggrieved persons and to adjudicate them in accordance with law

Label of "habitual litigant" could not be employed to deprive a citizen of his pensionary benefits, nor could it relieve public authority of its duty to act fairly promptly, and in compliance with legal framework

Appellant / retired civil servant acted within his lawful rights and the matter raised concerned pensionary benefits, entitlements that were recognized as vested and enforceable

Division Bench of High Court set aside the judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as the same was not justified

Division Bench of High Court directed the authorities to forthwith process and release pensionary benefits of appellant/retired civil servant, in accordance with law, from the date the benefits had become due, along with all arrears accruing thereon

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

If a law dealing with original proceedings offers a remedy of appeal, revision, or review, then the right to file Intra Court Appeal (ICA) before the High Court is barred

It is immaterial whether the aggrieved person actually availed the remedy or not, what matters is the legal availability of such remedy under the law.

Matter pertained to occurrence of 09-05-2023, whereby followers of a political party ransacked/attacked military installations situated in cantonment areas in different cities of Pakistan

Supreme Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, declared the provisions of sections 2(1)(d)(i), (ii) & 59(4) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ultra vires the Constitution and of no legal effect

Validity

The Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ('PAA') is a disciplinary statute, relates to members of the Armed Forces, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the maintenance of discipline amongst them, as provided by clause (a) of sub-Article (3) of Article 8 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ('Constitution'), hence, does not offer fundamental rights to persons under the military discipline

To the contrary, clause (d) added to subsection (1) of section 2 of the PAA relates to persons not otherwise subject to the PAA ('Civilians')

It does not relate to members of the Armed Forces, nor serves the aforesaid purpose, as provided by sub-clause (a) of sub-Article (3) of Article 8 of the Constitution, as such, it does not qualify for exemption from fundamental rights, hence, cannot be retained as part of the PAA

Article 175 of the Constitution provides the establishment and jurisdiction of courts

It requires that in order to fully secure the independence of judiciary, it must be separated from executive in all respects

The courts martial comprising of executive, being outside the scope of Article 175(3) of the Constitution cannot prosecute the civilians

The trial of civilians by courts martial offends the fundamental principle of independence of judiciary, fundamental rights of security of person, safeguard as to arrest and detention, fair trial and due process, right to information, equality of citizens and Injunctions of Islam, as guaranteed by Articles 2A, 9, 10, 10A, 19A, 25 and 227(1) of the Constitution, respectively

Denial of right of appeal to civilians against the conviction and sentence by courts martial before an independent and impartial forum is also violative of fundamental right of fair trial and due process

The trial of civilians by courts martial presided over by active military officers, is violative of the recognized covenants of the United Nations Human Rights Commission ('UNHRC') as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 ('ICCPR') and treaties, to which Pakistan is a signatory

The trial of civilians by courts martial is in excess of the functions assigned to the Armed Forces by Article 245 of the Constitution

Convictions and sentences awarded to civilians by Courts Martial for the occurrence of 09-05-2023 were without jurisdiction and were set aside

Accused under custody were to be treated as under-trial prisoners and their cases would be transferred to concerned Courts of competent jurisdiction for trial

Upon receipt of cases, the concerned Courts should proceed with their trials expeditiously and decide the same at the earliest in accordance with law

Persons who had completed/undergone their sentences or had been acquitted of the charge by Courts Martial or Forum of Appeal under Pakistan Army Act, 1952, would have the effect of their discharge under section 169 Cr.P.C.

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed. [Minority view]

Matter pertained to occurrence of 09-05-2023, whereby followers of a political party ransacked/attacked military installations situated in cantonment areas in different cities of Pakistan

Supreme Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution declared the provisions of sections 2 (1) (d) (i), (ii) & 59(4) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ultra vires the Constitution and of no legal effect

Validity

Attack on Corps Commander House, Lahore rendered the command dysfunctional for at least 4 to 5 hours creating a highly dangerous situation

All fundamental rights enshrined and envisaged under the Constitution were subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law

Peaceful assembly, association or public demonstration/protest within the bounds and precincts of reasonable restriction imposed by law is not prohibited as long as it is without violating or breaking the law or taking the law in one's hands

Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court restored the provisions of Pakistan Army Act, 1952, that were struck down by means of judgment passed by Supreme Court in original proceedings

Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court sensitized the need of legislative changes, which would also be compliant to the requirements laid down under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for maintaining and preserving Constitutional and societal norms in existing legal framework

Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court referred the matter to Government/Parliament for considering and making necessary amendments/legislation in Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and allied Rules in order to provide an independent right of appeal in High Court against conviction awarded to persons by Court Martial/Military Courts under the provisions of sections 2(1) (d) (i), (ii) & 59 (4) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952

Intra Court Appeal was allowed. [Majority view]

Appellant / taxpayer contended that rates specified in the Table in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the time of acquisition of securities were applicable

Validity

Notwithstanding the changes brought about in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the legislature through Finance Act, 2024 again revived 0% rate of tax on disposal of securities acquired between 01-07-2022 and 30-06-2024 where holding period exceeded six years

Disposal of securities acquired before 01-07-2013 were again held liable to 0% tax as per second proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Amendments so made had completely nullified the effect of offending proviso added to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022

This lent credence to the allegation of discrimination by appellant / taxpayer

In view of amendments made in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 up to year 2021 and in year 2024, there did not appear to be any rational basis for giving a different treatment to the disposal of securities acquired before 01-07-2013 through amendments made in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022

Offending proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which had the effect of nullifying the Table and which on textual plane could only be construed as an independent provision stipulating a new tax, could not be inserted in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for burdening appellant / taxpayer with 12.5% tax on capital gain on disposal of securities

The right that had come to vest in appellant / taxpayer for application of 0% tax could not be taken away by proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Division Bench of High Court directed Federal Board of Revenue to constitute a Policy Board consisting of experts to render advice on future legislation keeping in view legal and Constitutional principles interpreted and settled by the Courts in order to avoid such legislation being struck down

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court and constitutional petition filed by appellant / taxpayer was allowed

Division Bench of High Court declared that proviso added to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022 was inoperative on the right of appellant / taxpayer to be applied 0% tax on capital gain arising on the disposal of securities from 01-07-2022 till January 2023

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Federal Legislature is vested with legislative competence to tax capital value of asset with the exception relating to immovable property

Capital value of immovable property falls with the provincial legislative competence and it has been circumscribed by territorial limits of provinces and immovable property not falling within territorial confines of province ipso facto is not susceptible to any provincial legislation

Provision of Art. 141 of the Constitution vesting legislative competence in Federal Legislature to make laws having extra-territorial application comes into play

There is no ambiguity and / or conflict inter se Art.141 of the Constitution and Entry- 50 of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, as it is the finish-line of the exception in Entry-50 which gives way to the starting line of Art.141 of the Constitution

In Entry-50 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the Parliament has been given power to legislate in respect of taxes on capital value of assets

To limit such power, particularly when Provincial Legislature is clearly not competent to legislate in respect of the same (to the extent of foreign immovable properties) would amount to placing the narrowest and the most restrictive interpretation on Entry-50 of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution which runs contrary to the scheme of the Constitution and principles of Constitutional interpretation enunciated by Courts of the country

Power to levy Capital Value Tax under Entry-50 of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution did not vest with Provinces in relation to foreign immovable properties owned by residents but with the Federal Legislature

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court not to be invoked in cases of policy decision of the Government as well as in cases of factual controversies requiring determination of disputed questions of facts

The appellantchallenged the establishment of toll plazas and the award of contracts for toll collection during the tenure of the Caretaker Government

It was contended that the Caretaker Government was not authorized to award contracts and thetoll plazas were being established at intervals of 10-20 kilometers, violating paragraph 16 of the NHA Tolling Policy, which stipulated a minimum distance of 35-60 kilometers between toll plazas

The question requiring determination in the present appeal was as to "whether the Caretaker Government acted beyond its legal mandate by initiating the process for awarding toll collection contracts and establishing toll plazas at intervals"

Held: Sections 3 and 4 of the Punjab Tolls on Roads and Bridges Ordinance, 1962 empowered the Government of Punjab to levy toll tax on roads and bridges for the purpose of their maintenance and S. 10(2) of National Highway Authority Act, 1991 authorized the framing of policy for charging toll tax, hence, there was no violation of law to that extent

Although the proceedings were initiated by the Caretaker Government but the same were finalized when the elected Government was holding office, which not only issued the contract but impliedly endorsed the action of Caretaker Government for creation of toll plaza and leasing out rights for collection of toll and this was purely a policy decision, which could not be interfered with by the High Court unless shown to be suffering from any illegality or violation of law, which could not been shown from the record of present case

As regards the claim of the appellant that the distance between successive toll plazas was 10-20 kilometers, paragraph No.16 of NHA Tolling Policy while providing minimum distance for establishment of toll plazas also provided exceptions where requirement of minimum distance was not to be considered

In the present case the ground that toll plazas established at lesser distances without there being any supporting material to show that whether the case fell within the exception or not was a factual controversy requiring determination of disputed facts, which was not permissible in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, hence, High Court was not inclined to pass any direction regarding such aspect of the matter

Present appeal failed to disclose any illegality or jurisdictional defect in the impugned order and did not warrant interference by the High Court and was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant / company was aggrieved of charging of stamp duty on transfer of assets as a result of merger of two companies under the order of High Court

Validity

Objective to enact Companies Act, 2017 was to protect interests of shareholders, creditors, stakeholders and general public by inculcating principles of good governance and safeguarding minority interests in corporate entities and providing alternate mechanism for expeditious resolution of corporate disputes as well as matters connected thereto, as was mentioned in its preamble, read with the provisions of Ss. 4 & 5 of Companies Act, 2017

Hinderance by way of imposing stamp duty and other taxes would take away companies law jurisdiction from High Court to other Provinces

Conflict of law is created only when the two, i.e. the Federation and the Province, simultaneously have authority and in such circumstances, Federal Law would prevail

Provisions of Ss. 4 & 282(5) of Companies Act, 2017 were part of Federal Law, therefore, it prevailed over the provision of Provincial Law, i.e. S. 27-A of Stamp Act, 1899

High Court directed Chief Secretary of Province of the Punjab to file a detailed report on or before the next date, explaining progress made in the meeting to resolve the matter

High Court further directed that if matter would not be resolved despite efforts of the Chief Secretary of Province of the Punjab, then the same would be decided on its own merits, after discussing legal anthropology of relevant provisions of law, i.e. the Companies Act, 2017 and Stamp Act, 1899

High Court granted interim injunction in favour of appellant / company, since vires of the judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court, in case titled Jadeed Feeds Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Board of Revenue, Punjab through Chief Inspector of Stamps and others, reported as 2024 CLD 1570 was under challenge and balance of convenience for grant of interim relief also tilted in favour of appellant / company

Interim injunction was allowed accordingly.

Respondent was a civil servant and a statutory right of appeal under S. 4 of Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 was available to him against original order of termination before Service Tribunal

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the matter as Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable in law in terms of the crucial jurisdictional bar contemplated under S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which had expressly excluded maintainability of an appeal against an order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction, where order assailed before Judge in Chambers of High Court had arisen from the proceedings in which a statutory remedy, such as an appeal, was available

Order of termination of services of respondent under R. 12.21 of Police Rules, 1934 was appealable under S. 4 of Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 and the respondent nonetheless opted to invoke Art. 199 of the Constitution instead of availing the statutory remedy

Constitutional petition was thus not maintainable

Intra-Court Appeal was a continuation of a procedurally flawed proceeding, and was also hit by the bar contained in S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant / plaintiff was aggrieved of rejecting of plaint assailing notice issued by respondent / authorities to conduct audit

Validity

In absence of objection as to the jurisdiction being exercised by the officer concerned who had issued the notices, appellant / plaintiff was required to submit to such notices and contest the same before the hierarchy as provided under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

There was no question of seeking restraining order against such proceedings

As to grant of injunctive relief appellant / plaintiff could not succeed in getting permanent injunction against notices in question

As to injunction application in question, the same was to be dismissed even if plaint could not have been rejected

Appellant / plaintiff in its suit did not plead mala fide against any particular act of respondents / authorities nor any damages for such act of mala fides had been claimed

Time and again, it was stated in the plaint that act of respondents / authorities was mala fide, illegal and without lawful authority

It was not a case of any lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondents / authorities in issuing notices in question

Infact a mere allegation of any act being illegal is not by itself lack of jurisdiction

Cause of action based on which the suit had been filed by appellant / plaintiff was a notice under S. 177 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Justifiable reasons were mentioned independently in all such notices for different tax years pointing out various discrepancies and shortcomings in the tax returns of appellant / plaintiff

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order rejecting the plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Held: Provisions of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force

Provisions of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force

Provisions of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, trump provision of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001

At the same time, Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 2023 has also modified definition of "Tribunal" under S. 2(li) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001

In the amended definition of S. 2(li) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 "Tribunal" means the Registrar, as the case may be, the High Court or Intellectual Property Tribunal before which proceedings concerned are pending

Consequence/significance of retaining reference to "the High Court" in S. 2(li) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 even after creation of "Intellectual Property Tribunal" under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 on Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, and in particularly S. 116 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 remains subject to a judicial determination as and when it is triggered

After Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 2023: (i) suits for infringement of a trade mark under S. 117 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 (the word "infringement" under the trademarks regime has a definite meaning), as well as (ii)those matters which fall within the framework of the phrase in S. 117 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, described as suit(s) "otherwise relating to any right in a trade mark", which may relate to enforcement of such rights as those specified under S. 67(3) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 [unfair competition], S. 68 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 [misleading and comparative advertising], S. 90 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 [acts of agent or representatives], etc. - all such matters - both (i) and (ii) above - from 16-08-2023 onwards were to be instituted / filed before Intellectual Property Tribunal

After removing the word "District Court" in S.117 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 by way of Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 2023, no suit for infringement and enforcement of all such rights was to be instituted in any Court except an Intellectual Property Tribunal

High Court directed to transfer file of the suit to Intellectual Property Tribunal

Intra Court Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

During proceedings, respondent / defendant sought stay of proceedings and the matter was forwarded to arbitrator but on his failure to pay requisite fee to the arbitrator matter was delayed

Appellant / plaintiff sought the suit restored but Trial Court after recording of evidence dismissed the suit on ground that it could not have been restored

Validity

Award which had been made after issuance of a supersession order passed by Trial Court was liable to be set-aside

After order of restoring the suit was passed by Trial Court, award could not have been made by an arbitrator even if the matter had been referred back and decided in arbitration

Division Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by Judge in who Chambers of High Court who insisted on the matter only being decided through arbitration proceedings

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment and decree passed against appellant / plaintiff and the matter was remanded to Trial Court for decision afresh

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Appellants were aggrieved of dismissal of their application filed under O. XLVII, R. 1, C.P.C. seeking review of basic order

Appellants assailed the order passed in review and also the basic order to be reviewed

Held, that principles of doctrine of election denote that election to commence and follow available course, from concurrent avenues, vests with suitor

Once an option is exercised then the suitor is precluded from re-agitating the same lis in other realms of competent jurisdiction

Appeal, to the extent of order against which review was sought was time barred and could not be maintained

Period spent in pursuing review was not liable to be excluded while reckoning period of limitation for assailing basic or original order as in essence the intent was to call in question the correctness and validity of initial order of which the review was sought which had attained finality creating valuable rights in favor of the other party which could not be disturbed so lightly

Appeal against order refusing a review was in fact seeking vacation of previous order which by efflux of time had become final, whereas, refusal to review could not give a fresh period of limitation

Not availing remedy of appeal as provided under law against a basic order and instead prosecuting a review before same Court, did not allow appellants to benefit from S. 14 of Limitation Act, 1908 as the time spent could not be excluded in computing period of limitation

Appellant only intended to drag the matter; whereas, offer of respondent already stood accepted way back in year, 2021 and appellant intended to avail benefit of increase in price

High Court declined to interfere in basic order as well as order dismissing review

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Issue of repair of premises has been encompassed in S. 12 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and gives responsibility to landlord to make necessary repairs other than structural alteration to the premises

On failure of such obligations, issue can be raised before Rent Controller by tenant by moving an application

Rent Controller may direct landlord, after an inquiry, as required and deemed necessary by Rent Controller

If Rent Controller thinks necessary that such repairs may be made by tenant, only then the cost may be deducted from rent which is payable by tenant and not otherwise

Rent of the premises cannot be withheld unless order as required under S. 12 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, was passed directing landlord to carry-out repairs and the amount as adjudged, and only then tenant could be permitted to withhold the amount subject to the condition that such amount as adjudged was actually spent

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Order I, Rule 10(2), C.P.C. grants the Court the authority to mandate, at any stage during the proceedings, the inclusion of a party who is necessary and proper and whose presence before the Court is essential for the thorough and comprehensive resolution of all issues pertinent to the proceeding

The phrase "at any stage of the proceedings" clearly indicates that this discretion is not confined solely to the Court; it also encompasses appellate forums, including an Intra Court Appeal under the Letters Patent of the applicable statutory framework.

Section 38 of the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985 ('Ordinance of 1985') provides for the remedy of appeal or review before the Board of Governors against any order punishing a teacher or other employees of the university

Original order in the present case was an order by the Board of Governors discontinuing incentives which order was first challenged by the respondents by way of a departmental appeal and then subsequently in a writ petition

Respondents admittedly availed the remedy of appeal provided against the original order by the Board of Governors in terms of section 38 of the Ordinance of 1985

Consequently, the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 created a bar on the remedy of appeal for the petitioners (University)

As there was a remedy of appeal available under the Ordinance of 1985, hence the impugned judgment of the High Court was correct in dismissing the Intra Court Appeal

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court declaring provision of S. 7E of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, ultra vires the Constitution

Validity

Provision of S. 7E of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, treats increment in value of capital asset as income and resident person cannot be left immersed in the thought of deriving double benefit viz one increase in value of his capital asset and two zero tax

In case an owner of property disposes of his asset, no tax is leviable under S. 7E of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

But beyond six years, he does not pay capital gain tax on such sale, too

Such tax has been levied on notional income but not a notional asset (from which it is deemed to arise)

Legislature has intended to tax an asset apparently lying dormant and not generating an income in cash but indeed capable of increment in value

It is the value addition that S.7E of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, seeks to tax

Notionally the augmentation in value becomes part of taxpayer's income

Provision of S. 7E (2)(d)(i) to (iv) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, does not suffer from vice of discriminatory legislation and does not offend Art.25 of the Constitution

Categories of persons have been carved out in S. 7E (2)(d)(i) to (iv) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which are distinct and apart from general category of taxpayers

Legislature is empowered to create categories of taxpayers and to tax one and not the other

Division Bench of High Court in exercise of appellant jurisdiction set aside judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Appellants / taxpayers were aggrieved of levy of Income Support Levy at the rate of 0.5% on value of net movable assets / wealth exceeding one million Rupees

Appellants / taxpayers assailed the Levy as ultra vires the Constitution

Judge in Chambers of High Court dismissed petitions filed by appellants / taxpayers

Validity

Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, however, decided the matter on merits by enunciating principles of law

Such decision had the force of precedent and was binding on all subordinate Courts and Tribunals including High Court, in terms of Art. 189 of the Constitution

When Supreme Court deliberately and with intention of settling the law pronounced upon a question, such pronouncement was law declared by Supreme Court within the meaning of Art. 189 of the Constitution and was binding on all Courtsin Pakistan

Division Bench of High Court followed the judgment passed by Supreme Court

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Appellant was aggrieved of order issued by respondent / authority stopping his pension after his retirement on attaining age of superannuation

Judge in Chambers of High Court in view of bar contained in Art. 212 of the Constitution, declined to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction

Plea raised by appellant was that after retirement he ceased to be a 'civil servant', therefore, bar of Art. 212 of the Constitution did not apply

Validity

Pension was one of the terms of service of a civil servant, though it started with retirement

Pension formed part of those terms and conditions to which civil servant joined the service

Question of jurisdiction of High Court was different from the question whether the respondent/authority had correctly withheld the pension of appellant

Latter aspect of the matter was always to be considered, in such cases, by the forum having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters

Question of delay, on account of pursuing remedy before High Court could also be seen by competent forum for which guidelines were available in number of judgments of Supreme Court

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the matter as Judge in Chambers of High Court correctly appreciated the law on the subject

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant was auction purchaser and aggrieved of proceedings with regard to recovery of government dues during winding up proceedings

Validity

Judge in Chambers of High Court was likely hear the matter and would examine conclusions/issues assailed in ad-interim order, after giving opportunity of hearing to all parties including appellants who would file written reply, counter-affidavit and rejoinder, as the case would be

It was best that the appellant defends the proceedings and once for all puts to rest the challenges raised against auction-purchasers

Remarks made by Judge in Chambers of High Court were tentative subject to re-hearing of all parties and stakeholder

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in interim order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as interim measures were to be decided by the Single Judge at the time of passing of final order

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Vesting of lands in Board of Trustees of appellant / Karachi Port Trust, did not mean that the Board, either for the purposes mentioned in the statute or otherwise, was to be considered as "owner" of subject lands

There were two notifications, the prior one was dated 02-05-1940 and the subsequent was dated 05-10-1991

Notification of year 1940 was issued by the Government of India under S. 3 of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, whereas the subsequent one of year 1991 superseded the earlier one

None of the two notifications bestowed upon Karachi Port Trust any proprietary right nor empowered Karachi Port Trust to consider themselves as undisputed owner of subject lands

Karachi Port Trust was a statutory and regulatory body governed by statute and nothing else

Provisions of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 enabled it to deal with its affairs while remaining within the frame of the statute

Argument that Federal Government was empowered to take and demarcate port area was of no consequence as the rights of Karachi Port Trust were to be navigated within the scope of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court, as Trial Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Respondent / defendant company terminated the contract and did not allow appellant / plaintiff company to remove it's equipment from the site

Judge in Chambers of High Court dismissed applications moved by appellant / plaintiff company and restrained it from interfering with completion of works at the site

Validity

Contract had specified and fixed price payable to appellant / plaintiff company for performing works

Stages of payments to appellant / plaintiff company were pinned to milestones which too were identified in the contract

Standard existed in the contract for ascertaining actual damage caused to appellant / plaintiff company by its non-performance so as to attract S.12(b) of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Appellant / plaintiff company was to design and build a gas processing facility for respondent / defendant

Contract did not award any concession to appellant / plaintiff company so as to raise any issue of operating profits for appellant / plaintiff company

Pecuniary compensation for its non-performance would afford adequate relief so as to attract S.12(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Appellant / plaintiff company did not plead special circumstances to demonstrate otherwise, as a consequence, the contract was hit by S.21(a) of Specific Relief Act, 1877, which stipulated that a contract for non-performance of which compensation in money was an adequate relief, could not be specifically enforced

When subject contract was not specifically enforceable, the relief sought in the suit for incidental injunctions were barred by S. 56(f) of Specific Relief Act, 1877, which stipulated that injunction could not be granted to prevent breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

During the contempt proceedings in a matter before a Single Judge of the High Court, the appellant filed an Intra Court Appeal against the interlocutory order, passed by the Single Judge, whereby the charge of contempt of Court was framed against him

Said Intra Court Appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench; said order was challenged by the appellant before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a Criminal Petition, which was dismissed as not pressed

Appellant had neither disclosed the fact of dismissal of first Intra Court Appeal in the instant matter by a Division Bench of the High Court nor disclosed that an appeal against the order was dismissed as not pressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan

Neither said facts were mentioned in the instant appeal nor copies of the orders passed by both the Courts were placed on record

Appellant had concealed material facts by not mentioning the orders passed by High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan in earlier round of litigation

Person who seeks equity must approach the Court with clean hands

Admittedly show-cause notice had been withdrawn, warrants of arrest had also been cancelled and only grievance of the appellant was that his name was placed on Exit Control List

When confronted about whether on application to get permission for travelling for Umrah was filed before the Single Judge, counsel for appellant had stated that no formal application was filed in office, rather the same was given Single Judge during the proceedings but no order was passed

Appellant was required to file a proper application in the office for grant of exemption/permission for travelling to perform Umrah but admittedly said procedure had not been adopted

As the contempt proceedings against the appellant were pending, formal show cause notice had been issued; he was bound to appear in the Court on each and every date of hearing under S.17(2) of Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, thus, placing his name on Exit Control List would not cause any prejudice to him

Intra Court Appeal being not maintainable was dismissed in limine.

Appellant( Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited ('P.T.C.L.'), impugned the judgment passed by the Single Bench of the High Court whereby constitutional petition filed by respondents (four registered trade unions in the establishment of P.T.C.L.) was partly allowed

Plea of the respondents / trade unions, while placing reliance on S. 21 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ('the I.R.A, 2012'), was that a registered trade union can perform any act or function which is required to be performed under the provisions of the I.R.A, 2012, by a CBA where it has not been notified; and since the CBA had not been notified at the time when the constitutional petition was filed, the respondents / trade unions were well within their rights to have filed the constitutional petition

Validity

All the petitioners in constitutional petition were trade unions in the establishment of P.T.C.L.

Relief that was sought in the constitutional petition as referred to in relevant paragraph of the memo of petition as well as the prayer clause showed that none of the reliefs sought were for the enforcement of any of the legal rights of the trade unions but those of its members

Section 33(1) of the I.R.A, 2012, entitles a worker to bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement to the notice of his employer in writing "either himself or through his shop steward or collective bargaining agent" within 90 days of the date on which the cause for such grievance arises

Under said S.33(1), a CBA can espouse the cause of a worker by submitting a grievance notice to the employer

Similarly a grievance petition under S. 33(4) of the I.R.A, 2012, against a decision of the employer can be filed before the N.I.R.C. by the CBA when a dissatisfied worker takes the matter to the CBA

Section 20 of the I.R.A., 2012, provides for the functions that the CBA can perform; S.20(1)(b) entitles a CBA to represent all or any of the workmen in any matter or judicial proceedings under the I.R.A, 2012

Unlike S. 33(1) and (4) of the I.R.A, 2012, S. 20(1)(b) only entitles the CBA to "represent" workmen in any matter or judicial proceedings under the I.R.A, 2012, although the said provision entitles the CBA to represent workmen, it does not authorize the CBA to file or institute legal proceedings or to take a matter on behalf of workmen before any forum

Furthermore, under the said provision, the CBA has been entitled to represent workmen in any matter or judicial proceedings under the I.R.A

The term "under this Act" employed in the said provision has reference only to the I.R.A, 2012, and no other statute, therefore, even if it is presumed that the said provision entitles the CBA to file or institute judicial proceedings, such proceedings can only be under the provisions of the I.R.A, 2012

Constitutional petition filed by the respondents / trade unions was under Article 199 of the Constitution, and the petition's proceedings before the High Court in the said petition were most certainly not proceedings under the I.R.A, 2012

Therefore, High Court viewed that S. 20(1)(b) of the I.R.A, 2012, did not entitle a CBA to file or institute a petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution in its own name for the benefit of its members / workmen

Plea of the respondents was of no benefit to them since a CBA could not file or institute a constitutional petition in order to espouse the cause of workmen by relying on S. 20(1)(b) of the I.R.A, 2012

A trade union cannot take advantage of S.21 of the I.R.A, 2012, in order to perform an act or function in absence of a CBA which S. 20 does not confer on it to perform

Even if the rights of the workers which the respondents / trade unions were seeking to enforce by filing a constitutional petition were to be treated as the collective rights of their members / workers, S.60 of the I.R.A, 2012 gives the CBA the right to apply to the N.I.R.C. for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to the workers collectively by or under any law, award, settlement, or decision

In the presence of such an alternative remedy provided by the law, a CBA cannot file a constitutional petition for the enforcement of a right guaranteed or secured to workers under any law, award, settlement, or decision

A fortiori, a trade union, in the absence of a certified CBA, can also not file a constitutional petition to enforce a right guaranteed or secured to workers under any law, award, settlement, or decision

Existence of a legal right is the foundation of a writ of mandamus and the petitioner has to be an aggrieved person

Petitioner, in order to obtain relief by way of a writ of mandamus, must satisfy the High Court that he has a legal right to compel the performance of a duty and the person against whom the right is sought is under a legal obligation to perform the duty

Person cannot be said to be an aggrieved person unless he has a right in the performance of a statutory duty by a person performing functions in respect of any such right

Only an aggrieved person can file a constitutional petition other than a writ of habeas corpus and quo warranto

In the present case, the respondents / trade unions (which were the writ petitioners) were not seeking the enforcement of their own legal rights but those of their members, which was apparent from the prayer sought in the constitutional petition filed by the respondents / trade unions

Therefore, the respondents / trade unions could not be termed as aggrieved persons having the right to file a constitutional petition to espouse the cause of their members

It is no longer res integra that a trade union or an association cannot espouse the cause of its members by filing a constitutional petition in its own name

Thus, the ground taken by the appellant ( P.T.C.L.) regarding the incompetence of the constitutional petition filed by the respondents / trade unions succeeded

High Court set-aside the impugned judgment having been passed in the constitutional petition filed by the respondents / trade unions , thus the same ( constitutional petition) stood dismissed being not maintainable

Dismissal of the said constitutional petition shall not debar the aggrieved workers in the establishment of P.T.C.L. from taking their grievances in accordance with the law before the appropriate forum

Intra Court Appeal filed by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited the was allowed, in circumstances.

Accused was aggrieved of his jail trial and had also assailed appointment of Special Judge under Official Secrets Act, 1923

Validity

There was no judicial order available in file requiring proceedings and trial to be conducted in jail

Essential prerequisite of passing a judicial order requiring trial against accused to be conducted in jail was not fulfilled

Authorities submitted a proposal to Cabinet for sanctioning trial against accused to be conducted in jail, as under R. 3 in Part-A of Chapter-1 in Vol-III of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Trial Court was to obtain sanction of Government

Provision of R. 3 in Part-A of Chapter-1 in Vol-III of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders or any other law did not empower Government to issue such sanction with retrospective effect

It was a vested right of every accused for the trial against him to be conducted in open Court at a place designated for its usual sittings

Retrospective operation could not be given to executive orders so as to destroy vested rights of citizens

Division Bench of High Court declared ex-post facto sanction given by decision of Cabinet to proceedings and trial conducted in jail as unlawful

Intra Court appeal filed under S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, against judgment passed in Constitutional petition was maintainable

Designation of Special Court (Anti-Terrorism-I), Islamabad, to try cases reported under Official Secrets Act, 1923, through notification No. F.No.40(64)/2023-A-VIII, dated 27-06-2023 was valid and lawful

There was no provision in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 which could compel Trial Court to hold his Court in a usual Court Room

In exceptional circumstances and where it was conducive to justice, a trial could be conducted in jail in manner that could fulfill requirements of an open trial or trial in camera provided it was in accordance with procedure provided by law

Division Bench of High Court declared Notification No. F.No.8(93)/ 2021-A-IV,dated 29-08-2023 issued by authorities to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect for want of any order by appropriate Government and fulfillment of requirements provided in S. 352, Cr.P.C. as well as R. 3 in Part-A of Chapter-1 in Volume-III of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders

Division Bench of High Court further declared respective Notifications dated 12-09-2023; 25-09-2023; 03-10-2023 and 13-10-2023 issued by authorities to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect for want of fulfillment of requirements provided in S. 352, Cr.P.C., as well as R. 3 in Part-A of Chapter-1 in Volume-III of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders

Division Bench of High Court also declared that respective Notifications dated 13-11-2023, 12-11-2023 and 15-11-2023 issued by authorities on the basis of Cabinet's decision dated 15-11-2023 were of no legal consequence for not having been preceded by order of Trial Court in terms of S. 352, Cr.P.C., passed in judicial proceedings

Division Bench of High Court further declared by way of clarification that Notification No. F.No.40(68)/2023-A-VIII, dated 15-11-2023 issued by authorities on the basis of Cabinet's decision dated 15-11-2023, could not be given retrospective effect

Division Bench of High Court also declared that proceedings of trial against accused in jail premises were notan open trial and the same stood vitiated

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Intra Court appeal filed before a Division Bench of the High Court against a decision made by a Single Judge in a Constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution

Whether a remedy of appeal could be provided to an aggrieved person either through an Ordinance (i.e. Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972) or parliamentary legislation in respect of matters decided under the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court under Article 199 of the Constitution

[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J: Present issue is a constitutional issue regarding the provision of statutory right of appeal through the Ordinance against the order of a High Court passed under Article 199 of the Constitution and is also a matter of public importance

His Lordship issued notices to the Attorney General for Pakistan, the Advocate General, Islamabad, the Prosecutor General, Islamabad and the Advocate General, Punjab as provided by Order XXVII-A of the C.P.C., and also to the State

As the issue involved in present petition is identical to the issue involved in certain other Constitutional petitions, therefore, let the matter be placed before the Chief Justice to pass an appropriate order as to whether this case be heard along with said petitions or otherwise]

[Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting: Clause (2) of Article 175 of the Constitution provides that "no Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law"

Supreme Court and the High Courts have been established by the Constitution; they have such jurisdiction as has been conferred upon them by the Constitution, and also such other jurisdiction as is or may be conferred upon them by or under any law

Expression 'law' here has been used to distinguish it from 'Constitution' and obviously means an ordinary or sub-Constitutional law made in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution

Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was promulgated on 14.04.1972

Later, it was validated through Article 269 of the Constitution

Despite lapse of more than fifty years from the promulgation of the Ordinance, no question qua the legality of the Ordinance has been raised by any party, lawyer, any High Court or the Supreme Court

This question has also not been raised in the present case but it has been taken up by the other Member of this Bench (i.e. Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J) on his own

Such question is not related to the issue involved in this case, and thus, it cannot be brought under debate, nor can any conclusion be drawn thereon

Further, the case in hand is required to be decided first instead of referring such a delicate constitutional question to the Chief Justice which has not been raised before us and which could be decided in any other appropriate proceedings].

Proviso to subsection (2) of S. 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 provides that when a remedy of appeal, review or revision against the original order is available before any Court, Tribunal or Authority, then Intra Court Appeal is not maintainable.

Department assailed order passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby it was directed to issue license to the respondent-company to install a distillery plant for production of rectified spirits and low grade spirit with the capacity of 125000 liter per day

Respondent contended that remedy of appeal was provided against such order under Ss. 14 & 15 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914

Department argued that the words "Board of Revenue" appearing in S. 15 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, had been deleted by the Governor of Punjab through a notification, hence the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter

Validity

Act/Statute could not be amended through notification or subordinate enactment as such the aforesaid provisions were still operative or in field until and unless the same were repealed by a proper legislation

Application of the respondent was still pending before the department and against such inaction, the respondent had filed a Constitutional petition

Relevant order might not necessarily be the one which was under challenge but the test is whether the original order passed in the proceedings is subject to an appeal under the relevant law, irrespective of the fact whether the remedy of appeal so provided was availed or not

Apparently the meaning of the expression "original order" was the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced

Availability of remedy of an appeal, revision or review was not restricted to only the impugned order passed in the Constitutional petition rather it extended to the basic original adverse order as well irrespective of the fact whether the said remedy was explored or otherwise, as such Intra Court Appeal was not maintainable

Appeal was dismissed.

Predecessor of respondent agreed to surrender interest to the extent of 1/3 of the entire holding in appellant-Authority's favour as proportionate contribution for roads and open spaces or alternatively it was required to pay compensation at the assessed rate of Land Acquisition Collector

Invoice for the payment of certain amounts was issued and the total demand raised was duly paid by the predecessor of respondent

Respondent purchased the property from its predecessor and applied to the appellant-Authority for an NOC (No Objection Certificate) for placement of its' name in the record

Appellant-Authority did not accede to the request of respondent and raised a demand for ex-post facto approval for regularization of the plot

Respondent filed a writ petition against the demand, which was allowed

Validity

Appellant-Authority had not raised any demand against the predecessor of respondent for a period of eleven years

Appellant-Authority had no jurisdiction to rescind or cancel the agreement to the detriment of respondent or its predecessor

Present case was a case of past and closed transaction which could not be reopened at the whim and discretion of the appellant

Appellant-Authority never challenged the original transaction as being unlawful or ultra vires

Present case was a case of higher demand raised by the appellant-Authority unilaterally

Commercial transactions could not be reopened or rescinded to the detriment of one of the parties simply because the other party was a government department, which had a dominant position

Respondent was only required to make payment in respect of land which was excess land found to be in its possession as a result of demarcation carried out by the appellant

Impugned order was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.

Remedy of Intra Court Appeal is not available if the constitutional petition filed in terms of Art. 199 of the Constitution, arose out of any proceedings in which the law applicable, provided for at least one appeal or one revision or one review to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the original order

Admittedly, respondent-employee assailed the orders passed by the Competent Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority in the constitutional petition; hence the bar contained under proviso to S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, came into play and impeded the way of the appellant-employer to maintain the appeal

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed being not maintainable.

Functions of State Bank of Pakistan were contemplated under Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, with respect to activation and operation of banks and for carrying out purpose of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and matter ancillary thereto

No statuary duty and obligation of State Bank of Pakistan in Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 to direct private bank to perform its functions in respect of its employees' terms and conditions of service

Constitutional petition could only be filed for enforcement of fundamental rights

In order to obtain a writ or an order or direction in the nature of mandamus, petitioner was to satisfy the Court that he had a legal right towards performance of a legal duty by the party against whom mandamus was sought

Such order or direction could only be granted subject to provision of relevant law

Neither appellant / bank was amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction as was a private bank nor State Bank of Pakistan had any statutory role or jurisdiction in respect of terms and conditions of service of employees of private Banks like respondent

Division Bench of High Court set aside direction to decide representation of respondent / employee as it could not be issued by Single Judge of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Disposal of appeal in terms of compromise between the parties was without prejudice to the right and interest of third party, if any, and subject to law, including company law, that would have binding effect between the parties

Intra Court Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Appellant/accused failed to identify any error of law or illegality in order passed by Single Judge of High Court, warranting interference by Division Bench of High Court

Contents of FIR prima facie spelt out offence under provision of law pursuant to which FIR was registered

No embargo was placed under S. 13(3) of Official Secrets Act, 1923 which pertained to taking cognizance of an offence by a Court

Provisions of Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 pertained only departmental action and could not substitute or preclude investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court in view of bar contained in proviso to S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Right to actionable claim to appellant arose on 05-07-2017 when in proceedings before Chairman Pakistan Electronic Media Authority, License to Operate Cable Television Network under S.19 of Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Ordinance, 2002, was issued to respondent

Such was the first step when proceedings commenced by which machinery of law i.e. Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Ordinance, 2002, Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Rules, 2009 and Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Cable Television (Operations) Regulations, 2002 framed thereunder were put into motion

Same License was assailed by appellant by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and had sought its cancellation

Appellant was a person aggrieved who had remedy of appeal against order for issuance of a License by the Authority under Regln. 28 of Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Regulations, 2002 against order for grant of License to respondent

Order of the Authority was further appealable under S.30-A of Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Ordinance, 2002, before High Court

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the matter as approval/order for issuance of License in proceedings under Pakistan Electronic Media Authority Ordinance, 2002, Rules and Regulations framed thereunder was appealable under applicable provisions of law and action/License assailed in Constitutional Petition was subject to appeal

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Intra Court Appeal could be filed when judgment of Judge in Chambers of High Court was shown to have been delivered against provisions of law or a result of misreading, non-reading and had caused mis-carriage of justice or mistakes of law which were liable to be corrected by Division Bench of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Constitutional petition under Art.199 of the Constitution was only competent, if Rules/Regulations governing terms and conditions of service of employee of organization in question were statutory or where act or proceedings against which petitioner voiced her grievance were in violation of statutory Rules / Regulations

Intra Court Appeal could be filed when judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court was shown to have been delivered against provisions of law and was result of conclusions, which were contrary to any specific provision of law or was the result of misreading, non-reading or same had caused miscarriage of justice, or mistakes of like nature, liable to be corrected by Division Bench of High Court, otherwise judgment under appeal could not be upset

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

If a right of appeal is provided under rules or regulations which are not statutory in nature, they could not be termed as "law" so as to prevent an appellant from filing an intra court appeal.

Question was with regard to Revised Policy with regard to allotment of plots to Judges of Supreme Court and High Court in Federal Government Employees Housing Schemes

Validity

Privileges and entitlements of judges of Supreme Court and High Courts were described in relevant Presidential Order

Like a civil servant or other Federal Government employee, a judge of Supreme Court or High Court had no right nor entitlement to a plot costing less than its market value

Judge of Supreme Court or High Court was not entitled under Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act, 2020, to become beneficiary in a scheme unless such Constitutional bodies were declared and notified as one of the 'specified groups' by Executive Board or Federal Government

Participation of a Court or its judges in any scheme of FGEH Authority or accepting its benefits were contrary to public interest and not in conformity with impartiality and independence of judiciary as an institution

Inclusion of Supreme Court and High Courts and its judges by FGEH Authority, was inappropriate and not in conformity with the Constitutional status of exalted courts

Such was not permissible under the Constitution for a judge or a court to be seen as usurping fundamental rights of people at large and become complacent to a policy formulated in breach of public interest

FGEH Authority nor Federal Government was vested with power or jurisdiction under FGEHA Act, 2020 or Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, to launch a scheme or frame policy contrary to public interest and violative of Constitutionally guaranteed rights of people at large

Scheme launched by FGEH Authority, pursuant to a policy framed by Federal Government, could withstand Constitutional scrutiny if it was to benefit people at large rather than benefiting and enriching a few powerful classes

Assets of State acquired through inherent intrusive power of eminent domain could only be used for benefit of people at large and in public interest

Revised Policy and scheme pursuant thereto, intended to be launched were in derogation of public interest and violative of the Constitutionally guaranteed rights of people at large

Division Bench of High Court declared revised policy in question as illegal, unconstitutional, void and without jurisdiction and declined to interfere in order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as revised policy was contrary to public interest, unconstitutional and violative of rights of public at large

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellant assailed order passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby its constitutional petition was dismissed by holding that disputed question of fact regarding submission of document alleged by appellant and denied by the other side barred exercise of constitutional jurisdiction

Appellant's case was that it had supplied jute bags to the respondent at an agreed rate but at the time of disbursement of price, respondents made payment to the appellant at reduced rate on the ground that it had supplied bags to a Corporation at certain reduced rate

Validity

Requisite certificate was although furnished at later stage but it was part of the tender condition submitted by the appellant in response to the invitation made by the respondents

Respondents while deducting the excessive amount claimed by the appellant as compared to the said Corporation had not travelled beyond their limit prescribed in the terms of tender and action of respondents was within parameters of the terms of the tender; hence no interference was warranted

Appeal was dismissed.

Appellants, contract employees, challenged the validity of order passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby their writ petition was dismissed

Validity

Appellants were recruited purely on contract basis; their initial recruitment was not only found to be bogus and illegal but was also found in bare violation of Contract Policy; they had not challenged the order whereby their initial recruitment was declared to be illegal and their contract was not extended after its expiry

Contract employee could not maintain a Constitutional petition

Intra court appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is self-explanatory and provides that a right to file intra court appeal is not an absolute and unqualified right rather same is subject to certain limitations and conditions provided therein

Under subsection (1) of S. 3, intra court appeal is maintainable against a decree passed or final order made, by single Judge of High Court only if same is passed in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction

Similarly, although intra court appeal is maintainable against order passed by Single Judge under clause (1) of Art. 199 of the Constitution but same is not maintainable if order is made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause.

Term "original order" used in proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 means an order passed by the original/first fora and not the order passed by Single Judge of High Court in constitutional petition

Order passed by Single Judge in constitutional petition cannot be termed as an "original order" as required by S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 or an order passed in original civil jurisdiction of High Court because such order is passed in constitutional jurisdiction conferred by Art.199 of the Constitution.

Availing of remedy of appeal, revision or review is not a sine qua non to question the maintainability of intra court appeal and it is sufficient if applicable law in the matter provides such remedy

Not relevant whether such remedy is availed by the aggrieved person or not, there may be cases where despite the availability of appeal, revision or review against the original order, such remedy was not actually availed by the aggrieved party.

Subsection (2) of S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 in most unequivocal terms, lays down that remedy of intra court appeal is not available against an order of Single Judge having arisen out of proceedings in which applicable law provides remedy of at least one appeal, revision or review to any court, tribunal or authority against the original order.

Appellant assailed judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby orders of conviction of respondent passed by Summary Court Martial and the Court of Appeal under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 were set aside and the matter was remanded to Trial Court with direction to first fulfill the mandatory requirements as envisaged under the Act

Validity

Against the order of conviction, two remedies were available, to wit, remedy of review under S. 128 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 read with R. 116 of the Pakistan Army Act Rules, 1954 and second under S. 133B(1) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 to prefer an appeal before Court of Appeal

In presence of such remedies, against the original order of conviction and sentence passed against the respondent, intra court appeal of appellant was not maintainable against the impugned order of Single Judge

Appeal was dismissed.