Inherent powers of court
Inherent powers of court legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Petitioner was not initially named in any of the FIRs, however he was later implicated on the allegation that he, in collaboration with other PTI leaders, incited public unrest through social media statements and thereby abetted the events of 9th May, 2023, which continued over the following days
Petitioner contended that the allegations across the said FIRs were substantially similar, but the authorities had artificially split a continuous sequence of events into multiple cases, said FIRs should be consolidated under the doctrine of sameness and tried in a single proceedings
Validity
In the present case, each FIR arose from a distinct occurrence that took place at a different time and, in some instances, at a different location
Said events involved separate accused persons, acts of violence and evidentiary material, albeit all were said to have been precipitated by a common political development
Petitioner had been implicated in all those FIRs on the allegation that he abetted the violence through social media messaging
While his alleged conduct might have been broadly similar across the cases
Acts of violence forming the subject matter of the respective FIRs were neither identical nor part of a single transaction
As such, the doctrine of sameness did not justify a blanket consolidation of all FIRs
Petition having no merits was dismissed, in circumstances.
Petitioner was not initially named in any of the FIRs, however, he was later implicated on the allegation that he, in collaboration with other PTI leaders, incited public unrest through social media statements and thereby abetted the events of 9th May, 2023, which continued over the following days
Petitioner requested for the transfer of all the cases to F-(Faisalabad), where proceedings arising from identical allegations were already pending adjudication, for a joint trial
Validity
Although S.239, Cr.P.C., and the doctrine of sameness both employed the concept of a "same transaction", they operated in distinct legal spheres and serve different purposes
Section 239,Cr.P.C., was a permissive procedural provision that allowed the joinder of accused persons in a single trial, subject to statutory criteria
In contrast, the doctrine of sameness was a judicially developed principle rooted in procedural fairness that protected individuals from facing multiple prosecutions for the same alleged conduct
While the two might have intersected in some instances, particularly where overlapping factual allegations arose, their legal foundations and objectives remained separated
As to whether several occurrences or episodes constituted one legal transaction was a question of fact that had to be determined by reference to the evidence and circumstances of each case
In the present case, while most FIRs described incidents were separated by time, location and actors, some FIRs, such as those registered at Sarwar Road Police Station (FIR Nos. 103, 108, and 109 of 2023) appeared to involve events unfolding within a short period and in close physical proximity, possibly with overlapping participants and context
In such limited instances, the competent Court might have considered a joint trial under clause (a) or (b) of S.239, Cr.P.C., if the factual record supported it
However, a general consolidation of all FIRs across police stations was not warranted, as the incidents were too dispersed and varied to satisfy the "same transaction" standard
Petitioner's request for consolidation of all the subject cases and their transfer to District F-(Faisalabad) was also untenable for the same reasonsbased on the same erroneous construction of S.180, Cr.P.C.
Petition having no merit was dismissed, in circumstances.
The National Highway Authority (NHA), the Appellant, awarded a contract to M/s Hussain Cotex Limited (Respondent No. 1) for the construction of a bridge over the River Chenab at Sher Shah, District Muzaffargarh
The contract, signed on 04.02.2005, was to commence on 25.02.2005 and be completed in 30 months (by 28.08.2007) with a total value of Rs. 845 million
Respondent No. 1 initially planned to perform piling in the riverbed during low flow seasons, however, on the direction of the Appellant's Engineer, the strategy was revised to complete one of the two bridges earlier (by 14.08.2006) to facilitate urgent traffic diversion
This instruction was considered a variation under Clause 51.1(f) of the Contract, as it imposed work during high-flow seasons, increasing costs
A dispute arose over additional compensation claimed by Respondent No. 1 due to this change
The engineer and resident engineer initially assessed the compensation rate at Rs. 77.83/m³ for the earth platform
Respondent No. 1 submitted a revised rate of Rs. 169.66/m³, which the Appellant rejected, leading the matter to arbitration
The sole arbitrator issued an award on 10.04.2010, accepting that the engineer's directive constituted a contractual variation under Cl. 51.1(f) and awarded compensation at Rs. 77.83/m³
Dissatisfied, the Appellant filed an application under S. 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and S. 151, C.P.C. to set aside the award, which was dismissed by the Trial Court against which the appeal was filed
Appellant argued that the Arbitrator did not allow proper opportunity to lead evidence, amounting to misconduct
Held: The findings of sole arbitrator were based on documents placed on record and arguments of both parties
Since NHA raised no objection during the proceedings of the award, such objection could not be raised before the Trial Court or before the High Court, hence it was not a misconduct
The work undertaken in respect of the earthen platform and the comprehensive revision of the work methodology entailed by the Appellant's change instructions and requirements during the course of project, added considerably and enhanced the cost of Respondent No.1
It was fairly held by the arbitrator that appellant could not be allowed to wiggle out of his financial liabilities on the basis of a mere technicality
In the circumstances the appeal having no force was dismissed
Appeal dismissed.
Petitioner withdrew his suit on the basis of compromise but the cheque on the basis of which the compromise was affected was dishonoured with remarks "payment was stopped by the drawer"
Petitioner's application under S.12(2) read with S.151, C.P.C. was accepted by Trial Court restoring the suit of the petitioner but revisional court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court
Validity
Trial Court had rightly exercised inherent jurisdiction under S. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 because valuable rights of the petitioner were involved and he could not be knocked out of the arena of litigation merely on the basis of technicalities
Courts are to protect the valuable rights of the parties, that is why the inherent powers under S. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been conferred upon the Courts
Revisional Court, without keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand had roamed in oblivion, because an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. could be converted into application under S. 151, C.P.C. in order to administer safer justice to the litigant public, whose interest were being infringed on the basis of order obtained by fraud
Impugned order was set aside and petition was allowed, in circumstances.
Consolidation of suits was prerogative, which was to be exercised on the dictate of the justice to avoid contradictory judgments and for better administration of justice
Though no provision for consolidation of civil suits was provided in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but the Court could consolidate different suits to avoid conflict of judgments if the parties in the suits were the same and the cause of action was common
Parties, in the present case, had filed separate suits against each other before the Trial Court about the same property
Admittedly, subject-matter of the two suits, was the same and if the suits would have been adjudicated separately there was likelihood of conflicting judgments subject matter of the suits being the same it was proper in the interest of justice that they (suits) be consolidated
Despite the fact that the two suits were at different stages of adjudication, they should be heard together
No illegality or infirmity was found in the impugned orders and the judgments passed by both the Courts below
Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Every court was deemed to possess all powers which are necessary to do the right and to undo the wrong, in the course of administration of justice and law recognized and left unfettered inherent powers of a Court to act ex debito justitiae.
Court in order to secure ends of justice can correct a mistake or set aside an order based on illegality under S. 151, C.P.C.
Provisions of inherit jurisdiction could only be exercised during pendency of a suit, when no other appropriate and specific provision relating thereto was available in the C.P.C.
Jurisdiction under S.151, C.P.C. was termed as an inherent jurisdiction
Civil court in its original jurisdiction, appellate court or the High Court could exercise such powers under S.151, C.P.C. but under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, provisions of S.561-A could only be exercised by the High Court alone and the trial court or the appellate court could not exercise such jurisdiction.
After decision of the suit petitioner filed application for correction of clerical mistake/error in the compromise deed which was dismissed
Validity
Once lis was decided, the court passing the decree would become functus officio and could not re-open/re-enter into the matter except review of the judgment
Provisions of inherent jurisdiction could only be exercised during pendency of a suit, when no other appropriate and specific provision relating thereto was there in the C.P.C.
Jurisdiction under S.151, C.P.C. was termed as an inherent jurisdiction
Civil court in its original jurisdiction, appellate court or the High Court could exercise such powers under S.151, C.P.C. but under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, provisions of S.561-A could only be exercised by the High Court alone and the trial court or the appellate court could not exercise such jurisdiction
Section 152, C.P.C. dealt with correction of clerical and typographical mistakes occurring inadvertently in the judgment and decree or order apparent on the face of the record and without such exception no judgment and decree or order of a court could be reviewed/revisited/altered/modified
Both the provisions of Ss.151 & 152, C.P.C. including review could not be invoked in the present case
Application under S.151, C.P.C. was not maintainable
Question of law could be considered at any stage and a party could not be left to suffer on account of technicalities
In the present case, there was difference in the two terms and words to be inserted in the compromise deed which would change the scenario
For correction of entries in a compromise on account of fraud or mutual mistake one had to file a separate suit
Better course for the Trial Court was to have returned the application
Impugned order was modified and application was returned as not maintainable
Revision was disposed of accordingly.
Plaintiff filed suit for partition wherein she moved an application for preliminary decree for possession and mesne profits which was dismissed however, Trial Court directed defendant to furnish surety amount
Defendant filed application for reduction of the same which was dismissed
Validity
Impugned order was passed with the consent of parties
Defendant was estopped to challenge the validity of said order on the principle of estoppel
Defendant while filing application for reduction of surety amount was satisfied with the nature of order but was aggrieved of the quantum of surety amount
Defendant could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate
No misexercise of jurisdiction nor any illegality, irregularity, perversity or infirmity was found in the impugned order
Revision was dismissed in circumstances.
Suit which on the face of it, was barred because of an express or implied embargo imposed upon it under the law should not be allowed to further proceed and court should reject the plaint under its inherent power
Still born suit should be properly buried, at its inception
Plaint having been being found to be barred by law, attracting the principle of res-judicata as well as estoppel, by conduct had rightly been rejected.
Plaintiff filed suit wherein one of legal heirs on his death moved an application for refund of earnest money paid by his father to the defendant
Validity
Prayer for refund of earnest money was out of purview of the pleadings
Inherent powers under S.151, C.P.C. could not be stretched to change the complexion of a suit from the suit for specific performance of contract to the suit for refund of money
Legal heirs of the plaintiff had not been impleaded nor any application for the same had been moved
No material was on record whether applicant was the legal heir of the deceased
None of the legal heirs of deceased had authorized the applicant to claim/seek refund of earnest money from the defendant through court
Earnest money, if same was refundable, could not be refunded to the legal heirs unless they were impleaded in the suit or they produced succession certificate to claim the refund as legal heirs of the deceased
Application for refund of earnest money was dismissed in circumstances.
Power so conferred in civil court was known as the inherent power of the court, which basically was meant to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to shorten litigation and to do complete justice between parties; as well as mould relief according to altered circumstances in the larger interest of justice
Such powers, however, would remain subject to exercise of discretion to be exercised judicially in proper cases only.
Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of money wherein application for permission to appear and defend the suit was moved which was accepted by the Trial Court and defendant was granted conditional leave to defend the suit by furnishing bank guarantee
Defendant filed application under S.151, C.P.C. for exemption to furnish bank guarantee which was dismissed by the Trial Court
Validity
Trial Court should have allowed the parties to adduce evidence
Defence taken by the defendant was not illusory
Condition of furnishing bank guarantee was based upon the pendency of criminal cases
Triable issue had been raised by the defendant
No sufficient ground existed for imposition of condition of furnishing bank guarantee
Appeal was accepted.
Where claw conferred jurisdiction, it also would grant powers of doing all such acts as were legitimate and were necessary for its execution.
"Inherent powers of court", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124939737
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Inherent powers of court"
P L D 1978 Lahore 790
MUHAMMAD USMAN KHAN AND ANOTHER- Petitioners Versus MIRAJ DIN AND ANOTHER — Respondents
Court:2003 Y L R 82
Mst. NAZIRAN BIBI‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others‑‑‑Respondents
Court: Lahore1993 M L D 772
MUHAMMAD GHANI — Appellant Versus All AHMAD and 3 others — Respondents
Court: Lahore2014 C L C 1080
MUHAMMAD SALEEM — Plaintiff Versus Messrs PREMIER AGGLOW INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED. — Defendant
Court: SindhP L D 1995 Karachi 282
(PVT.) LTD., KARACHI‑‑‑Petitioner Versus Messrs AWAMI COTTON GINNERS
Court: ‑‑‑‑Ss. 151, 115 & O.XXIII, R.1‑‑‑Inherent powers of the Court‑‑‑Withdrawal of suit under bona fide mistake‑‑‑Rectification of such mistake under inherent jurisdiction of Court‑‑‑Inherent jurisdiction‑‑‑Concept‑‑‑To secure ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of Court inherent powers of Court ought to be exercised unhesitatingly so long as such powers do not conflict with or are not contrary to any provision of law or the C.P.C. and are not in respect of matter for which specific provision is made in Civil Procedure Code‑‑ Where application for withdrawal of suit was mistakenly made by counsel as a result of confusion arising out of similarity in the name of defendant firm and the other firm which had cleared its dues and such suit was dismissed, Trial Court ought to have invoked its inherent powers to recall its order dismissing the suit, when matter was brought to its notice through application with prima facie proof‑‑‑Trial Court's refusal to do so on technical ground that "no specific law or precedent was produced to satisfy the Court that once any order had been passed wherein suit had been dismissed as withdrawn it could be recalled subsequently", amounted to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested 'in it‑‑ Order in question whereby Court refused to recall its order of dismissal of suit as withdrawn, was set aside and suit was ordered to be restored to file. p. 285 A, B & C2000 Y L R 951
JUMA KHAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus THE STATE‑‑‑Respondent
Court: Federal Shariat CourtP L D 2003 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 14
AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, MIRPUR through Chairperson and 3 others‑‑‑Appellants Versus ABDUL QAYYUM QAMAR‑‑‑Respondent
Court:P L D 1981 Lahore 321
MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND 3 others ‑Petitioners Versus SULEMAN AND 4others -Respondents
Court:1992 C L C 1394
MUSHARRAF SULTANA‑‑‑Petitioner Versus FAZAL HUSSAIN and 9 others‑‑‑Respondents
Court: Lahore1988 S C M R
WEST PAKISTAN through its Chairman — Petitioner Versus Messrs DRILL WELL CONSULTING ENGINEERS &
Court: High Court