Competent authority
Competent authority legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Petitioner sought direction from the High Court to National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to unblock his Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC)
Petitioner pleaded that his CNIC had been blocked by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)
Respondents contended that the petitioner had obtained CNIC by unfair means by committing fraud and concealing the facts at the time of processing of his CNIC by posing himself as citizen of Pakistan
Validity
Pursuant to the report received by the NADRA from the intelligence agency, the CNIC of the petitioner was digitally, impounded on the basis of mere suspicion and doubt nothing in the said report could establish the alleged fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner
Therefore, when a right is accrued to any person, the same could not be taken back, withheld, and/or stripped away without adhering to due process of law; such right could not be taken away on mere suspicious or feeble grounds
Moreover, the CNIC of the petitioner was digitally impounded on the solitary report of the agency, wherein it was alleged that the petitioner had obtained his CNIC by unfair means, committing fraud and concealing the facts by posing himself as citizen of Pakistan at the time of processing of his CNIC
Such stance taken by NADRA held no veracity as neither NADRA nor any intelligence agency was competent under the law to determine the citizenship of a person
All matters relating to or in connection with the citizenship of a person were covered and dealt with under the Citizenship Pakistan Act solely, whereas the Ordinance 2000 provided for the registration of all persons and for the establishment and maintenance of a multipurpose database, data warehouses, etc.
NADRA under the Ordinance 2000 did not have the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings, whereby the eligibility of a person to hold CNIC based on his/her citizenship could be interrogated
Determination of eligibility, relating to a person's citizenship, fell strictly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, particularly Section 16 read with the Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952
Therefore, any action under Section 18(2)(a) of the Ordinance, 2000, concerning eligibility linked to citizenship, must be based on a prior determination by the competent authority
NADRA under Ordinance, 2000 cannot block, suspend, impound or confiscate a CNIC on citizenship-related grounds unless a prior judicial order or final determination by the competent authority had been made under Section 16 of the Citizenship Act
In such circumstances, NADRA could initiate appropriate proceedings before the competent authority i.e., the Federal Government under the Pakistan Citizenship Act
Respondents were also directed to provide fair opportunity to the petitioner keeping in view fundamental rights and international obligations
Petitioner was also directed to comply with proceedings so that his grievances could be redressed amicably by the competent authority
NADRA under Ordinance, 2000 was directed to restore the CNIC of the petitioner for the time being till the decision of the Federal Government upon the application of the petitioner
Petition was partly allowed.
Petitioner who was appointed in BPS-21 in Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Medical University (SZBMU/University) was aggrieved of his termination by the University
Contention of the counsel for the petitioner was that the impugned notification was issued contrary to law and by an incompetent authority
Validity
SZBMU/University, is a statutory entity established under the Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Medical University Act, 2013, ('the Act 2013')
The Vice-Chancellor is authorized to appoint, on the recommendation of the selection board, employees up to the pay scale equivalent to BPS-18 as enunciated under S. 13(6)(i) of the Act 2013
Furthermore, under S. 25 of the Act 2013, the Syndicate of the University is vested with, inter alia, the authority to appoint, on the recommendations of the Selection Board, officers to pay scale equivalent to BPS-19 and above
The Syndicate is also empowered to determine the terms and conditions of such appointments, including the pay fixation and other related matters
Thus, under provisions of the Act 2013 all appointments at BPS-19 and above, as well as the determination of terms and conditions of service, fall exclusively within the domain of the Syndicate of the University
In the present case, the petitioner was employed in BPS-21; consequently, his appointment, termination and the terms of service unequivocally fall within the purview of the Syndicate of the University, as delineated under the statutory framework of the Act 2013
Thus, it is vividly evident from the record that the said Notification was issued with the prior approval of the Syndicate, which is the competent authority to pass such orders
The impugned notification has been duly issued and the contents thereof demonstrate that the competent authority, the Syndicate, had exercised its authority and determined the employment of the petitioner in the manner permissible under the terms and conditions governing the employment of the petitioner
Petitioner failed to pinpoint any illegality in the impugned notification
Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.
Argument of appellants, Judicial Officers who were retired from service by the High Court, was that competent authority for civil servants in Grade-19 and above, in terms of Explanation to S.12 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, was the Chief Minister, thus impugned retirement order had been passed by an incompetent authority
Validity
Argument of the appellants was totally misconceived as the Punjab Judicial Service Rules, 1994 ('the Rules, 1994'), regulate recruitment of the Punjab Judicial Service and prescribe conditions of service
Rule 3 of the Rules, 1994 provides that the service shall comprise the post of:- a) District and Sessions Judges; b) Additional District and Sessions Judges; c) Civil Judges-cum-Judicial Magistrates
Rule 4 of the Rules 1994 provides that appointments to the service shall be made by the High Court
Admittedly, appellants were appointed by the High Court, thus the competent authority to pass their retirement order in terms of S. 12 of the Act of 1974 was the High Court, which was comprised of the Chief Justice and Judges
Appeals filed by the retired Judicial Officers were dismissed, in circumstances.
Petitioners sought direction from the High Court to National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to unblock their Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs)
Petitioners pleaded that their CNICs were validly issued and were subsequently renewed by NADRA from time to time, thus , the same had wrongly been placed under alien category
Argument of the respondents /NADRA was that the case of the petitioners was examined by the NADRA vigilance branch whereafter it was sent to verifying agency (Intelligence Bureau) for probe of their status which found that their particulars could not be verified,resultantly, their CNICs were digitally impounded in alien category
Validity
NADRA / respondents had not appended any document on record reflecting the determination by the verifying agencyregarding the status of the petitioners, whereas on the other hand, the petitioners had appended the relevant documents which also included the properties purchased by them
NADRA or the Intelligence Agencies are not competent to determine the citizenship of a person
A person cannot be denied the right of being a citizen nor deprived of it , save as provided under the Pakistan Citizenship Act , 1951 , and NADRA has no right under the National Database und Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, to determine the question of citizenship which can only be adjudicated by the Competent Authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, and the Rules framed there under
NADRA has no power to suspend or block the CNIC as it would tantamount to suspending the citizenship of a registered citizen
High Court directed the respondents (NADRA) to forthwith unblock the CNIC of the petitioners
Constitutional petition was allowed , in circumstances.
Held, that any irregularity which had been committed by the department during the process of appointment, the appellant could not be punished for such lapse
Appointing Authority was responsible to face the consequences of their lapses
Under S. 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, when the Competent Authority issues an order in favor of any individual and when the same order has taken its legal effect or implemented, the appointing authority becomes functus officio
Appellant had joined his duty in the pursuance of the appointment order and had also received monthly salary till his time in service, as such a valuable right had been accrued to appellant and that valuable right could not be snatched without following the proper procedure
Principle of locus poenitentiae, in the circumstances, was fully applicable and department was not vested with the authority to cancel the order of appointment of appellant which was passed by their predecessor and stood acted upon
Service Tribunal restored the appellant in service while treating the intervening period as leave without pay
Appeal was allowed accordingly.
Accused and his co-accused brother, who was a stenographer of Sessions Court, were alleged to have prepared a fake order sheet
Sessions Judge after recording statements of accused and co-accused gave directions to the Anti-Corruption Establishment for registration of criminal case against both of them
Legality and propriety
Before lodging of FIR, Anti-Corruption Establishment was to hold an inquiry, for guidance, but the Sessions Judge himself gave orders for lodging of FIR
In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the matter was to be remitted by competent authority to the Anti-Corruption Establishment for legal action by the said Establishment
Impugned order of Sessions Judge only to the extent of directing the Anti-Corruption Establishment to register the FIR without formal and independent inquiry at their own was without jurisdiction, lawful authority and as such was set aside
High Court directed that the Anti-Corruption Establishment was to proceed in the matter as per Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 2014, after affording right of audience to the accused and co-accused and all concerned and if commission of any scheduled offence was made out against any public servant and his other accomplice/s, the Anti-Corruption Establishment was to proceed strictly in accordance with law/rules
Constitutional petition was partly allowed accordingly.
Inquiry was conducted and officer was awarded major penalty of withholding of promotion for five years by the Chief Justice of the High Court
Service Tribunal accepted the appeal of judicial officer on the ground that the Chief Justice of the High Court was not competent to initiate proceedings against Sub-Registrar
Validity
No new appointments of Registrar and Sub-Registrar were made nor fresh terms and conditions of service were determined rather only additional charge was assigned to the judges of subordinate judiciary
Basic appointment of the officer had been made as a judicial officer subordinate to High Court and only an additional charge of Sub-Registrar was assigned to him by the Government
If the officer had committed any illegality/irregularity while performing additional duty then appointing authority under whose subordination he was performing duty was competent to proceed against him
Chief Justice of the High Court was performing the duty of Inspector General of Registration
Government had delegated powers of Inspector General of Registration to the Chief Justice the High Court which did not mean that he had become subordinate to the Government
If the Chief Justice of the High Court while performing the function as Inspector General of Registration committed any illegality/irregularity then Government was not vested with the powers to proceed against him rather matter had to be referred to the Supreme Judicial Council
Chief Justice was not supposed to be the subordinate of Government merely on the ground that it had delegated to him the powers of Inspector General of Registration
Registrars/Sub-Registrars, at present, were judicial officers
Observation of Service Tribunal that Government was competent authority with regard to judicial officers performing their duties as Registrars or Sub-Registrars was against the spirit of independence of judiciary
Only the Chief Justice of the High Court was competent authority to proceed against judicial officers or employees of subordinate judiciary
Service Tribunal had not decided the case of judicial officer on merits and it would be proper to remand the same to the Service Tribunal for decision on merits
Impugned judgment passed by the Service Tribunal was set aside and case was remanded to the Service Tribunal for decision afresh on merits
Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
Secretary Planning and Development initiated departmental proceedings against the employee and he was compulsorily retired from service
Service Tribunal accepted the appeal on the ground that Secretary Planning and Development was not the competent authority to initiate proceedings against the employee
Validity
Appointing authority of employee was Additional Development Commissioner/Chief of Section/Assistant Chief
Secretary Planning and Development was not the appointing authority in the present case
Proceedings against the employee had been conducted under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001
Final order of compulsory retirement had been passed by the Secretary of the Department
Only the competent authority could initiate departmental proceedings
Competent authority was Prime Minister or any officer or authority designated by him
Prime Minister had designated the relevant appointing authorities to exercise powers as 'competent authority'
Secretary Planning and Development being not the appointing authority of the employee, he was not the Authority according to law
Conclusion drawn by the Service Tribunal was consistent with the statutory provisions of law
Appeal filed by the department was dismissed in circumstances.
Plea of employee that the decision to compulsorily retire him from service was not taken independently by the competent authority/Chairman
Validity
Decision was taken by the Chairman and CEO in presence of the other members of the Board of Directors and minutes of the meeting were duly signed by the Chairman and CEO
Even otherwise the Chairman had independently endorsed the decision of compulsory retirement of employee at the footnote of the minutes of the meeting, which was substantial compliance of subsection (1) of S. 3 of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000
Employee was not able to point out any prejudice caused to him by the order of competent authority taken in the Employee Leadership Team meeting, meaning thereby the decision was even concurred by a larger and higher forum, and was communicated by H.R. Manager which practice was common in a corporate environment
Even in the representation made by the employee impugning decision of the competent authority he admitted that order was made by a competent authority
Appeal was dismissed accordingly.
Petitioner, who was appointed as Director General (Legal affairs) in Pakistan Railways on contract basis, challenged his termination on the grounds that the same was carried out without necessary approval of the competent authority i.e. the Prime Minister, and that if any approval had been made it was ex-post facto approval which was not permissible under the law
Validity
In terms of Sl. No. 140, Chapter 2 [Recruitment/Appointment/Seniority and Promotion] of ESTA Code, and R. 4 of the Federal Rules of Business, 1973, the competent authority to appoint the petitioner was the Selection Board headed by the Secretary of the Ministry/Division and not the Prime Minister, who was only the approving authority
Approving authority of the petitioner was undoubtedly the Prime Minister but it was noticeable that the word 'prior' was never mentioned in Sl. No. 140, Chapter 2 [Recruitment/Appointment/ Seniority and Promotion] of ESTA Code; meaning thereby that although the 'approval' of the Prime Minister for the appointment of the petitioner was essential yet 'prior approval' was not necessary for his appointment or termination
If the words used were "with the prior approval of the Prime Minister", the impugned termination order could not be issued without first obtaining the approval of the Prime Minister
Since the words used in the procedure provided were "Approving Authority", the impugned termination order could be passed after obtaining the approval of the Prime Minister subsequently and in case the Prime Minister did not grant approval subsequently, any action taken on the basis of the decision of the Board would be invalid and not otherwise
In the present case, the termination of the petitioner was approved by the Prime Minister subsequently
Constitutional petition filed by the petitioner against his termination was dismissed accordingly.
Plea of employee that the decision to compulsorily retire him from service was not taken independently by the competent authority/Chairman
Validity
Decision was taken by the Chairman and CEO in presence of the other members of the Board of Directors and minutes of the meeting were duly signed by the Chairman and CEO
Even otherwise the Chairman had independently endorsed the decision of compulsory retirement of employee at the footnote of the minutes of the meeting, which was substantial compliance of subsection (1) of S. 3 of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000
Employee was not able to point out any prejudice caused to him by the order of competent authority taken in the Employee Leadership Team meeting, meaning thereby the decision was even concurred by a larger and higher forum, and was communicated by H.R. Manager which practice was common in a corporate environment
Even in the representation made by the employee impugning decision of the competent authority he admitted that order was made by a competent authority
Appeal was allowed accordingly.
Rule 22 of Muslim Commercial Bank Staff Service Rules, 1961, postulated that an employee could be dismissed by the competent authority and competent authority for that purpose was the General Manager or any officer authorized by the General Manager in that behalf; whereas, in the present case, order regarding dismissal of the employee from service was passed by the Controller of the Bank
In absence of any power, the order passed by the Controller of the Bank could only be dubbed as coram non judice.
Inquiry was conducted and employee was awarded major penalty of withholding of promotion for five years under S.8 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001 by the Chief Justice of High Court
Contention of employee was that competent authority for Sub-Registrar was Government i.e. Prime Minister or a delegatee under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001
Validity
Chief Justice High Court as competent authority had imposed punishment on the employee as Senior Civil Judge/Sub-Registrar
Prime Minister or a delegatee was the competent authority to order inquiry or award punishment under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001
Impugned punishment had been awarded to the employee in his capacity as Sub-Registrar
Chief Justice High Court was neither appointing nor competent authority of Sub-Registrar as said official was appointed by the Provincial Government under S.6 of Registration Act, 1908
Government had appointed Inspector General of Registration, Registrar and Sub Registrar from Judicial Department in the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Proceedings conducted by Chief Justice High Court were without jurisdiction and nullity in the eye of law
When an order was passed against civil servant without jurisdiction, merits of the case need not to be probed into
Impugned order was set aside
Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
Neither the Interior Minister nor the Ministry of Interior had the legal authority to order regularization of contractual employees of the Authority
Authority was a statutory body and was governed by the terms of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, which did not permit either the Interior Minister or the Ministry of Interior to issue an order or notification of regularization of contractual employees.
'Disciplinary proceedings' were initiated against delinquent 'Inspector' and Sub-Inspector' by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), who also ordered their dismissal from service
Legality
Service profiles of the Inspector revealed that he was awarded 22 major punishments during his service and he was also awarded minor penalties several times
Furthermore, he did not file any departmental appeals against many of the said penalties, which were the outcome of serious charges
Similarly service record of the Sub-Inspector showed that he was awarded major penalties 6 times during his service against which he did not file any appeal and only contested one major punishment
Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 specifically provided that an order for dismissal may be passed on the basis of cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service
Consistent misconduct of the Inspector and Sub-Inspector reflected in their service profiles squarely fell under R. 16.2, Police Rules, 1934
Rule 12.1 of said Rules described the DIG Police as appointing authority of an Inspector, and R. 16.1 conferred powers on the DIG to award major punishment of dismissal from service of an Inspector
Moreover, the Sindh Police (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules, 1988, conferred powers on DIG to award major punishment of dismissal from service to a police officer of the rank of Inspector
Competent authority under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000 was the Chief Minister, who in the present case had delegated his authority by way of two notifications issued in terms of S. 9 of the said Ordinance
Reading of said two notifications together, along with the powers of appointment under Rr.12.1 & 16.2 of Police Rules, 1934 showed that the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) being the appointing authority of an 'Inspector' was competent to issue show cause notices to the delinquent 'Inspector' and 'Sub-Inspector' under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000
Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) was also competent to pass dismissal order against the 'Inspector' and 'Sub-Inspector'
Supreme Court observed that if police officials with record as that of the delinquent Inspector and Sub-Inspector were allowed to continue in service, it would not only damage the image of police force, but would also encourage social evils in the society, which the police force was required to eliminate.
'Disciplinary proceedings' were initiated against delinquent 'Inspector' and Sub-Inspector' by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), who also ordered their dismissal from service
Legality
Service profiles of the Inspector revealed that he was awarded 22 major punishments during his service and he was also awarded minor penalties several times
Furthermore, he did not file any departmental appeals against many of the said penalties, which were the outcome of serious charges
Similarly service record of the Sub-Inspector showed that he was awarded major penalties 6 times during his service against which he did not file any appeal and only contested one major punishment
Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 specifically provided that an order for dismissal may be passed on the basis of cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service
Consistent misconduct of the Inspector and Sub-Inspector reflected in their service profiles squarely fell under R. 16.2, Police rules, 1934
Rule 12.1 of said Rules described the DIG Police as appointing authority of an Inspector, and R. 16.1 conferred powers on the DIG to award major punishment of dismissal from service of an Inspector
Moreover, the Sindh Police (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules, 1988, conferred powers on DIG to award major punishment of dismissal from service to a police officer of the rank of Inspector
Competent authority under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000 was the Chief Minister, who in the present case had delegated his authority by way of two notifications issued in terms of S. 9 of the said Ordinance
Reading of said two notifications together, along with the powers of appointment under Rr.12.1 & 16.2 of Police Rules, 1934 showed that the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) being the appointing authority of an 'Inspector' was competent to issue show cause notices to the delinquent 'Inspector' and 'Sub-Inspector' under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000
Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) was also competent to pass dismissal order against the 'Inspector' and 'Sub-Inspector'
Supreme Court observed that if police officials with record as that of the delinquent Inspector and Sub-Inspector were allowed to continue in service, it would not only damage the image of police force, but would also encourage social evils in the society, which the police force was required to eliminate.
Petitioner was employee with Punjab Small Industries Corporation and he was transferred to Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority where he was imposed major penalties of recovery and dismissal from service
Contention of petitioner was that he was employee of Punjab Small Industries Corporation and Chairman Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority was not the authority against him and only Punjab Small Industries Corporation being the parent department could initiate disciplinary proceedings
Validity
Petitioner was employee of Punjab Small Industries Corporation and his services were transferred to Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority and absorbed therein later-on
Petitioner was to be considered as an absorbed employee of Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority
Chairman Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority had been authorized to initiate proceedings against such employees of the Punjab Small Industries Corporation working therein
Chairman Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority was the competent authority against the petitioner (employee)
Chief Minister might authorize any officer or authority to exercise powers of competent authority
Said officer should not be inferior in rank to the appointing authority
Chairman Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority was not inferior in rank to the appointing authority of the petitioner
Chairman Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority was the authority for all the employees of Punjab Small Industries Corporation working therein after approval of Chief Minister
Employees who had been awarded any penalty under Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 might file an appeal before the appellate authority
If order was passed by the Chief Minister then employees might file review against the said order
Remedy of departmental appeal was available to the petitioner but he had skipped the same
No litigant could be allowed to avoid statutory remedies available to him and to adopt a forum of his own choice
Employee (petitioner) had not availed the remedy of appeal under S.16 of Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 which he might avail if so advised
Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Inquiry was conducted against the petitioner-employee and he was compulsory retired on the allegations of financial irregularities
Contention of petitioner-employee was that compulsory retirement order was not passed by the competent authority
Validity
Department was not bound to impose the penalty as recommended by the Inquiry Officer but in case of any deviation or decision to impose any penalty other than recommended, Department was bound to inform the employee in the show cause notice with the reasons of such deviation
Maximum punishment could be inflicted by the authority provided under the law which could not be said to be illegal
Competent authority could pass such order on the report and recommendation of inquiry officer as it might deem proper
Competent authority was not bound to follow the report of inquiry officer
Compulsory retirement order could not be defended on the ground that Chairman/CEO (Competent authority) of the corporation was present in the meeting and there was no need to sign the same by him
Serious allegations were levelled and proved in the inquiry and exact figure of loss had been mentioned in the show cause notice
Inquiry report could not be wiped out or wrecked due to the reason alone that retirement order was not signed by the competent authority
Department should be afforded an opportunity to make another study of the case and pass appropriate order
Impugned order was set aside, however, same would not preclude and impede the authority from passing an appropriate order afresh after consideration of inquiry report
Constitutional petition was disposed of in circumstances.
Questions before the High Court were that as to "who was competent/vested with power and jurisdiction to issue show cause notice under S. 11 of the Act and whether the Commissioner was vested with the power and jurisdiction to delegate the powers conferred upon him by Sales Tax, 1990 to a subordinate officer, and that what was the status of the Notification whereby powers had been delegated by the Commissioner to an officer having the designation of "Inland Revenue Officer"
Held, S.30 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 empowered the Board of Revenue to appoint in relation to an area, person or class of persons an Officer of Inland Revenue having a specific designation
Section 2 (18) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 defined the expression 'officer of Inland Revenue' as an officer appointed under S. 30 of the Act; said definition was exhaustive and unambiguously showed that the expression in itself was not a specific officer but referred to all the officers appointed under S. 30 of the Act
Appointment was, therefore, made on the basis of a specific designation of an officer
Section 30 (1) (a) to (ja) of the Act explicitly enumerated the various designations of officers of the Inland Revenue, and S. 30 (j) of the Act provided that the Board of Revenue might appoint an officer of the Inland Revenue with any other designation
Each officer necessarily had to have a specific designation in order to exercise the powers and functions under the Act
Expression 'Officer Inland Revenue' was, therefore, a general expression or phrase for all the officers having a specific designation and empowered to exercise powers under various provisions of the Act
Show cause notice, in the present case, had been issued by officer having the designation of Inland Revenue Officer as mentioned in S. 30(1)(g) of the Act
Section 30(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Act expressly provided that the show case notice would be issued by an "Officer of Inland Revenue"
Section 31 of the Act declared that an "Officer of Inland Revenue" appointed under S. 30 of the Act would exercise such powers and discharge such duties as were conferred or imposed upon him or her under the Act and further that such an officer would also be competent to exercise all powers and discharge all duties conferred or imposed upon any officer subordinate to him
Section 31, proviso of the Act empowered the Board to impose limitations or conditions on the exercise of such powers and discharge of such duties by general or special order; said proviso contained a non-obstante clause in relations to the Act or the rules made thereunder
Section 32 of the Act conferred upon the Board of Revenue or the Chief Commissioner the power of delegation, however, the Commissioner could exercise powers subject to approval of the Board
Sections 30 A to 30 E of the Act related to such entities or offices not covered under S. 30 of the Act as officers of Inland Revenue
Section 30A to 30-E of the Act were in respect of the respective Directorates and were distinct from the officers of Inland Revenue appointed under S. 30 read with S. 31 of the Act
Each officer appointed under S. 30 of the Act by the Board fell within the generic expression of 'officers of Inland Revenue'; however, every officer of Inland Revenue appointed under S. 30 of the Act ought to have a designation as explicitly mentioned in S. 30 (1) (a) to (ja) of the Act
Board was vested with the exclusive power to confer jurisdiction or vest power in any officer of the Inland Revenue for the purposes of the various provisions of the Act
Powers of delegation were also circumscribed under S. 32 of the Act
If the officer of the Inland Revenue had been specified under a provision of the Act, then only such officer could exercise power thereunder; otherwise, the Federal Board of Revenue through a general or special order delegated the power to an officer appointed under S. 30 of the Act
Board had empowered one of the officers of Inland Revenue specified under S. 30 of the Act to exercise powers and jurisdiction under S. 11 (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Act
Commissioner had delegated the power to the Inland Revenue Officers, which had been conferred upon him by the Board
Commissioner, in the present case, had issued the order on the assumption that he could assign function to any officer subordinate to him, pursuant to the powers vested in him under S. 30 (3) of Act
Section 30 (3) of the Act envisaged that the Commissioner Inland Revenue was empowered to direct any officer, with the designation specified in that provision, to perform functions in respect of any person or class of persons or such areas
Section 30 (3) of the Act merely empowered the Commissioner to assign to the specified officers or class of persons or areas in respect of performance of their functions as might be directed by the latter
Definitions of the expressions 'power', 'function' and 'jurisdiction' were distinct and separate
Functions can only be performed by persons who were already conferred with power or jurisdiction
Power or jurisdiction conferred on an officer of Inland Revenue preceded the performance of functions
Conferment of power or jurisdiction was a pre-condition for the performance of functions
Section 30 (3) of the Act had not empowered the Commissioner to confer power or jurisdiction
Commissioner, however, pursuant to S. 30 (3) of the Act could assign persons or areas in respect of the officers specified therein for the purpose of performance of functions with regard to the scope of the power and jurisdiction already conferred on such officer
Such officer, in order to perform their respective function, had to be vested with power or jurisdiction
Board had expressly conferred the power of adjudication under the Act on the Commissioner; therefore, the latter had no authority or jurisdiction to further delegate the power and jurisdiction of adjudication conferred by the Board
Inland Revenue Officer was, therefore, not vested with the power nor had jurisdiction to issue a show cause notice under S. 11 of the Act, as the Commissioner alone was vested with the power and jurisdiction under S.11 of the Act pursuant to the Board's order
High Court allowing the constitutional petition, declared the impugned show cause notices as having been issued by the persons not vested with power or jurisdiction
High Court further provided that the Commissioner or such officer vested with the powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate under S.11 of the Act could issue fresh show cause notice
Constitutional petitions were allowed accordingly.
Chief Judge, Chief Court, nominated a Judge of Chief Court, to act as Banking Judge to take cognizance of all Banking cases, exceeding amount of Rs.50 million, under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 [since repealed]
Petitioner challenged said order as totally illegal, unlawful and void ab initio in the eyes of law
Contention of the petitioner was that Judge, Banking Court had not been appointed by the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan being competent authority in terms of subsection (4) of S.5 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, read with S.2 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Adaptation and Enforcement Order, 2001
Submission of counsel for respondent was, that the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, being the competent authority, after consultation with the Chief Judge, Chief Court had established the Banking Court in terms of subsections (1), (2) of S. 5 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Adaptation and Enforcement Order, 2001, which was lawful and in accordance with law and procedure
No illegality and infirmity had been pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner in the impugned judgment passed by the Chief Court
Case-law cited by counsel for respondent Bank, was applicable; whereas case-law cited by the counsel for the petitioner, was distinguishable
Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal by the Supreme Appellate Court, and was dismissed being meritless having no substance
Impugned judgment passed in writ petition by Chief Court was maintained, in circumstances.
Service Tribunal allowed appeal of sub-inspector mainly on the ground that competent authority to initiate proceedings against him was Regional Police Officer (RPO)
Legality
Order of Service Tribunal was violative of Arts.23 and 2(xii) of Police Order, 2002
Proceedings against sub-inspector were rightly initiated by the District Police Officer (DPO)
Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment was set aside and appeal filed by sub-inspector was deemed to be pending before the Service Tribunal, which was to be decided afresh on merits.
"Competent authority", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124939779
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Competent authority"
1991 P L C 52
AHMAD SAEED and 16 others Versus SINDH LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and another
Court: Karachi High Court1983 P L C (C
UMAR HAYAT KHAN NIAZI Versus SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, FAISALABAD AND ANOTHER
Court: Service Tribunal Punjab2004 P L C (C
MUHAMMAD RASHID Versus LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and 3 others
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