Permissibility

Briefly, the petitioners' (through their late father) filed a civil suit before seeking declaration, perpetual injunction and, in the alternative, possession regarding the shop in question, claiming leasehold rights and challenging a registered lease deed executed in favour of respondent No.1; the suit was decreed and the respondent's appeal was dismissed, but in civil revision the High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and dismissed the suit, leading to the filing of present petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, whereby, the Supreme Court considered maintainability of the suit in view of the earlier civil suit (on the same cause and lease deed) which was withdrawn without permission to file a fresh suit

Held: The application seeking withdrawal of the earlier suit was completely silent as to any condition, reservation, or liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action

A withdrawal founded upon a private arrangement which neither received judicial recognition nor was reflected in the order of the Court could not, in law, be treated as anything other than a withdrawal simpliciter

Such an unconditional withdrawal squarely attracted the bar contained in Order XXIII, Rule 1(3), C.P.C., thereby precluding the institution of a subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter

With respect to the issue of limitation the petitioners had neither pleaded nor established any factual or legal basis to attract the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908

There was no assertion, much less proof, that the earlier proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith before a Court lacking jurisdiction or suffering from any defect of a like nature

Consequently, the challenge laid to the registered lease deed, after the lapse of several years, was manifestly beyond the prescribed period of limitation and was, therefore, hopelessly time-barred

Withdrawal of the earlier suit without permission to institute a fresh suit operated as a complete bar under Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C.

The subsequent suit was not only barred by law but also by limitation

The failure of the petitioners to challenge the withdrawal order further estopped them from re-agitating the same cause of action

Leave was refused and present petition being devoid of merit was dismissed.

Items given by a husband or his family in connection with marriage fall within the category of bridal gifts or presents and, as such, vest absolutely in the bride

Such items cannot be reclaimed by the husband, as they do not constitute dower nor are they recoverable as personal property of the husband.

High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, may not substitute its own view on disputed questions of fact unless there is gross misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or findings that are wholly perverse or unsupported by the record

The High Court is not an appellate forum to reappraise evidence merely on grounds of perceived injustice unless the conclusions arrived at by the subordinate fora are shown to be legally untenable.

Interference in concurrent findings by High Court is permissible only when such findings are shown to be illegal, perverse, or based on extraneous considerations.

Briefly, present appeal arose from an order passed by the Insurance Tribunal, however, the memorandum of appeal was signed by an advocate who was not shown to be duly authorized through a specific board resolution or instrument, while the company's authorized officer had only verified the contents by affidavit

During proceedings, an application was moved to place on record the relevant board resolution and Articles of Association and to permit filing of an amended memorandum of appeal through an authorized person, which was opposed on the ground that additional documents could not be introduced at the appellate stage

The pivotal issue before the High Court was “whether the defect in signing and authorization of the memorandum of appeal was a fatal irregularity or a curable procedural defect that could be rectified at any stage without affecting the merits or jurisdiction of the Court?”

Held: Memorandum of appeal or are vision petition should be signed by appellant and a duly appointed pleader as per R.1 of O.XLI, C.P.C. and same could be presented by the appellant or pleader as per R.1 of O.III, C.P.C.

Rules 14 & l5 of O.VI as well as R.1 of O.XXIX C.P.C. as to signing and verification of pleadings like plaint and written statement, was not applicable to memorandum of appeals and revision petition

Any defect or omission in signing, verifying or presenting a pleading or memorandum of appeal or revision would not affect merits of the case or jurisdiction of a Court and should therefore be taken as a curable irregularity of proceedings

Regarding legal proceedings on behalf of a corporation, any defect in the authority of a person to sign or verify the pleadings in a suit(by or against Corporation) or in instituting or defending such a suit (by presenting appropriate pleadings) or in signing or filing of memorandum of appeal or revision petition by a corporation, could also be curedat any stage of proceeding

Mere technicality unless offering an unsurmountable hurdle, could not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice and that the trivial issue of non-signing of written statement could have been allowed to be remedied by allowing the party to sign the written statement

Documents annexed with application were allowed to be placed on file and appellants were allowed to file an amended memorandum of appeal

For compensating the other party cost ofRs.100,000/- (one hundred thousand) were imposed on the appellant

Present application was allowed, in circumstances.

In presence of clear and favorable findings by the inquiry officer the department cannot proceed to punish the employee without any additional or independent justification, otherwise, it would undermine the principles of natural justice and fair inquiry

In such circumstances the disciplinary action taken against an employee would be arbitrary, unjustified and without lawful authority.

Section 181 of the Customs Act is to the effect that once an order for confiscation of goods is passed under the Customs Act, the adjudicating officer may pass an order giving an option to the owner of the goods to pay such fine in lieu of the confiscated goods, as he thinks fit, however, the proviso to the said section envisages that the Federal Board of Revenue is empowered to circumscribe the discretion of the officer for passing an order for payment of fine in lieu of confiscated goods

While exercising the powers conferred under S. 181 of the Customs Act, the Federal Board of Revenue has indeed issued a notification bearing SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009, the preamble of the said SRO describes the goods or classes of goods from clauses (a) to (g)regarding which the officer concerned cannot exercise his discretion in terms of S.181 of the Customs Act

There are two significant recent amendments/insertions/substitutions brought about in the SRO 499(I)/2009

Initially clause (ba) was inserted vide SRO 1280(I)/2024 dated 20.08.2024

Thereafter, the said clause was substituted vide SRO 1619(I)/2024 dated 03.10.2024

Perusal of newly substituted clause (ba) of SRO 499(I)/2009 clearly concludes that a 'lawfully registered conveyance', 'if seized and found carrying smuggled goods' will fall within the exceptions of Section 181 of the Customs Act and shall not be amenable to avail the option of payment of fine in lieu of confiscation

This substitution is definite in terms and unequivocal in application

If a vehicle was found carrying smuggled goods and was being used exclusively for the transportation thereof, thus, the same will be squarely covered under clause (ba) of SRO 499(I)/2009 and the option contemplated under Section 181 of the Customs Act cannot be resorted to for its release.

In case an AGM is not held on time as provided by law for any reason whatsoever and no extension can be granted by the Commission, the only option left is for an EGM to be held for transaction of a business.

Whether, upon expiry of statutory period for holding AGM, the company is legally competent to transact AGM business through an EGM

Appointment of auditors for subsequent years through EGM

Permissibility

Non-holding of AGM attracting regulatory consequences but not rendering subsequent EGM proceedings void

Briefly, the petitioner was a minority shareholder holding approximately 22.5% shares in the respondent company who invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Companies Act, 2017, complaining of prolonged non-holding of Annual General Meetings (AGMs), non-approval and filing of financial statements for multiple past years, and subsequent steps taken by the board of directors to approve audited accounts for earlier periods and to appoint auditors for later periods through an Extraordinary General Meeting

The petitioner participated in and voted at the said EGM, where resolutions were passed by majority

The core issue before the High Court was "whether, in the absence of timely AGMs, the company could lawfully transact the business of approval of past financial statements and appointment of auditors through an EOGM, and whether such acts amounted to unlawful conduct or oppression of minority shareholders requiring interference under the Companies Act, 2017?"

Held: Subsequent auditors were to be appointed by the company in the annual general meeting on the recommendation of the board

In the present case, it had been done in an extraordinary general meeting for which a special resolution was required to be passed in terms of S.2(66) of the Act

Doubtless, the necessary majority for a special resolution was conspicuously missing in the present case for appointment of auditors

Only course open to the company was for convening an extraordinary general meeting which had duly been done yet the foremost requirement of special resolution had not been fulfilled

Members of the company could in any EGM consider the financial statements of previous financial years as well as the reports of the Board and auditors

This was precisely what was considered and approved by the members of respondent company in the EGM under challenge in the present petition

Law provided for the transaction of a business in an EGM which could have been transacted in an AGM but was not so done at the relevant time

If such transaction through an EGM was disallowed then this would have given carte blanche to the directors to simply evade their duty to place the financial statements before the members of the company by deliberately failing to hold an AGM

This could not be the intention of the legislature under the law

As regards the plea of oppression taken in the petition, same did not make out an actionable claim

Since the petitioner did not challenge the proceedings of the general meeting within time (thirty days), he could not bring the present petition alleging oppression of the minority shareholders

Instead of bringing a separate petition to challenge the EGM (of 23.5.2024), the petitioner ought to have added this as a ground to C.O.24829/2023 (whereby challenge to the election of Board held on 01.02.2023 in an EOGM was made) to seek winding up of respondent company

On this basis too, the instant petition was an abuse of the process of the court

Though no case for oppression was made out, in order to streamline the future affairs of the respondent company, it was directed that (i) the audited accounts were to be completed expeditiously and placed before a general meeting for consideration soon thereafter; ii) The AGM for the upcoming financial year to be held on time and according to law; iii) The petitioner and other shareholders were to have access to financial statements, directors reports, audited reports etc. as and when same were prepared and presented

Holding of EGM of 23.5.2024 and other factors mentioned in the petition did not give rise to unlawful and fraudulent acts by the respondents Nos. 2-6 to constitute oppression

The petition to that extent was dismissed, in circumstances.

Whether an interlocutory order passed by an arbitral tribunal, which does not finally determine the rights of the parties, is amenable to challenge before a civil court

Permitting parties to approach civil courts to challenge every procedural or interlocutory order passed by a arbitral tribunal would defeat the very object of arbitration, opening the floodgates for recalcitrant parties to delay proceedings and transforming the arbitrator into a trial court and the Civil Court into a court of first appeal for every minor procedural decision

The scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals no provision granting a right to challenge interlocutory order

If, however, a party is genuinely aggrieved by an arbitrator's conduct, such as undue delay, partiality or biased procedure, the appropriate remedy lies under S. 11 of the Act of 1940, which empowers the Court to remove an arbitrator or umpire in certain circumstances

Arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), provides a speedy, efficient and cost-effective substitute for conventional and often protracted litigation

Particularly in commercial and complex disputes, arbitration is preferred due to its procedural flexibility, technical expertise and finality

Accordingly, if a party alleges misconduct, undue delay or procedural impropriety, it may invoke the provisions of S. 11 ibid for removal of the arbitrator.

Brief facts of the matter were that the Province of Punjab (petitioner/plaintiff) instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction asserting that the suit land was government property under its possession on the basis of a possession slip dated 10.01.1973 and that a Government High School was operating on a portion thereof; the dispute arose when Darul Haq Trust (respondent/defendant) constructed shops on the suit land; the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and the appeal was dismissed as well, leading to the filing of present civil revision petition challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below

Held: The burden squarely rested upon respondent trust to produce cogent and reliable evidence demonstrating either that the impugned use of the land fell within the permissible scope of the original allotment, or that any lawful authorization had subsequently been obtained to vary its terms. However, DW-1 appearing on behalf of respondent trust unequivocally admitted during cross-examination that the land had not been allotted for the construction of shops

Respondent's defence failed to meet the evidentiary threshold required to justify the deviation from the original, restrictive purpose of the allotment

The conversion of land devoted to a public or religious purpose into commercial use amounted to an infringement of the petitioners' proprietary and possessory rights and a breach of the public interest in preserving land dedicated for communal use

Such conversion was contrary to the express terms of the allotment and was therefore unlawful

Any attempt to convert mosque-dedicated land into commercial premises, particularly without statutory sanction constituted not only a breach of allotment but an impairment of the religious trust and a violation of the fiduciary obligations attached to such property

Respondent trust was permanently restrained from further encroachment, construction, or use of the land for purposes other than a mosque, as specified in the allotment letter

Concurrent judgments of the courts below were set aside

Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Facts: The petitioner (claiming to be the widow of deceased) filed an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. to set aside the judgment and decree passed in a suit for declaration filed by the deceased's children (respondents Nos. 3 to 8) against “public at large” wherein the suit was decreed; the petitioner's section 12(2) application was dismissed and her revision was also dismissed by the District Court; findings of both the courts below were drawn from the statements/evidence of the deceased and his witnesses recorded in the earlier jactitation-of-marriage proceedings filed by respondent No.9/mother of respondents Nos.3 to 8; petitioner filed present constitutional petition challenging both concurrent orders

Issue: “Whether the evidence recorded in the earlier suit for jactitation of marriage could legally be pressed into service against the present petitioner, who was neither a party to those proceedings nor afforded any opportunity of cross-examination?”

Held: In the present case, none of the mandatory pre-conditions for use of earlier recorded testimony in subsequent proceedings stood fulfilled

The petitioner was neither a party to the suit for jactitation of marriage nor afforded any right or opportunity to cross-examine the deceased or his witnesses

Furthermore, the issues involved in the said proceedings were materially distinct from the controversy arising in the application under S.12(2), C.P.C.

Consequently, the evidence recorded in the earlier proceedings was wholly inadmissible against the petitioner and could not legally form the basis for adjudication of her rights

The courts below, therefore, committed a manifest error of law by treating such evidence as determinative, in clear disregard of the statutory mandate contained in Art.47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

The omission to implead the present petitioner, who claimed to be the widow of deceased at the time of his death, became significant and prima facie indicative of material concealment

Such selective impleadment, in a suit directly concerning declaration of legal heirship and inheritance rights, struck at the root of fair adjudication and attracted the mischief contemplated under S.12(2), C.P.C.

The controversy squarely involved disputed questions of fact, which could only have been resolved through proper framing of issues and recording of evidence of the contesting parties

Impugned orders were set aside and matter was remanded to Trial Court

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Amendment of pleadings should ordinarily be allowed if it is necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties and does not change the complexion of the case or cause prejudice to the opposite side

The jurisdiction to allow amendment is wide and intended to advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it

Therefore, the proposed amendment if essential for clarification of pleadings and does not alter the fundamental character of the case, it should be permitted even at an advanced stage of the proceedings.

Whether, upon expiry of statutory period for holding AGM, the company is legally competent to transact AGM business through an EGM

Appointment of auditors for subsequent years through EGM

Permissibility

Non-holding of AGM attracting regulatory consequences but not rendering subsequent EGM proceedings void

Briefly, the petitioner was a minority shareholder holding approximately 22.5% shares in the respondent company who invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Companies Act, 2017, complaining of prolonged non-holding of Annual General Meetings (AGMs), non-approval and filing of financial statements for multiple past years, and subsequent steps taken by the board of directors to approve audited accounts for earlier periods and to appoint auditors for later periods through an Extraordinary General Meeting

The petitioner participated in and voted at the said EGM, where resolutions were passed by majority

The core issue before the High Court was "whether, in the absence of timely AGMs, the company could lawfully transact the business of approval of past financial statements and appointment of auditors through an EOGM, and whether such acts amounted to unlawful conduct or oppression of minority shareholders requiring interference under the Companies Act, 2017?"

Held: Subsequent auditors were to be appointed by the company in the annual general meeting on the recommendation of the board

In the present case, it had been done in an extraordinary general meeting for which a special resolution was required to be passed in terms of S.2(66) of the Act

Doubtless, the necessary majority for a special resolution was conspicuously missing in the present case for appointment of auditors

Only course open to the company was for convening an extraordinary general meeting which had duly been done yet the foremost requirement of special resolution had not been fulfilled

Members of the company could in any EGM consider the financial statements of previous financial years as well as the reports of the Board and auditors

This was precisely what was considered and approved by the members of respondent company in the EGM under challenge in the present petition

Law provided for the transaction of a business in an EGM which could have been transacted in an AGM but was not so done at the relevant time

If such transaction through an EGM was disallowed then this would have given carte blanche to the directors to simply evade their duty to place the financial statements before the members of the company by deliberately failing to hold an AGM

This could not be the intention of the legislature under the law

As regards the plea of oppression taken in the petition, same did not make out an actionable claim

Since the petitioner did not challenge the proceedings of the general meeting within time (thirty days), he could not bring the present petition alleging oppression of the minority shareholders

Instead of bringing a separate petition to challenge the EGM (of 23.5.2024), the petitioner ought to have added this as a ground to C.O.24829/2023 (whereby challenge to the election of Board held on 01.02.2023 in an EOGM was made) to seek winding up of respondent company

On this basis too, the instant petition was an abuse of the process of the court

Though no case for oppression was made out, in order to streamline the future affairs of the respondent company, it was directed that (i) the audited accounts were to be completed expeditiously and placed before a general meeting for consideration soon thereafter; ii) The AGM for the upcoming financial year to be held on time and according to law; iii) The petitioner and other shareholders were to have access to financial statements, directors reports, audited reports etc. as and when same were prepared and presented

Holding of EGM of 23.5.2024 and other factors mentioned in the petition did not give rise to unlawful and fraudulent acts by the respondents Nos. 2-6 to constitute oppression

The petition to that extent was dismissed, in circumstances.

Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties

The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property

During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4

Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order

Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application

The maxim 'Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria' provided that, 'no one can benefit from their own wrong'

Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished

Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O. XXI, R. 77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors

It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh

Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced

Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit

Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree

Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor

Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled

In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered

Reliance on S.51 C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced

Lastly, an objection was raised that under O. XXI, R. 23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard

In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million

After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered

Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs

Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors

Both applications were allowed, in circumstances.

High Court while exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not empowered to undertake a factual inquiry or resolve disputed questions of fact

The constitutional jurisdiction is primarily intended to address issues involving public law, enforcement of fundamental rights, or jurisdictional errors by public functionaries

Where the resolution of a dispute depends upon examination of evidence, determination of private rights, or adjudication of contested facts, the parties must resort to the appropriate forum under ordinary civil or criminal law.

Petitioner was awarded a two-year vending contract through an open auction conducted by Pakistan Railways pursuant to a public notice

Petitioner deposited 30% of the bid amount, i.e., Rs.1,683,000, with the respondents

Allotment pertained to vending services, and subsequent to commencement of the contract, the petitioner's vending operations were regulated in terms of items permitted for sale and the number of salespersons authorized under the allotment order and applicable railway policy, during which period the petitioner's vending activity ultimately ceased

Held: Matter at hand emanated solely from a contractual dispute between the parties

The document annexed by the petitioner himself demonstrated that the petitioner was authorized to vend only twelve items and to operate through no more than four salespersons, in accordance with the terms explicitly set forth in the contractual letter, hence, the very basis of his claim stood contradicted by his own annexures

Furthermore, the petitioner had concealed a material fact viz. institution of a civil suit, wherein, plaint was rejected

Such concealment, coupled with the petitioner's contradictory pleadings, rendered it evident that the petitioner had not approached the High Court with clean hands, and, therefore, was not entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court

Contractual disputes, laden with factual controversies, did not fall within the purview of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution

In the absence of any demonstrable violation of fundamental rights or statutory obligations, High Court could not be called upon to adjudicate such dispute

Present petition was misconceived and same was devoid of any merit, as such, same was dismissed.

Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties

The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property

During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4

Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order

Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application

The maxim 'Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria' provided that, 'no one can benefit from their own wrong'

Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished

Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O.XXI R.77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors

It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh

Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced

Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance, 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit

Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree

Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor

Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled

In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered

Reliance on S.51 C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced

Lastly, an objection was raised that under O.XX1, R.23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard

In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million

After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered

Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs

Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors

Both applications were allowed, in circumstances.

Brief facts of the matter were that the Bank sought execution of a consent decree arising from a settlement agreement under which two sets of agreed amounts were to be satisfied through acquisition and sale of specified properties

The first portion of Rs.426,171,375/- was satisfied through acquisition of four properties, whereas the second portion of approximately Rs.120 million remained partly unsatisfied due to other executions and pending proceedings regarding one property

During execution, the Court issued a direction for blocking the CNICs of judgment debtors Nos.3 and 4

Judgment debtor No.4 later filed applications seeking recalling of that order

Held: A clear discrepancy appeared in the address of the judgment debtor and such position clearly supported his contention that due to his wrong address in the execution application he was never served in the present proceedings and therefore he did not have any knowledge about the instant execution application

The maxim 'Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria' provided that, 'no one can benefit from their own wrong'

Such address was provided by the decree holder, for which the judgment debtor No.4 should not be punished

Attending to the next aspect of the matter and in order to justify the blocking of CNIC of judgement debtors, decree holder relied upon O. XXI, R. 77 of the Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] [KPK Amendment], which provided for blocking of National Identity Card of judgment debtors

It was to be noted after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, C.P.C. had become a Provincial subject, whereas no such provision was available in the C.P.C. as enforceable in the Province of Sindh

Hence, reliance on such a provision, which was neither available nor enforceable in the present jurisdiction, was completely misplaced

Secondly, it was also to be noted that for execution of a decree under the banking jurisdiction, a complete mechanism was provided under the C.P.C., being the general law and under the Financial Institutions Ordinance 2001 [Ordinance 2001] being special law applicable to the present case, which provisions and mechanisms were required to be followed strictly in letter and spirit

Conspicuously, none of these two laws, as applicable in the Province of Sindh, contained any specific provision for blocking of CNIC of a judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree

Further decree holder sought to rely on S.51 of C.P.C. seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor

Before issuance of a warrant under S.51 of C.P.C. certain mandatory pre-requisites had to be fulfilled

In the present case, neither any of pre-conditions was pleaded, nor was issuance of warrant ordered

Reliance on S.51, C.P.C. was therefore, completely misplaced

Lastly, an objection was raised that under O. XXI, R. 23A the judgement debtor No.4 was first required to deposit the decretal amount before his objections could be heard

In this regard, the decree holder was first required to correct the address of judgment debtor No.4 on the title of the present execution application; and thereafter was also required to bring on record the exact outstanding amount which was to be recovered in final satisfaction of the decree, after deduction of the amounts received in partial satisfaction of Rs.120 million

After completion of such activity if the judgment debtor No.4 chose to file objections to this execution, that would be appropriate time when such an objection would be considered

Although the order impugned was passed under S.18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 yet even under such Ordinance, Courts had repeatedly discouraged blocking of CNICs

Order impugned was recalled and consequently, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was directed to immediately unblock the CNIC of the judgement debtors

Both applications were allowed, in circumstances.

The petitioner (victim) was an 'associate professor' at a university who lodged a complaint before the Federal Ombudsman alleging various incidents occurring during her employment, after which the Ombudsman imposed penalties upon respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (accused harassers)

Both sides filed representations before the President of Pakistan, who dismissed the petitioner's representation while accepting those of Respondents Nos.3 to 5

The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition challenging the President's order

Held: Perusal of the inquiry report showed that the harassment committee comprised of five members which was not in consonance with the mandate of S.3 of the Act, 2010

Section 3(2) of the Act, 2010 mandated in unequivocal terms that the inquiry committee had to consist of three members

The composition was further qualified by express criteria, i.e., one member must be a woman, one from senior management, and one a senior representative of the employees (or a senior employee where no CBA exists)

The statutory prescription of a three-member panel was deliberate and rooted in legislative intent, which was to ensure a fair, impartial, and gender-balanced inquiry process through a compact and manageable structure

Provisions of Ss. 3 and 11 of the Act were to be treated as mandatory in nature rather than directory

The organization, in the present case, had not constituted the inquiry committee in accordance with S. 3 of the Act, 2010 at the time of filing of the complaint by the petitioner, therefore, the organization constituting a five-member committee, having a gender disparity, expressly violated the mandatory provisions of the Act, 2010

Constitution of a five-member inquiry committee represented a flagrant departure from the mandatory structure

The inflation of membership from three to five was not a trivial or procedural irregularity; it constituted a patent illegality that struck at the root of the committee's jurisdiction

Record further revealed that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5, and their witnesses were not subjected to any meaningful cross-examination

An inquiry so conducted could not be sustained in the eyes of law and was liable to be declared void ab initio

Impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the respondent No. 1/President of Pakistan to decide the representation against the respondent No. 2/Federal Ombudsman's order in the light of interpretation of the term sexual harassment rendered by Supreme Court

Instant writ petition filed by the victim was allowed, in circumstances.

Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.175F(1)(c), 189 [as amended by the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act (XXXII of 2025)] & 268

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11

Interfaith marriage between Muslim male and Christian female

Permissibility

Female claiming conversion to Islam

Essentials and proof

Petitioner sought recovery of his daughter alleging that her marriage with respondent No.6 was void because she was a minor Christian girl and was being kept in illegal custody

The courts below dismissed the matter on the basis of her own statements that she had married of her free will

Issue requiring determination in the present matter was "whether such custody could be treated as illegal despite dispute about age and validity of marriage?"

Held: The Christian girl made a formal declaration of embracing Islam

Undoubtedly, the certificate was issued by the authority two days after the solemnization of her marriage, however, it sufficiently verified and confirmed her earlier declaration made at the time of her marriage with respondent No. 6

The aforesaid declarations were adequate to conclude that the Christian girl had fulfilled all the prerequisites for embracing Islam

Any further probe into the matter, or an attempt to ascertain the true nature of her prior disbelief would have amounted to unwarranted intermeddling, unjustifiable on any ground

She was no longer a Christian by faith and, as such, her marriage was validly solemnized under the Ordinance, 1961

Documents advanced by the petitioner could not be relied upon as the sole basis for concluding that her daughter was born on 07.10.2012, particularly when she was physically present in the court and appeared to be of a more advanced age

High Court was fully justified in holding that her custody with her husband could not be termed illegal or unlawful, particularly in the absence of any declaration of invalidity by a competent court of law

Leave was refused and petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.

Prosecution in criminal cases and departmental inquiries on the same allegations can proceed concurrently at both venues without having any overriding or overlapping effect

It is the prerogative of the employer to conduct the disciplinary proceedings despite acquittal in the criminal proceedings.

It is obligatory for any employee to intimate his correct date of birth and to produce confirmatory documentary evidence at the time when the first entry is made in the service record which cannot be altered, except in the case of a clerical error, because the date of birth once recorded at the time of joining service is deemed to be final and thereafter no alteration in the date of birth is permissible

It is an admitted position that in the original National Identity Card (CNIC), the year of birth of the respondent (employee) was 1964, while in the CNIC prepared on 12.11.2002, again his date of birth was 22.09.1964

Even in his Passport his date of birth was 22.09.1964

However, the respondent was issued his new CNIC on 03.03.2023, wherein his date of birth was shown as 22.09.1966

Employer-Corporation had issued a circular, wherein it was categorically mentioned that certain employees are placing a representation for the correction in the date of birth after having completed a number of years of service, therefore, it was announced by means of the aforesaid circular that no change in the date of birth will be made if it is not requested within 2 years of the date of initial appointment

Respondent himself relied upon this circular

Record reflects that the respondent first applied for the correction of his date of birth in the official record vide application dated 17.03.2023 on the basis of his matriculation certificate issued in 1983, but no justification was shown in the application as to why he himself mentioned his date of birth as 22.09.1964 when he was appointed by the petitioner's company

It is also incomprehensible that even when he applied for a CNIC in 2002, why at that time the correction was not applied, and even in his passport, issued in 2010, he maintained the same date of birth

Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court was dismissed.

The petitioner challenged the legality and validity of his dismissal from Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) service

The challenge centered on whether his termination, was lawful and justified, particularly in light of the proposition that the petitioner's previous exoneration from criminal charges concerning similar conduct were founded on same allegations

Held: Disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings were altogether different and independent of each other and could not be terms synonymous and interchangeable

The departmental inquiries for misconduct used a lower standard of proof (balance of probabilities) compared to criminal trials (proof beyond a reasonable doubt)

The forums for adjudication, principles of evidence, and procedure were also separate and distinct

The decision of one forum could not a bearing on the decision of other forum

Even if the petitioner was acquitted in a criminal case following a conviction, this did not automatically lead to exoneration from departmental charges based on the same factual grounds

Moreover, while a writ under Art. 199 of the Constitution was available in specific limited situations, it was generally not the appropriate remedy to contest a dismissal from service based on these charges, particularly when the employee was afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present his/her defense but did not convince the department of his/her innocence

Constitutional petition was not maintainable and same was dismissed, in circumstances.

Withholding or withdrawal of pension permissible where pensioner is convicted of serious crime or found guilty of grave misconduct, whether during or after service

Scope

Good conduct is an implied condition of every kind of pension and empowers the Government to withhold or withdraw a pension or any part of it if the pensioner is convicted of serious crime or found to have been guilt of grave misconduct either during or after the completion of his service, provided that before nay order to this effect is issued, the procedure regarding imposition of penalty of removal from service shall be followed

In addition, thereto, under clause (b) to R. 1.8, it is provided that the Government reserves the right of recovery from the pension on account of losses found to have been caused to the Government by the negligence, or fraud of such Government pensioner during his service, by instituting judicial or departmental proceedings

Provided that such judicial or departmental proceedings shall not be instituted after more than one year from the date of retirement of the Government pensioner, clause (c) of R. 1.8 empowers the Government to call upon the Government servant to refund such excess payments, if afterwards found to have been received by the pensioner.

But the request of petitioners for consolidation/merger was not entertained and the mode of partition was finalized without consolidation of Khatas

The matter of consolidation/merger/ pooling (??????) of the Khatas of the petitioners had gone all the way up to level of the Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab

The Courts below, while relying on Letter No. 2014/66/D-0/BOR/PMU dated 27.02.2014 issued by Project Management Unit of Board of Revenue, Punjab, held that consolidation of Khatas cannot be permitted since every Khata is a separate entity and must be partitioned separately

Question as to whether or not the consolidation of khatas is permitted under the Land Revenue Act, 1967?

Held: In the present case, the petitioner has raised a compelling practical concern; which confirms that all co-sharers of the impugned khatas have voluntarily expressed their explicit and uncontested consent to merge and pool their holdings

No party has raised any legal or factual objection

Imposing an unqualified prohibition in these circumstances is not only inequitable but also counterproductive to the objectives of just partition

A blanket ban creates procedural deadlocks, forcing repetitive and technical proceedings, and defeats the fundamental aim of revenue administration, which is to reflect accurate and agreed-upon ownership and possession

The principle "ubi jus ibi remedium-where there is a right, there must be a remedy" clearly supports the petitioner's case

Ownership rights of co-sharers in the land are undisputed, yet the denial of merger or pooling, despite mutual agreement, effectively deprives them of a practicable remedy

When procedural obstacles obstruct the enforcement of rightful possession or fair partition, the law must intervene to restore balance

The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, while detailed in its regulation of partition under Chap. XI, remains silent on the subject of merger or pooling of khatas

Said legislative silence must not be misconstrued as a prohibition

The Latin maxim "Quod lex non prohibet, licitum est" (which the law does not prohibit, it permits) clearly applies

Thus, while clearly the Land Revenue Act, 1967, is silent in regard to consolidation of khatas/khewats, yet a complete ban on the same should not be allowed to continue

Subject to certain safeguards, pooling or merger of khatas shall be deemed a permissible administrative and judicial act in appropriate cases

Member Judicial, Board of Revenue, Punjab, set-aside the impugned order, maintaining orders/judgments of Courts below, passed by the predecessor of this court; and ordered the Khatas-in-question to be merged / consolidated; and the case was remanded to the competent Revenue Officer for fresh proceedings

Review petition was accepted accordingly.

Written test measures a candidate's knowledge and expression skills but does not evaluate important personality traits like communication skills, leadership qualities, and decision-making abilities

These traits are assessed during the interview

Interview process allows evaluators to see how candidates interact and respond in real-time, offering a complete picture of their suitability for the job

An interview is inherently a subjective evaluation, and a Court of law does not have jurisdiction to substitute its opinion with that of the Interview Board to provide relief to anyone

Role of the Interview Board is to evaluate candidates based on a variety of subjective criteria, which may include interpersonal skills, presentation, and other intangible qualities that are difficult to measure objectively

These assessments are inherently qualitative and depend on the opinion of interviewers, who are appointed for their expertise and ability to make such evaluations

However, this does not mean that the decisions of the Interview Board are beyond scrutiny

If there are any indications of mala fides, bias, or significant errors in the opinion (of the Interview Board) that are apparent from the record, the Court would certainly be compelled to intervene

But where the candidates fail to pass the interview examination for not meeting the necessary standards in the interview, the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked for challenging the interview process.

Under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C., the rejection of a plaint on any of the grounds mentioned in Order VII shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action

Meaning thereby that, where the plaint is rejected due to non-payment of court fee and not for any other cause such as limitation, a pathway is open to the plaintiff to invoke the remedy provided under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C. by presenting fresh plaint within the prescribed period of limitation rather than wasting time or contesting the matter up to the Supreme Court.

Column No.3 of the declaration, provided in the nomination papers, by which a candidate is required to declare his/her bank account

Interpretation

Tenor of column No.3 of the declaration provides two options for a candidate

First, the candidate has to declare that he/she has opened an exclusive single signatory account, which means that before filing nomination papers, the candidate has opened an exclusive single signatory account for the purpose of documentary evidence of election expenses

If, for any reason, the candidate cannot open an exclusive single signatory account before filing the nomination papers, the other option for him/her is to declare that he/she will use his/her existing account for the purpose of election expenses

This implies two things: firstly, the existing account may be single or joint, and secondly, a candidate is given the opportunity, if their account is joint, to have it converted into a single signatory account for the purpose of election expenses later on

This option seems to be for those candidates who, due to some exigencies including illness, imprisonment, etc., cannot open their exclusive single signatory bank account or convert their existing joint account to a single signatory account before filing nomination papers

Purpose of providing such a facility can only be to ensure that the citizens are not deprived of their fundamental right, that is, to contest election freely

So the objection, if any, in the present case with regard to the joint bank account declared by the petitioner (candidate), it could not be held to be a defect which was substantial in nature as the petitioner had the option, as stated above, to rectify it under proviso (ii) to subsection (9) of section 62 of the Act, and convert it into single signatory account

This aspect of the matter escaped consideration of the High Court, and so, it misdirected itself while declining the petitioner's prayer

Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner for PP-150 (Lahore) were deemed accepted and her name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.

It is not mandatory for the bank account opened or dedicated for the purpose of election expenses to be a single signature account

However, the Election Commission of Pakistan ("ECP") exercising its delegated power under section 239 of the Elections Act, 2017 ('the Act') amended Rule 51 of the Election Rules, 2017 ('the Rules') with the effect that the bank account so opened for the purpose to document election expenditure should not be a joint signatory account

Stipulation in Rule 51 that the bank account so opened or dedicated should not be a joint signatory account is inconsistent with the express provision of section 60(2)(b) of the Act

Since Rule 51 (as amended) travels beyond the ambit of the Act, it is ultra vires and cannot be given any effect, and resultantly, based on it the nomination papers could not be rejected

Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner for PP-150 (Lahore) were deemed accepted and her name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.

Parliament can legislate on any matter it is authorized under the Constitution, but it cannot reverse or set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court

Even an express pronouncement in a statute, and that too, through a non-obstante clause, cannot render the decision of the Supreme Court non-binding

Such an action would constitute an attempt to reverse a judicial decision rendered in the exercise of judicial power, which lies beyond the legislative domain

However, it cannot be denied that the effect of a judicial decision can be nullified by legislative action

Legislature can alter even with retrospective effect, the law which formed the basis of the judicial decision; the provisions on which the decision of the Court was based on may be altered, so fundamentally that, the decision no longer remains applicable to the altered circumstances

More importantly, the vires of any such law cannot be questioned on the ground that it nullifies the judgment of the Court

However, the same may be questioned being violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court is competent to examine the vires of a statute, if it has been enacted in derogation of any of the provisions of the Constitution.

In terms of S. 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, 2017 ('the Act') there is a requirement of a declaration that an 'exclusive' bank account, for the purpose of recording election expenses, has been opened, or an existing bank account be dedicated for the same, to be nominated for an election

However, the said section, or rather any section of the Act, does not create a distinction between an 'exclusive bank account' or a 'joint bank account'

After all, a 'joint bank account' could be 'exclusive' as well

There is nothing on the record to suggest that the 'joint bank account' which is at the forefront of the present case, was not being exclusively used by the petitioner (candidate) and his wife

Moreover, S. 60(2)(b) of the Act gave the petitioner the option to dedicate an existing bank account for recording election expenses; in this regard, the Act does not specify, once again anywhere in any section of Act, that this existing bank account cannot be a joint account

If the legislature so desired that this exclusive bank account be owned 'exclusively' by one individual, or that an existing account which has to be dedicated is to be solely owned by the individual seeking nomination for elections, it would have added a proviso on its own

When the legislature has already mandated that the declaration required for nomination for election will be that of opening an exclusive bank account or dedicating an existing bank account, it was beyond the legislative competence of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to require that such bank account shall not be a joint signatory account

Legislature did not envision such a bifurcation, and therefore S.R.O. No. 1793(I)/2023, dated 12.12.2023, which amended Rule 51 of the Election Rules, 2017 ('the Rules'), by adding the proviso, impinges upon the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and is in conflict with the Constitution, specifically the right to contest elections, which is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 17(2) of the Constitution

Said proviso was beyond the legislative competence of the delegate, the ECP, making it and the proviso is violative and beyond the scope of its parent and enabling statute, i.e. Elections Act, 2017

Therefore, S.R.O. No. 1793(I)/ 2023, dated 12.12.2023, which amended Rule 51 of the Rules, by adding the proviso, is in conflict and contradiction hence is not applicable to the matter at hand

Insofar as the question of vires of Rule 51 is concerned, that may be taken up in another case

Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and it was directed that the nomination papers of the petitioner (candidate) for NA-163 (Bahawalnagar) are deemed accepted and his name is deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.

Written test measures a candidate's knowledge and expression skills but does not evaluate important personality traits like communication skills, leadership qualities, and decision-making abilities

These traits are assessed during the interview

Interview process allows evaluators to see how candidates interact and respond in real-time, offering a complete picture of their suitability for the job

An interview is inherently a subjective evaluation, and a Court of law does not have jurisdiction to substitute its opinion with that of the Interview Board to provide relief to anyone

Role of the Interview Board is to evaluate candidates based on a variety of subjective criteria, which may include interpersonal skills, presentation, and other intangible qualities that are difficult to measure objectively

These assessments are inherently qualitative and depend on the opinion of interviewers, who are appointed for their expertise and ability to make such evaluations

However, this does not mean that the decisions of the Interview Board are beyond scrutiny

If there are any indications of mala fides, bias, or significant errors in the opinion (of the Interview Board) that are apparent from the record, the Court would certainly be compelled to intervene

But where the candidates fail to pass the interview examination for not meeting the necessary standards in the interview, the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked for challenging the interview process.

Object of civil proceeding is to enforce civil rights, whereas criminal proceeding is to punish the offender for committing criminal offence

Both proceedings, even if relating to same matter can proceed simultaneously

Criminal Courts are empowered to postpose proceedings when criminal liability is intimately connected with the result of civil proceedings

Criminal and civil proceedings against petitioners/borrowers can be maintained simultaneously

Powers of Banking Courts could not be abridged as normal procedure of law was followed

High Court declined to interfere in proceedings of criminal complaints pending before Banking Courts

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Amendments in the pleadings where possession was to be granted only as a consequential relief without altering the core facts or basis of original pleadings

Permissibility

Contention of the petitioner was that since consequential relief by way of possession had not been claimed by the respondent in his plaint, therefore, any amendment to that effect would change the nature and character of the suits and he also raised objections as to maintainability and limitation for filing the application for amendment

Validity

Addition of relief of possession in view of alleged development could not be termed as setting up of a new case

Factum of dispossession gelled well with other facts contained in the plaints and by no stretch of imagination it could be considered a change in the nature and complexion of the suit for the reason that natural result of declaration if successful would be that consequential relief had to be given by the court even if same was not claimed, and the Court in such circumstances was bound to call upon the party to amend the plaint to the extent of possession and direct him to pay the court-fee

Application under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C., can be entertained and allowed at any stage of the proceedings if the same is necessary for effective decision thereof

Amendment can be allowed while ignoring delay whatsoever, even at any stage of proceedings in the trial, and in certain cases amendments can be permitted at the stage of appeal or even in revisional jurisdiction

Keeping in view the beneficial rule, the proposed amendment was expedient for the purpose of determining the real questions involved in controversy between the parties and it did not change the nature of pleadings

Alteration in the relief does not ordinarily change the character or substance of the suit, if it is based on the same averments, and if such an amendment is allowed, no injustice can be done to the other party

Amendments to pleadings are permissible at any juncture of the legal proceedings, provided they serve to crystallize the substantive issues at hand without transmuting the fundamental character of the original pleadings

Petitioner had failed to point out any illegality in the impugned order

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

There is no prohibition in the law for the Police Officer to investigate the case lodged by him.

Evidence of a witness who is not physically present in court can be recorded in a civil case by using the modern technology of video conferencing, within the existing legal framework

Civil court can allow, under Section 151, C.P.C. and Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 recording the oral evidence of a witness through video conferencing

Virtual attendance of a witness in court, appears to be the species of the genus of "attendance" required under Rule 4 of Order XVIII, C.P.C. and fulfills the legislative purpose and policy in requiring the attendance of a witness in court for recording his evidence

Word "attendance" used in Rule 4 can be extended to "virtual attendance", and the word "attendance" mentioned in the said Rule does not mean only "physical attendance" but includes "virtual attendance" made possible by the modern technology of video conferencing.

Petitioner did not qualify on merit to get admission in MBBS Program and intended to switch her admission in BDS program

Validity

Option of getting admission under Regln. 19-D of Admission Regulations (Amended), 2020-2021, was for to those students only, who had applied in other colleges but could not get admission in college of their choice in the program, thus, were allowed to be admitted in any other college on merit in the program in which they had applied

Students were not entitled under Regln. 19-D of Admission Regulations (Amended), 2020-2021, to get admission in the program other than the one they had applied for

By creating suchlike exception, as sought by petitioner, and thereby overriding settled policy which was within the knowledge of petitioner, the entire process of admission would be disrupted and merit list which had since been finalized would be thrown into disarray for which there was no lawful justification

High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution declined to interfere in transparent policy decisions of executive, aimed at achieving best possible result in managing its affairs as High Court had very limited jurisdiction for examining such criteria

Petitioner failed to point out any illegality or legal infirmity in the orders passed by authorities

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

There is no bar on the institution of civil proceedings on a cause which is also the subject matter of criminal proceedings because not only the object of proceedings is different but also the standard and onus of proof is different in the civil and criminal proceedings.

Where an act or omission constitutes a criminal offence as well as a civil wrong, the mere fact that an accused has been acquitted from a criminal charge does not ipso facto mean that he stands absolved from civil liability

Criminal and departmental proceedings against an employee can go side by side and may even end in varying results

Departmental and criminal proceedings can be taken simultaneously and are independent of each other

Acquittal in a criminal case would not constitute a bar for the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings

Criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings against a civil servant are entirely different as one relates to the enforcement of criminal liability and the other is concerned with service discipline.

There is no bar on the institution of civil proceedings on a cause which is also the subject matter of criminal proceedings because not only the object of proceedings is different but also the standard and onus of proof is different in the civil and criminal proceedings.

Object behind the enactment of Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, is to protect a woman from being harassed at the workplace

Inquiry proceedings conducted by the Ombudsperson pursuant to a complaint filed by an employee under S.8(1) are not criminal proceedings

Section 8(3) of the Act provides that the Ombudsperson shall conduct an inquiry into the matter according to the rules made under the Act and conduct proceedings as the Ombudsperson deems proper

Under S.10(2), the Ombudsperson, while making a decision on a complaint, can impose any of the minor or major penalties specified in S. 4(4) of the Act.

Adopted child must be addressed with the name of his real father and if somebody does not know the name of the father of the adopted child, then Allah (SWT) said that they should be treated as brethren in Islam and as friends.

No legal bar existed for a party to avail two or more available remedies under the law simultaneously and a decision in any one of such remedies availed would render the others as infructuous.

When cross-examination of prosecution witnesses had already been conducted by the defence counsel, any application under S. 540, Cr.P.C. at a belated stage just on the ground that the said prosecution witnesses had made statements contrary to their earlier statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. was no ground at all to issue direction for re-summoning and re-examining the said witnesses for further cross-examination which was against the essence of law

No one could be permitted to fill in the lacunas at the belated stage according to his own whims.

Oral submission for condonation of delay does not make a valid justification for condoning the delay in cases even falling under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ('the Act')

Party seeking condonation or exclusion of time in terms of section 5 or section 3 of the Act has to explain the delay of each and every day through an affidavit and/or justify exclusion of time.

Any act does not lose its criminal nature just because it has a civil liability, and it is wrongly presumed that when a civil liability is under challenge and its discipline relates to civil remedy, criminal prosecution is unsustainable.

In respect of a charge, which also constituted a criminal offence under the law of the land, a civil servant could legally be proceeded departmentally and a criminal case could be lodged against him as well

Consequences of both departmental proceedings and criminal case were distinct

In the departmental proceedings, if a civil servant was found guilty, he suffered penalty as provided by the rules of service, while in the criminal case, if adjudged guilty he suffered conviction and sentence of imprisonment and fine as provided by law

Law allowed both types of proceedings to be conducted simultaneously.

In respect of a charge, which also constituted a criminal offence under the law of the land, a civil servant could legally be proceeded departmentally and a criminal case could be lodged against him as well

Consequences of both departmental proceedings and criminal case were distinct

In the departmental proceedings, if a civil servant was found guilty, he suffered penalty as provided by the rules of service, while in the criminal case, if adjudged guilty he suffered conviction and sentence of imprisonment and fine as provided by law

Law allowed both types of proceedings to be conducted simultaneously.

Where the scribe was not shown or described as a witness in the agreement, he could not be categorised as an attesting witness.