Civil liability

2023 CLC 1008 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Civil liabilityAcquittal in criminal caseEffect

Exoneration from charge in a criminal case is not of any relevance while determining civil liability in civil case.

2020 SCMR 361 SUPREME-COURT-OF-CANADA Judicial Precedent

Police officialsCivil liability

Circumstances in which a police official could be held civilly liable for his conduct and the test on basis of which such conduct was to be assessed stated.

2020 SCMR 361 SUPREME-COURT-OF-CANADA Judicial Precedent

Police officialsUnlawful ordersCivil liabilityImmunityAppellant used an escalator in a subway station without holding the handrail

Police officer employed by the city, who had been designated as an inspector by the transport authority responsible for the subway system, ordered her several times to hold the handrail, since the authority taught police officers that holding the handrail was an obligation under a by-law

Appellant refused to comply and to identify herself, where after the police officer arrested her and searched her bag

Police officer gave the appellant two separate fine tickets, one for disobeying a pictogram indicating that the handrail should be held, which the transport authority had posted near the escalator pursuant to its by-law, and another ticket for hindering the police in their duties

After being acquitted in the Municipal Court, the appellant instituted a civil liability action against the police officer, his employer and the transport authority, contending that the arrest was unlawful and unreasonable and that it constituted a fault because holding the handrail was not an obligation under the by-law, but simply a caution/warning

Trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the police officer had not committed any civil fault and that it was the appellant who had behaved in an inconceivable manner by refusing to comply with the officer's order

Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge

Held, that the police officer committed a civil fault by ordering the appellant to identify herself and by arresting her and conducting a search based on a non-existent offence, namely disobeying the pictogram indicating that the handrail should be held

Reasonable police officer in the same circumstances would not have concluded that disobeying the pictogram was an offence under a by-law, and would necessarily have doubted the existence in law of the offence and, as a result, would not have required the appellant to identify herself so that she could be given a fine ticket

Such an officer would certainly not have arrested her if she refused, but would instead have allowed her to continue on her way

Before depriving the appellant of her liberty, the officer had to ensure that there was valid legal justification for his actions

Reasonable police officer would have concluded that the pictogram simply advised users to be careful, despite the training received

Police officer's conduct necessarily constituted a fault insofar as it resulted from an unreasonable belief in the existence of an offence that did not exist in law

As principal, the city was also bound to make reparation for the injury caused, [pursuant to Arts. 1463 & 1464 of the Civil Code of Quebec, 1994], because it was not in dispute that the police officer was acting in the performance of his duties when the fault was committed, even though his conduct was also unlawful

Transport authority had no public law immunity

Legal person established in the public interest may be civilly liable if it made an error of law in implementing its own regulations or by-laws

In the present case, the training provided to police officers by the transport authority was part of the implementation of a by-law

In this respect, the transport authority committed a direct fault in the implementation of the by-law by providing training that suggested to police officers called upon to enforce its by-laws that holding the handrail was an obligation

Once the transport authority undertook to provide police officers with training, it had to ensure that the training would be appropriate and that it would reflect the law

If the police officer was at fault for believing that holding the handrail was an obligation, the transport authority was equally at fault for misinterpreting the by-law and providing training accordingly

Transport authority was also liable as mandator for the police officer's fault

Designation of a police officer as a subway inspector created a legal relationship analogous to that of mandate (within the meaning of Art. 2130, para. 1 of the Civil Code of Quebec, 1994), in which a public transit authority may incur civil liability to a third person

In enforcing the by-laws of a public transit authority, a police officer ipso facto represented that authority in the performance of a juridical act, which must be interpreted broadly

Appellant was entitled to refuse to obey an unlawful order and therefore committed no fault that would justify an apportionment of liability

Unless a statutory provision or common law rule clearly imposed it, there was no obligation to identify oneself to, or indeed to cooperate with, a police officer

Similarly, the appellant could not be faulted for not doing anything to mitigate the injury she suffered

Reasonable, prudent and diligent person was not under an obligation to obey an unlawful order

In a free and democratic society, no one should accept or expect to be subjected to unjustified state intrusions

Interference with freedom of movement, just like invasion of privacy, must not be trivialized

Appellant suffered minor bodily injuries, but also above all, moral injury as a result of her unlawful arrest, the force used against her and the unreasonable search of her personal effects

Compensation for suffering, anguish and humiliation had to be awarded in the present case

Appellant was awarded $20,000 with interest in damages, with the transport authority and the police officer, each liable to pay 50% of said amount

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

2020 SCMR 361 SUPREME-COURT-OF-CANADA Judicial Precedent

Legal person established in public interestCivil liabilityImmunity

Legal person established in the public interest generally incurred no civil liability where it made or passed a regulation or by-law that was subsequently held to be invalid, unless its decision to do so was made in bad faith or was irrational

Purpose of said immunity was to preserve the latitude that a legal person established in the public interest must have in order to make policy decisions in the interests of the community

However, legal person established in the public interest that made an error of law in implementing its own regulations or by-laws may be civilly liable.

2015 SCMR 397 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Ss. 3, 4 & 14(1)West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 119Balochistan Government, Rules of Business, 1976Corruption and corrupt practicesCivil liabilityAmount allegedly misappropriated returnedNo misuse of authorityNo benefit gainedNo loss caused to public exchequerEffect

Accused in his capacity as Food Minister to the Provincial Government was alleged to have illegally issued orders to supply wheat to a Flour Mills on credit, managing director of which was the co-accused

Both the accused and co-accused were convicted and sentenced for the offence of "corruption and corrupt practices" under the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997

Plea of accused that wheat was provided to co-accused on credit as per practice and no violation of any rule/regulation took place, and that the supply of the wheat to the Flour Mills was pursuant to the Prime Minister's directive of supplying cheaper flour to people of the Province

Validity

Reference was wrongly filed under S. 14(1) of Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997, instead of Ss. 3 & 4 of the said Ordinance

Before filing of the reference, the Provincial Board of Revenue issued a notification mentioning name of co-accused from whom recovery of amount was to be made as arrears of land revenue

Competent authority had thus described the liability of the co-accused as civil liability and the outstanding amount was construed as arrears of land revenue for the recovery of which elaborate procedure had been laid down in provisions of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967

Perusal of the relevant rules including the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 1976, showed that there was no prohibition of divesting the then accused-Minister from issuing an order of release of wheat to the mills of the co-accused more so, when it had been released subsequently to other Flour Mills as well, therefore, present case was neither a case of misuse of authority nor a single iota/shred of evidence was available on record to slightly indicate that the accused-Minister was in any manner a beneficiary of the said transaction nor it had been established that co-accused in any manner was related to him much less dependent upon him or he was acting as his benamidar

Right from the very inception, it had squarely been communicated by accused to the Secretary Food and all relevant authorities that it was the then Prime Minister's directives to manage the crises of shortage of wheat flour in open market, thus, in relaxation of rules steps were required to be taken, subject of course to secure the interest of public exchequer

Such stance was not taken by the accused for the first time during the trial but right from the first directive he had issued

No one from the food department, or the Chief Minister or the then Chief Secretary raised a pointing finger that there was no directive of the then Prime Minister to such effect

Secretary Food did not resist the approval of the accused-Minister nor sent the case/summary to the then Chief Secretary to be placed before the then Chief Minister for final opinion but instead he agreed to it, with the suggestion that the period of payment for wheat be reduced and the entire flour mills be pledged with the Food Department

Such recommendations of the Secretary Food were faithfully approved by the accused-Minister firmly securing the interest of the public exchequer

Even otherwise misuse of authority due to ignorance or for other justifiable reason would not make the accused/wrongdoer liable to prosecution and conviction under the provisions of Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997

From the different letters/correspondence made by different authorities of the food department it was a well established fact that there was serious crisis of shortage of wheat flour in the Province and to silence the rising protests of the people and to minimize their miseries the old policy was relaxed in such manner

Amount outstanding against co-accused's Flour Mills was deposited during the proceedings of the present case and once such amount was accepted without any exception or reservation then, the very trial of both the accused and co-accused was not warranted under the law

Entire outstanding arrears were paid to the government exchequer and not a single penny was misappropriated so no wrongful loss was caused to the public exchequer nor the accused had gained anything illegal from the transaction

Delayed payment of outstanding arrears by co-accused would attract civil liability for compensation through damages if any, but in no manner it would constitute an offence under S. 3 or 4 of the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997

Conviction of both the accused and co-accused were held to be without lawful authority and in disregard of law, and were accordingly set aside and both of them were acquitted of all charges

Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

2013 MLD 891 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

S. 498Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 405/406Criminal breach of trustAd-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation ofEntrustment in pursuance of a business transactionCivil liabilityDelay in lodging F.I.R.Effect

Allegation against accused was that he by way of committing criminal breach of trust usurped/embezzled an amount of Rs. 750,000, belonging to the complainant

F.I.R. was lodged with a delay of four months and eight days without any plausible explanation

Record revealed that entrustment of amount was in pursuance of a business transaction, whereas, law clearly recognized a distinction between payment/investment of money and entrustment of money/property

Prima facie, facts of the case did not satisfy the ingredients contained in S. 405, P.P.C as such provisions of S. 406, P.P.C were not attracted to the present case

Investigating Officer had stated that allegation qua Rs.500,000 was found false and dispute between the parties was only to the extent of Rs.200,000 and that too over a business transaction

Prima facie, present matter pertained to civil liability, for which the proper forum was the civil court

Ad interim pre-arrest bail already granted to accused was confirmed in circumstances.