Special law

Accused persons were convicted in trials under Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and they sought benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. to include pre-sentence period of their custody

Validity

As Pakistan Army Act, 1952 is a special law, the trials conducted thereunder are not governed by provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

Sentence of imprisonment, in terms of S. 135 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 commences from the date on which original proceedings are signed by military court

Provision of S. 1, Cr.P.C. restricts application of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 to any local or special law, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribe by any other law for the time being in force

Provision of S. 1, Cr.P.C. defines the scope and application of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 to ordinary and general offences and trials, while it places all special laws and jurisdictions outside of its ambit

Military courts had granted benefit of the provision to the convicts

Provision of S. 135 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 constitutes a special law, whereas S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. is a general law

Distinction for extending benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. in cases under Pakistan Army Act, 1952 is that in general law it is mandatory for Trial Court to take into consideration the pre-sentence custody period in the light of the principles laid down by Supreme Court in case titled Shah Hussain v. The State reported as PLD 2009 SC 460 and the effect thereof has to be taken into account at time of release of convict by the authority with whom he was undergoing the sentence whereas in the later (Pakistan Army Act, 1952), the Court at the time of sentencing the accused considers the period in which he remained in custody as under trial prisoner within the parameters of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and when he is convicted, the benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. is extended to him and included in his sentence at the time of conviction

High Court declined to interfere in the matter as Military Courts had granted benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. read with R. 53(1) of Pakistan Army Act Rules, 1954

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellant company was aggrieved of order passed by NEPRA (Authority) and had sought interim injunction against such order

Validity

Matter was governed by special law which gave special jurisdiction to specified legal forum, which forum had to function within the limits of that special jurisdiction

General law conferring wider jurisdiction was ousted unless specifically made applicable under a provision of special law

High Court while deciding earlier appeals had upheld order of NEPRA Appellate Tribunal and kept in field the notification in question in line with settled approach in such cases

Injunctive relief was neither provided for by National Electric Power Regulatory Authority nor was provided before by any High Court or Supreme Court

Application was dismissed, in circumstances.

Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is a special law which has prescribed limitation (six months since publication of the documentary material/matter) for filing suit for defamation and Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply in defamation cases.

When special statute confers special powers and jurisdiction and provides a special form of procedure then those prevail over the procedure or provisions of Cr.P.C.

Non obstante clause was triggered only in event of an inconsistency between provisions and where two special laws contained competing non obstante clauses then general rule was that provision latter in time prevailed.

Special law/procedure excludes the general law/procedure.

Specific provisions of a special law would displace general law which would be deemed to be inapplicable.

Specific provisions of a special law would displace general law which would be deemed to be inapplicable.

Specific provisions of a special law would displace general law which would be deemed to be inapplicable.

Rule that a general act/statute was not to be construed as a repeal of a previous particular act/statute was not absolute

Construction that a latter general law did not abrogate an earlier special law was not automatic but was dependent on many factors such as intention of Legislature in subsequent legislation; context leading to enactment of such a law; nature of inconsistency between the two statutes and whether in latter law a reference to the previous particular law on the subject had been made

Normally implied repeal were not imputed and it was an established rule that in construction of a statute; a subsequent statute treating a subject in general terms and not expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, was not be constructed as intending to affect the more particular and specific provisions of an earlier act

When there existed some express reference to previous legislation on a subject or there was a necessary inconsistency between two acts/statutes standing together the rule that subsequent statute was not to be considered intending to affect provisions of earlier statute, would not be attracted

Presumption would be that Legislature after having had its attention to a special subject and having observed all circumstances, had intended by latter general enactment/statute to derogate from a previous act /statute and had made special mention of its intention to do so in the latter act/statute

Law which was essentially general in nature may contain some special provisions relating to certain matters and said law would therefore be classified "special law", and an inconsistency with a prior special law would be considered to have abrogated by said latter law, by implication.

In construing and interpreting a special law, the court had to look at the reasons and background, which influenced the mind of the legislature in enacting the special law and the history of events, which had occurred preceding the enactment of the special law.

For enactments meant to deal with a particular subject and which were purposive in nature, the courts were required not to depart from its literal construction, and the same shall be narrowly interpreted

Widening the scope of such (special) statutes would defeat the legislative intent

Enlarging the scope of the special law was not permissible because the result and object intended to be achieved by the legislature shall go to waste.

Where special law provided elaborate mechanism and procedure to challenge a certain action under the scheme of special law, recourse to general law and or challenge to such action, that too through collateral proceedings (such as application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.) was not approved.

Where special law provided elaborate mechanism and procedure to challenge a certain action under the scheme of special law, recourse to general law and or challenge to such action, that too through collateral proceedings (such as application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.) was not approved.

Requirement of exact adherence to legal demands was more stringent for plaintiff while invoking jurisdiction of a special court created under a special law when the conditions and prerequisites to resort to such jurisdiction had been specifically and expressly described in the special law.

Even if there were two parallel laws, even then the law which was later in time, would prevail.

Bank alleged that petitioner had misappropriated or stolen the rice bags and sought direction from Ex-officio Justice of Peace for registration of FIR

Validity

Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was a special law and had overriding effect over the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

When Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, itself provided procedure for dealing with matters of civil as well as criminal nature, only Banking Court constituted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had jurisdiction to take action upon criminal acts performed by parties

Provision of S. 7(b) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, created a prohibition in respect of lodging of criminal case under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not within his jurisdiction when he ordered for registration of case against petitioners under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

Bank had no authority to file application under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C., nor Ex-Officio Justice of Peace had any jurisdiction, in presence of Banking Court, to order for registration of case against petitioners

High Court set aside the order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace

Petition was allowed in circumstances.

Preamble of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 explained the purpose behind promulgation of the law reason for the establishment and operations of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority clearly substantiates that this was a special law.

Bank alleged that petitioner had misappropriated or stolen the rice bags and sought direction from Ex-Officio Justice of Peace for registration of F.I.R.

Validity

Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was a special law and had overriding effect over the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

When Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, itself provided procedure for dealing with matters of civil as well as criminal nature, only Banking Court constituted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had jurisdiction to take action upon criminal acts performed by parties

Provision of S.7(b) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, created a prohibition in respect of lodging of criminal case under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not within his jurisdiction when he ordered for registration of case against petitioners under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860

Bank had no authority to file application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., nor Ex-Officio Justice of Peace had any jurisdiction, in presence of Banking Court, to order for registration of case against petitioners

High Court set aside the order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace

Petition was allowed in circumstances.

Tribunal which was a quasi-judicial forum and a court working under a special statute, could borrow equitable principles from the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the dispensation of justice, however it cannot deviate from what had been laid down in special law

Broad equitable principles of C.P.C. could be invoked in special cases but the original and basic provisions of the special statute could not be overridden altogether.

Provisions of special law would exclude application of general law.

Provisions of special law would exclude application of general law.