Restoration of possession

Grievance of appellant/tenant was that after seeking her ejectment from the premises on basis of personal need, the respondent/landlord did not utilize it for his bona fide personal need

Rent Controller allowed the application of appellant/tenant and ordered to restore possession to her but Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to interfere in the ejectment order

Validity

Tenant cannot be given an unlimited period of time to apply under section 15-A of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979

Period of one year cannot be construed as a period of limitation for tenant to apply but such right cannot be extended indefinitely at the leisure of tenant

Such application should be preferred within a reasonable period of time and it is for Rent Controller to decide whether the application is hit by laches rather than applying limitation period as provided under residuary Article 181 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908

Supreme Court directed to restore possession of premises to appellant/tenant and set aside the orders passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court

Appeal was allowed.

Complaint of the applicant, being tenant, for the restoration of possession in respect of property under discussion was dismissed by the Trial Court

Validity

Record transpired that the applicant/complainant being a Franchisee/Licensee was handed over possession of the subject shop by the Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and such license/agreement was to continue for a period of three years

After expiry of such license period neither any extension was made nor the parties entered into any other agreement

Thus, it was crystal clear that no rent agreement was entered into between the parties in respect of subject property, but, in fact, the PSO had granted franchise in favour of the applicant in respect of the subject property

Meaning thereby that the status of the applicant was not that of a "Statutory Tenant" as provided in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, but she was merely a "licensee"

Licensee could not be equated with a tenant

According to the applicant/complainant on 17-11-2022 respondents Nos.1 to 5 had forcibly obtained signature of her husband over an agreement to vacate the shop/subject property, on which a civil suit was filed and subsequently on 29.12.2022, the respondents forcibly took over possession of the subject premises

However, the applicant had herself admitted that the plaint in the said suit was rejected by the civil Court vide order dated 25.02 2023

Although the complainant claimed her possession over the subject premises but the civil suit was filed by her husband and not by the applicant wherein he claimed his possession over the subject shop and on that basis he obtained interim order dated 02.12.2022, however the same was recalled and the plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Besides, applicant had also filed civil suit which was returned to her in terms of O.VII, R.10 C.P.C. vide order dated 08.09.2017

Bare reading of subsection (1) to S.3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, revealed that protection had been provided to the "owner" and "occupier" against illegal and forcible dispossession

Clause (c) of S.2 of the Act, 2005, defined "occupier" to be "person who was in lawful possession of a property"

Hence, the claim of the applicant/ complainant in instant case that she being lawful occupier/tenant, could not be illegally and forcibly dispossessed by the respondents, was not of much consequence

Applicant was not a statutory tenant, thus was not a lawful occupier as defined under S.2 of the Act

Therefore her such claim carried no weight

Criminal revision application was dismissed, in circumstances.

No doubt the legislature had not provided any specific section/provision in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, for compounding the offences; however, S.9 of the Act, 2005, provides that unless otherwise provided in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the provisions contained under the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, shall be applicable to all the proceedings under the Act ibid

Therefore, the compromise arrived at between the parties under the Act ibid should be treated as the compromise within the meaning of S.345, Cr.P.C.

It was an admitted fact that both the parties had amicably settled all their differences and had agreed to pass rest of their lives in peace, tranquility and harmony

Non-compoundability of a particular offence under any section of the enactment should not be read in isolation but it should be read in the background of each criminal case and beneficial interpretation should be given to it

When both parties had earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquility by ignoring and settling all their past differences, then for the sake of their welfare in general and betterment of socio-economic conditions of society as a whole, it would be prime need of the time to accept the compromise and consequently acquit the appellant from the charges

Parties had filed joint applications for compromise, besides the possession of the subject property, had also been handed over to the complainant, therefore, in order to maintain peace and tranquility between the parties, propriety of law demanded to entertain the compromise application

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Petitioner being general secretary of Fruit and Vegetable Commission Agents Association sought the removal of the private respondents being illegal encroachers/Mashakhors, from the two platforms Hazar Ganji Fruit and Vegetable Market, Quetta, with prayer to shift them to their allotted land

Contention of the petitioner was that due to illegal encroachments of private respondents/Mashakhors on the platforms , not only the Association's business had been damaged badly, but there was also a serious security threat

Validity

Record revealed that initially, the private respondents were doing their business on the road of two platforms meant for the auction of fruits and vegetables; however, with the passage of time, they installed their camps and fully possessed the platforms above, which created obstacles for the petitioner's Associations to run their business smoothly; the petitioner approached and apprised the private respondents of their illegal occupation and encroachments, but to no avail

In said connection, the petitioner applied to the concerned offices (Police, Civil Administration, Market Committee, etc.) to redress their grievance, but no concrete steps had been taken

Meanwhile, the Committee of respondents/Mashakhors filed a civil suit against official respondents, which was tried and finally dismissed by the Civil Court

Later, reportedly, an unfortunate bomb blast occurred in the Fruit and Vegetable Market Complex, Hazar Ganji, resulting in heavy loss of precious lives and property; after that the petitioner's Association convened various meetings with the official respondents, and in connection to that, petitioner's Association installed CCTV cameras and street lights for security, however, same could not bear results due to illegal encroachments

Unfortunately, record also showed that even the concerned official authority had approved and allotted a vast space/land to the private respondents / Mashakhors; however, they (respondents) alleged to have sold out and utilized the said land for purposes other than the purpose for which it was allocated

High Court viewed that , in any case, no person can be allowed to encroach upon property of others in the garb of his own business and said trend cannot be appreciated at all

High Court directed the official respondents to restore the possession of both the Fruit and Vegetable Market Complex Hazar Ganji platforms to the petitioner's Association after following the law

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Primary aspect of the case, which seemed to have swayed the Trial Court in ordering that the property be taken away from Mr. "A" and handed over to Mr. "I", was that in a preliminary inquiry, the documents of title of the property in question were with Mr. "I" and not with Mr. "A"

Documents of the property on which Mr. "A" relied were fake

Trial Courts seized of criminal complaints under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, often made a slight overreach and also decided issues regarding ownership of the property, which was not the correct approach

Only the Civil Courts of competent jurisdiction could make such findings

Such issue required evidence to be recorded by a Civil Court before such declarations or pronouncements of a conclusive nature were made

Prima facie ownership of the property might only be one of the factors considered by a Criminal Court when adjudicating a S.7 application under the Act of 2005

Primary finding had to be that who was in possession when dispossession was alleged and on what basis the possessor claimed his possession

Person's possession of a property, when he was not the owner, might not always be illegal

In the current case, prima facie, it seemed that Mr. "I" based his property ownership on an agreement to sell

If that was found correct, the question arose about how an agreement to sell established title

Allotment Letter of the property showed that it was allotted to "SJ" with the condition that selling the property was prohibited

How did "SJ" agree to sell the same to Mr. "I"

How did the Lyari Expressway Resettlement Project issued a Transfer Order in the name of Mr. "I" when, apart from the restriction on sale, there was no document on record to show that the sale transaction between "SJ" and Mr. "I" ever culminated

On the contrary, Mr. "A" had documents to show prima facie that the property's electricity, water and gas connections were in his wife's name and that he had been paying the utility charges since 2009

Mr. "I" had not denied that

Given the above, prima facie, it seemed that Mr. "A" had been in possession of the property since 2009, therefore, it would be unsafe to order him to be evicted arbitrarily

An opportunity should be given to both Mr. "I" and Mr. "A" to show at trial how they claimed to be in possession of the property

Impugned order was, therefore, set aside

High Court observed that parties should wait till the conclusion of the trial so that the Trial Court decided their respective claims of being in lawful possession after it had an opportunity to review the evidence produced.

Allottee filed suit against the Market Committee on the basis of a registered sale deed executed by the Nazir of Single Judge of the High Court (Trial/Executing Court) by virtue of a previous decree in his favour

Appellant/defendant (Market Committee) was directed by the Court to restore possession of the suit-plot to the respondent / plaintiff (allotee)

Plea of the appellant/defendant was that neither the number of the suit plot was correct nor such plot physically existed and it was also not traceable in layout plan, and decree had already been assailed by filing an application under S.12(2), C.P.C

Validity

Site Plan attached to the registered sale deed executed by the Nazir of the Court in favour of the allottee and the Layout Plan of the subject market, prima facie, showed that the suit property was shown and described therein

Question as to whether the suit property did not exist and the plot claimed by respondent/plaintiff fell within the amenity plot / parking area, as alleged by the appellant, or was available and was situated elsewhere, as claimed by respondent /plaintiff, could be decided in the Suit only after examining the evidence led by the parties

Thus, the dispute relating to the location and title of the piece of land in dispute was yet to be decided in the Suit

Regarding possession of the suit property, the record showed that inspection thereof was ordered in the respondent /plaintiff's (previous) suit by appointing the Nazir of High Court as Commissioner who submitted his report stating that respondent No.1 was in possession

Perusal of the impugned order showed that the above factors were taken into account by the Single Judge of the High Court while directing the defendants to restore the possession of respondent /plaintiff as, admittedly, an ad-interim order, securing the latter's possession, was in the field at the relevant time

Therefore, the impugned order did not require any interference to the extent of restoration of the respondent/ plaintiff possession

It was an admitted position that the decree in respect of the suit property passed in favour of the allottee and the registered sale deeds executed in pursuance thereof in favour of the allottee and respondent / plaintiff were still in the field

However, the dispute involved in the suit relating to the location and title of the piece of land in dispute was yet to be decided

Due to said reason, the finding in the impugned order that respondent No.1 / plaintiff was apparently the lawful transferee of the suit property, was premature and could at best be tentative

If the subject matter of the lis was not preserved till the final disposal of the suit, not only would the purpose of filing the suit be defeated, but there would also be multiplicity of proceedings between the parties

Respondent / plaintiff had given an undertaking before the High Court that if possession of the suit property was restored to him, he shall construct a boundary wall around it at his own cost to save it from encroachment, and shall not raise any other construction thereon till the final disposal of his suit

Said undertaking appeared to be reasonable and suitable for preserving the subject matter of the lis and equitable for protecting the interest of the contesting parties during pendency of the suit

High Court modified the impugned order in terms of the said undertaking

Appeal stand disposed of accordingly.

Tenant sought restoration of possession on the ground that the landlord had not utilized the suit property for personal use

Validity

Landlord had remained successful for ejectment of the tenant on two grounds, the first ground was personal bona fide need and the second ground was default in payment of rent for two consecutive months

Landlord had indeed been living abroad since long, who had never come to Pakistan to take an initiative of practicing medicine, for which the required shop was to be utilized

If this alone was the ground, then the tenant could have been entitled to restoration of possession

Even otherwise, landlord had sold out the suit property

Constitutional petition was dismissed.

Appellant/land acquiring authority was aggrieved of order regarding return of land in question which was acquired from respondents/ex- land owners

Validity

Power to restore possession of acquired land to the persons from whom it was acquired laid with the Government and that too when the department of government or a local authority for which land was acquired proposed to abandon the public purpose for which it was acquired

Respondents/ex-land owners were claiming restoration of meagre part of acquired land on the ground that it had become surplus

Provision of R. 14 of Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, could not be stretched in favour of respondents/ex-land owners

Matter relating to return of acquired land could not be left at the whims of ex-land owners

Allowing respondents/ex-land owners to claim part of acquired land having become surplus would open a pandora box and a flood gate for other land owners as well

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Petitioners/accused persons were aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court restoring possession to respondents/complainants

Validity

Merely on the basis of civil litigation, legal proceedings in criminal matter neither could be terminated nor transfer of possession in terms of S. 8 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could be declared illegal

In order to constitute an offence under provisions of S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 complainant was to disclose existence of unlawful act (actus reus) and criminal intent (mens rea)

Act of petitioners/accused persons by dispossessing respondents/complainants who were occupant of property with a categorical stance that on a particular date they were illegally dispossessed by petitioners/accused persons was proved not only through oral but also through documentary evidence

Such order was maintained up to Supreme Court

Once Trial Court found commission of offence, i.e. dispossession of respondents/complainants Trial Court rightly ordered that position be restored/handed over to respondents/complainants

Petitioners/accused persons wanted to stay execution proceedings

High Court declined to quash order of restoration of possession passed by Trial Court

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plea raised by petitioner was that due to illegal acts of Karachi Development Authority officials, her plot was renumbered and thereafter allotted to respondents

Contention of authorities was that plot allotted to petitioner was renumbered and allotted to respondents on Minister quota

Validity

Plot numbers allotted to petitioner and respondents were of one and the same plot, belonging to petitioner

Plot in the name of respondents was illegally created by officials of Karachi Development Authority (KDA) by misusing their official power and authority and for apparent "extraneous motives"

Action of Karachi Development Authority officials in rearranging, renumbering the whole lane was illegal

If plot of respondents allotted under Minister quota was encroached upon, there was no justification available with KDA officials to rearrange, re-fix and reallocate, fit in or to devise a method to cause prejudice to petitioner, who was owner of plot in question

Committee headed by high officials of KDA was of the view that such action of allocation and renumbering of plot was illegal and in fact plot allotted to respondents was fitted in plot allotted to petitioner

High Court declined to approve action of Karachi Development Authority officials in rearranging / renumbering plot of petitioner as plot of respondents

High Court directed Karachi Development Authority to allot and handover peaceful, vacant and physical possession of an alternate plot, having same value and utility to petitioner forthwith

High Court also imposed special costs upon Karachi Development Authority as due to acts and abuse of authority by its officials petitioner suffered a lot

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Dispute was with regard to establishing a golf course on land falling in Margalla Hills area falling under 'Specified area'

Plea raised by authorities was that land was taken into possession due to security reasons

Validity

No one could claim to be above the law nor could anyone be given license to violate enforced laws

Providing security was function of State and establishing a golf course in violation of law on the pretext of security could not be justified by any stretch of imagination

Authorities who chose to illegally encroach State land by brazenly violating enforced laws exposed themselves to disciplinary proceedings besides attracting criminal liability prescribed under Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 or Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, as the case was

Far greater responsibility of the State institutions and its public functionaries to obey and respect the enforced laws

When State officials were involved in its abuse, it would become the worst form of undermining of rule of law and violation of rights guaranteed under the Constitution

Authorities encroached upon State land, including notified area of National Park by illegally establishing a golf course outside allocated sector

Construction on encroached land and establishing a golf course was illegal, without lawful authority and jurisdiction

High Court directed that Golf Course in question to be sealed and its possession handed over to Capital Development Authority and Islamabad Wildlife Management Board

High Court further directed that construction on encroached land of Golf Course would be demolished unless it could be utilized for an environmentally friendly activity

High Court directed the Capital Development Authority and Islamabad Wildlife Management Board to jointly restore encroached land of Golf Course as part of National Park

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Area was owned by Metropolitan Corporation and removal of signboards, hoardings and concrete structure was performed in compliance of the orders of Supreme Court as well as on the ground that such placement of signboards and concrete structure was in utter violation of the agreement

Plaintiff had transgressed his rights and rather than beautifying the roundabouts, had spoiled the architectural icons to the loss of public at large

High Court directed Metropolitan Corporation to ensure upkeep of greenery of roundabouts and bring them back to their original glory on its own

High Court further directed the Corporation that it could also seek assistance for preservation and beatification of the city icons with the help of advice from Floral Art Society as well as Horticultural Society of Pakistan

Application was dismissed, in circumstances.

Court could not give any conclusive finding as plaintiff was not able to point out exact location of his land on basis of his ownership documents annexed with plaint

Land of plaintiffs fell far away from position, i.e., position claimed by plaintiffs as all along land was pointed out by plaintiffs to court officials

At injunctive stage plaintiff was duty bound to make out his prima facie on basis of his documents

Inspection was carried out along with concerned officials and none had supported case of plaintiffs

High Court declined to restore possession

Application was dismissed in circumstances.

When court has to pass order for restoration of possession of subject property to owner or occupier and such orders have to be given effect, then in given circumstances of case, court has to exercise inherent powers under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. to secure ends of justice.

Trial Court handed over possession of disputed property to complainant under S. 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (the Act) while accused were acquitted

Scope

Record showed that accused were not found guilty of offence within the meaning of S. 3 of the Act, hence they were acquitted of the charge yet order was recorded for restoration of possession to the complainant

Provision of S. 3 of the Act, defined the offence and punishments thereof which, however, did not include restoration of possession

Restoration of possession could not be ordered as punishment which, on proving of guilt, was legally awarded as must

Order for restoration of possession had been dealt with independently which the Court might have ordered but only when the Court was passing a punishment within meaning of subsections (2) and (3) of S. 3 of the Act

In the present case, no punishment had been passed rather accused/appellants stood acquitted of offence

In such eventualities the Trial Court was never competent to legally order for restoration of possession which could only be restored within meaning of S. 8 of the Act

Admittedly, complainant had not filed acquittal appeal, thus it could safely be said that such direction/order was nothing but a pure excess of jurisdiction without any back of law hence, the same could not be sustained

Trial Court had travelled beyond jurisdiction thus appeal was allowed by setting aside impugned judgment only to extent of challenged portion regarding restoration of possession

Failure in complaint under S.3 of the Act, would never create a legal bar in obtaining possession or removal of illegal occupants by resort to other legal remedies because such remedy was a special one and in no way prejudice other available legal remedies.

After setting aside of decree by Supreme Court, Single Judge of High Court directed the Official Assignee to take over the possession of suit property

Appellant contended that exercise of restitution as provided under S.144, C.P.C. was not available being limited to person entitled and that whole of the order as passed by Supreme Court was not considered and the order of remand as passed while setting aside the decree and such order could not be treated as reversal of decree

Validity

Elements of variation or reversal along with any determination of entitled party were missing and in absence of the same exercise of power under S.144, C.P.C. was not available and warranted, even to the extent of handing over the same to the Official Assignee

Neither disentitlement of appellant stood established nor there was any element of wastage of subject property

Division Bench of High Court set aside order of restoration of possession passed by Single Judge of High Court on account of not being available accordingly without required determination of entitlement

High Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Complainant/respondents purchased the disputed plot on which the accused persons/ appellant party was in illegal possession and also harassing the complainant party/ respondents

Complainant party/respondents filed civil suit against the applicant which was decreed and the same was not challenged by the applicant party

Applicant party filed civil suit for specific performance of contract but said suit was dismissed as withdrawn

Later on, applicant party filed civil suit, which was dismissed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Such order had also not been challenged by the applicant party before any competent forum

Complainant party/respondents filed application under S.7(1) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 for eviction the accused persons and directing them to handover the possession of disputed plot

Trial Court disposed of the application with warning to accused persons/appellants to stop harassing and humiliating the complainant party/respondents as the claim of the accused persons/ applicant party was disproved and directed the accused persons to handover the possession of the disputed plot within 15 days otherwise the complainant would be entitled to get possession of the disputed plot through legal agency

Validity

Relief could not be granted to hold retention of ill-gotten gains even if for technical reasons impugned order was not strictly justifiable

Trial Court, in the present case, had not committed any illegality or material irregularity while passing the order and had rightly disposed of the criminal complaint and fully justified to issue directions to the accused persons/applicants to handover the possession of the disputed plot to the respondents, which order was maintained by the High Court

Criminal revision being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner submitted application regarding her forcible dispossession by respondents from the house to the District Police Officer, who after inquiry submitted complaint under S.145, Cr.P.C. to the Magistrate

Respondents asserted that complaint was not maintainable while the Magistrate held that the complaint was maintainable as there was apprehension of breach of peace

Revisional court vide impugned order held that the complaint under S.145, Cr.P.C. was not maintainable

Validity

Proceedings under S.145, Cr.P.C. were meant to avoid breach of peace and in no way were meant to decide a title dispute or to restore possession

Section 145, Cr.P.C. laid down that complaint was to be presented with proof of dispossession within two months of its filing, but said application submitted to District Police Officer did not reveal any specific date or period of dispossession

Petitioner and respondents were siblings and no doubt the former might have claimed share in disputed property, but the same could not be adjudicated upon under S. 145, Cr.P.C. that had got a very limited scope and infringement of private right or dispossession of any of the parties was per se not enough to attract S.145, Cr.P.C.

Section 145, Cr.P.C. was meant to meet an emergent situation posing a threat to peace and could not be used for settling rights of the parties or their claim to title

Import of subsection (5) of S.145, Cr.P.C. was that where there was no breach of peace then the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make order regarding subject of dispute

Revisional court had rightly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and arrived at right conclusion, which order was not open to interference under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.

Petition, being devoid of merits, was dismissed.

On complaint filed by respondent, Trial Court handed over possession of disputed property, to her under S. 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, as an interim arrangement

Respondent, after seeking possession withdrew her complaint

Plea raised by petitioner was that the complaint could not have been withdrawn without return of the possession as the same was handed over as interim arrangement during pendency of the complaint

Validity

Offence and offender was described in S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and whoever would commit the offence of illegal dispossession against a lawful owner or occupier then such person indeed could be prosecuted under 'substantive provisions' of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, without any restriction

Offence was described exhaustively in S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, but not the offenders in specific terms rather it used general terms, such as 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offenders

High Court set aside order of withdrawal of complaint and remanded the matter to Trial Court to decide the application afresh

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Plaintiff moved application for restoration of possession which was accepted by the Trial Court and possession was restored but Appellate Court set aside the said order of Trial Court

Validity

Court granting injunctive relief had the jurisdiction to restore the possession of property in case the same was taken away in violation of the injunctive order

No appeal would lie against the order for restoration of possession

Trial Court had ordered for restoration of possession on the assumption that possession was taken over by the defendant on the date of passing of impugned order

Court could order status quo ante under its inherent jurisdiction under S.151, C.P.C., however said provision of law was not appealable

Appeal was a substantive right and could only be exercised if available

Non-availability of such right or invocation of the same when it was not available could not be regarded as a mere technicality

Appeal filed by the defendant was not maintainable

Injunctive order passed by the Court was not operative unless other side against whom the order had been passed was served with the same

Trial Court had deferred the adjudication of issue whether defendant had knowledge of the interim order but proceeded to restore possession

Trial Court had only the jurisdiction to restore the possession if injunctive order had been violated and violation could only be attributed to the other side if it was aware of the same

Grant of restoration of possession could not have been made unless it was first adjudicated whether defendant had knowledge of the status quo order

Impugned order for restoration of possession was not tenable in circumstances

If said order was left intact then same would be unjustified

High Court had suo motu revisional power to correct any illegality/jurisdictional error

High Court set aside order passed by the Appellate Court as well as Trial Court

Application for restoration of possession should be deemed to be pending before the Trial Court and same be decided after determining the fact whether notice of injunctive order was served on the defendant

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Complainant alleged that he was owner of land in question and sought recovery of the possession but complaint was dismissed by Trial Court

Validity

For attracting provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and in order to get benefit of S. 3(1) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, complainant had to prima facie establish before Court that he was lawful owner or was occupier of subject property and accused entered into or upon the property without having any lawful authority

Complainant was also to prove that accused had done so with the intention to dispossess or to grab or to control or to occupy property in question

Order as an interim relief regarding restoration of possession of subject property to complainant under the provisions of S. 7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, pending trial could only be passed when prima facie it was established to the satisfaction of Court that complainant was a lawful owner of subject property and he was illegally and forcibly dispossessed by accused and accused was in unlawful possession of subject property

Prima facie, possession of complainant over subject property could not be established as no evidence or any document had been produced by complainant to establish that he was occupier of subject property within the meaning of S. 2(c) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

In absence of any material establishing possession of complainant, his plea of lawful possession of subject property was not tenable

High Court declined to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction as no jurisdictional infirmity or any illegality was pointed out in the order passed by Trial Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Complainant alleged that he was owner of property in question and sought recovery of the possession but complaint was dismissed by Trial Court

­Validity

For attracting provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and in order to get benefit of S. 3(1) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, complainant had to show befole Court that he was lawful owner or occupier of subject property and accused entered into or upon the property without having any lawful authority

Complainant was also to prove that accused had done so with intention to dispossess or to grab or to control or to occupy property in question

Contents of complaint did not have any such allegations which could fall within the ambit of Ss. 3 & 4 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

High Court declined to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction as no jurisdictional infirmity or any illegality was pointed out in the order passed by Trial Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Contention of applicants was that status quo order was passed by the Supreme Court and Rent Controller was bound to issue notice before passing order with regard to door breaking and lock breaking

Application for restoration of possession of rented property was dismissed by the Rent Controller

Validity

Status quo order was passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Petition which was dismissed in default but same was restored later on

Rent Controller issued warrants of possession during the interregnum from dismissal in default to its restoration and possession of disputed property was handed over to the landlords

Decree holder might make an application to the court with regard to resistance or obstruction from taking over possession of property

If any person other than judgment debtor was dispossessed from immovable property by a holder of a decree for possession of such property then an application could be made on his behalf with regard to such dispossession

Order with regard to restoration of possession could be passed if court was satisfied that applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some other person other than judgment debtor

Applicants were claiming right on the basis of sub-tenancy from original judgment debtors and provisions of O. XXI, Rr.97 to 101, C.P.C. were not attracted in the present case

Applicants were not entitled for restoration of possession as they were enjoying prior to restoration of status quo order

Status quo order was passed by the Supreme Court but position of same was not ordered to be as it was on dismissal of Civil Petition in default

Possession of a property could be restored if decree was varied, reversed or set aside

Ejectment decree was passed by the Rent Controller against original lessee which stood upheld uptill High Court

Possession of rented premises was handed over to the decree holder through process of law

Applicants were not dispossessed from the property in an illegal manner

No illegality had been pointed out in the impugned order

Present application was not maintainable before the Executing Court which was rightly dismissed

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiffs contended that during pendency of suit possession of suit-land was transferred and they sought restoration of the same

Validity

If there was any right of plaintiffs for restoration of possession under S.144 C.P.C., they might move for the same before proper forum but in a suit for partition Lower Appellate Court while ignoring law straightaway granted decree without specifying right of every party on specific portion of property

Decree was defective one, therefore, no warrant of possession for specific property could be issued in execution of such decree and it was to be seen by Executing Court and Lower Appellate Court

Both the courts below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside the orders passed by courts below so that grievance could be redressed by competent forum

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Suit for cancellation for agreement to sell immovable property was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and possession was accordingly handed over to him

Subsequently appeal of defendant thereagaisnt was allowed, and application of the defendant under S.144, C.P.C. was allowed; and possession was restored to the defendant

Validity

Act of the court should not injure rights of any person and S.144 of C.P.C. was based on the same principle

Defendant had lost possession of the disputed property in execution of ex parte decree which was set aside by High Court on appeal, therefore, defendant was entitled to restoration of the possession of the same in accordance with law and parties were to be restored to the same position they were in prior to the decree

Any benefit received by a decree holder under a decree which had been reversed was refundable to the party entitled to such benefit by restoration

Section 144, C.P.C. was applicable irrespective of fact whether restoration had or had not been directed in the Appellate Court's decree

Restoration was a consequential relief on account of reversal of decree for the safe administration of justice

No illegality therefore existed in the impugned order

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.