Death sentence
Death sentence legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
A foreign accused who was in custody of Pakistani authorities on the charges of espionage and terrorism, for his release of whom, International Court of Justice was approached, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199, against death sentence handed down against him by the Field General Court martial, appeal against which was rejected by the appellate court.
The violation of due process of law is a violation of the fundamental rights as protected under Art.10-A of the Constitution
When the legal process is unnecessarily delayed, inaccessible, or obstructed by undue complexities, it becomes a barrier to justice itself
Access to justice is a human and fundamental right of a person and citizen
The concept of justice being sine qua non of a civil order in the society has been highlighted in the words "Society cannot exist without justice and justice cannot prosper without independent judges"
Article 37[d] of the Constitution enjoins that State shall ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice
Although the Principles set out in Chapter 2-Principles of Policy are not enforceable through Courts, but at the same time they have been termed as the conscience of the Constitution
Therefore, the Governments [Provincial and Federal] and the State institutions must ensure continuous improvement in the justice delivery system
Negligence or lacking towards this constitutional obligation would have disastrous and long-lasting repercussions, because no society can flourish without an independent justice delivery system in place
Principles of Policy is the covenant between the State, Organs of the State, its functionaries and citizens of this country, and thus, state policies must be structured on this constitutional covenant.
Chapter XXVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not extend to death sentences passed by the High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction
These provisions do not necessitate confirmation of such sentences or lead to the forfeiture of the right of appeal.
On a reference for the confirmation of the sentence of death, the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with sections 375 and 376, Cr.P.C. and the provisions of these sections make it clear that the duty of the High Court, in dealing with the reference, is not only to see whether the order passed by the Trial Court is correct, but to examine the case for itself and even direct a further enquiry or the taking of additional evidence if the Court considers it desirable in order to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the convicted person
When the High Court passes a sentence of death in its original criminal jurisdiction, Chapter XXVII of Cr.P.C. becomes redundant and inoperative
Chapter XXVII of the Cr.P.C does not extend to death sentences passed by the High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction
These provisions do not necessitate confirmation of such sentences or lead to the forfeiture of the right of appeal.
When ocular account is believed to be inspiring confidence and trustworthy, mere the fact that recovery (of weapon) is inconsequential by itself could not be a ground for imposing a lesser penalty than death sentence on the accused.
Both sentences are alternative to one another, however, awarding one or the other sentence shall essentially depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case
Multiple factors may be considered to award the death sentence for the offence of murder and equal number of the factors would be there not to award the same but instead a life imprisonment
Extra degree of care and caution is required to be observed by the Court while determining the quantum of sentence, depending upon the facts and circumstances of particular case
Single mitigating circumstance, available in a particular case, would be sufficient to put on guard the Court not to award the penalty of death but life imprisonment
Facts and circumstances of one case differ from the other, however, it is the essential obligation of the Court in awarding one or the other sentence to apply its judicial mind with a deep thought to the facts of a particular case
Where the Court entertains some doubt, albeit not sufficient for acquittal, judicial caution must be exercised to award the alternative sentence of life imprisonment.
Over a petty incident involving children playing cricket the accused persons had gone to the complainant party's house and launched an attack with daggers and resultantly killed two persons and injured another by giving them multiple dagger blows mercilessly
Injuries attributed to the accused persons had proved fatal
Accused persons appeared to be desperate persons evoking no sympathy in the matter of their sentences of death
Convictions and sentences of death recorded against the accused persons were maintained.
Compromise between parties was relevant as it would imprint beneficial effects in relations between the parties and promote peace, tranquility and harmony
High Court observed that it would be justified if death sentence inflicted upon petitioner/ accused was to be converted into life imprisonment with all sentences to run concurrently and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to accused
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Where the heirs of the victim (deceased) willingly agreed to bury the hatchet, it would not only add to the public peace and tranquility but would save their present and successive generations from bloodshed; thus it was in the larger public interest to grant legal sanctity to compoundability only in the cases of Qisas.
Evidence produced by the prosecution against the accused persons should be so strong and solid that it should start right from the toe of the deceased on one hand and the same should encircle a dense grip around the neck of the accused on the other hand.
Different methods of carrying out death sentences adopted in the United States of America since the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights to ensure that death sentences were executed in the most humane manner stated.
Prohibition against carrying out death sentence by a method that was cruel and created a demonstrable risk of severe pain
Death sentence carried out through administration of lethal injection
Death sentences were carried out by the State in question through a three-drug protocol administered through injections, in which the first drug, a sedative rendered the prisoner unconscious, so that he did not feel the severe pain caused by the second and third injected drugs, which paralyzed the prisoner and stopped the heart
Petitioners, who were death-row prisoners, challenged the use of the sedative as the first drug in the lethal injection process by contending that evidence suggested that the sedative could not reliably ensure the 'deep, comalike unconsciousness' required before injecting the second and third drugs; that use of the sedative in question to carry out executions failed to render a person insensate to pain, which violated their Constitutional right of prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment [Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the United States Constitution]
Validity
Sedative in question, used to render condemned prisoners unconscious as the first stage in the lethal injection process, worked sufficiently well that it did not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment [Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the United States Constitution]
Expert evidence available on record supported the conclusion that the sedative in question could render a person insensate to pain
Petitioners failed to identify an available and preferable method of execution and failed to make the case that the sedative entailed a substantial risk of severe pain
Rejecting every available means of carrying out the death penalty would amount to striking it down even though it was Constitutional
Supreme Court (USA) opined that the execution of petitioners could be carried out by using the sedative in question in the three-drug injection formula
Detailed reasons stated.
When it was settled that capital punishment was Constitutional, it necessarily followed that there must be a Constitutional means of carrying it out.
Prohibition against carrying out death sentence by a method that was cruel and created a demonstrable risk of severe pain
Death sentence carried out through administration of lethal injection
Death sentences were carried out by the State in question through a three-drug protocol administered through injections, in which the first drug, a sedative rendered the prisoner unconscious, so that he did not feel the severe pain caused by the second and third injected drugs, which paralyzed the prisoner and stopped the heart
Petitioners, who were death-row prisoners, challenged the use of the sedative as the first drug in the lethal injection process by contending that evidence suggested that the sedative failed to render a person insensate to the pain caused by the administration of the second and third drugs, thus its use to carry out executions, violated their Constitutional right of prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment [Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the United States Constitution]
Validity
Where a State wished to vary out a death sentence, it must do so subject to the constraints that the Constitution (of the United States of America) imposed on it, including the obligation to ensure that its chosen method was not cruel and unusual
Method of executing a condemned prisoner that was barbarous or involved torture or a lingering death, did not become less so just because it was the only method currently available
Where all available means of conducting an execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment, then conducting the execution would constitute cruel and usual punishment
Nothing compelled a State to perform an execution
Prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment [Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the United States Constitution] should have barred the State in question from using the disputed sedative drug as part of a lethal injection protocol because it could not be trusted to render and keep a condemned prisoner unconscious, leaving him open to pain at the later stages of his execution
District Court below relied on scientifically implausible testimony of State's expert witnesses to determine the effectiveness of the sedative in question in rendering a person insensate to pain
Such expert evidence was unsupported by any study or third-party source, contradicted by the extrinsic evidence proffered by petitioners, inconsistent with the scientific understanding of the sedative's properties, and apparently premised on basic logical errors
In stark contrast to the State's expert evidence, petitioners' experts cited multiple sources to point to objective evidence indicating that sedative in question could not serve as an effective anesthetic that rendered a person insensate to pain, and that it had a ceiling effect, which meant that there was a point at which increasing the dose of the sedative did not result in any greater effect
Such evidence alone provided ample reason to doubt the sedative's efficacy
Petitioners only had to establish an intolerable risk of pain, not a certainty
Petitioners failure in the present case to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entailed a lesser risk of pain was irrelevant as a condemned prisoner had no duty to devise or pick a Constitutional instrument of his or her own death
Safeguards adopted by the State in the present case to ensure that the disputed sedative was properly administered did not seem to mitigate the substantial risk that the such sedative would not work
Petitioners in the present case had no part in creating the shortage of execution drugs, that had been effectively and successfully used for executions before the use of the disputed sedative; it was odd to punish the petitioners for the actions of pharmaceutical companies and others who sought to disassociate themselves from the death penalty
Execution protocols that States hurriedly devised as to locate new and untested drugs, such as the disputed sedative in the present case, were all the more likely to be cruel and unusual
Presumably, such drugs would have been the States' first choice were they in fact more effective
Courts' review of execution methods should be more, not less, searching when States were engaged in what was in effect human experimentation
By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment [Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the United States Constitution] reaffirmed the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons. Detailed reasons stated. [Minority view]
Delay in carrying out death sentence-Not a mitigating factor to reduce death sentence to imprisonment for life-Convict sentenced to death undergoing a period of custody equal to or more than a full term of imprisonment for life having exhausted/lost all legal remedies against his death sentence-Delay caused by the executive in executing death sentence of convict was not a ground to invoke the principle of expectancy of life to reduce his death sentence to imprisonment for life.
Held that, according to the calculation chart, the total period of imprisonment came to 214 years and the total amount of fine imposed was Rs.17,20000/- or in default thereof to undergo imprisonment for a further period of 11-1/2 years
After getting benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. and various remissions, granted by the Federal and Provincial Governments and the jail authorities, the appellant had undergone sentence of 42 years, 7 months and 21 days
Court of law could not fold up its hands to deny the benefit of Ss. 35 & 397, Cr.P.C. to the appellant as denial would amount to ruthless treatment and he would certainly die while undergoing such long period of imprisonment
If concurrent running of sentences was denied to the appellant, it would bring at naught the benefit conferred upon him by the amnesty given by the Government and ultimately the object of the same would be squarely defeated as appellant would meet natural death during imprisonment
Construing the beneficial provisions in favour of the appellant would clearly meet the ends of justice
Supreme Court directed that all the sentences awarded to the appellant shall run and shall be deemed to have run concurrently; that the appellant shall also have the benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.0 and all the remissions whether granted by the Federal and Provincial Governments or the jail authorities, shall be extended to him
Appeal was allowed accordingly.
Nature of evidence produced at trial is relevant primarily for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence of accused and not sentence to be awarded
No rule exists that sentence of death cannot be awarded in absence of direct ocular evidence, if guilt of accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial and forensic evidence
Overall features of occurrence, nature of offence and events leading thereto, including motives etc. are relevant to the extent permitted by law.
"Death sentence", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124941847
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Death sentence"
1979 S C M R 364
SIRAJ DIN‑Petitioner Versus NAZAR HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER‑Respondents
Court: ‑‑ S. 302‑Murder‑case‑Commutation of death sentence‑General amnesty declared by President on 23‑12‑1971 applying only to convicts standing sentenced to death on such date‑Death sentence of petitioner having already been set aside by High Court, petitioner's case, held, not covered by terms of amnesty.‑Amnesty‑Sentence.P L D 1994 Peshawar 35
QADAR ALI ‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL, HARRIPUR and 3 others‑‑‑Respondents
Court: ‑‑‑‑S. 5‑‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Act.199‑‑‑Special Court awarded death sentence on three counts to the accused, but did not make a reference to the High Court for confirmation of his death sentences‑‑‑Presidential General Amnesty Order dated 7‑12‑1988 commuting death sentences into life imprisonment being applicable to the case of the accused, he was taken out of the death cell and made to serve the sentences of life imprisonment as an ordinary prisoner‑‑‑Pursuant to the Federal Government's letter dated 9‑4‑1991 clarifying that the General Amnesty Order was applicable to those prisoners only whose death sentences had been already confirmed by the High Court by 6‑12‑1988, the accused was once again placed in death cell ‑‑‑High Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987 did not contain a provision for making of a reference by the Special Court of a death sentence for confirmation to the High Court as the Special Court itself was vested with the powers of a High Court under the Act and the provisions of S374, Cr.P.C. were not applicable to the case as the Special Court had not at all acted as a Sessions Court‑‑‑Letters of the Federal Government and the Inspector‑General of Prisons and subsequent placing back the accused in death cell in pursuance thereof were consequently declared as acts without lawful authority with the direction to the Provincial Government and the Superintendent Jail concerned to take out the accused from the death cell and make him serve the sentences of life imprisonments on three counts.‑‑Amnesty.P L D 1987 Karachi 250
NAWAB ALI LORALI AND ANOTHER‑Appellants Versus THE STATE‑Respondent
Court: --Ss. 374 & 431‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302,134‑..Appeal and reference for confirmation of death sentence, pending‑Accused N" killed in encounter while attempting to escape in jail break up, while accused `,A' escaped alongwith 3, others‑Appeal of accused 'N' pertaining to sentence of death, held, would abate as contem plated under S. 431, Cr. P. C. but would not abate so far as sentence of fine was concerned‑No useful purpose however, would be served by recovery of fine‑Sentence of fine was set aside in circumstances. Abatement.2008 P Cr
MUHAMMAD YAQOOB — Petitioner Versus SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL, FAISALABAD and 4 others — Respondents
Court: Lahore2005 S C M R 412
HAZOOR BAKHSH‑‑‑Petitioner Versus HAQ NAWAZ and others‑‑‑Respondents
Court: Shariat Appellate JurisdictionP L D 1993 Supreme Court 14
EID MUHAMMAD and another‑‑Appellants Versus THE STATE‑‑Respondent
Court:P L D 2015 Lahore 391
JAMSHED NAWAZ — Petitioner Versus SESSIONS JUDGE, RAWALPINDI and 2 others — Respondents
Court: High Court2020 P Cr
SHAFI MUHAMMAD — Appellant Versus The STATE — Respondent
Court: Sindh (Hyderabad Bench)P
AZAD J. & K. GOVT. Versus AZIZ AND FAQIRA
Court:1989 S C M R 176
ABDUL REHMAN alias MANI — Appellant Versus THE STATE — Respondent
Court: ---Ss. 302 & 307--Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B--Death sentence--Appeal against--Compromise--Effect of--Appellant convicted under Ss. 302 & 307, P.P.C. sentenced to death and also 7 years' R.I. with fine on both charges--Husband of deceased, the only surviving heir, entered into compromise with appellant and received compensation--Appeal accepted and death sentence converted into imprisonment for life--Sentences ordered to run concurrently and benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. allowed. Compromise--Sentence.