Protection against double punishment

2026 YLR 337 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 403General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 26Protection against double punishmentDouble jeopardyScopeNo individual can be prosecuted or punished more than once for the same offence

Case of protection was firmly embedded in Art.13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guaranteed that "no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once"

Said constitutional safeguard was reinforced by S.403 Cr.P.C., which barred retrial for the same offence or upon the same facts once a person had been acquitted or convicted

Additionally, S.26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that although a single act might have constituted offence under multiple enactments, the offender may be prosecuted under any one of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

2024 PLD 795 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentDouble jeopardyScope

Protection given under Article 13(a) of the Constitution is against prosecution and punishment, which means the trial and its proceedings followed by a conviction

If the first prosecution results in an acquittal, so far as Article 13(a) of the Constitution is concerned, the second prosecution is not prohibited

Concept of double jeopardy essentially means that a person cannot be tried multiple times for the same offence on which there is a conviction based on the same set of facts as they should not be put in peril twice

It is based on the rule of conclusiveness and finality which requires that once a court has taken cognizance of an offence, tried a person and convicted them, then for the same offence that person cannot be tried again

So, the basic question is that in the case of double jeopardy, the second trial should be on the same set of facts of the first trial which resulted in a conviction for the same offence, which would require the same evidence before the court

Basically, this means that the case has to be the same as the one that has already resulted in a conviction but if the proceedings are different in substance and law then it will not be a case of double jeopardy.

2024 PLD 795 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

S.8Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006), S. 4Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S. 9Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentDouble jeopardyNon-applicability of

Petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the concerned authorities wherein he made certain allegations against the respondent (lady)

On the basis of the said Letter, an inquiry was initiated against the respondent, who was exonerated from the complaint

In the meantime, respondent filed a suit for recovery of damages against the petitioner under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (2002 Ordinance) on the grounds that the petitioner defamed and damaged her reputation on the basis of the letter

Said suit was decreed in favour of respondent

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), which was inquired into and the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct as he had levelled false and fabricated allegations against respondent in the letter, and, major penalty of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years was imposed upon him

During this time, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ("2010 Act") on the grounds of sexual harassment before the Ombudsperson alleging therein that the petitioner came to her office unnecessarily on one pretext or the other

Petitioner was found guilty of harassment and major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was imposed upon him

Contention of the petitioner was that the orders under PEEDA, the 2010 Act and the 2002 Ordinance were hit by the principle of double jeopardy

Validity

There were three different decisions under three separate laws against the petitioner

Each of these laws are special laws which operate within their given jurisdiction and can result in penal consequences if the requirements of the law are fulfilled

Hence, a conviction under any of these laws will not prevent or bar a conviction under the other two laws which operate within their own domain for a specific purpose

Respondent initiated a claim of sexual harassment at the workplace against the petitioner based on instances and evidence of harassment, which was considered by the Ombudsperson, who concluded that he caused harassment to respondent

In the suit for defamation, the court determined that the contents of the petitioner's letter fell within the definition of defamation

So the court awarded her damages

Finally, so far as action under PEEDA was concerned, the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the basis of the letter, which he had specifically written in his official capacity and the said inquiry discovered that the same was false and incorrect, hence, punishment for his misconduct was awarded in the form of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years

Even though the parties were the same, the cause of action was separate in each case before different forums with distinct penal consequences emanating out of its respective statutory laws

Argument of double jeopardy was misplaced and without any basis

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

2024 PLC(CS) 957 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentDouble jeopardyScope

Protection given under Article 13(a) of the Constitution is against prosecution and punishment, which means the trial and its proceedings followed by a conviction

If the first prosecution results in an acquittal, so far as Article 13(a) of the Constitution is concerned, the second prosecution is not prohibited

Concept of double jeopardy essentially means that a person cannot be tried multiple times for the same offence on which there is a conviction based on the same set of facts as they should not be put in peril twice

It is based on the rule of conclusiveness and finality which requires that once a court has taken cognizance of an offence, tried a person and convicted them, then for the same offence that person cannot be tried again

So, the basic question is that in the case of double jeopardy, the second trial should be on the same set of facts of the first trial which resulted in a conviction for the same offence, which would require the same evidence before the court

Basically, this means that the case has to be the same as the one that has already resulted in a conviction but if the proceedings are different in substance and law then it will not be a case of double jeopardy.

2024 PLC(CS) 957 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

S.4Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010), S.8Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S. 9Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentDouble jeopardyNon-applicability of

Petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the concerned authorities wherein he made certain allegations against the respondent (lady)

On the basis of the said Letter, an inquiry was initiated against the respondent, who was exonerated from the complaint

In the meantime, respondent filed a suit for recovery of damages against the petitioner under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (2002 Ordinance) on the grounds that the petitioner defamed and damaged her reputation on the basis of the letter

Said suit was decreed in favour of respondent

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), which was inquired into and the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct as he had levelled false and fabricated allegations against respondent in the letter, and, major penalty of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years was imposed upon him

During this time, respondent also filed a complaint against the petitioner under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ("2010 Act") on the grounds of sexual harassment before the Ombudsperson alleging therein that the petitioner came to her office unnecessarily on one pretext or the other

Petitioner was found guilty of harassment and major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was imposed upon him

Contention of the petitioner was that the orders under PEEDA, the 2010 Act and the 2002 Ordinance were hit by the principle of double jeopardy

Validity

There were three different decisions under three separate laws against the petitioner

Each of these laws are special laws which operate within their given jurisdiction and can result in penal consequences if the requirements of the law are fulfilled

Hence, a conviction under any of these laws will not prevent or bar a conviction under the other two laws which operate within their own domain for a specific purpose

Respondent initiated a claim of sexual harassment at the workplace against the petitioner based on instances and evidence of harassment, which was considered by the Ombudsperson, who concluded that he caused harassment to respondent

In the suit for defamation, the court determined that the contents of the petitioner's letter fell within the definition of defamation

So the court awarded her damages

Finally, so far as action under PEEDA was concerned, the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the basis of the letter, which he had specifically written in his official capacity and the said inquiry discovered that the same was false and incorrect, hence, punishment for his misconduct was awarded in the form of forfeiture of past service for a period of two years

Even though the parties were the same, the cause of action was separate in each case before different forums with distinct penal consequences emanating out of its respective statutory laws

Argument of double jeopardy was misplaced and without any basis

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

2023 MLD 312 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT Judicial Precedent

Ss. 417 & 403Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 26Appeal in case of acquittalPerson once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offenceProtection against double punishmentScope

Petitioner sought special leave to appeal against order passed by Magistrate whereby respondents were acquitted under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.

Record reflected that earlier, the petitioner had filed a complaint against respondents regarding same allegations as narrated in the present complaint

Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, after hearing both the sides, had dismissed the complaint by invoking the provisions of S. 203, Cr.P.C.

Under the law, nobody could be tried twice for the same offence on the basis of maxim "nemo debet bis vexari", which meant that no person could be tried for the second time for an offence with which he was previously charged

Said principle was fundamentally embodied in S. 403, Cr.P.C., S. 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Art. 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan

Matter had already been tried by the Court of competent jurisdiction

Petition was dismissed.

2022 CLD 413 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentScopeDouble jeopardy, principle of

Scope of Art. 13(a) of the Constitution stated.

2022 CLD 413 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Ss. 264(3) & 500Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 37 & 41BConstitution of Pakistan, Art. 13(a)National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S. 9Protection against double punishmentScopeDouble jeopardy, principle ofDefrauding and cheating the public at largeInducing and luring members of the public to invest money in companies by way of a 'Ponzi/pyramid scheme'

Plea of accused petitioner that in view of the proceedings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), the second proceedings by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding the same matter would amount to double jeopardy and thus infringe his fundamental right to protection against double punishment guaranteed by Art. 13 of the Constitution

Held, that SECP was not a court of law, nor were the offences under the Companies Act, 2017 for which it had imposed penalties on the accused-petitioner and his companies constituted, of the same ingredients as that of the offence defined in S. 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Shield of Art. 13 of the Constitution was therefore not available to the petitioner to prevent the proceedings against him under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.

2022 PLD 409 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S. 9Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 264(3) & 500Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 37 & 41BProtection against double punishmentScopeDouble jeopardy, principle ofDefrauding and cheating the public at largeInducing and luring members of the public to invest money in companies by way of a 'Ponzi/pyramid scheme'

Plea of accused petitioner that in view of the proceedings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), the second proceedings by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding the same matter would amount to double jeopardy and thus infringe his fundamental right to protection against double punishment guaranteed by Article 13 of the Constitution

Held, that SECP was not a court of law, nor were the offences under the Companies Act, 2017 for which it had imposed penalties on the accused-petitioner and his companies constituted, of the same ingredients as that of the offence defined in section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Shield of Article 13 of the Constitution was therefore not available to the petitioner to prevent the proceedings against him under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.

2022 PLD 409 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentScopeDouble jeopardy, principle of

Scope of Article 13(a) of the Constitution stated.

2021 PLD 200 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishment

Whether enhancement of sentence of convict who had already undergone the sentence during the pendency of appeal/revision, was hit by the principle of "Double Jeoperdy" enshrined in Art. 13 of the Constitution

Principles recorded.

2020 PLD 158 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

S. 21FConstitution of Pakistan, Art.13RemissionsProtection against double punishmentApplicabilityAct of refusing remission to an accused does not amount to punish him for the same offence more than once

Such accused is only punished for one offence and question of availability of remission is governed by law and is a matter of concession not as of right

Issue of self-incrimination is not relevant in circumstances.

2017 PLC(CS) 279 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

R. 16.2Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13(a)Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934, vires ofProtection against double punishmentScopeContinued misconductDismissal from service

Continued misconduct of police official resulted in him being awarded minor/major punishments during his career/service, and ultimately on basis of such record he was dismissed from service

Contention of dismissed police official that he had already been penalized departmentally for acts of misconduct during his service, and that he could not be dismissed from service and punished again on the basis of such adverse entries recorded in his service record in view of Art. 13 of the Constitution

Validity

Concept of Art. 13(a) of the Constitution was completely distinct from the wisdom behind R. 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934

Wisdom behind Art. 13(a) of the Constitution was to provide protection to a person who was tried and convicted from being vexed again in the same offence, whereas, concept of R. 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 was completely different whereby the penalty of dismissal from service of a police officer was awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service

Such penalty had further been qualified by the language of Rule 16.2 to the length of service

In terms of R. 16.2 cumulative effect of the penalties which the competent authority recorded in the service record of the police officers, could be examined to measure whether such police officer was fit to continue in the police service

Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 was independent and had been introduced to ensure discipline within the police service and also to keep a strict check on the conduct of the police officer; it enabled a constant watchful-eye on the police officer by examining their dossier at any point of time and if the competent authority reached the conclusion that the police officer had indulged in acts of misconduct, which proved incorrigibility and rendered him completely unfit for service, the competent Authority could award the penalty of dismissal from service

Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 was not violative of Art.13(a) of the Constitution.

2013 PLD 793 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Art. 13(a)Protection against double punishmentAutrefois acquit and autrefois convict, principles ofScope

Provisions of Art.13 of the Constitution recognized the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and granted them the status of a Fundamental Right, which right could not be violated or abridged and against which no legislation could be passed.