Unconscionably delayed punishment

Convict sentenced to death for murder had undergone a period of custody equal to or more than a term of imprisonment for life during the pendency of his legal remedy against his conviction and sentence of death

Effect

Where a convict sentenced to death on a charge of murder failed to obtain a final judicial determination qua validity of his conviction or desirability of his sentence of death for such a long time that his period of custody stretched to a period equal to or exceeding a full term of imprisonment for life, which was one of the two alternative legal sentences provided in S.302(b), P.P.C., there the State, acting through its judicial organ, might acknowledge failure of its constitutional responsibility of ensuring expeditious justice and might exercise discretion in the matter of the sentence of such convict by reducing it from death to imprisonment for life

Such a case might not strictly be termed as a case of double punishment but it could more appropriately be called a case of an unconscionably delayed punishment, delayed to such an extent that the punishment was aggravated beyond the contemplation of the relevant law itself

Legislative intent might lean in favour of extending some relief to a convict placed in such a predicament which was not of his own making and the least that the court could do for him in such an unfortunate situation was to exercise its discretion in the matter by reducing his sentence of death to imprisonment for life on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case and also on the basis of the principle of expectancy of life

Such relief, however, could possibly be misused through clever machinations of a convict whose neck was on the line, therefore such relief shall not be applicable to any delay caused by the Executive in processing or deciding a condemned prisoner's mercy petition or in executing his sentence of death after his judicial remedies had been exhausted

Such relief shall also not be applicable to a case wherein the convict was himself demonstrably and significantly responsible for the delay occasioned in conclusion of his judicial remedies.