Consequences

Briefly, the predecessor of petitioners filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of the mutation; the said suit was dismissed; appeal and revision were also dismissed; petitioners then filed a second suit for rectification which was dismissed in default and restoration/withdrawal applications were dismissed without permission to file afresh; petitioners later filed a third suit challenging mutation No.8225/2014 (sanctioned in culmination of correction of initial mutation under challenge)

Question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether the third civil suit challenging mutation was maintainable when an earlier suit against same mutation stood finally dismissed and a later suit was dismissed in default without leave to file afresh?”

Held: Instead of agitating matter before the higher revenue hierarchy, the petitioners opted to institute a suit for declaration before the Civil Court, therefore, bar of election of remedies was attracted

No permission to file a fresh suit was granted by the Trial Court as the application for restoration and withdrawal was dismissed and instead of knocking the door of higher forum the petitioners instituted the third suit, which was blatantly barred by Order XXIII, Rule 1 of C.P.C.

When all the three Courts below had concurrently, while construing law on the subject, non-suited the petitioners and during course of arguments, no substantial question of law and any illegality in the impugned judgment had been pointed out on behalf of the petitioners, warranting interference by the Supreme Court

As such, no case for grant of leave was made out

The petition in hand failed and the same was dismissed.

Section 153, like a number of other provisions in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requires for the advance payment of tax by way of deduction

Other provisions provide for advance payment of tax byway of collection

If the person who is required to so deduct or collect fails to do so then, among other consequences, Section 161 is activated

The section makes the person in default personally liable for the payment of the amount of tax that was not deducted or collected and the recovery provisions of the Ordinance become applicable, per Section 163, "as if it were tax due under an assessment order", thus, a failure to abide by the duty to deduct or collect advance tax has severe penal consequences and he becomes, in essence, a taxpayer in default

Section 153, when viewed from the perspective of the person who is said to be under a duty to collect or deduct the advance payment of tax, may be regarded as akin or analogous to a charging provision

This is so because of the severe penal consequences that can result from a failure to abide by the statutory duty

These advance payment provisions therefore have to be strictly construed

This need not be with the same rigidity and literalness with which a charging section, in terms of well settled tax jurisprudence, is interpreted

Nonetheless, such provisions cannot be regarded simply as recovery mechanisms and dealt with accordingly

The severe penal consequences for a person who defaults on a duty to deduct or collect, as the case may be, militate against any such approach

The interpretation must be tight and narrow.

Section 153, like a number of other provisions in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requires for the advance payment of tax by way of deduction

Other provisions provide for advance payment of tax byway of collection

If the person who is required to so deduct or collect fails to do so then, among other consequences, Section 161 is activated

The section makes the person in default personally liable for the payment of the amount of tax that was not deducted or collected and the recovery provisions of the Ordinance become applicable, per Section 163, "as if it were tax due under an assessment order", thus, a failure to abide by the duty to deduct or collect advance tax has severe penal consequences and he becomes, in essence, a taxpayer in default

Section 153, when viewed from the perspective of the person who is said to be under a duty to collect or deduct the advance payment of tax, may be regarded as akin or analogous to a charging provision

This is so because of the severe penal consequences that can result from a failure to abide by the statutory duty

These advance payment provisions therefore have to be strictly construed

This need not be with the same rigidity and literalness with which a charging section, in terms of well settled tax jurisprudence, is interpreted

Nonetheless, such provisions cannot be regarded simply as recovery mechanisms and dealt with accordingly

The severe penal consequences for a person who defaults on a duty to deduct or collect, as the case may be, militate against any such approach

The interpretation must be tight and narrow.

During pendency of the suit, the respondents/plaintiffs moved an application under O.XXIII Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. seeking withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one, which was allowed by the Trial Court

The petitioner challenged the said order through a civil revision petition, which was dismissed by the revisional Court

Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for determination of the issue as to "whether the Courts below rightly exercised jurisdiction under O.XXIII Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C., in permitting withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit?"

Held: Respondents/plaintiffs did not disclose in detail a formal defect or any other sufficient ground as required for conditional withdrawal of the suit

Respondents/plaintiffs ought to have mentioned justifiable grounds for conditional withdrawal of the suit

Specific requirements necessary for withdrawal and filing a fresh suit was lacking, because a formal defect was a defect which could be of technical nature and could be cured through fresh suit

Mere mentioning of general grounds were not enough to allow the parties to withdraw the suit conditionally and to institute a fresh suit

Concurrent findings of the courts below were set aside and the petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Petitioners were employees of a university who were proceeded against in relation to alleged irregularities concerning examination forms and bank fee challans and were terminated from service

The Senate subsequently decided to convert the penalty of termination into compulsory retirement

Pivotal question before the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction was as to "whether the termination/compulsory retirement of the petitioners was in accordance with law; and whether the principles of natural justice were adhered to?"

Held: No statement of allegations was served upon the petitioners, nor were they provided any final show cause notice prior to the issuance of the impugned termination orders

Right to a fair hearing, which included notice of allegations, access to evidence and the right to cross-examine witnesses was a fundamental component of due process which lacked in the present case

The alleged misconduct even if assumed to be under investigation, could not have justified such a hard penalty without first affording the petitioners an opportunity to rebut the allegations in a properly conducted inquiry

University's failure to follow its own rules vitiated the entire disciplinary proceedings

Petitioners were reinstated into service, however, were to remain suspended till finalization of fresh inquiry proceedings

Constitutional petitions were partly allowed, in circumstances.

Every public company having a share capital is obligated to hold a general meeting of members of the company within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of which the company is entitled to commence business or within nine months from the date of its incorporation whichever is earlier

This shall be called a statutory meeting

Section 132 is about annual general meetings of a company and provides that every company shall hold an annual general meeting within sixteen months from the date of its incorporation and thereafter once in every calendar year within a period of one hundred and twenty days following the close of its financial year

Thus, by the tenor of S.132 every company is obliged under the law to hold an annual general meeting once in every calendar year within a period of one hundred and twenty days following the close of its financial year

Time for holding an AGM cannot be extended beyond a period of thirty days from the original one hundred and twenty days provided by law

That period has come to pass in respect of financial years till 2024

It was under these circumstances that the respondents resorted to calling of extraordinary general meeting as contemplated by S.133

A reading of S.133 indubitably leads to the conclusion that all meetings of the members of the company shall be referred as general meetings of a company

Further, all general meetings of a company other than the annual general meeting referred in S.132 and statutory meeting mentioned in S.131 shall be called extra ordinary general meetings for the precise reason that an EGM is held under special circumstances and by subsection (2) the Board may at any time call an extraordinary general meeting of the company to consider any matter which requires approval of the company in a general meeting

Doubtless,

Every public company having a share capital is obligated to hold a general meeting of members of the company within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of which the company is entitled to commence business or within nine months from the date of its incorporation whichever is earlier

This shall be called a statutory meeting

Section 132 is about annual general meetings of a company and provides that every company shall hold an annual general meeting within sixteen months from the date of its incorporation and thereafter once in every calendar year within a period of one hundred and twenty days following the close of its financial year

Thus, by the tenor of S.132 every company is obliged under the law to hold an annual general meeting once in every calendar year within a period of one hundred and twenty days following the close of its financial year

Time for holding an AGM cannot be extended beyond a period of thirty days from the original one hundred and twenty days provided by law

That period has come to pass in respect of financial years till 2024

It was under these circumstances that the respondents resorted to calling of extraordinary general meeting as contemplated by S.133

A reading of S.133 indubitably leads to the conclusion that all meetings of the members of the company shall be referred as general meetings of a company

Further, all general meetings of a company other than the annual general meeting referred in S.132 and statutory meeting mentioned in S.131 shall be called extra ordinary general meetings for the precise reason that an EGM is held under special circumstances and by subsection (2) the Board may at any time call an extraordinary general meeting of the company to consider any matter which requires approval of the company in a general meeting

Doubtless, subsection (2) of S.133 confers power on the Board to call an EGM and any matter may be considered in an EGM which requires the approval of a company in a general meeting.

Brief facts were that the appellant filed an appeal under S. 63 of the Elections Act, 2017 challenging the Returning Officer's order rejecting his nomination papers on grounds of concealment of facts

The record showed that an FIR existed against him; that he obtained pre-arrest bail after learning of the case; that his name was placed in the 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and his CNIC and bank accounts were consequently frozen; that under S. 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, maintaining an active bank account for election expenses was mandatory, but due to the freezing order the appellant could not operate his account; and that he had also been declared a proclaimed offender in criminal proceedings which he did not disclose in his nomination papers

Pivotal question requiring determination in the present election appeal was as to "whether the Returning Officer rightly rejected the appellant's nomination papers on the basis of concealment of material facts, specifically the pending criminal cases; his status as a proclaimed offender; and his inclusion in the 4th Schedule which resulted in frozen bank accounts, and whether these circumstances legally disqualified him from contesting the election due to failure to meet mandatory requirements under the Elections Act, 2017"?

Held: Appellant's name had been included in the list of 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, firstly, in the year 2018, secondly in 2021 when it was excluded, however, keeping in view appellant's activities his name had again been included in the said list in 2023

Consequently, according to the order passed against the appellant, movables or any other property owned or controlled wholly or partly, directly or indirectly stood frozen

According to S. 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, 2017, opening of a dedicated account for the purpose of election expenses was essential for every candidate

Since, during the existence of aforesaid order, appellant's account remained frozen and he was unable to utilize the same for the purpose of election expenses, therefore, this fact alone was sufficient to preclude him from contesting the forthcoming elections

Moreover, a criminal case was pending against the appellant in which he was a proclaimed offender and same was not disclosed by him in his affidavit

Furthermore, it was revealed that appellant was also a proclaimed offender in another criminal case for the last many years in which admittedly the appellant had not surrendered before the court of law

Appellant had also concealed that case in his affidavit which amounted to concealment of facts, rendering the appellant ineligible to contest the elections

Impugned order passed by the returning officer being within four corners of law needed to intervention in appeal before the High Court

Present appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Facts: Petitioner worked as 'ex-chief technician' at Pakistan Air Force who filed the present constitutional petition challenging his dismissal from service order, purportedly passed under S.20(1) of the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953 read with R.31-A of the Pakistan Air Force Act Rules, 1957

Record reflected that a board of inquiry regarding alleged embezzlement/misappropriation of "service medicines" was initiated and a show-cause notice was issued, and thereafter the impugned dismissal followed, while no court-martial proceedings were shown to have been conducted

Issue: Pivotal issue requiring determination before the High Court was as to "whether, despite Art.199(3), the petition was maintainable on the pleaded jurisdictional/due-process grounds, and whether dismissal under S.20(1) read with R.31-A, after initiating inquiry machinery and without completing the prescribed statutory procedure (including court-martial where required), was lawful and consistent with due process/fair trial, and further, whether S.20(1) and R.31-A were ultra vires the Act/repugnant to the Constitution?"

Held: Board of Inquiry [BOI] in respect of the alleged misappropriation done by the petitioner in service medicines, was initiated on 22.06.2020 and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide the impugned Order on 14th June 2024, that was, after four years

On 21.09.2021, the Additional Board of Inquiry (ABOI) was initiated and show cause notice was issued after four years from the date of initiation of the Board of Inquiry that was, 20.06.2020 and after two and a half years from the issuance of ABOI)

Upon charges against the petitioner the punishment was to be awarded after court martial, which admittedly was not done

Once the respondents had elected to prosecute the petitioner by initiating a BOI, then halfway through, and that too after nearly four years, it could not abruptly dismiss the petitioner without first completing the prescribed procedure

Respondents had misused and had wrongly exercised the authority under S.20(1) of the Pakistan Airforce Act, 1953 read with R.31-A of the Pakistan Airforce Act Rules, 1957 because due process as required under the Act was flagrantly violated

If the petitioner's case was dealt with in accordance with the Act, Rules and the prescribed procedure, then the appellate or other curative forum would have been availed, but abruptly his service was terminated

No inherent illegality in the above provisions under challenge was found

Merely because a provision of law was exercised in a colourable manner, did not justify that the same be declared as illegal or struck down

Section 20 of the Act and R.31-A of the Rules were neither ultra vires the said Act nor violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution

To the extent of challenge to the vires of the Act and the Rules the present petition was dismissed

The respondents had violated their laid down statutory procedure, therefore, the impugned dismissal order was set-aside

Since petitioner had retired from service, thus, he was not reinstated, but, he was to be deemed to have been discharged from respondent PAF, with the entitlement to receive service dues, benefits applicable to his cadre and length of service

Present constitutional petition was partly allowed, in circumstances.

Brief facts were that the petitioner secured admission in BS International Relations (Fall 2018) at the respondent university after submitting an online admission form in which he declared securing 443/950 marks, whereas his actual result was 443/1100, making him ineligible under the university's criteria, and his admission was cancelled though he continued attending classes due to procedural lapses

After a previous writ petition was treated as a representation which was decided against him, he filed the present petition challenging that decision

Issue requiring determination before the High Court was as to "whether the petitioner, having obtained admission through misrepresentation of academic marks and having continued his studies for several semesters, was entitled to constitutional relief against cancellation of admission under Article 199 of the Constitution"?

Held: Under constitutional jurisdiction, interfere in academic, disciplinary, or administrative policy matters of educational institutions, particularly where no violation of any fundamental or statutory right was established, was not warranted

The petitioner's own conduct was tainted with misrepresentation and concealment

In his admission form, he categorically declared that "The information furnished in the application form is correct and nothing has been concealed in this regard"

Moreover, all the attached documents i.e. Matric/ Intermediate/ Bachelor/Master/ MS/ MPhil/ equivalent results were complete, correct and meet the eligibility criteria as per advertisement

If the information provided or the documents attached were found deficient/incorrect/false/fake/or tampered at any stage, the university had the right to cancel the admission without any refund

Having voluntarily and consciously executed such an undertaking, the petitioner stood precluded, under the well-established doctrine of estoppel, from invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to seek protection against the very consequence that lawfully emanated from his own false declaration

The petitioner, regrettably, chose to begin his academic journey on a false foundation, and having done so, he could not later invoke equity to validate that which was void from inception

As regards the contention that the petitioner's continued attendance in classes and regular payment of fees created a vested right under the principle of locus poenitentiae, it sufficed to observe that an illegality could not ripen into legitimacy merely through the passage of time or by continued participation in an unlawful arrangement

No benefit could flow from a fraudulent or deceitful act

The petitioner, being the architect of his own wrong, could not claim equity or protection from the High Court

The equitable maxim "he who seeks equity must come with clean hands" squarely applied

A structure founded upon falsehood could not be sustained in law; therefore, any claim erected upon such a defective foundation must collapse under its own weight, and the petitioner alone must bear responsibility for the consequences of his own misconduct

Constitutional petition was devoid of merit and was dismissed, in circumstances.

Failure at this step can have consequence i.e. the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree.

Parliamentarian votes or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the parliamentary party to which he/she belongs

Consequences

Vote cast by such Parliamentarian is to be disregarded, as it is only in this way that the external aspect of the "healthy" operating of political parties will be maintained

Balance among the political parties will not be disturbed and they will continue to compete and vie for political power in the manner required by Article 17(2)

Defector's vote is to be disregarded immediately and automatically once the member in default has cast his vote against the direction of the parliamentary party

No other act, resolution or direction is required

Any conscientious objector in a party can resign at any time to register his dissent and disagreement, instead of defecting, which was disruptive of, and dangerous for, the functioning of the constitutional system.

While final determination was not completed within six months, appropriate officer passed the impugned final assessment order by holding that the amount determined through provisional assessment order had become final and as a result thereof, the security instrument i.e. bank guarantee for differential amount should be encashed

Petitioner / importer assailed impugned order passed by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court

Objection of the respondents / department was that impugned order could be challenged before the next higher forum in terms of S.193 of the Customs Act, 1969 (' the Act, 1969')

Validity

Section 193 of the Act, 1969 had provided specifically that an order passed by any officer of the Customs Department under different provisions of the Act, 1969 was appealable

Section 81 of the Act, 1969 did not figure in the said order which were appealable before the next higher forum

Indeed, appeal was a creation of statute and in absence of any provision of law envisaging for filing appeal against an order, the appeal could not be entertained by the upper forum as a matter of course

High Court set aside the impugned order passed by the appropriate officer, declaring that her findings were not based on correct appreciation of subsection (4) of S. 81 of the Act, 1969 and directed the respondents / department to return the bank guarantee through which the differential amount was secured from the petitioner / importer

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

On the strength of credentials and being number one in the list of candidates, short listed for appointment of Vice Chancellor, appellant filed a suit as she viewed discrimination at the hands of the authority

Injunctive order was passed directing the Authority not to make final list in respect of the selected candidates

While the injunctive order was operating, a Vice Chancellor was appointed

Appellant being aggrieved of the notification yet again filed an application for seeking appropriate injunctive orders

Single Judge of High Court apart from issuing notices observed that suspension of notification would not be proper as it would adversely affect the functioning of the University and that the interim orders passed earlier were to continue till the next date of hearing

Validity

Once an earlier injunctive order was passed, a follow up order to carry the real object of the earlier order should have been passed

Single Judge of High Court was empowered to revisit and decide the applications finally but not in a cursory manner and that too after passing adverse remarks

Single Judge of High Court could have conveniently avoided the observation as only notices were ordered

Selection of observation by the Single Judge of High Court had perhaps overlapped and overshadowed the earlier order and the mandate without the applications being actually heard and decided

Impugned order was set aside to the extent of observations, in circumstances

Appeal was allowed.

Public authority was a most sacred trust and a very high onus was cast upon a State functionary to uphold the highest degree of rectitude in financial matters

Financial corruption or misappropriation of public money were wrongs of most repugnant depravity

Once a public servant was found to have the capacity to betray the public trust, it would be most unwise as well as inexpedient to retain him on the job.

Public authority was a most sacred trust and a very high onus was cast upon a State functionary to uphold the highest degree of rectitude in financial matters

Financial corruption or misappropriation of public money were wrongs of most repugnant depravity

Once a public servant was found to have the capacity to betray the public trust, it would be most unwise as well as inexpedient to retain him on the job.

In order to succeed in a claim for damages under S. 73 of the Contract Act, 1872, claimant had to prove the same through positive evidence; whereas liquidated damages could only be granted under S. 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 ,when inter alia, an aggrieved party proves default / breach of contract by the other party.

Parties may determine expected losses and agree for an amount to be paid in breach of contract and earnest money was part of purchase price when transaction went forward, and same was forfeited when a transaction fell though by reason of fault and failure of vendee

Discretion, however lay with the Court to interpret and implement a forfeiture clause in an agreement

Court, if forms an opinion, that amount mentioned in an agreement as liquidated damages for breach, penalty or forfeiture; was unreasonable, then it was not necessary to implement such clause

Court was not to permit a party to keep the entire amount if it was exorbitantly high and unreasonably harsh.

Problems caused by Pakistan's alarmingly high population growth rate highlighted by the Supreme Court.

Respondent raised a preliminary objection that where the appeal was returned by the office of High Court for removing the objections within the specified time and meanwhile prescribed period for filing appeal lapsed, then such delay would render the appeal time-barred unless delay was explained through an application for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and the delay was condoned by the court

Contention of the appellant that the appeal was not barred by time as the same was originally filed within time and the date relevant for determining whether the appeal was within time or not would be the date when the appeal was originally filed and mere delay in removing the office objections would not render the appeal time-barred

Validity

Office report showed that although the appeal was originally filed within time, however, the office objections were not removed despite repeating objections by the office and re-filings by the appellant, and when finally the objections were removed the time prescribed for filing the appeal had elapsed

Legal question for the High Court was as to which of the two dates would be treated as date of filing of the appeal for the purposes of limitation, the date on which the appeal was originally filed or the date when the office objections were finally removed

Held, that once appeal was originally filed within the prescribed limitation period but was returned within given time and when the office objections were finally removed the prescribed period of limitation for filing appeal elapsed, would not render the appeal barred by time

Present appeal being within the prescribed period of limitation and only because the office objection was removed subsequent to that period, will not make the appeal barred by time.

Respondent raised a preliminary objection that where the appeal was returned by the office of High Court for removing the objections within the specified time and meanwhile prescribed period for filing appeal lapsed then such delay would render the appeal time-barred unless delay was explained through an application for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and the delay was condoned by the court

Contention of the appellant that the appeal was not barred by time as the same was originally filed within time and the date relevant for determining whether the appeal was within time or not would be the date when the appeal was originally filed and mere delay in removing the office objections would not render the appeal time-barred

Validity-Office report showed that although the appeal was originally filed within time, however, the office objections were not removed despite repeating objections by the office and re filings by the appellant, and when finally the objections were removed the time prescribed for filing the appeal had elapsed

Legal question for the High Court was as to which of the two dates would be treated as date of filing of the appeal for the purposes of limitation, the date on which the appeal was originally filed or the date when the office objections were finally removed

Held, that once appeal was originally filed within the prescribed limitation period but was returned within given time and when the office objections were finally removed the prescribed period of limitation for filing appeal elapsed, would not render the appeal barred by time

Present appeal being within the prescribed period of limitation and only because the office objection was removed subsequent to that period, will not make the appeal barred by time.