Intention of legislature
Intention of legislature legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
When wording is explicit, the Legislature's intent should be understood directly from the text, without resorting to interpretative aids.
Word "Shall" and "May" might be considered interchangeably while determining the intention of legislature.
Such general rule of construction is applicable to all statutes alike, is spoken of as construction ex vise-ceribus actus, i.e. within the four corners of the Act
Such rule of construction has frequently been recognized and acted upon by Courts of law from Coke's time down to the present day.
Only in cases of exceptional nature and where apparently on the face of it, an order had been passed which lacked jurisdiction and was so patently illegal warranting correction, only then High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction could exercise discretion in favour of an aggrieved petitioner.
Law is conscious reflection of sovereign command which always has clear history, aim and purpose behind its enactment and also clear objective and purpose ahead of it
Law cannot be read or truly understood in isolation with very purpose it was enacted for
Purposive approach of construction provides the Court objective and necessary aid to unearth underlying true intention of Legislature.
Where intention of Legislature is clear and object for which law has been enacted is well reflected in statute, Courts are not allowed to interpret such law in a manner which impedes or defeats object for which law has been enacted.
When meaning of statute is clear and plain language of statute requires no other interpretation, then intention of Legislature conveyed through such language has to be given full effect
Plain and unambiguous words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense
Court is under legal obligation to discover true intent of Legislature while interpreting statute
Intention of Legislature is primarily to be gathered from language used and attention has to be paid to what has been said and also what has not been said.
Ss. 131(5) second proviso [as inserted by Finance Act (XXX of 2018)] & S.132(2A) [as inserted by Finance Act (VII of 2005)]
Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199
Constitutional petition
Statutory right of appeal, decision of
Time-frame
Mandatory or Directory nature of statute
Intention of Legislature
Taxpayers were proceeded against by authorities who challenged same before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue seeking extension of injunctive orders under S. 131(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001
Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was unable to decide issue within statutory timeframe given under S. 132(2A) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001
Validity
Time prescribed for validity of an order passed regarding recovery of tax and deciding appeal is same and S. 131 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, therefore, could not be read in isolation
Provisions of S. 131 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had to be examined and interpreted in context of other provisions related to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue so that legislative intent and scheme could be discovered
Both Ss. (131 & 132(2A)) prescribed time limitations and if time specified in second proviso of S. 131 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was treated as mandatory and otherwise in case of 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 then it would give rise to an anomalous and odd situation
Appeal might not have been decided within time prescribed under S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 because of acts or omissions on part of department or Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and yet taxpayer would be exposed to hardship by depositing liability
If time prescribed under S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was treated as mandatory, it would lead to an even more preposterous consequence because in such an eventuality party that exercised statutory right of appeal would be left without a remedy because proceedings would have abated on lapse of time
Statutory right of appeal would become redundant and losing right of appeal before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was of great significance having regard to scheme of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001
Legislature, therefore, could not have intended to deprive taxpayer from such an important appellate remedy by making time prescribed under S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as mandatory even when default was not on the part of taxpayer
Provisions of third proviso to S. 131(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be interpreted in isolation and it had nexus with S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001
High Court declared that time prescribed under S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and second proviso to S. 131(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were directory and not mandatory
If delay in deciding appeal beyond time prescribed under S. 132(2A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was attributed to person who preferred appeal and not department or tribunal then latter would be at liberty to vacate an order staying recovery after affording opportunity of hearing
High Court remanded case to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue to afford an opportunity to determine whether delay in deciding appeal beyond prescribed time was attributed to taxpayers
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Intentions of Legislature in their wisdom qua S. 36 of Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 were that the officers working under the Act should exercise their powers freely and should not be interrupted unnecessarily to administer colony land according to the terms and conditions issued by the competent authority from time to time but this provision did not give unfettered/unchecked power
Ambit of jurisdiction of Revenue Courts had been laid down by Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 and the officers functioning thereunder could not be allowed to act beyond their scope of jurisdiction or exceed their jurisdiction
Civil Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction had the authority/power to interfere, if the orders of revenue hierarchy were found to be without jurisdiction mala fide, excessive or in violation of law
Under S.9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Civil Court was competent to check usurpation of power by Revenue Courts, but it could not check errors of judgment of Revenue Court on the plea of mis-appreciation of evidence.
In order to discover intention of legislature, provision has to be read as a whole.
Intention of legislature had to be ascertained by reference to word used and grammatical and ordinary sense of word to be adhered to
Where language of statute was clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in its ordinary sense
State of law which was passed at time of statute was a matter material to be considered to arrive at intention of legislature.
Where the statute was plainly understandable and its meaning was conveniently conceivable, court could not put a different meaning on a statute nor could it stretch the same to cover those matters or to apply to the cases which were not covered by the same either impliedly or expressly
Supplying omissions; repairing defects in a statute and changing clear meaning of statute was not the province of the court.
In order to discover intention of legislature the statute has to be read as a whole.
Intention of the legislature was primarily to be gathered from the language used, which meant that attention should be paid to what had been said as also to what had not been said
Words of a statute were first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences were construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that led to some absurdity or unless there was something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.
"Intention of legislature", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124944571
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Intention of legislature"
1997 C L C 679
Messrs MALAH RICE MILLS, JACOBABAD and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING TRIBUNAL, LARKANA and others‑‑‑Respondents
Court: Karachi1981 C L C 369
M. SHAFIQUE SHAH AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus Kist. IRSHAD BEGUM AND 8 OTHERS‑Respondents
Court: Lahore1987 M L D 3045
MUHAMMAD RIAZ — Petitioner Versus Mst. GHAZALA BEGUM and another — Respondents
Court: Lahore2004 M L D 696
AFTAB MOHY-UD-DIN — Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and 2 others — Respondents
Court: Lahore2006 P L C (C
Prof. MUHAMMAD WALI KHAN Versus HAMDARD UNIVERSITY and others
Court: Federal Service Tribunal2001 S C M R 1191
MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED — Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD NASIM — Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan1983 S C M R 1323
HABIBULLAH AND ANOTHER-Petitioners Versus THE DIRECTOR (HEADQUARTERS), EXCISE & TAXATION,
Court: ----S. 2 (e) as amended by West Pakistan Urban Immovable Pro perty Tax (Amendment) Ordinance XXVIII of 1963-Displaced Persons (Compensation and. Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), S. 4--"Owner".-Provisional transfer of evacuee property-Such transferee of evacuee property, held, owner for purposes of liabilities to property tax, even though he may not be a full owner under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.1981 C L C 1143
KASHMIR AND ANOTHER‑Appellants Versus COMMISSIONER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
Court: Azad J & K2016 P T D 643
COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Versus MADINA COTTON GINNERS AND OIL MILLS
Court: Lahore High Court2023 S C M R 2096
ABDUL NAFEY — Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE and others — Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan