Fundamental Right
Fundamental Right legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Whether military status of military judges violates such constitutional guarantee of person tried by a court martial.
Service appeal was decided in the manner that order of dismissal from service was set aside and matter was remanded for decision afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant
In post-remand proceedings, the appellant was granted hearing before the Administrative Committee followed by issuance of notification, whereby the disciplinary proceedings against appellant were abated on the ground that he had already been superannuated
Appellant approached the Registrar for the release of his pension and other service benefits, however his request was declined
Validity
Record showed that no adverse order existed against the appellant as order of his dismissal from service had already been set aside and the disciplinary proceedings to determine the question of 'moral turpitude' were also abated by the competent authority as during the course of proceedings, the appellant had reached the age of superannuation on 01.04.2004
Therefore, the respondent-authority was obligated to pass the further order by notionally permitting the appellant to retire from service on the date he had attained the age of superannuation i.e. 01.04.2004 besides considering the release of the retirement benefits to him, treating the disciplinary proceedings abated as if no punishment was ever awarded to the appellant
Even otherwise, in terms of office memorandum dated 26.02.1976, it was incumbent upon the respondent-authority to notify the retirement of its officers to all concerned for recovery of dues from them, if any, and to facilitate the payment of pension and other dues to them
Appellant had served the Judiciary for a period of about 23-years
So in all fairness, when the pending disciplinary proceedings were abated and dismissal order was no more in the field, there was no justification in halting the retirement notification in favour of the appellant and withholding the payable pensionary benefits to him
Therefore, the inaction on the part of respondent-authority in that regard appeared to be totally unjustified and unwarranted
Thus, the impugned order dated 22.01.2022 was set aside being illegal and without lawful authority
Respondent-authority was directed to issue retirement notification of appellant and release the retirement benefits in his favour
Appeal was allowed, accordingly.
Brief facts were that the petitioner was the daughter of a deceased police constable who was receiving pension in his life time
Petitioner was a widow and claimed to be entitled to grant of family pension of her deceased father
Petitioner's mother/widow of deceased police official had also passed away who was also receiving pensionary benefits from pension of deceased police official
Held: Widowed or divorced daughters fell in the definition of family for the purpose of pension rules for life time or till re-marriage
The fact that the petitioner had been residing with her children in the house of her deceased husband could not be considered a disqualification for the grant of family pension as the same was allowable to her under the given circumstances
No such disqualification was mentioned in the applicable pension rules
When the law did not impose any restriction on availing the pension in such circumstances, no restriction could be introduced without the backing of any legal provision, as no one was above the law
Furthermore, the right to pension had a constitutional significance
It drew its strength from the right to life or the right to livelihood under Art. 9 of the Constitution
Petitioner made out a case warranting interference by the High Court and was declared entitled to the grant of family pension under the applicable rules
The respondents were directed to release her pension in accordance with rules, along with payment of arrears
Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.
Petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years retired from service on 21.08.2023 but the respondents withheld all the emoluments of the petitioner including pensionary benefits due to pending departmental proceedings against him
Validity
Pension was not a bounty or an ex-gratia payment but a right acquired in consideration of past services
Pension was a vested right and a legitimate expectation of a retiring civil servant, the same being a right conferred by law and it could not be arbitrarily abridged or reduced except in accordance with law
Fundamental Rule 54-A of Fundamental Rules made it absolutely clear that after the superannuation of the petitioner the disciplinary proceeding against him would abate
Since the petitioner had superannuated, thus the disciplinary proceedings against him had abated and as such the impugned letter was of no legal effect
Said rule also made it absolutely clear that once the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner had abated, the petitioner shall retire with full pensionary benefits
Employee could not be penalized for any action which was subject-matter of an inquiry which was not completed before his retirement
Rule 54-A of the Fundamental Rules of Service provided that on attaining the age of superannuation disciplinary proceedings which had not been completed, automatically abate and the civil servant was entitled to receive all pensionary benefits
High Court set aside the impugned letter holding that the subject inquiry against the petitioner as alluded to in the impugned letter had abated and that the petitioner was entitled to all pensionary benefits
Petition stood disposed of accordingly.
Plea of lack of funds to pay the pensionary/service benefits to the retired employees and their families taken by the respondents
Legality
Pension, like salary, is a regular source of livelihood and thus is protected by the right to life enshrined in and guaranteed by Art.9 of the Constitution
Right to life of a person/citizen shall include the right to livelihood and such right, therefore, cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority; pension is not a bounty from them i.e. individuals in authority, nor can its survival be at their mercy
Long and unjustified delay in payment of pensions has been a source of tremendous hardship and humiliation for retiring officials and their families
Despite strictures and orders passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its various pronouncements and simplified guidelines laid down by the Government, petitions on account of delay persist
Merely relying on lack of funds was not sufficient to deny the rights of the pensioners
Pension granted or continued to the pensioner was not liable to seizure by the department under Pension Act, 1871, and the rules framed thereunder
Government has no power to withhold gratuity, pension or any service benefits at any stage either before the proceeding or after the conclusion of the proceedings, if any
Petitioners had the qualifying length of service to their credit and they gave various reasons to claim the interest on the delayed payments on the premise that they stood retired from services in their respective years, however, in violation of law, they had been denied the pensionary benefits and in some of the cases arrears, which had triggered the cause and hardship to the petitioners to approach High Court
Pensionary benefits could not be stopped or withheld without assigning any cogent reason
High Court directed the Chief Secretary of Sindh to form a Committee to address and resolve pension and service benefits issues for petitioners, including recalculating any arrears and the committee must act according to the relevant Supreme Court ruling on the matter and ensure timely payments
Disciplinary action was also suggested against officials, who neglected these responsibilities
Constitution petition was disposed of accordingly.
Principle of access to justice, which flows from the constitutional scheme and has been recognized as a fundamental right, obliges courts and tribunals to adjudicate matters in substance rather than reject them on form
Where procedural lapses are curable and do not go to the root of jurisdiction, the interest of justice requires that litigants are afforded an opportunity to correct the record, especially in the absence of mala fides or deliberate concealment.
Denial of payment of commutation amounts (pensionary benefit) to retired employees of Pakistan Television Corporation (PTVC), challenge to
Entitlement
Pensionary benefits and entitlements
Fundamental right
Pensionary benefits equated to and are protected as part of right to life under Art. 9 of the Constitution
Right to pension and commutation, grant of
Significance and essence stated
The main issue in the present petition was withholding of commutation amounts (pensionary benefits) by Pakistan Television Corporation from its retired employees
The case revolved around whether the denial in releasing these commutation benefits (pensionary benefits) was lawful and sustainable, and whether such benefits formed part of the retired employees' constitutionally protected right to life and livelihood
Held: The petitioners, though employees of a Corporation, had performed public functions under the substantial administrative and financial control of the State, in such circumstances, the denial of commutation amount (pensionary benefit), by the respondent No.4 (Finance Division) on the pretext that PTVC employees were limited to CPF instead of GPF or statutory pension and by the respondents Nos.2 and 3 on the pretext of an ongoing financial crisis was also both arbitrary and unjust and it also amounted to unfair discrimination and violated the settled principles of fairness, equality, and legitimate expectation
Stance of the respondents created an unjustified distinction between employees of the Federal Government and those serving in State-owned entities
Such a classification, without reasonable and objective justification, offended the mandate of Art. 25 of the Constitution, which guaranteed equality before law and equal protection of law
Prima facie, the petitioners possessed the requisite qualifying service and were duly retired in accordance with the applicable rules
The right to receive pension and its allied benefits, including commutation, was not merely a statutory entitlement but formed part of the fundamental right to life as envisaged under Art.9 of the Constitution
A retired employee, upon superannuation, was ordinarily bereft of alternate sources of income and was wholly dependent on pension for sustenance, dignity, and survival
Pension, much like salary, constituted a continuous and legitimate source of livelihood
As such, it fell squarely within the protective ambit of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Art. 9 of the Constitution as right to life inherently encompassed the right to livelihood
Consequently, this right could not be subjected to the whims, discretion, or arbitrary inclinations of those in positions of authority
Public employment, and the benefits flowing therefrom, was not a charitable concession or bounty granted by the State or its functionaries, nor could its continuity be left to their mercy
Rather, it was a legally enforceable right, grounded in law, justice, and constitutional protections
Upon superannuation or retirement, the pensionary entitlements of an employee, including commutation, must be processed during service and disbursed promptly upon retirement, without any unwarranted delay
Consequently the right of commutation amount vested in favour of the petitioners, and they were entitled to its release
The respondents were directed to process the case of petitioners for grant of commutation amount according to law without any failure of time
However, the remaining relief, in respect of the prayer to restrain the respondents from utilizing the amount received from the encashment of NIT Units, was beyond the purview of the High Court's jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution, as the petitioners had an alternate efficacious remedy available under the Companies Ordinance 1984, having its own Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, therefore, this relief was declined
Present Constitutional petition was partially allowed, in circumstances.
Question was whether Rr. 2.2 and 2.3 of the relevant Pension Rules read with Art. 371-A of the Civil Service Regulation, the service rendered on contract basis/fixed pay could be counted towards regular service after completion of the service necessary for the purpose of pensionary benefits
Civil servant must have completed 10 years of regular service first?
In other words, temporary service couldn't be counted for the purpose of pensionary benefits
However, once the 10 years regular service completion was established, the temporary service, then, could be added up towards pension
Record showed that deceased employee rendered her service on contract basis from the year 2000 (initial appointment) till the 2014 (reappointment against a regular position)
Said employee couldn't render the qualifying 10 years service as a regular civil servant
Hence, her almost 14 years service on contract basis couldn't be counted for the purpose of her pension
In other words, had deceased employee been able to render regular service for the prescribed period of 10 years, her contract service would have been countable for the purpose of pension
Petition was accordingly dismissed.
Person who enters the Government /public service has also something to look forward to after his retirement viz. his retirement benefits; the grant of pension being the most valuable of such benefits
Pension is like a salary and is no longer a bounty or an ex-gratia payment , but isa right acquired after putting in satisfactory service for the prescribed minimum period
Right to pension has been conferred by law and cannot be arbitrarily abridged or reduced or refused except to the extent and in the manner provided in the relevant rules and it becomes the property of the retiring employee or civil / public servant as a matter of right upon the termination of his / her service
Pension, like salary, is a regular source of livelihood, and thus, is protected by the right to life enshrined in and guaranteed by the Art. 9 of the Constitution.
Fundamental rights are those rights which are recognized, provided and pledged by the State to its citizens regardless of their colour or creed and beliefs or believes
However, each fundamental right is attached to a corresponding responsibility i.e. the right to be recognized equally before the law implies the responsibility to abide by the laws.
Lawful profession was a fundamental right of every individual which had been guaranteed and safeguarded by the Constitution
Any individual could adopt any lawful profession or could carry on business.
Promalgation of Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules, 2015 by superseding Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules, 1980 without consultation with Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights Department
Effect
Consultation with Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights Department was mandatory as said department was meant for giving the legal structure to a document
Facility of allotment/transfer of accommodation to the serving son or daughter or spouse had been withdrawn in the Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules , 2015
Said Rules, were against the spirit of Arts.2-A, 9, & 38 of the Constitution
Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules , 2015 would affect the daily life of the civil servants
Facility of allotment of residential accommodation to the serving son/daughter/spouse of deceased civil servant was granted in the year 1992 which could not be rescinded after lapse of twenty three years without giving opportunity of hearing to the allottee of said cadre
No consultation as required under R.12(5) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Rules of Business, 1985 had been made prior to promulgation of Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules , 2015
Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules , 2015 were declared as un-constitutional, illegal, unlawful and against the fundamental rights of civil servants
Constitutional petition was accepted in circumstances.
Any law or act of public functionary violative of the constitutionally guaranteed Fundamental Rights was void.
Question of status of person should not be of significance in a petition qualifying the term 'probono publico' which would always be sustainable
Constitutional courts was guardian of 'fundamental rights'
State had failed to provide 'health care services' to its citizens
Constitutional petition was disposed of in the specified terms.
Contention of petitioner was that she had fulfilled all the formalities but authorities had not installed water supply meter at her house
Validity
Authorities were bound to supply/provide water to the petitioner when they were charging and collecting water tax from her
Cantonment Board was to ensure adequate and continuous water supply throughout the year not only to the petitioner but also to all the residents within its territorial jurisdiction in consideration of water tax paid by them
Cantonment Board might disentitle itself from charging, claiming or collecting water tax from the residents in case of failure to discharge its statutory duty and function with regard to supply of water
Cantonment Board, in the present case, had not, issued any notice to the petitioner to obtain water from a source of public water supply nor taken necessary steps in that behalf
Constitution had guaranteed fundamental rights to every citizen and also equal treatment vis-a-vis such rights
High Court observed that citizens who were already enjoying such Fundamental Rights should not be deprived of their rights nor such right be curtailed or restricted on the pretext of granting such rights to the new applicants/consumers
Authorities should ensure that permissions and approvals for fresh construction and new water connections were granted without disturbing, restricting or curtailing the rights of all those residents who were already enjoying such rights
Public functionaries should perform their functions and duties for safety, wellbeing and betterment of general public with prudence, vigilance and full responsibility
Question involved in the present case was of Fundamental Right to 'life' and human existence and enjoyment of amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country was entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally and constitutionally
Authorities had stated that they had arranged for additional water bowsers for the residents to whom water was not being supplied on regular basis in the water supply lines and five water bowsers per month would be issued to the residents who applied on line for the same
Constitutional petition was disposed of by High Court on such statement with the direction that Cantonment Board should file compliance report on monthly basis to the High Court and it should not charge water tax from those residents to whom water was not supplied or provided and it should display its said statement on Website and Notice Boards which should not be removed without permission of the Court.
Refusal to grant protective bail tantamount to denial of right to access to justice, which is fundamental to and an integral part of rule of law.
Claim of appellant was in consonance with law as his junior was promoted while he was ignored on the basis of adverse remarks recorded in his ACRs
Had such adverse remarks not been recorded in the ACRs, appellant would have been considered for promotion on the date when his junior was promoted
Claim of appellant to get himself promoted after the decision of Service Tribunal when his junior was promoted was his fundamental right
Proforma Promotion Committee was obliged to adjudge the case of appellant from the date when his junior was promoted after expunction of adverse remarks from his ACRs
Appellant became eligible to be considered for promotion by the Authority from the date when adverse remarks had precluded
Authority had incorrectly ignored the ACRs of the appellant which would amount to denying the relief granted by the Service Tribunal and upheld by the Supreme Court
Matter was remitted to the Authority with the direction to re-consider the case of the appellant as prayed for
Appeal was accepted in circumstances.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Ordinance (XLVII of 2002) [Since repealed], Ss. 5, 9 & Preamble
Constitution of Pakistan, Part II, Chap. 1 [Arts.8 to 28] & Arts. 199
Fundamental Rights
Service of Medical Teaching Institutions, protection of
Petitioner had contended that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015 was violative of the Fundamental Rights as enshrined in Part II, Chap.1 of the Constitution by promulgation of the Act autonomy of the Medical Institutions had been taken away and the control of the bureaucracy had been brought about, and that outsiders (being non-doctors) could not be assigned the task of management and administration of the Medical Institutions
Validity
Concept of assigning task to non-doctors to administer the Medical Institutions also existed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Ordinance (XLVII of 2002) [since repealed]
Profession and efficiency of a professional was one thing, whereas administration of the body was altogether different phenomenon
Objection that the government had taken control of the Institution was belied by the fact that three members of the Board being the nominees of the Government had not been given the right to vote
Decision making power had absolutely been vested in the private member belonging to the public at large
Administrative landscape had been broadened by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
Services of the employees had been protected by virtue of S. 16 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
Rights accrued to petitioner under the repealed Ordinance had not been affected by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
High Court observed that phrase 'till further orders' occurring in S. 16 (2) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015 appeared to be not compatible with cl.(2) and substituted cl.(3) of S. 16 of the Act, and the same being unreasonable and unjustified was liable to be omitted and deleted.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Ordinance (XLVII of 2002) [Since repealed], Ss. 5, 9 & Preamble
Constitution of Pakistan, Part II, Chap. 1 [Arts.8 to 28] & Art. 199
Fundamental Rights
Service of Medical Teaching Institutions, protection of
Petitioner had contended that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015 was violative of the Fundamental Rights as enshrined in Part II, Chap.1 of the Constitution by promulgation of the Act autonomy of the Medical Institutions had been taken away and the control of the bureaucracy had been brought about, and that outsiders (being non-doctors) could not be assigned the task of management and administration of the Medical Institutions
Validity
Concept of assigning task to non-doctors to administer the Medical Institutions also existed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Ordinance (XLVII of 2002) [since repealed]
Profession and efficiency of a professional was one thing, whereas administration of the body was altogether different phenomenon
Objection that the government had taken control of the Institution was belied by the fact that three members of the Board being the nominees of the Government had not been given the right to vote
Decision making power had absolutely been vested in the private member belonging to the public at large
Administrative landscape had been broadened by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
Services of the employees had been protected by virtue of S. 16 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
Rights accrued to petitioner under the repealed Ordinance had not been affected by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015
High Court observed that phrase 'till further orders' occurring in S. 16 (2) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act, 2015 appeared to be not compatible with cl.(2) and substituted cl.(3) of S. 16 of the Act, and the same being unreasonable and unjustified was liable to be omitted and deleted.
When Local Council was suspended, fresh election of the same should be held within a period of ninety days after expiry of period of suspension
Government could not suspend local bodies and appoint administrators for an indefinite period
Government was bound to make necessary arrangements for elections of Local Councils in the country to ensure that elections were conducted honestly, justly, fairly and without corrupt practices
Right to be governed by chooser representatives through free will of the member was constitutional reality
Life of representative of democracy could not be envisaged without freedom to exercise political choice, the right of choice of political leader and elect the government of his/her choice
Every person enrolled as voter on the electoral roll should have a right to vote
Right to vote was a fundamental right of every person
Holding of a free, fair and transparent Local Council elections was a command of law
Petitioner who was an advocate had filed present writ petition for enforcement of law, he was a state subject and presumed to be enrolled as a voter, hence he should have the right of vote
Petitioner, therefore, was an "aggrieved person"
Government was directed to appoint Election Commissioner (Local Bodies) for organization, conduct and supervision of local bodies elections and hold local bodies elections throughout the country within specified period
Writ petition was accepted in circumstances.
Contention of petitioners was that they were not willing for disinterment of grave of their daughter but respondents police officials were causing undue harassment to sign and thumb mark the application for disinterment of the same
Validity
Respondents-police officials were after the dignity of petitioners and they were not safe from their invasion and illegal intrusion
Constitution was the custodian of the sanctity of a person's rights which had guaranteed to protect dignity of man and privacy of home
Such dignity had also been valued by Islam
Not only dignity of deceased female was intruded but peace and tranquility of her family had also been disturbed
Court had to safeguard the Fundamental Rights of citizens without being biased in performance of its duties/dispensation of justice
Law or religion did not enforce anyone to do anything which he/she did not want to do
Respondents police officials were directed to remain within the four corners of law and not to cause undue harassment to the petitioners by exerting pressure to sign and thumb mark the application for disinterment of the grave of deceased against their wishes
Constitutional petition was disposed of.
Any perception of impartiality or bias, even if not a reality, would certainly prejudice the right to a free trial of accused
Confidence in the court; and assurance of a fair trial, was a prerequisite for the dispensation of justice; and pivotal for creating public confidence and trust in the judiciary
Independence of Judiciary, would entail, that the trial or adjudication was through courts, which were competent, independent and impartial
Duty of the courts to maintain said public confidence and independence, could only be achieved when it not only would ensure a fair trial, but also would create an environment and perception of a fair trial
Not only actual bias, but the perception of bias would also raise questions regarding the impartiality of the court and would prejudice a fair trial
Bias was the overriding factor for ascertaining a court's impartiality
Ques-tions regarding bias, could be raised, if the court would make it evident through its conduct, observation, opinions or other-wise that it had a stake in the proceedings
Bias would ultimately weigh while concluding the trial, raising questions about impartiality
Person was presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; and the guilt could be proved only on the touchstone of proof beyond a shadow of doubt
Right to a fair trial, and due process had been declared as the corner-stone of the administration of justice, in the sense that regardless of the nature of the allegations, every accused would be entitled to the process of law, and would be presumed innocent until proved guilty
Bias would vitiate the proceed-ings, if such circumstances were created by the court.
Right of citizen to travel abroad was a fundamental right guaranteed under Arts. 2A, 4, 9, 15 & 25 of the Constitution, and abridgement thereto was to be tested on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions.
"Fundamental Right", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124945683
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Fundamental Right"
P L D 1967 Lahore 1
SHER ALI AND 3 OTHERS-Petitioners Versus (1) DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MIANWALI,
Court:P L D 2015 Sindh 118
ZUBAIR AHMED KHASKHELI — Petitioner Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others — Respondents
Court: High CourtP L D 1960 Supreme Court (Pak
THE TRIBUNAL (DISTRICT MAGISTRATE), KARACHI-Appellant Versus HASHIM- Respondent
Court: Laws (Continuance in Force) Order (1 of 1958), Art. 4 (1) read with Art. 2 (7)-Enactments of date prior to 7th October 1958 (date of Proclamation) continue in full force, unaffected by any Fundamental Right formulated by Constitution of Pakistan (1956) (abrogated)-Karachi Control of Disorderly Persons Act (XXIX of 1952)-To operate irrespective of any conflict with Fundamental Rights granted by (abrogated) Constitution- Hashim v. Tribunal P L D 1959 Kar. 286 reversed. Held, that with effect from the 7th October 1958 when the Constitution including the Fundamental Rights was abrogated, all enactments of date prior to the 7th October 1958, are continued in full force according to their terms,' and irrespective of any conflict between their provisions, and the Fundamental Rights formulated in the late Constitution.P L D 1978 Lahore 1298
PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH ITS HOME SECRETARY, AND 3 OTHERS-Appellants Versus GULZAR HASSAN, ADVOCATE AND 8 OTHERS-Respondents
Court: -- Arts. 8, 143, 232(4), 233 & 268 read with Arts. 184(3) & 199, Part II, Chap. I and Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908), Ss. 16 & 17-A-Word "void"-Meaning and import-Laws inconsistent with Constitution-Do not die, neither still-born non est or nonexistent nor effaced or obliterated from statute book: Such law exists totally to be applicable to pre-Constitutional matters and also to those to whom Fundamental Rights afford no protection and may re-appear to be operative as soon as Fundamental Rights or supreme law cease to exist-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, continued in force under Art. 268-Fundamental Rights remain in existence during Proclamation of Emergency but no remedy available during such period in presence of an order under Art. 233(2)-Executive actions contemplated in Art. 233(1) necessarily concern future legislation and not any of void existing laws-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, inconsistent with Fundamental Right No. 17, void and so unenforceable and, therefore, not available for any executive action-Notifications issued under Ss. 16 and 17, Criminal Law Amendment Act Held, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.--Words and phrases-Interpretation of statutes.2024 Y L R 1961
Judicial Activism Panel — Petitioner Versus Government of Pakistan and others — Respondents
Court: LahoreP L D 1968 Lahore 1244
ABDUL GHANI KHAN‑Petitioner Versus GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND OTHERS Respondents
Court: (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1962)----Art. 30 (1), (9) & (10) as recast by Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act (XVII of 1965)‑President's power to suspend right to move Courts under sub‑Art. (10) during Proclamation of Emergency under sub‑Art. (I)‑ Contention that President could issue order suspending right to move Courts for enforcement of such rights only which are mentioned in sub‑Art. (9)‑Held: Sub‑Art. (10) not subject to sub‑Art. (9) President, during Proclamation of Emergency, empowered under sub‑Art. (10) to declare suspension of right to move Courts for enforcement of any Fundamental Right‑Order can be made about "such of Fundamental Rights as maybe specified in order" leaving it to good judgment and choice of President as to about which specified rights he would declare remedies of enforce ment as barred.2010 C L D 1765
AF INDUSTRIES through Proprietor and 2 others — Appellants Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Law and 7 others — Respondents
Court: LahorePLD 2007 Supreme Court 642
PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, M.N.A. and others — Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others — Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan1971 S C M R 83
SAEED AHMAD KHAN alias SHENO AND OTHERS — Petitioners Versus THE STATE AND OTHERS‑Respondents
Court: High CourtP L D 2008 Supreme Court 30
JAMAT-E-ISLAMI through AMIR and others — Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan