Suit for recovery of damages

Application of the petitioner, filed after closure of evidence, for sending the video for forensic report/expert opinion regarding its originality was dismissed by the Trial Court

Validity

By now, it is possible with the advancement of science and technology to get a forensic examination, audit or test conducted through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether a video or tape is genuine or not and such examination, audit or test can also reasonably establish, if such video has been edited, doctored or tampered with or not

Any party could make a request for forensic examination of an audio tape or video through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether the audio tape or video is genuine or not through moving a proper application to the concerned court

Trial Court had totally overlooked the fact that the petitioner was seeking expert opinion of the video regarding its originality or otherwise and production of additional evidence in light thereof

Trial Court also failed to appreciate that by virtue of O. XVIII, R. 17, C.P.C., the additional evidence could be allowed at any stage

Even if one or the other party had failed to produce all the material documents and/or failed to request for proper examination of the disputed documents/ signatures/video, the court had ample power to do the needful so as to advance justice rather than injustice

Trial was at the verge of conclusion, but in order to ascertain as to whether the video in question was genuine or not, there was no harm, even at such stage, to accept the request of the petitioner qua sending the video for forensic report regarding its originality and genuineness in the larger interest of the justice

Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances, while accepting the application of the petitioner for sending video for forensic report/expert opinion.

Appellant was twicely placed ex-parte, however, first order was set aside on his request by the Trial Court and subsequently, when he once again absented himself from the proceedings, he was proceeded against ex-parte and finally after recording of evidence of the respondent-University, ex-parte decree was passed

Contents of the application qua setting aside the ex-parte decree showed that the same were flimsy, bald and unsubstantiated

It was the duty of the appellant to have satisfied the court qua his non-appearance and diligence in pursuing his case by forwarding reasonable and justifiable grounds for his absence, however, he failed to do so, thus, the Trial Court had rightly dismissed the application of the appellant for setting aside the ex-parte decree passed against him for recovery of damages

Regular First Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellants/plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 (mother and daughter) were passengers on the bus, while the remaining appellants/ plaintiffs were immediate family members affected indirectly by the consequences of the accident

As a result of the accident, appellant/ plaintiff No. 1 was rendered permanently disabled, causing physical, emotional, and financial distress to the family

The primary claim was that the bus was mechanically unfit and unstable from the start of the journey, whereas, defendant company contended that the accident occurred due to a fault of another vehicle which suddenly changed lanes, forcing the bus driver to swerve, resulting in a rollover

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, awarding Rs. 140,000 to plaintiff No. 1 and Rs. 40,000 to plaintiff No. 2

Dissatisfied from the Trial Court's decision, the appellants/plaintiffs filed the present appeal

Held: Considering that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 'the thing speaks for itself' only supplied an inference and not a conclusive presumption and since the defendants through their evidence were able to cast doubts by denying the claim of the appellants, the appellants/ plaintiffs were required to produce some expert evidence to bridge the gap but none was produced

The evidence brought by the defendants remained unchallenged

Since the appellants/plaintiffs had opted to take a specific position that occurrence was due to bus's mechanical and fitness failure, therefore, they had to prove it by producing some evidence but they failed to do so

It was clear that in the present case doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not attracted and normal rule of evidence prevailed, therefore, the onus of proving negligence on part of the defendant was on the appellants/plaintiffs, particularly when the defendant had unrooted the prima facie presumption by producing bus driver, bus hostess and workshop in-charge, since it was appellant/ plaintiffs' position that the accident occurred due to fault in the bus

Neither the appellants/plaintiffs sought to rely on the record of maintenance and fitness of the vehicle in issue nor they sought to produce any such record or evidence through process of the court in terms of O. VII, R. 14, read with O. XVI, Rr. 1 & 2 of the C.P.C.

Had the appellants/plaintiffs applied for expert [advice or evidence] for the inspection of the bus or sought appointment of any expert and the response the respondent/defendant company had opposed such prayer, there would have been some inference in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs

Although it was proved that appellant/plaintiff No.1 had sustained injuries, she was bedridden for life and her family members might be facing trauma and emotional stress for life, however, it was not proved that those had occurred due to direct negligence by the respondent/defendant company

There was nothing on record which could have established that the bus carrying the appellants/plaintiffs had any mechanical fault, which fault was then instrumental for causing the accident

Appeal being without merit was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondent/plaintiff was employee of appellant/Company who sought recovery of general and special damages early retirement from service on the plea of being penalized wrongly

Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent/plaintiff

Validity

Respondent/plaintiff need not have led any special evidence to quantify damages in lieu of pain and suffering as they were damages that could not be quantified by reducing them to a financial number

Damages in lieu of pain and suffering fall within the category of general damages

Once respondent/ plaintiff established through evidence wrongful conduct of appellant/ company that would naturally have caused pain and suffering

It was for Court to determine quantum of damages that would be compensatory in nature and satisfy conscience of Court that respondent/plaintiff as claimant had been duly compensated for bearing such pain, suffering and agony inflicted on him

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court

High Court directed appellant/company to pay interest on decretal amount from the date of judgment until the day when such amount was paid by appellant/ company to respondent/plaintiff

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondents published a false speech/report in a Daily Newspaper, which caused harm to the reputation, dignity, honor and business of plaintiffs

Plaintiffs claimed damages, and Trial Court decreed the suit

Validity

Under Defamation Ordinance 2002, the power vests only in the District Court

Section 13 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, prescribes the remedy before District Court

Said section has no ouster clause regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit for defamation

Civil Court being Court of ultimate jurisdiction could be invoked in all civil matters unless its jurisdiction was expressly or impliedly barred by statute

Appellate Court ignored such aspect of the case while passing the impugned judgment

Petition was dismissed accordingly.

Objection under S. 79, C.P.C., was raised in its memorandum of appeal, nonetheless, Lower Appellate Court overlooked the objection

Pure question of law which can be decided without any evidence can be raised at any stage of proceedings

By ignoring mandatory statutory provisions, subordinate Court committed material illegality and irregularity which went to the root of the suit

High Court set aside judgments passed by two Courts below and remanded the matter to Trial Court for trial afresh after impleading Federal Government as party in accordance with the provisions of S. 79 read with O. XXVII, C.P.C. and Art. 174 of the Constitution

High Court directed the office to issue relevant certificate to petitioner / government for return of court fee stamps as per S. 13 of Court Fees Act, 1870

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9 [as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab) (Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018)], O. VII, R. 10

Suit for recovery of damages

Intellectual property

Copyrights

Jurisdiction of Courts

Principle

Special and general laws

Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs for recovery of damages was returned by Trial Court to be filed before competent forum

Lower Appellate Court on appeal filed by respondents/plaintiffs remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh

Validity

Court which is specialized and exclusive on a particular subject would be more equipped and focused to deal with special subject which may involve interpretation of specialized legal terms and concepts, as compared to an ordinary Court of civil jurisdiction

Such stance also finds its support from the latest amendment regarding jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and as per Province of Punjab Amendment brought in S. 9, C.P.C. [as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab) (Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018), dated 20.3.2018]

jurisdiction of Courts provided in the C.P.C. is barred where a general or special law is in force

Respondents/plaintiffs could not insist to pursue their claim before Civil Court

Term "Intellectual Property Laws" was defined in S. 2(h) of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, to mean laws specified in its Schedule

Provision of Entry 2 of Schedule to Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, duly mentioned "Copyright Ordinance, 1962"

Where Legislature created a Special Court that would deal with all matters relating to Intellectual Property Laws including matters relating to intellectual property rights along with matters concerned therewith or incidental thereto notwithstanding that suit involved other non-IP related matters

High Court set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court and plaint of respondents/plaintiff would stand returned for its presentation before concerned Intellectual Property Tribunal

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Defamation of respondent and his son in the form of libel by publishing serious malicious allegations on Facebook and TV News Channel causing harm to their reputation, dignity and honour in the society and respondent's department

Admission on part of the appellants as to libel

Lack of counter evidence in support of defamatory acts

Effect

Contention of the appellants was that suit had been filed by respondent as a counterblast of a decree for recovery of dowry articles in favour of the appellants

Validity

Contents of the statement or interview that was subsequently broadcast on a news channel and posted on a social media account (specifically, a Facebook ID), was deemed sufficient to prove defamation

Defamatory substance had not been refuted by the opposing party

Actions of the appellants constituted an actionable wrong under the Ordinance, 2002

Violation of the Ordinance had been proved especially when the appellants had failed to present any defence plea stipulated in S.5 of the Ordinance, therefore, no formal or additional proof of the defamatory material was required

Appellants did not identify any discrepancies in the record

Upon the establishment of libel, the presumption of injury or damage to one's reputation and goodwill was an axiom of jurisprudence, now codified within S.4 of Ordinance

Once defamation is substantiated, the law invariably infers detriment, injury and diminution to the reputation, goodwill or standing of an individual, their profession, or products, as applicable

High Court dismissed the appeal accordingly.

Appellant/Provincial Government was aggrieved of compensation awarded to respondents/legal heirs of deceased who lost his life in a road accident

Plea raised by appellant / Provincial Government was that personal expenses of deceased were not deducted from the amount of damages and markup was to be given from date of decree

Validity

No accurate breakup in respect of amount of compensation / damages claimed can either be worked out or calculated but it is always a guess work, which is based upon a number of facts which include age of deceased, amount earned by him at the time of his death, his life expectancy, number of persons of whom he was the bread earner, etc.

Such working is always a guess work based on the facts of each case

Deceased was only 26 years of age at the time of his death and it was assumed that had he not died, he would have lived upto 72 years and thereafter keeping in view such factors compensation was worked out

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Discharge of original contract under S. 62 of Contract Act, 1872, was only to the extent it was novated, rescinded or altered

Such novated contract did not override intention of parties to novate original contract only partially

Original contract to the extent it was not novated or altered remained binding and operative

For novation excusing performance of previous agreements, it first needed to be established that parties agreed to substitute new contract wholly for the earlier one but it could not be so if accrued obligations under previous contract were kept alive in express terms despite new contract, all the more so where new contract was occasioned due to breach of first contract and injured party included a term in new contract that its claims under the old contract would remain alive

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as novation did not excuse performance of accrued obligations under previous settlement agreements

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Discharge of original contract under S. 62 of Contract Act, 1872, was only to the extent it was novated, rescinded or altered

Such novated contract did not override intention of parties to novate original contract only partially

Original contract to the extent it was not novated or altered remained binding and operative

For novation excusing performance of previous agreements, it first needed to be established that parties agreed to substitute new contract wholly for the earlier one but it could not be so if accrued obligations under previous contract were kept alive in express terms despite new contract, all the more so where new contract was occasioned due to breach of first contract and injured party included a term in new contract that its claims under the old contract would remain alive

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as novation did not excuse performance of accrued obligations under previous settlement agreements

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Distinguishing feature between a 'right to sue' that survives death and one that does not is whether the right was a personal right of action

Right immediately connected with individuality of deceased does not survive

Personal right of action arising from tort cannot be distinguished from such right arising out of contract and/or under statute for the purpose of surviving death

Liability of carrier in the event of wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by passenger pursuant to R. 17 of Chapt. III contained in the First Sched. to Carriage by Air Act, 2012, is a personal right connected with the passenger and as such dies with such passenger

If death occurs after conclusion of hearing but before pronouncement of judgment, it may be pronounced irrespective of whether cause of action survives or not

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Trial Court struck out defence of petitioner/defendant as he failed to file answers to interrogatories despite having been given many opportunities in that regard

Validity

Petitioner/defendant failed to file objections on the interrogatories within the period stipulated in O. XI, R. 7, C.P.C, therefore, Trial Court rightly overruled the objections filed by him

Court had the jurisdiction to regulate trial proceedings of a case, in order to eliminate abuse of process of law by adhering to all fairness in trial proceeding

Trial Court should always endeavor to conclude trial within reasonable span of time

Petitioner/defendant was granted ample opportunities but he failed to file answers and any grant of further opportunity would be an express abuse of process of law and same was not permissible

Trial Court was empowered to non-suit a plaintiff for any default on its part and there was no reason to oblige petitioner/defendant with numerous opportunities of adjournments on one pretext or the other without any justiciable reason causing unreasonable delay in deciding the lis

Courts have inherent powers to curb unnecessary delay for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of law

Trial Court while invoking provision under O. XI, R. 21, C.P.C. rightly struck out right of defence of petitioner/ defendant

High Court declined to interfere in the order of striking out of defence as petitioner/defendant did not point out any illegality or material irregularity in the orders passed by Trial Court and also not identified any jurisdictional defect

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of a suit for damages on the ground of loss of reputation and defamation was expressly barred by S. 13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002

Exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon District Court to adjudicate upon such matters

Special law excluded general law and where special tribunal or Court was established to hear and decide a dispute, which was contemplated by the special law, then jurisdiction of Courts constituted under general law were ousted from exercising powers of same nature

Plaintiff might have a good case of malicious prosecution as he claimed to have been acquitted of the charge after full-fledged trial in FIR lodged under S. 39 of Electricity Act, 1910 by Trial Court and appeal against acquittal was dismissed by High Court

Plaintiff did not possess any authorization on behalf of the Hotel to sue defendants for damages and compensation

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Suit was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs sought recovery of damages for the death of their predecessor-in-interest caused due to rash and negligent driving of a vehicle driven and owned by defendants

Validity

Factum of death of predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs was admitted fact

Liability of such gross wrongful act fell on defendants

Claim of damages was maintainable under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855

Deceased was 52 years old man, his nature of business was business of "dates" and simultaneously indulging in business of import/export of "dates"

Longevity in family of deceased had established life expectancy of 75 years

Deceased could also have lived for another 23 years approximately, therefore, the claim of awarding damages of Rupees 1,25,00,000/- was justifiable and the same was granted

Suit was decree accordingly.

Plaintiff claimed his right under S.3(1)(g) of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, which spoke about "any claim for loss or damage to goods carried in a ship"

Plaintiff sought damages for alleged act of defendant who reneged from contract of sale

No such agreement existed between parties nor was proved

Claim of plaintiff did not arise out of any condition provided in S.3(2) of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980

Plaintiff had no claim of nature provided in S.3(2) of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, upon or against defendant vessel

Claim of plaintiff was that it suffered damages on account of agreement made by it for selling defendant vessel to plaintiff but had failed in their obligations and to honor their contract, resulting in selling of vessel to some other party

Such damages were not covered in provisions under S.3(2) of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, and could not be enforced in rem against defendant ship

High Court declined to pass any decree in favour of plaintiff and against defendants

Plaint was rejected, in circumstances.

Lower Appellate Court was drawing presumption of 'malice' from report of police officer filed under S.173, Cr.P.C. without even examining maker of the report to unearth as to the reason of discharge and that how investigating officer found respondent/plaintiff innocent during 'face to face' discussion (??????? ?????)

Important for respondent/plaintiff to provide possible evidence to prove entire ingredients of 'malicious prosecution' and it was duty of Trial Court to secure all possible evidence as to the elements of 'malicious prosecution' before reaching to finding and allowing damages

Finding of 'malice' on the basis of report under S.173, Cr.P.C., without examining maker of statement/report was unsafe

High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and remanded the matter for decision afresh after procuring evidence of concerned police officials and careful examination as to the ingredients of 'malicious prosecution'

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Respondent/plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase customized car from appellant/company who failed to provide the same within due course of time

Trial Court and allowed interim relief to respondent/plaintiff

Plea raised by appellant/company was that where compensation and damages were sought in alternative, specific performance could not be ordered

Validity

Party claiming repudiation by counter party could not have its cake and eat it too

Appellant/company prima facie did not rescind the contract, which remained in field and had bound both parties i.e. appellant and respondent

Matter related to customized vehicle ordered by respondent/plaintiff and model of vehicle was not in production any more

No infirmity was noticed in order in question and Trial Court had rightly reasoned that respondent/plaintiff had made a prima facie case as vehicle was specially customized therefore, monetary compensation in lieu of it was not adequate compensation

Appellant/company was holding substantial amount of deposit from one customer, while refusing to refund it or process termination of the order in face of delays in delivery and then selling that vehicle to another customer at a much higher price and accepting his deposit as well, while dispute with first customer had already matured, such was not the kind of behaviour that seemed endearing from the perspective of equity

High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Trial Court and imposed cost upon appellant/company

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plaintiff sought recovery of damages on the plea that he was wrongly made to face inquiry before NAB where he had to enter into voluntary return

Suit and appeal were concurrently dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Factum of conviction or acquittal had no concern with the matter when plaintiff applied under S.25 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Plaintiff accepted allegations so levelled against him and inquiry/investigation was completed against him

Allegations were levelled against plaintiff and he submitted application under S.25 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in concurrent findings against plaintiff, as the same were not suffering from misreading and non-reading of evidence, nor there was any jurisdictional defect or infirmity in judgment of Courts below

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Trial Court after framing of issues rejected plaint summarily without recording of evidence on the plea that plaintiff did not face prosecution

Validity

Principle governing such type of circumstances was that where issues were framed, parties must be allowed to lead evidence and plaint could not be summarily rejected

Trial Court did not take such principle into account and without recording evidence granted application stating its finding on preliminary issues and rejected the plaint under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Such judgment and decree passed by Trial Court was not outcome of fair trial as neither justice was done nor it seemed to have been done

High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and remanded same for decision afresh on merits after recording of evidence on issues already framed

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs sought recovery of damages caused to cargo during terrorist attack at Karachi airport which cargo was then in the custody of defendants

Defendants sought rejection of plaint on the plea that it was an act of war/armed conflict and suit was barred by time

Validity

Attack at Karachi airport could only be termed as a terrorist attack but was rather part of a wider armed conflict within the state of Pakistan

Attackers were personnel of a proscribed organized group engaged in series of hostilities ranging from suicide bombings at public places to organized attacks on armed forces of Pakistan, defence installations and even religious places

As per official figures thousands of civilians and service men lost their lives

Protection given to carriers in R.18(2) of Fourth Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 2012, was applicable to undisputed facts

Term 'War' and 'Armed Conflict' as included in R.18(2) of Fourth Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 2012, included Non-International Armed Conflict

Different facilities at Karachi airport including warehouses of defendants were destroyed as a result of intense fighting between terrorists and law enforcement officials, which was a result of Non-International Armed Conflict

Defendants were not liable to pay any amount or compensation as claimed by plaintiffs

Benefit of R.18(2) of Fourth Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 2012, relating to exclusion of liability was extendable even in Non-International Armed Conflict

Suit was adversely affected by R.18(2) of Fourth Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 2012

Plaint was rejected, in circumstances.

Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of damages against defendant on allegations of frivolous, fictitious and vexatious litigation and also malicious prosecution

Trial Court declined to reject plaint

Validity

Provisions of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. contemplated that only statements in plaint were to be looked into for limited purposes which needed to be treated as true and if on perusal thereof, plaint did not disclose cause of action, plaint could be rejected

Examination of plaint disclosed that defendant had raised serious allegations against plaintiff

Plaint also showed that defendant was involved in number of civil and criminal litigation of fictitious and malicious character which prosecution was deliberate, intentional and malicious as also without probable cause and in view thereof, it could not be assumed that on the face of it, plaint did not disclose any cause of action or called for an outright order of rejection

High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court as plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. was premature and unwarranted at the stage it was filed

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Such claim was dependent upon existence or otherwise of such finance/loan therefore, within meaning of S. 4 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance) Act, 1997, jurisdiction of ordinary civil court was barred

Ordinary civil court had no jurisdiction to try suit as jurisdiction lay exclusively with Banking Court

High Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by both courts below and suit filed by plaintiff was deemed to be pending before Trial Court

High Court directed Trial Court to return plaint under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. for want of jurisdiction for presenting same before Banking Court having jurisdiction as per law

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Any party who claims damages on account of breach of contract is required under law to establish contract, breach thereof and extent of damages put forward/claimed in a suit for damages.

Although claim of plaintiff was settled as full-and-final settlement at time of winding-up of company, yet he filed suit for damages and recovery of money against ex-Directors

Single Judge of High Court dismissed suit on basis of evidence recorded during trial

Validity

Defendants were natural persons and ex-Directors of company in question who could not be treated as same persons like a company

Any legal person though discharged its functions through its Directors, Managers, Agents, Representatives but still two were distinct and never merged into each other rather both remained to continue and retain their respective independent identities and separate personalities

Filing of suit against ex-Directors was not only misconceived but also misleading

Defendants upon passing of winding-up orders ceased to be Directors/divested of all powers to act on behalf of company under liquidation

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Single Judge as same was correct and in accordance with law

Intra court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiffs sought recovery of damages from Airline company on allegations of wilful misconduct, carelessness and negligence

Validity

Onus to prove, non-existence of liability, specially caused on account of accident not having been denied, in presence of language of R. 20 of Sched. II of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 and Art. 122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, concept of no-fault liability rested with Airline

Under Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966, claimant only had to bring up his/their case and onus of proof in that regard rested with Airline to disprove same

Same would be to extent and what was within prescribed limit of 250,000 Francs as provided in S. 22 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 where applicable as well as under S. 25 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 for an ultimate loss, if Airline was not able to prove anything in adversity

Special law did not provide availability to Airline to contest and challenge claim other than as provided under Rule 20 of Sched. II of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 which stand defendant had not preferred to take for obvious reasons

Relaxation of limit as provided under S. 25 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 was also found available as Airline had neither come up with its own version of accident nor report of Civil Aviation Authority was challenged

Suit was decreed accordingly.

Defendant was employee of plaintiff attended a foreign course against an indemnity bond to serve plaintiff for at least 3 years

Defendant after completing course abroad, served plaintiff only for 8 months and then left the job

Suit filed by plaintiff was concurrently decreed in his favour by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Plaintiff examined only one witness who was not signatory of indemnity bond

Plaintiff neither examined any witness nor produced any documentary evidence to establish that plaintiff suffered any loss due to act of leaving of company by defendant before agreed period

Both courts below had only referred to indemnity bond and suit was decreed whereas other conditions available in bond were not considered

High Court declined to allow such approach of courts below

In absence of establishing loss actually suffered by indemnity-holder, claim of plaintiff, legally, could not be accepted for decreeing merely for reason that there had been a document under title of indemnity bond

Failure of plaintiff in establishing actual loss suffered by him, suit could not be decreed in favour of plaintiff

High Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by two courts below and dismissed the suit

Second appeal was allowed in circumstances.

If plaintiff noticed that he had left out some aspect for which he had not claimed damages in the earlier suit then present suit was barred under O. II, R. 2, C.P.C.

Court was bound to decide the applicability of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. by perusal of plaint only

Courts below had dismissed application for rejection of plaint without keeping in view the relevant provisions of law

Plaint was liable to be rejected in circumstances

Impugned orders were set aside and plaint was rejected

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Revision was filed within time which was entertained but was returned when it was fixed for final argument being beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court

Validity

District Judge was contributory to the delay for presentation of revision before High Court; had he objected at the very first point of time while realizing that Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, revision might have been filed within time before the High Court

Suit was instituted by the plaintiffs without fixation of court-fee on the plaint

Suit was not competent to be proceeded any further without fixation of court-fee

Suit was adjourned in routine without specifically requiring the filing of written statement and delivery of copy of plaint

Only four days time was provided to the defendant to file written statement which was not sufficient

Trial Court while delivering copy of plaint had not specifically required to do the needful

Period of ten months was allowed to the plaintiffs to furnish court fee to make their suit competent

One chance was to be afforded to the defendant to submit written statement

Law favoured adjudication on merits

Impugned order was set aside subject to payment of costs of Rs. 15,000/

Trial Court was directed to proceed with the suit from the stage when defence was struck off

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Plaintiff sought damages with reference to an earlier tender, if any, which he himself substituted with the fresh tender

Plaintiff opted not to sue for alleged breach and supplied the items under fresh tender at reduced price

Effect

Plaintiff, in circumstances, waived his right to object the breach, if any

Plaintiff though failed to prove any of the two tenders being sufficient to hold him entitled for damages, however, plaintiff also took the plea of hardship and mental agony but no details were furnished about the loss suffered/damages sustained by him at the hands of the defendant

Plaintiff did not give kind of loss/damages that he sustained "special" or "general damages" at the hands of defendant

Plaintiff did not examine any doctor in support of his plea that after causing of loss he became ill and got treated himself by any doctor

Plaintiff claimed loss as well as damages in lump-sum without giving details as well as reasons for the same

Failure of plaintiff to discharge his burden resulted in declining what could have been declared as a 'right' on successful discharge of burden

Plaintiff failed to prove his case against the defendant

Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of rupees one crore as damages under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 claiming that he belonged to respectable religious family with large number of devotees, and that defendants, in their weekly magazine with wide circulation, had published scandalous news with contemptuous title, which had seriously damaged dignity and reputation of his family and caused mental agony and torture

Trial Court decreed the suit to extent of rupees five hundred thousand

Defendant took plea that he was just owner of said magazine and the news had been published by reporter of magazine, and that apology had already been published in the said magazine

Validity

Fact that defamatory and scandalous news was published in weekly magazine owned by defendants and subsequently apology was also published, was not denied by defendants

Defendants could not provide any material to show whether they had probed into or conducted any investigation regarding material against plaintiff to meet requirements and parameters of ideal journalism

Such illegality and wilful negligence on part of defendants, which was both against law and unwritten norms, values and conventions of fair reporting, could not be overlooked and left unattended

Defendants had published material against respondent without establishing its veracity, which was extreme example of yellow and irresponsible journalism

Suits filed against defendants by other persons affected by same news had also been decreed

Record showed that defendants were habitual of publishing such type of defamatory and scandalous news items against different people in order to extract money

Trial Court had rightly concluded that present suit was to be dealt with under provisions of Defamation Ordinance, 2002

Apology published by defendants was insufficient and same was, therefore, not acceptable in law, as same could not restore dignity and honour of plaintiff's family

News published by defendants was highly defamatory and scandalous

If plaintiff had filed cross-appeal, quantum of damages awarded by Trial Court would have been much higher

Judgment and decree of Trial Court was maintained

Appeal was dismissed in circumstance.

Law permitted that any party to suit could submit documentary evidence not mentioned in the list of documents at time of institution of suit subject to condition of showing 'good cause'

'Good cause' for placing documents could be interpreted as documents in absence of which no effective decree could be passed

Plaintiff instituted his case by referring documents relating to defendant, therefore, if those documents referred in plaint were not allowed to be produced by defendant, it would not be possible to pass an effective and executable decree

Documents could be brought on record at any stage subject to showing good cause and good cause was to be decided by court by giving reasons

When evidence was yet to be completed, parties must be given maximum opportunity to place on record material pertaining to case

Trial Court after careful appreciation of record had rightly allowed the application

Revision petition was dismissed being devoid of illegality or jurisdictional effect.

Contention of plaintiff-employee was that defendant-company had caused financial loss to him by terminating his service contract illegally

Validity

Plaintiff-employee was bound to establish additional assurance or representations made to him by the defendant-company

Nothing was on record apart from the terms and conditions of appointment of plaintiff-employee

Nothing was on record that termination from service had resulted into breach of any assurance or promise

Principle of master and servant was involved in the present case

Only remedy for the plaintiff-employee was to file suit for damages in circumstances

Plaintiff-employee could not ask for restitution of his service in circumstances

Burden to prove his entitlement to the reliefs on the grounds as stated in the plaint was on the plaintiff-employee

Any compensation or damages could not be awarded to the plaintiff-employee for a loss or damage which had been sustained by him indirectly by reason of breach of contract

Plaintiff-employee was bound to show that defendant's action of terminating his service was against the terms and conditions of contract

Plaintiff and defendant were in equal position to choose to terminate service by giving a 30 days written notice in advance or making the payment in lieu thereof

Defendant-company was within the domain to terminate service of plaintiff-employee by resorting to scheme of appointment letter

Defendant-company had not committed any breach of contract in circumstances

Thirty days period contained in the appointment letter was too short for a person to find out a new job in the private sector

Period of 120 days was reasonable within which a person could secure a new job of the same stature in the private sector

Plaintiff-employee was entitled to either 120 days written notice in advance or payment in lieu thereof

Plaintiff-employee had received 30 days salary in lieu of the stipulated notice and other emoluments and deductions

Plaintiff-employee was directed to be paid the salary of remaining 90 days and other emoluments as per his entitlement

Suit was partly decreed accordingly.

Contention of defendants was that deceased died due to an accident in the factory and a reference was pending adjudication before the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation and jurisdiction of civil court had been barred to settle, decide or deal with any question which was by or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 required to be settled, decided or dealt with by Commissioner or to enforce any liability

Validity

Suit for recovery of damages had been filed on the ground of composite negligence on the part of defendants under the law of tort

Objective of law of tort was to compensate the plaintiffs for the harm which they suffered

Case of plaintiffs was not with regard to any "compensation" so bar of jurisdiction of civil court contained in S.19 of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was not applicable in the present case

Action under law of tort was different and distinct from the statutory liability of an employer to pay the compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Suit of plaintiffs was maintainable in circumstances

Application for rejection of plaint was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff, a private limited company, filed suit for damages on ground that defendants, foreign companies, had failed to fulfill their part of undertaking as agreed upon through a Letter of Intent, which had resulted in huge loss, and other defendants, being franchise holders, represented said foreign companies in Pakistan

Defendants, foreign companies, on application under O. XII, R. 2, C.P.C. filed by plaintiff, had admitted all documents annexed with the plaint, including receipt of amount of money as part of payment of the franchise agreement; on which, plaintiff filed application under O. XV, R. 1 read with S. 151, C.P.C. for preliminary decree on basis of said admission seeking deposit of the admitted amount in court, which was dismissed by Trial Court

Defendants took plea that the amount paid by plaintiff was non-refundable

Validity

Present suit had already been summarily dismissed against defendants, the franchise holders, by Trial Court under O. I, R. 10, C.P.C.

Defendants, in their reply to present application for preliminary decree, had shown their willingness to refund the disputed amount but with condition that plaintiff would withdraw the suit

Defendants, had no assets in Pakistan, and in case, decree was passed, plaintiff would not be able to get the decree executed against the defendants

Franchise fee being received by the defendants from other defendants, franchise holders, were not ascertainable

Defendants, having been incorporated out of Pakistan, should deposited the amount in court, which would be regulated as per terms of decree

High Court, setting aside order of Trial Court, directed defendants to deposit the amount in dispute with Trial Court

Revision petition was allowed in circumstances.

Plaintiff filed suit for damages against defendants, foreign companies, and the other defendants, who were franchise holder of said companies, for loss caused due to violation of Letter of Intent

Trial Court, while declining applications of plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction and attachment of franchise fee, deleted names of defendants, franchise holders, from the suit; revisional court maintained the order of Trial Court

Plaintiff contended that defendants, foreign companies, were doing business abroad and were not maintaining assets in Pakistan, except the franchise fee payable by defendants (franchise holders) which, be attached till pendency of the suit to make recovery of damages possible in case decree was passed

Validity

Names of defendants, franchise holder, had already been deleted from array of defendants; thus, case of plaintiff to the extent of attachment of franchise fee before judgment could not proceed

Plaintiff had claimed damages only against defendants, foreign companies

Plaintiff, in case a decree was passed, might file application for execution of decree

Suit having not been decreed restraining order could not be passed on probability

Appeal against order was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff filed suit for damages against defendants, foreign companies, and the other defendants, who were franchise holder of said companies, for loss caused due to violation of Letter of Intent

Trial Court, while declining applications of plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction and attachment of franchise fee, deleted names of defendants, franchise holders, from the suit; revisional court maintained the order of Trial Court

Plaintiff contended that defendants, foreign companies, were doing business abroad and were not maintaining assets in Pakistan, except the franchise fee payable by defendants (franchise holders) which be attached till pendency of the suit to make recovery of damages possible in case decree was passed

Validity

Names of defendants, franchise holders, had already been deleted from array of defendants; thus, case of plaintiff to the extent of attachment of franchise fee before judgment could not proceed

Plaintiff had claimed damages only against defendants, foreign companies

Plaintiff, in case a decree was passed, might file application for execution of decree for attachment or execution of decree against the franchise fee

Restraining order, as the suit had not been decreed so far, could also not be passed on probability

Appeal against order was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff, a private limited company, filed suit for damages on ground that defendants, foreign companies, had failed to fulfill their part of undertaking as agreed upon through a Letter of Intent, which had resulted in huge loss, and other defendants, being franchise holders, represented said foreign companies in Pakistan

Defendants, foreign companies, on application under O.XII, R.2, C.P.C. filed by plaintiff, had admitted all documents annexed with the plaint, including receipt of amount of money as part of payment of the franchise agreement; on which, plaintiff filed application under O.XV, R.1 read with S.151, C.P.C. for preliminary decree on basis of said admission seeking deposit of the admitted amount in court, which was dismissed by trial court

Defendants took plea that the amount paid by plaintiff was non-refundable

Validity

Present suit had already been summarily dismissed against defendants, the franchise holders, by trial court under O.I, R.10, C.P.C.

Defendants, in their reply to present application for preliminary decree, had shown their willingness to refund the disputed amount but with condition that plaintiff would withdraw the suit

Defendants, had no assets in Pakistan, and in case, decree was passed, plaintiff would not be able to get the decree executed against the defendants

Franchise fee being received by the defendants from other defendants, franchise holders, was not ascertainable

Defendants, having been incorporated out of Pakistan, should have deposited the amount in court, which would be regulated as per terms of decree

High Court, setting aside order of trial court, directed defendants to deposit the amount in dispute with trial court

Revision petition was allowed in circumstances.

Constitutional petition was accepted in circumstances.

Plaintiff company was aggrieved of notices issued by defendant Bank which had put a lien on the foreign currency account of plaintiff

Plaintiff sought recovery of damages against defendant Bank

Validity

To substantiate claim of damages based on losses suffered due to act of defendant Bank as alleged, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to demonstrate that such losses in fact had occurred during such period by quantifying and substantiating them, whereafter damages proportionate to such losses could have been claimed

Damages could not be awarded on such expectation or on hearsay evidence, it had to be specific with transactions and the quantum of losses so as to claim damages in retrospect

Single Judge of High Court rightly declined to allow damages to plaintiff against defendant Bank

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff sought direction to defendants to arrange transship plaintiff's consignment to the port of discharge and had also sought recovery of damages

Validity

In the proceedings of the nature, that was, for an action in rem, a plaintiff even without participation of owner of a vessel, if the case (of plaintiff) otherwise fell within the purview of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, could succeed in its claim

One of the basic reasons for the same was that if an owner of vessel was a foreign entity and had no presence in Pakistan, then a genuine claim of a party should not fail or a plaintiff should not be remediless, merely due to absence of the owner of vessel or for any other technicality

Defendant was even resisting delivery of cargo in question to plaintiff and contract of carriage was breached by defendants as it was discharged at the port that too only after the orders of High Court whereas, port of discharge as mentioned on Bills of Lading was other one

Suit was decreed accordingly.

Any negligence or carelessness on the part of financial institution does not entitle a customer to file a suit before Banking Court for damages.

Plaintiff filed suit against bank and insurance company before civil court which was returned and then he filed the same before Insurance Tribunal which was dismissed as withdrawn on the ground that remedy was to be sought from Banking Court

Customer or financial institution could file a suit in Banking Court in case of default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance which had been made

Section 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 empowered the Banking Court to adjudicate the matter brought by the customer

Banking Court had to follow the provision of statute in accordance with law instead of by-passing the procedure provided under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Banking Court had passed the impugned order in slipshod manner and beyond the jurisdiction vested in the same

Impugned order had been passed on the application moved under O.VII, R.11, C.P.c. in a casual manner which was not warranted by law instead of deciding the application for leave to defend

Banking Court was bound to decide the application for leave to defend first in order to determine the locus standi of defendant and in case he failed to establish the same to defend the suit then he had no right to file any other application including the one under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Rejection of plaint prior to the grant of leave to defend would amount to deviation from the provision of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001

Rejection or dismissal of plaint could be considered by the Banking Court after the grant of leave to defend if said court had come to the conclusion that substantial question of facts and law had been raised by him but prior to such stage the exercise of jurisdiction would amount to departure from procedure and law

Plaint had been rejcted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was incorrect application of law

Order VII, R. 10, C.P.C. was applicable in such like cases and grounds for the same were different as to the grounds enumerated in O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Plaints/suits were returned and dismissed from two different forums but same had been ignored by the Banking Court and impugned order had been passed in haste and harsh manner

Impugned order was set aside and case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision in accordance with law

Appeal was accepted in circumstances.

Plea raised by defendant was that claim of professional negligence was initially to be established before Disciplinary Committee of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, before "any other proceedings"

Validity

Phrase "any other proceedings" related to proceedings for removal of names from the Register maintained under S.23 of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962

Words "other proceedings" appearing in S.31(4) of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, had reference to and created nexus with proceedings as contemplated in S.13(1) of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962

Extending the phrase to any other proceedings would be reading in the statute something not intended by legislature

Single Judge had correctly interpreted S.31(4) of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, and no material defect or infirmity was pointed out in the order

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Single Judge as the same had been passed in accordance with law having correctly interpreted provisions of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.