Factual controversies

The powers of attorney, in the present case , were valid, registered, and covered the land-in-question; the mutation-in-question was sanctioned based on said documents, which were duly verified before the transaction

Revenue hierarchy erred in overlooking the documentary evidence and instead relied on a misapprehension of facts

Application of the respondents was not only delayed beyond the statutory limitation period but also involved disputed questions of title and allegations of fraud, which fall outside the jurisdiction of the revenue hierarchy

Such matters must be resolved by a civil court

Furthermore, the principle of acquiescence and bar of limitation were clearly applicable

The respondents' silence for over a decade renders their belated challenge unsustainable

Revenue authorities are creatures of statute and are confined strictly to the jurisdiction vested in them under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967; which are not courts of plenary jurisdiction and cannot venture into questions that involve adjudication of civil rights, title, or allegations of fraud, which require framing of issues and recording of evidence

Ironically the respondents never availed themselves of the remedies available under the law by instituting any civil or criminal proceedings

No recourse was taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, nor was any action initiated under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860

The District Collector is empowered to effect corrections in the revenue record only where the illegality or irregularity is manifest, apparent on the face of the record, and already established through a recognized legal or investigative process

Where the matter necessitates a detailed appraisal of evidence for the determination of such questions, particularly in matters involving allegations or commission of fraud, the validity or competence under a General Power of Attorney, the enforceability of a decree, the requirement of execution of a decree, or the applicability of limitation, the jurisdiction of not only the District Collector, but all revenue courts stand ousted

In such circumstances, revenue courts lack the lawful competence to venture into adjudication of such complex and inherently civil disputes

Therefore, the respondent had no lawful grounds to seek relief from the revenue courts in a matter which squarely fell within the domain of civil adjudication

Member - Board of Revenue set aside the impugned orders while the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Revenue) was upheld ;the respondents might seek appropriate relief before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, if so desired

Review petition was allowed.

High Court cannot assume the role of an investigation agency or of a trial Court without recording evidence to deliberate upon the factual controversies involved in the cases in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.

Collectorate filed Reference Application against order of Customs Appellate Tribunal contenting that the smuggled goods were found in a cavity specifically designed inside the container

Validity

Appellate Tribunal, which is final fact finding authority, observed that "neither the seized vehicle possessed false / secret cavity nor was used for offending goods"

It was not permissible to take into consideration such factual aspects in reference under S.196 of the Customs Act, 1969

Reference Application, filed by the Collectorate, was dismissed.

Decision of Appellate Court cannot be challenged indirectly by filing of Constitutional petition while the legislature had specifically restricted the remedy against family court decision to only one right of appeal

Facts in brevity were that the respondent (wife) filed a suit for dissolution of marriage (Khula), recovery of dowry articles, gold ornaments, and past maintenance against the petitioner (husband) before the Family Court

Despite summons, the petitioner (husband) did not appear, and the suit was decreed ex-parte

Petitioner (husband) filed Constitutional petition challenging decisions of the Trial Court as well as of the Appellate Court

At the outset the petitioner (husband) was confronted with the question as to the maintainability of the Constitutional petition

Held: Provision of S. 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 reflected that judgment and decree of the family court could be challenged only once before the court of District Judge, as the same was the only appellate forum and no further right of appeal had been provided against the verdict of such Appellate Court

In the present case, neither the family court was presided over by a district judge or additional district judge nor any person notified by the Government to be of rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge, therefore, the appeal against a decision or decree of family court was competent before the District Court, which was conclusive and final

Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 did not in any manner, envisage any right to appeal against the decision of Appellate Court in the High Court indirectly by filing a Constitutional petition

Moreover, contentions pertained to factual controversies, which had already been discussed by the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court, being the fact-finding fora, therefore, High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution could not look into the factual controversy

Besides, the High Court was not vested with the jurisdiction to act as a court of appeal against the decisions of the Family Court in the absence of any specific statutory provisions conferring such a right of appeal in family cases.

Registered person / Company (plaintiff) filed suit, invoking original jurisdiction of High Court, to challenge a 'pre-suspension notice' issued to plaintiff by the Commissioner-Inland Revenue ('Commissioner') for initiating suspension/blacklisting proceedings ('impugned notice')

Plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from taking coercive action against the plaintiff

For seeking temporary injunction, grounds taken by the petitioner / plaintiff (registered person) included that the impugned notice was without the signature of the Commissioner, which was received when date of hearing had passed, and that the allegation in the impugned notice that the petitioner / plaintiff made purchases from suspended or blacklisted vendors was belied by the tax profile of those vendors which showed that at the relevant time those vendors were not suspended nor blacklisted

Validity

The impugned (pre-suspension ) notice was essentially a notice to show-cause against suspension of sales tax registration

It was a precursor to blacklisting proceedings

By virtue of subsection (5) of S. 21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which had been inserted by the Finance Act, 2024, a remedy was now available to the Plaintiff before the Chief Commissioner in the event an order of suspension was passed against the plaintiff/ petitioner

Excepting a jurisdictional defect, a Court of law did not ordinarily interfere with a show-cause notice issued by a statutory authority lest such interference stifled the exercise of fact-finding and provided an escape from special statutory proceedings and remedies

The grounds urged by petitioner / plaintiff for interference were based on the facts of the case and did not relate to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner in issuing the impugned notice

Said facts had been laid by the petitioner / plaintiff before the Commissioner who had yet to pass any order thereon

The temporary injunction sought in effect required (this/High) Court to determine facts instead of the Commissioner

Petitioner /plaintiff did not bring forth any exception for interfering with the impugned notice

Application for grant of temporary injunction, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondents/ plaintiffs filed declaratory suit against petitioners / defendants seeking therein perpetual injunction and in alternative possession of the suit property through correction of revenue record

Suit filed by Trial Court was dismissed but Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of respondents/plaintiffs

Validity

Lower Appellate Court rightly appreciated evidence and preference was supposed to be given to findings of Lower Appellate Court when a different opinion was formed than the Court of first instance in respect of a factual controversy

One of the essential ingredients required for giving benefit of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was when original owner gives any express or implied consent or similar representative to the buyer or purchaser

Person from whom petitioner / defendant purchased the property was not in physical possession of property in dispute

Entry as ostensible owner was existing in revenue record but in a case where express or implied consent of other person interested in such property was not available and ostensible owners had also been in physical possession of property in dispute, then transfer by ostensible owners could not be dealt to be protected under S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Petitioner / defendant could not exhibit reasonable care at the time of purchase, therefore, benefit of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was rightly denied to him by Lower Appellate Court

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Precise intent of remedy of reference provided under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 is to resolve and adjudicate only the question of law originating and stemming from the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal

High Court cannot embark upon factual aspects or controversy

High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 is not free to embark upon an unfettered inquiry into factual aspects which have been properly considered and decided by the Tribunal.

Matters pertaining to factual controversy can only be resolved after thorough inquiry and recording of evidence in a civil court.

Precise intent of remedy of reference provided under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 is to resolve and adjudicate only the question of law originating and stemming from the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal

High Court cannot embark upon factual aspects or controversy

High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 is not free to embark upon an unfettered inquiry into factual aspects which have been properly considered and decided by the Tribunal.

Matters pertaining to factual controversy can only be resolved after thorough inquiry and recording of evidence in a civil court.

Grievance of appellants was that Cantonment Board revoked lease of cattle market executed in their favour and put it to auction

Validity

All acts relating to holding of cattle market in Cantonment Board were subject to authority of the Board and any contract with regard to cattle market could only be competently entered into by Cantonment Board

Contractual disputes between private parties could not be resolved under Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere with order passed by Single Judge of High Court and appellants were at liberty to avail their remedy from the Court of plenary jurisdiction

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

High Court could not resolve factual controversies in its constitutional jurisdiction.

Such controversies cannot be embarked upon by High Court, while sitting in its constitutional jurisdiction.

High Court could not resolve factual controversies in its constitutional jurisdiction.

Petitioner had availed the "yellow-cab scheme" of the Provincial Government and after balloting, a vehicle was handed over to the petitioner conditional upon petitioner making monthly payments to the bank

Said vehicle was subsequently repossessed by the bank upon default of payment by the petitioner

Petitioner sought release of the vehicle

Held, that petitioner had committed default in his fulfilment of contractual obligations and vehicle was repossessed after his persistent defaults

Person who violated any contractual obligation had no right to take fruit from using the same in its true perspective

No illegality in the repossession of vehicle had been pointed out

Factual controversies could not be resolved in the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

High Court observed that the petitioner could approach a proper forum for redressal of his grievance in accordance with law

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

High Court could not indulge in the factual controversies and that too when the petitioner had exhausted all the legal remedies available to him

Article 212 of the Constitution had placed specific bar on the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain and adjudicate upon the matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants

While exercising powers under Art.199 of the Constitution, the powers of High Courts were not as that of an appellate court

High Court could only exercise constitutional jurisdiction in matters, where no factual controversy was involved and the order was without jurisdiction

Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Art.199 was very limited in its scope, that had to be used very carefully

To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, the petitioner had to show that he had left with no other adequate remedy under the ordinary laws of land and he was to satisfy the court that he was really an "aggrieved person" and certain orders or directions of a court, authority or tribunal need rectification

Constitutional petition was dismissed.

Petitioner was appointed on "Shaheed's claim" on the basis of a fake school leaving certificate and misstatement that his father was martyred in a police encounter

On complaint a detailed inquiry was conducted and certificate was found bogus

Criminal case was registered against the petitioner, which culminated into conviction by Special Judge Anti Corruption in the light of confessional statement of the petitioner

Petitioner submitted certificate issued by the Headmaster Government Elementary School, "B", which was proved to be correct, but at the time of appointment as constable, petitioner had relied upon a certificate issued by the Headmaster Government High School, "SJ"

Petitioner's father was not martyred, rather another constable was martyred

Petitioner availed all the remedies available to him by way of filing departmental appeals, appeal before the Tribunal and even before the High Court, but failed to make out a case for exercise of a constitutional jurisdiction

Validity

High Court could not indulge in the factual controversies and that too when the petitioner had exhausted all the legal remedies available to him

Article 212 of the Constitution had placed specific bar on the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain and adjudicate upon the matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants

While exercising powers under Art.199 of the Constitution, the powers of High Courts were not as that of an appellate court

High Court could only exercise constitutional jurisdiction in matters, where no factual controversy was involved and the order was without jurisdiction

Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Art.199 was very limited in its scope, that had to be used very carefully

To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, the petitioner had to show that he had left with no other adequate remedy under the ordinary laws of land and he was to satisfy the court that he was really an aggrieved person and certain orders or directions of a court, authority or tribunal needed rectification

Constitutional petition was dismissed.