Arbitration proceedings

During proceedings, respondent / defendant sought stay of proceedings and the matter was forwarded to arbitrator but on his failure to pay requisite fee to the arbitrator matter was delayed

Appellant / plaintiff sought the suit restored but Trial Court after recording of evidence dismissed the suit on ground that it could not have been restored

Validity

Award which had been made after issuance of a supersession order passed by Trial Court was liable to be set-aside

After order of restoring the suit was passed by Trial Court, award could not have been made by an arbitrator even if the matter had been referred back and decided in arbitration

Division Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by Judge in who Chambers of High Court who insisted on the matter only being decided through arbitration proceedings

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment and decree passed against appellant / plaintiff and the matter was remanded to Trial Court for decision afresh

Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

In presence of arbitration agreement between parties there was no other option left but for the aggrieved party to proceed with agreed alternative dispute resolution mechanism i.e. arbitration

There was no reason to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for issuance of writ in an ongoing arbitration matter unless some exceptional ground could be made out for such intervention in the facts and circumstances of the case or in law

Respondent/Pakistan Stock Exchange was not a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation

Institutional arbitration was currently under process between parties

Petitioner could not renege from the same and even otherwise, arbitral forum had provided adequate remedy to petitioner, which had not been exhausted

High Court declined to interfere in the matter as an arbitration was underway

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Arbitrator had set out the grounds for rejection and denial of claims and rejected eight (8) out of thirteen (13) claims filed by the respondent based on the evidence brought on record

Where an arbitrator awards general damages, the absence of documentary evidence for the assessment of such damages does not automatically warrant setting aside the award

General damages are distinct from special damages, which require proof of actual losses

Courts may invoke the "rule of thumb" to award general damages where legal rights have been violated, and there is no precise yardstick for assessment, provided the determination satisfies the conscience of the court based on the facts and circumstances of the case

Division Bench of High Court had not found any "legal misconduct" or "moral misconduct" on part of the Arbitrator

Appellant (NTC) had not made out a case to identify precisely where the arbitrator had travelled beyond his jurisdiction

Division Bench of High Court could have considered setting aside the award if there was any error, factual or legal, which floated on the surface of the award, but appellant had failed to make such demonstration before it

No irregularity or perversity was found in the judgment passed by the Single Judge, making the arbitral award a rule of the court

High Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

The National Highway Authority (NHA), the Appellant, awarded a contract to M/s Hussain Cotex Limited (Respondent No. 1) for the construction of a bridge over the River Chenab at Sher Shah, District Muzaffargarh

The contract, signed on 04.02.2005, was to commence on 25.02.2005 and be completed in 30 months (by 28.08.2007) with a total value of Rs. 845 million

Respondent No. 1 initially planned to perform piling in the riverbed during low flow seasons, however, on the direction of the Appellant's Engineer, the strategy was revised to complete one of the two bridges earlier (by 14.08.2006) to facilitate urgent traffic diversion

This instruction was considered a variation under Clause 51.1(f) of the Contract, as it imposed work during high-flow seasons, increasing costs

A dispute arose over additional compensation claimed by Respondent No. 1 due to this change

The engineer and resident engineer initially assessed the compensation rate at Rs. 77.83/m³ for the earth platform

Respondent No. 1 submitted a revised rate of Rs. 169.66/m³, which the Appellant rejected, leading the matter to arbitration

The sole arbitrator issued an award on 10.04.2010, accepting that the engineer's directive constituted a contractual variation under Cl. 51.1(f) and awarded compensation at Rs. 77.83/m³

Dissatisfied, the Appellant filed an application under S. 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and S. 151, C.P.C. to set aside the award, which was dismissed by the Trial Court against which the appeal was filed

Appellant argued that the Arbitrator did not allow proper opportunity to lead evidence, amounting to misconduct

Held: The findings of sole arbitrator were based on documents placed on record and arguments of both parties

Since NHA raised no objection during the proceedings of the award, such objection could not be raised before the Trial Court or before the High Court, hence it was not a misconduct

The work undertaken in respect of the earthen platform and the comprehensive revision of the work methodology entailed by the Appellant's change instructions and requirements during the course of project, added considerably and enhanced the cost of Respondent No.1

It was fairly held by the arbitrator that appellant could not be allowed to wiggle out of his financial liabilities on the basis of a mere technicality

In the circumstances the appeal having no force was dismissed

Appeal dismissed.

Client alleged that Illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker

Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration

Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Validity

Contention of the appellant was that the impugned order be modified making the same time-bound

Held, that the contention of the appellant was not tenable for the reason that in the applicable arbitration framework , an in-built timeline was provided, hence there was no need to issue a separate time-bound directions

No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.

Client alleged that illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker

Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration

Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Validity

Record revealed the matter between the parties remained pending before the High Court and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was directed by the High Court to decide the matter in accordance with law

Relevant law was very clear and unambiguous , therefore, any dispute between a securities broker and its client was subject to determination through the arbitration mechanism provided under Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited Regulations ('PSX Regulations), which is compendium of PSX Regulations made in exercise of powers conferred under S. 7 of the Securities Act, 2015, with the prior approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in terms of the Account Opening Form, being the underlying agreement between the parties

Impugned order was passed in compliance with the Court's order as well as relevant law

No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.

Client alleged that illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker

Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange ( PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration

Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Validity

Contention of the appellant was that during the arbitration proceedings, respondent had submitted fictitious documents

Validity

Presentation of any fake or fabricated document during the arbitration proceedings, generally, does not vitiate the proceedings, rather the arbitrator has the authority to determine through appropriate procedures whether the documents submitted by either party are real or fictitious

No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondent / Company was impleaded as party to arbitration proceedings on the ground that it was a subsidiary company of appellant / Institution

Appellant / Institution assailed Rule of the Court on the plea that no proceedings could be referred to Arbitral Tribunal

Validity

Respondent / Company had an independent legal-cum-corporate existence and its claim of being a wholly owned subsidy of Appellant was clearly indicative of the distinct statuses enjoyed and claimed, respectively

Respondent / Company could not be declared or treated as party to the agreement for the purposes of proceedings under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940 nor the same could be construed as an entity, which substituted or novated appellant / Institution as party to the agreement

No resolution of Board of appellant / Institution was shown or relied upon to demonstrate or establish that respondent / Company had assignment of rights and obligations of appellant / Institution or any novation took place

No person or entity, merely signatory to agreement, for and on behalf of one of the party to the agreement, was competent to file petition under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940, unless its status as party to the agreement was satisfactorily established, by virtue of any law or under any contractual arrangement

Respondent / Company failed on both counts to claim any alleged assignment of rights or novation of contractual obligation

Order passed by Trial Court referring the matter to Arbitral Tribunal and proceedings conducted subsequent thereto, including arbitration proceedings and issuance of Award without appellant / Institution were unlawful and invalid

No validity could be extended to the Award in wake of an invalid order of reference

High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 30(c) of Arbitration Act, 1940, declared that the Award procured was invalid and the decree, making Award rule of the Court, was also unlawful and of no legal effect, in wake of illegality of the order of reference of matter to arbitrators, in purported exercise of jurisdiction under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940

Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Plaintiff invoked arbitration clause in the agreement and sought referring the matter to arbitration after issuance of interim injunction in its favour

Validity

GSA Agreements fulfilled the term “agreement in writing” containing an “arbitral clause” as mentioned in Art. II of Schedule of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011

Proceedings were governed by the provisions of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and not Arbitration Act, 1940

High Court declined to confirm restraining order granted earlier, as no case was made out by plaintiff for such kind of interim injunctive relief

Subject GSA Agreements not only contained foreign arbitration clause but also the governing law was that of foreign country

Plaintiff could avail remedy of interim relief/ protection, under the relevant provisions of laws of foreign country

High Court stayed proceedings of suit filed by plaintiff, under Ss. 3 & 4 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, and ad-interim order passed earlier was vacated/recalled

Application was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff invoked arbitration clause in the agreement and sought referring the matter to arbitration after issuance of interim injunction in its favour

Validity

GSA Agreements fulfilled the term “agreement in writing” containing an “arbitral clause” as mentioned in Art. II of Schedule of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011

Proceedings were governed by the provisions of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act,2011 and not Arbitration Act, 1940

High Court declined to confirm restraining order granted earlier, as no case was made out by plaintiff for such kind of interim injunctive relief

Subject GSA Agreements not only contained foreign arbitration clause but also the governing law was that of foreign country

Plaintiff could avail remedy of interim relief/ protection, under the relevant provisions of laws of foreign country

High Court stayed proceedings of suit filed by plaintiff, under Ss. 3 & 4 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, and ad-interim order passed earlier was vacated/recalled

Application was dismissed in circumstances.

Legal effect of conclusion of fact is a question of law.

Petitioner companies were aggrieved of order passed by Lower Appellate Court maintaining judgment and decree by Trial Court allowing objections of respondent / Pakistan State Oil Company against arbitration award

Validity

Notice for arbitration, statement of claim, application to make award rule of Court and appeal under S. 39 of Arbitration Act, 1940, against judgment and decree passed by Trial Court were all filed by petitioner / APCNGA in its own name

Petitioner / APCNGA was not a party to licenses / agreements, therefore, it could neither have invoked arbitration clause embedded therein, nor have filed application or appeal

High Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings of two Courts below as petitioner / APCNGA was a stranger to licenses / agreements and arbitration proceedings

Concurrent judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or irregularity

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

During arbitration proceedings before Trial Court, on application filed by defendant, Local Commission was appointed to inspect site of work

Validity

Application under S.41 of Arbitration Act, 1940, was filed before Trial Court, who pursuant to proceedings under arbitration agreement had jurisdiction to pass orders which were mentioned in Second Schedule to Arbitration Act, 1940

Orders under serial No.1 of Second Schedule to Arbitration Act, 1940, could be passed for detention, preservation and inspection of any property

Wording of O.XXI, R.26, C.P.C., could not be interpreted to the effect that Local Commission could only examine spot which was within territorial jurisdiction of the Court

Provision of S.76, C.P.C. was not applicable as it pertained to issuance of Commission to another Court for examination of any person and not otherwise

High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court as it did not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional error

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

No jurisdiction and discretion under S.41 of Arbitration Act, 1940, has been conferred upon Court to pass interim orders

Such proceedings are only applicable in respect of arbitration proceedings before Court

Arbitration Act, 1940 is a special law and is a complete code in itself

Use of words 'arbitration proceedings' were not to be so stretched to include all proceedings before the Court like an ordinary civil suit as well.

No jurisdiction and discretion under S.41 of Arbitration Act, 1940, has been conferred upon Court to pass interim orders

Such proceedings are only applicable in respect of arbitration proceedings before Court

Arbitration Act, 1940 is a special law and is a complete code in itself

Use of words 'arbitration proceedings' were not to be so stretched to include all proceedings before the Court like an ordinary civil suit as well.

Appellant was aggrieved of recalling of ex parte proceeding order by Trial Court on the ground that all modes of service were not applied before invoking extraordinary mode of service

Validity

Extraordinary mode of effecting service should be the last resort of Trial Court when it was satisfied and had reasons to believe that other mode of service of notice on respondent were either no possible or respondent was avoiding receipt of notice

Service of notice on respondent was essential requirement of law to ensure attendance of parties to participate in proceedings so as to arrive at just and impartial conclusion as important rights of parties were involved in the matter

To adopt all modes of effecting service prescribed under law were mandatory and unless and until it was finally determined through various modes of service that there was no possibility of appearance of party to proceed with the matter, ex parte proceedings should not be commenced

High Court declined to interfere in the order withdrawn by Trial Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

By way of the Arbitration Award, plaintiff-son was held to be the owner of the property in dispute on the basis of a gift in his favour by the father

Said Award was made the Rule of the Court on the basis of the conceding statement of the father

Defendant-son filed an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. alleging fraud and misrepresentation

Held, that the question as to whether judgment and decree was obtained fraudulently by the plaintiff-son would depend primarily upon the fact whether the father actually appeared in court and conceded the case of plaintiff-son of making the Award, the Rule of the Court

Judgment and decree sought to be set aside through the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was passed on 9-1-1979 against the father who died on 11-10-1990

On the basis of the said judgment and decree, a mutation had also been effected

During his lifetime, the father never challenged the said judgment and decree

As per the record, the Award was filed in court where the father entered appearance and stated that he had no objection if the Award was made, the Rule of the Court

Statement of father was recorded and thumb impression was obtained

Defendant-son was unable to bring any evidence on record to disprove the thumb impression of the father

No evidence was brought on record to suggest that the father did not appear and concede the case of plaintiff-son

Defendant-son in his own statement did not specifically spell out that fraud had been allegedly committed or that the father did not appear in court, and his entire evidence was based on hearsay

Stamp vendor from whom the stamp paper for the Arbitration Agreement was purchased, also entered the witness box along with his register

Counsel who represented the father also appeared as a witness and supported the case of the plaintiff-son

Defendant-son conceded in his cross-examination that plaintiff-son was in possession and cultivated the part of the land in dispute

Record also showed that the defendant-son had been involved in a murder case, giving support to the claim of plaintiff that the father and defendant-son were estranged

Application filed by defendant-son under S. 12(2), C.P.C. had been rightly dismissed

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Intention of legislature is to make a flow to realize consequences they can face after divorce but it does not mean that Arbitration Council has been empowered to examine the scope/validity of Talaq

Significance of arbitration proceedings is only to streamline completion of process of divorce and even on account of non-following the provisions of S. 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, does not affect validity of divorce

Divorce has to reach its logical end provided spouse who declared Talaq had not revoked it within the stipulated time enunciated by the Holy Quran

Any deficiency in completion or following of process provided under S. 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, does not invalidate consequences of pronouncement of Talaq nor it enlarges time of its effectiveness

Any deficiency in following provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, does not annul effect of Talaq beyond 90 days.

Petitioner assailed proceedings conducted by Arbitration Council under the provisions of S. 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, on the notice of divorce issued by respondent who was her husband

Plea raised by petitioner was that the Council did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter as both the parties were nationals of USA and the matter was sub judice before a court in USA

Validity

Both the parties were Muslim citizens of Pakistan at the time of issuance of notice and its proceedings

Both the parties, though, resided in USA but at the time of pronouncement and submission of notice of Talaq, both were residing in Pakistan and till that time they had not acquired status of being citizens of USA

For certain period both the parties left USA in order to stay in Pakistan but simultaneously they lived together for a short duration in USA and UK etc.

Both the parties were Muslims and holder of Pakistani nationality and were entitled to avail process provided under S.7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

Arbitration Council did not commit any illegality by initiating process and issuing arbitration process on the basis of notice of Talaq sent by respondent

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Defendant contended that no details of fraud were given in plaint and the suit was barred by limitation as Umpire had earlier rendered award on 31-8-2002 and suit was filed on 25-10-2007

Validity

If defendant had promised and was liable to bear, discharge and satisfy obligations and liabilities of another company towards plaintiff, the plaintiff immediately upon acquiring such knowledge, ought to have sued defendant for recovery of amount that was liable to be paid by the company

If maximum benefit was given to plaintiff and limitation for instituting suit against defendant was reckoned not from plaintiff's knowledge during arbitration proceedings but from the date of award, even then suit/claim was to have been instituted / made by plaintiff latest by 30-8-2005

Suit instituted on 25-10-2007 was barred by limitation

Where plaintiff levelled allegation of misrepresentation or fraud, it must specify and mention details of fraud, including dates

Fraud was required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and not on the basis of surmises, conjectures or suspicion

Plaint was barred by limitation and not compliant of the mandatory requirements of O.VI, R.4, C.P.C.

Plaint was rejected ire circumstances.

Petition seeking reference to arbitration of disputes and differences which had not arisen prior to the institution of earlier arbitration proceedings, were not barred under the principle of res judicata and O.II, R.2, C.P.C.

Arbitration was a time saving device and parties to arbitration proceedings were expected to adhere strictly to time lines

If the respondents did not come up with a 'sufficient cause' in their reply or failed to file a reply within the time stipulated by court, the court was to assume that there was no cause or reason not to refer matters in dispute between parties to arbitration

No formal order closing right of respondent to file reply was required under special law and Court once satisfied that respondents, despite having notice/knowledge of application under S.20 of Arbitration Act, 1940, had not filed a reply, ought to refer the matter to arbitration in terms of arbitration agreement and S.20(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940

Application under S.20 of Arbitration Act, 1940, was to be adjudicated upon expeditiously and should be kept pending for the least possible time

High Court appointed sole arbitrator and referred the matter to him

Application was allowed in circumstances.

Administration of justice requires that there should not be multiplicity of proceedings and parties should not be permitted to raise disputes over and over again, once disputes have been settled either by a pronouncement of court of competent jurisdiction or by an award of an arbitrator.

Paragraph 3 of the First Schedule of Arbitration Act, 1940 requires an arbitrator to make award within a period of four months after entering on the reference

Very purpose of resolution of disputes through a domestic tribunal would be defeated if the objections to an arbitration award or appeals from judgments and decrees in terms of the arbitration award are kept pending indefinitely

Courts to make an earnest effort to decide the objections and appeals in a time frame lesser than the one given to the arbitrators to decide a dispute.

Doctrine of least intervention (by the court) was a valid principle, but the court would not apply the same where there had been sheer non-compliance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

Benefit of S.14, Limitation Act 1908 could be sought if proceedings were initiated in wrong court in good faith and after coming to know that proceedings had been started in wrong court had come to the court where actually the suit was to be filed

Arbitration proceedings and present suit were independent proceedings and were on the basis of separate cause of action

Plaintiff could not claim the benefit of S. 14 of Limitation Act, 1908

Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the suit

No procedural defect had been pointed out in the judgment passed by the Appellate Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Objections were filed by defendant Authority and Single Judge of High Court declined to make award rule of the court on the ground that claim of plaintiff was barred by limitation

Validity

While hearing objections to award under Ss.30 and 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940, Court could not sit in appeal on award which had been passed after recording of evidence led by both the parties

Court was not to launch itself into an exercise of reappraisement of evidence or set itself as appellate Court, except when there was error on the face of award

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere with findings of sole arbitrator as the award had been made in favour of plaintiff on the basis of evidence of defendant Authority itself, as barring limitation issue

Defendant Authority was not able to raise any substantial question and or objections which regard to merits of the case

High Court set aside the findings of Single Judge of High Court and award of sole arbitrator was made rule of the court

Intra Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Respondent/National Highway Authority (NHA) awarded contract to the respondent-Company for construction of a project, however, later on, the Company also claimed compensation for the work not included in the original contract, which was declined by the Authority

Arbitrator allowed the claim of the Company and passed an award for payment of certain amount to the Company, and the civil court, after entertaining objection from the Authority made said award a rule of court

Validity

Civil court hearing objections to the award under Ss.30 & 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940, not being court of appeal, was not to appraise the entire case, but the court had to confine itself to the grounds mentioned in Ss.30 & 33 of the Act

Contention that the Arbitrator had not given any finding on the question of limitation was not factually correct as the parties had agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration and by mutual consent had appointed the respondent as sole Arbitrator; therefore, all previous discussions/ meetings had come to an end

Respondent had not raised the question of limitation in its reply before the Arbitrator and raised the same for the first time in the supplementary affidavit in evidence

Question of limitation, even if the same was not properly appreciated by the court or the authority which passed an order, did not render the decree or an award a nullity

Objection as to limitation should have been taken before the Arbitrator in clear terms

Award could not be considered to be a nullity in the eye of law, even if the claim was barred by time

Respondent had not raised the issue of maintainability of arbitration in its reply to the claim of the Company

Contention that the proceedings before the Arbitrator were not maintainable as no appeal had been filed against the decision of Dispute Resolution Committee had no substance, as both the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and contested the matter on merits

Technicalities could not defeat the chosen forum of the parties

Object of Arbitration Act, 1940 was that when the parties to a contract decided to get their dispute settled by an Arbitrator, the decision of the Arbitrator should have been considered to be final

Party, participating in arbitration proceedings without protest, could not question the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator when award had been given against that party

Arbitrator was not obliged to give reasons for his decision, and even if giving of reasons was held to be obligatory, that was not obligatory for the Arbitrator to give detailed judgment

Arbitrator was the final judge of fact and the court was bound by the Arbitrator's findings of fact and could not review the same, unless the same were not supported by evidence

Coming to an erroneous decision was not 'misconduct' in terms of Ss.30 & 33 of the Act

Error or infirmity in the award should have been floated on the face of it

Arbitrator, in the present case, while passing the award, had addressed all legal and factual issues, and no error was floating on the surface which could show that the award was suffering from any apparent legal infirmity or that the proceedings by the Arbitrator had been conducted in the manner which amounted to misconduct

Failure to give notice of the award to the respondents did not nullify or vitiate the award

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Contention of plaintiffs was that they were legal heirs of deceased and mother of one of the defendants had wrongly given share to him

Suit was decreed by the Trial Court but same was dismissed by the Appellate Court

Validity

Inheritance mutation was got entered by son of the deceased on 15-11-1977 and his mother received her share who transferred suit land in favour of defendants

Mother of deceased entered into arbitration proceedings which were made rule of court

Mutation was attested on the basis of said rule of court

Transferees were in possession of suit land and before that vendor was in possession of the same

Suit had been filed on 9-8-1995 after more than 22 years of death of father of plaintiffs which was time-barred

Decree could be challenged in a suit in which the plaintiff prayed for declaration of his title

Vendor was owner of much more land than she transferred and if there was any claim of plaintiffs, such could be satisfied from her ownership

Suit was result of connivance between the parties

Plaintiffs had failed to prove the case pleaded by them and Trial Court had recorded findings by ignoring the pleadings as well as documentary evidence available on record

Findings recorded by the First Appellate Court were in accordance with law and no case for interference had been made out

Revision was dismissed.

Contention of the appellant was that respondent should be restrained from encashing the bank guarantee till conclusion of arbitration proceedings between the parties

Held, that encashment of bank guarantee was to be restrained only if a prima facie case was made when there was material available on record to show that the person in whose favour the performance bond was executed, had also committed default in performance of the contract

When such a prima facie case was made out then the court could restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee

In the present case, however, time for performance of the contract by the appellant was extended many times, but the appellant failed to discharge its contractual commitment, and only after getting extension of contract, when the contract was still not performed by the appellant, the bank guarantee was sought to be encashed

No justification therefore, existed to restrain the respondent from encashing the bank guarantee

Appeal was dismissed.

Defendant moved an application for rejection of plaint with the contention that plaintiff had no cause of action for filing the present suit as dispute had been directly and substantially decided in arbitration proceedings

Validity

Plaint, its accompaniments and other material available on record which on its own strength was sufficient to refute the claim of plaintiff could be looked into for the purpose of rejection of plaint

Dispute with regard to suit property was finally resolved through award which was made rule of court with the consent of parties

Matter directly and substantially in issue in the present suit was directly and substantially in issue in the arbitration proceedings between the parties

Present suit was barred under the principle of res judicata and under S. 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 as plaintiff ceased to have any legal character or right in the suit property which had been awarded to the defendant

Plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant

Plaint should be rejected in any of the four eventualities mentioned in O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Court should reject the plaint if plaintiff would not be entitled to the relief claimed if all the allegations made in the same were proved

Neither the main relief of declaration nor the consequential reliefs could be granted to the plaintiff in the present case

Plaint was rejected in circumstances.