Freedom of expression

Fundamental rights of any civilized society is to communicate and learn about its shared interest in freedom of expression

This is always a path to truth finding and self-actualization

It offers a way to strike a fair balance between societal development andstability and increase populace's improved ability to participate in decision-making

Such idea of free people's government rests on bedrock of free expression

Achieving a reasonable balance between societal change and stability was made more accessible and ability of individuals to engage in decision making was further enhanced

Idea of free government by free people rests on bedrock of such unrestricted communication

Right to free expression is safeguarded in a democratic society by a combination of responsibilities and limitations.

Qualified privilege.

Activities may fall outside the scope of such right where the method of the activity itself-such as violence-or the location of that activity was not consonant with protection offered by Fundamental rights.

When a democratic election took place, freedom of expression protected the rights of candidates and voters to meaningfully express their views and engage in reciprocal political discourse on the path to voting day; that was at the core of political expression

Right to disseminate and receive information connected with elections was recognized as integral to the democratic principles underlying freedom of expression, and as a result, attracted robust protection

Stable election period was crucial to electoral fairness and meaningful political discourse

As such, state interference with individual and collective political expression in the context of an election struck at the heart of the democratic values that freedom of expression sought to protect, including participation in social and political decision-making.

Where a claimant could demonstrate that, by denying access to a statutory platform, the government had substantially interfered with freedom of expression or acted with the purpose of doing so, the claim may proceed

Substantial interference with freedom of expression occurred where lack of access to a statutory platform had the effect of radically frustrating expression to such an extent that meaningful expression was effectively precluded

While meaningful expression need not be rendered absolutely impossible, effective preclusion represented an exceedingly high bar that would be met only in extreme and rare cases.

Individuals or organizations who wished to "sponsor election advertising" were required by S. 239(1) of Election Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 (Canada) to register with Chief Electoral Officer

Question as to whether individuals who engaged in political self-expression through small-scale election activities like displaying homemade signs in their windows, putting bumper stickers on their cars, or wearing T-shirts with political messages on them, came within definition of "sponsor" and needed to register

Held, that the words of Ss. 228, 229 & 239 of the Election Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 [Canada] ("the Act") read in their grammatical and ordinary sense and harmoniously with the statutory scheme, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature, indicated that a "sponsor" required to register was an individual or organization who received an advertising service from another individual or organization, whether in exchange for payment or without charge

Individuals who neither paid others for advertising services nor received advertising services from others without charge were not "sponsors" within the meaning of S. 229(1) of the Act

Any individual working entirely on his own, without paying for or receiving any service in the creation or dissemination of election advertising, was not required to comply with any of these provisions of the Act

Such individuals may transmit their own points of view, whether by posting a handmade sign in a window, or putting a bumper sticker on a car, or wearing a T-shirt with a message on it, without registering

Small-scale election advertising of such nature was not covered by the Act

By confining the registration requirement to sponsors and exempting individual political self-expression by persons who were not sponsors, S. 239 of the Act tailored the impingement on expression to what was required by the object of the Act

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Individuals or organizations who wished to "sponsor election advertising" were required by S. 239(1) of Election Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 [Canada] ('The Act") to register with Chief Electoral Officer

Question as to whether registration requirement was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit on expression of such sponsors

Held, that although the registration requirement imposed on sponsors limited their right of expression guaranteed by S. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter"), the limit was justified under S.1 of the Charter, which provided that rights and freedoms were subject to reasonable limits prescribed by law as could be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society

Besides the scope of the infringement of S. 2(b) of the Charter was minimal

Registration process was simple and unlikely to deter much, if any, expression in which a sponsor would otherwise engage

Impingements on the freedom of political expression due to the registration requirement were limited, since only political expression in the form of 'sponsorship' of election advertising stood to be delayed or inhibited

Sponsorship involved receiving advertising services; it was an organized activity that involved at least two, and usually more, people; it was by its nature not spontaneous

Such limited deleterious effects were outweighed by the benefits of the registration scheme i.e. permitting the public to know who was engaged in organized advocacy in their elections, ensuring that those who sponsored election advertising must provide the public with an assurance that they were in compliance with election law, and providing the Chief Electoral Officer with information that could assist in the enforcement of the Act and in informing sponsors of its requirements

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Said theory postulated a laissez faire approach to the regulation of speech and expression and stated that the success or failure of ideas, theories and propositions would depend on their own merits and demerit

Notion behind said theory was that rational individuals had the capacity to discern through the process of deliberation and exchange of competing ideas to realize the best possible result.

Principle underlying a free, democratic society was that every individual had a right to decide what art he or she wanted or did not want

Similar freedom to create art must also be made available to the artists

Freedom of expression would also apply to artistic work presenting controversial and shocking ideas

Choice, however, remained with the society for rejection of certain expressions of art forms that was controversial.

Task of censorship was always delicate and a balance had to be struck between the right to freedom of expression and the various limitations mentioned in proviso to S.9(2) (a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979.

Satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that a movie and its content violated the "grund norms" mentioned in S.9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 was a sine qua non for the decertifying the said movie

Ministry of Information, in the present case, however, failed to present a demonstrable case either that the decision to decertify the film was remised on valid reasons that met the satisfaction required by proviso to S.9 (2) (a) of the Ordinance or that the movie and its contents in fact offended the class of things mentioned therein

Film in question was at best a work of fiction; its plot and the characters portrayed therein may or may not have similarity and relevance to the real persons or situation in the country, but this was not a justification to place a ban on the screening of the film

Central Board of Film Censors ('Censor Board') at the time of initial screening of the film did not find anything objectionable in it and granted it the requisite certificate for public exhibition

Subsequently, the Chairman of the Censor Board simply recommended decertification of the film to the Ministry of Information which, without application of mind, acted upon the said recommendation

Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 did not allow decertification of a movie on the value judgment of the Government rather the case must fall within the limitations provided in the proviso to S.9(2) thereof

Notification and the reasons furnished for decertifying the said film had no nexus with the permissible limitations provided for in proviso to S.9(2) of the Ordinance on the freedom of expression

Said notification was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Interdict restrained not only defamatory statements but also statements that were untrue, when no case of injurious falsehood was made

Unconstitutional

Prior restraint of speech was among the most serious infringements of freedom of expression as it could extend to any future statements even those that might be lawful.