Right of Appeal

Authorities punished the accused under Regulation 40 of Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 which punishment was maintained by High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction

Validity

Following are the circumstances under which jurisdiction of Supreme Court and that of High Court are not barred under Article 247(7) of the Constitution rather the same are available to be exercised under Articles 184 and 199 of the Constitution:

Accused assailed his conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court whereby he was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment

Validity

Where a particular statute/law provides a self-contained mechanism and well defined forum of redressal for determination of questions of law or facts by way of an appeal or revision to another authority or tribunal as the case may be, the same has to be followed being remedy provided under law

Accused without exhausting such remedies can be allowed to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

Such jurisdiction of High Court cannot be exploited as the sole solution when there are equally effective and adequate alternative remedies provided under law

Such remedies cannot be bypassed to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction

Retrospective effect cannot be given to a Constitutional amendment, without any such intention by Legislature, otherwise matters decided prior to Constitutional amendment would also need to be reviewed by Constitutional Courts and it would open flood gates to any case

In the present case, provision of Article 247 of the Constitution was in field and jurisdiction of High Court was barred in matters exclusively dealt with by FATA hierarchy

Supreme Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused as the judgment passed by Trial Court had attained finality

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Independent right of appeal before an independent forum is also a basic limb of doctrine of due process and right to a fair trial, as enshrined under Article 10A of the Constitution.

Petitioner/Authority was aggrieved of setting aside of provisions of section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and Rule 8 of Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998 by High Court declaring them as unconstitutional

Validity

Directing a party to deposit total amount of subject matter, before admission of his appeal is unreasonable, resulting into preventing that party from exercising its right of appeal, which violates its fundamental right of fair trial and due process, guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution

Such condition may not only deprive a party from its fundamental right of challenging a decision of executive authority before an independent and impartial higher forum but may also give a license to powerful executive to misuse its authority

Condition of depositing of fine amount imposed by section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 is so excessive and unreasonable that it would amount to denial of right to appeal, which violates Article 10A of the Constitution, hence, it cannot sustain

Supreme Court declined to interfere in the impugned judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect in the judgment

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Unreasonable conditions attached to an appeal would likely be ones that are not justified, disproportionate or infringe upon fundamental rights or legal process

Unreasonable condition can make it impossible or unfairly difficult to exercise the right to appeal.

Petitioner/Authority was aggrieved of setting aside of provisions of section 23-C (4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and Rule 8 of Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998 by High Court declaring them as unconstitutional

Validity

Full mechanism for the recovery of sums due to the Government has been provided in section 23J of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947

In the light of such enforcement measures already available to the State, imposition of additional precondition of depositing penalty amount or furnishing security equivalent thereto under section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 at appellate stage is wholly disproportionate and oppressive and does not serve to further any legitimate Governmental interest that is not already safeguarded under section 23-J of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947

Provisions of section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, as well as Rule 8 of Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1988, which mandate a financial precondition for filing an appeal, constitute an unreasonable and unconstitutional restriction on the fundamental right of access to justice

Such provision disproportionately affects individuals with limited financials means, effectively denying them the opportunity to challenge adverse decisions

High Court had rightly declared section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, as well as Rule 8 of Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1988, (to the extent that said Rule makes the receipt of an appeal subject to compliance with section 23-C(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947), as unconstitutional/ultra vires of the Constitution and had rightly struck down the provisions

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

In contrast, S. 67(3) of Representation of the People Act, 1976 stated that any person aggrieved by a "decision" of the Tribunal may challenge it by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Purpose of providing remedy of appeal is to evaluate and examine correctness and validity of orders passed by Court below to eliminate chances of miscarriage of justice.

Right of appeal could not be availed unless it was conferred in a clear manner by some enactment or statute or rules having the sanctity of some law, therefore, it was not to be assumed that there was right of appeal in every matter brought before a Court for its consideration

Must be specified in clear terms that the appeal against an order was competent, as such right could not be supplemented by implications

No extraneous consideration or matter could be imported in the relevant statute so as to abridge or enlarge scope of an appeal.

Petitioner company was aggrieved of sanction order issued by respondent authorities to present a petition for winding up (petitioner) company

Validity

Petitioner had remedy of appeal against sanction order before a Bench of two judges of High Court in the capacity of appellate jurisdiction under S. 485 of Companies Ordinance, 1984

When an alternate remedy was available to petitioner but was not availed by him, it was to be determined whether petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution was competent or not

Extra ordinary jurisdiction was conferred in High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution to pass appropriate directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus subject to fulfilling requirements laid down under Art. 199 of the Constitution

In order to invoke such extra-ordinary jurisdiction, petitioner was bound to also establish that he had no alternative and efficacious remedy under ordinary law

If petitioner failed to fulfill such mandatory criterion requirement, then all other grounds which favoured him had lost significance and did not merit any consideration

Extra-ordinary remedy could not be sought and secured when ordinary remedy was well available

Purpose behind establishment of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was to beneficial regulation of capital markets and superintendence and control of corporate entities in a manner which must equally secure rights and interest of every stake-holder involved in the process

High Court declined to interfere in the matter as petitioner had adequate and efficacious remedy available to it

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Unless a right of appeal is specifically granted it cannot be inferred or borrowed from implied interpretation of any law.

Such right cannot be exercised on any analogy unless expressly conferred upon under some law.

Nothing exists in the Constitution or the Rules to compel the Court to decide on merits an appeal filed by an accused person who has chosen to be fugitive from justice and while remaining so decides to disobey or frustrate the orders, directions and process of the Court from which he seeks justice.

Where the petitioner, as a fugitive from justice, presented himself before an attorney and signs a power of attorney in his favour for the presentation to the Court a petition for special leave to appeal and the same is duly filed, in such an eventuality, the court would not act in aid of a person who is a fugitive from justice and the petition was to be dismissed.

Appellate Court had to consider the controversy entirely afresh both as regard to facts and law and was to state the points arising from the determination

Appellate Court was required to give its decision with regard to each point, which would be self-explanatory, illuminative and in the nature of speaking order

Where the provisions of O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C. were not complied with, the judgment was not in accordance with law

Such was evident from the judgment that the judge was conscious of the matter involved and that decision had been pronounced on the basis of record

Phrase "points for determination" referred to all important questions involved in the case

Necessary for the appellate Court to record the points for determination so that it could be determined whether the Court had dealt with all the points.

Such right was a creature of the statute and it was not to be assumed that there was a right of appeal in every matter brought before a Court for its consideration

Right of appeal was expressly given by a statute or some authority equivalent to a statute such as a rule taking the force of a statute

Existence of right of appeal could not be assumed on any 'a priori' ground

Such right was a substantive right, which had to be conferred by statute.

Such right was a substantive right, which had to be conferred by statute.

When a power was vested in State functionary empowering him to do something, then concerned functionary was obliged to exercise such power fairly and in the manner provided under relevant statue

Right of appeal was not merely a matter of procedure but a substantive right

Appellate forums had ample powers to scrutinize documents on record and exercise same jurisdiction as vested in original authority

Inexpensive and expeditious justice to people of Pakistan was ensured by State under the provisions of Art.37(d) of the Constitution

Denial of right of appeal by not appointing appellate forum under S.12 of Punjab Regularizing of Service Act, 2018, was not only denial of substantive right but was also against the dictate of Art.37(d) of the Constitution

High Court directed Competent Authority to constitute Appellate Committee under S.12 of Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018, and to make the same functional

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner/mother contended that order of interim custody of minor being interlocutory in nature could only be challenged under constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

Respondent/father contended that matter of interim custody under Family Courts Act, 1964 was appealable before District Court

Validity

If order was interlocutory one which was not appealable then even constitutional petition was not maintainable

Provision of S. 47, Guardians and Wards Act,1890, provided that order under S. 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was appealable

Provisions of Guardians and Wards Act,1890 could not be read in isolation

Matters pertaining to guardianship would exclusively be triable by the Family Court created under the Family Courts Act, 1964 which was a later enactment than the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890; statute later in time would prevail upon the earlier

According to S.14(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 a decision given or a decree passed by Family Court would be 'appealable' in spite of the fact that S. 12 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was not mentioned in S. 47 of the said Act

Appeal could be filed against order passed under S. 12 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, being a 'decision' given by Family Court and the same was not hit by subsection (3) of S. 14 of Family Courts Act, 1964 and the appeal would lie before the District Court if the Family Court was not presided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge

Impugned order passed by the Family Court being appealable before the District Court same could not be challenged under constitutional jurisdiction before the High Court

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Right of appeal was a substantive right, and could only be availed, if it was clearly and expressly provided under the enabling statute

Legislature, while enacting S.19 of Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, had provided only the forum of appeal, without specifying the persons, who had the right of appeal

Such omission on the part of the legislature was meaningful

Person, convicted of the offence of contempt of court, could not be rendered remediless, he, and none other could move the appellate forum in appeal against his conviction

If the contempt petition was dismissed, the proceedings were terminated; and not even the State or petitioner could agitate the same in appeal.

Right of appeal, and for that purpose remedy of filing a reference under Customs Act, 1969 was a statutory right and any period of limitation as prescribed under such special enactment had to be construed strictly and any discretion in such regard had to be exercised with due care and only in appropriate cases, so that a right accrued in favour of other party may not be impinged or intruded on flimsy grounds of ignorance of legal procedure or fault on the part of some officer or counsel.

When right of appeal had been accorded by legislature in S. 193 of Customs Act, 1969 then provision of S. 195 was inoperative and could not be exercised by any authority.

Service Tribunal being the only forum for determination of terms and conditions of a civil servant before approaching that Tribunal, civil servant had to satisfy the legal requirements, especially question of limitation with reference to S.21 of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974.

Allotment of excess land made in favour of respondents was cancelled by Settlement Authorities vide order dated 26-2-1973 and vide order dated 28-8-1991 authorities permitted to allot excess land to informers

High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside the order passed by authorities and petition was allowed

Plea raised by respondent was that Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable as order dated 26-2-1973, was assailed in Constitutional petition, when evacuee laws were not repealed and provision of appeal was available with appellant

Validity

Constitutional petition had arisen out of proceedings with regard to transfer of property in dispute inasmuch as original order was passed on 26-2-1973, which was subject to appeal, when the same was passed

Such was sufficient to satisfy requirement of section 3 (2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which was attracted

Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable as barred by section 3 (2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Intra-Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Order of registration of trade union, was assailed by employer company and the same was maintained by Single Judge of High Court

Plea raised by respondent trade union was that intra-court appeal was incompetent on account of bar contained in proviso to S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as order under appeal was passed in Constitutional petition under Art.199 of the Constitution, which had arisen out of the proceedings commenced before Registrar, trade unions on application of respondent trade union and order for grant of such certificate of registration of trade union, issued by Registrar in favour of respondent trade union was an original order passed in such proceedings, in which right of appeal was provided under S.9(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002

Validity

Bar contained in proviso to S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, was applicable

Intra-court appeal was dismissed I circumstances.

Order of registration of trade union, was assailed by employer company and the same was maintained by Single Judge of High Court

Plea raised by respondent trade union was that intra-court appeal was incompetent on account of bar contained in proviso to S.3 of Law Reforms. Ordinance, 1972, as order under appeal was passed in Constitutional petition under Art.199 of the Constitution, which had arisen out of the proceedings commenced before Registrar, trade unions on application of respondent 'trade union and order for grant of such certificate of registration of trade union, issued by Registrar in favour of respondent trade union was an original order passed in such proceedings, in which right of appeal was provided under S.9(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002

Validity

Bar contained in proviso to S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, was applicable

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider; whether in absence of any provision for appeal or revision petition in Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, appeal of accused and revision of complainant were competent before High Court; whether complainant's complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was competent when matter pertaining to ownership and possession of relevant piece of land was already sub judice before civil court as well as before Evacuee Trust Property Board; whether in absence of any concrete proof available in that regard, accused could be treated as land grabbers/land mafia/ Qabza group for the purpose of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005; whether courts below had correctly appreciated and followed law declared by Full Bench of Lahore High Court which was affirmed by Supreme Court; whether one-time ploughing of a piece of land in absence of continued physical occupation thereof amounted to dispossession for the purposes of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005; whether or not failure on the part of complainant to produce two prosecution witnesses before Trial Court had weakened her case because according to complaint itself', it was one out of said two prosecution witnesses who informed complainant about incident in issue; and whether complainant had succeeded in proving her case against accused beyond reasonable doubt or not.

Right of appeal substitutive right which is expressly conferred by express language of statute and under no circumstances, it can" be assumed to have been conferred upon an individual

Such right cannot be imported to special statute from general law on' the ground of convenience unless it is clearly spelt out therefrom.

Hierarchy set up under criminal justice system is with object to streamline and channelize process of justice through check and balance system

Mere subordination of court to High Court by itself does not at all make its decision appealable to High Court unless, jurisdiction is expressly conferred on High Court.

Phrase "other than the Vice-Chancellor" used in S.42 of Islamia University of Bahawalpur Act, 1975 begun with comma and ended with comma, which not only separated Vice-Chancellor from teachers and other employees of University, but excluded him from definition of officer for purposes of filing appeal before Syndicate

If there was intention of legislature to exclude teachers or other employees of University from filing an appeal, then any conjunctive word like "and" could be used between phrase "other than the Vice-Chancellor" and phrase "teacher or other employees of the University"

Other officials, teachers and employees of University had a right of appeal before Syndicate.

Goods imported had been assessed by competent officers exercising powers under S.79 read with S.80 of the Customs Act, 1969

Assessment order became final order after the lapse of period for filing an appeal against the said order

Such right of appeal had not been given to Customs authorities in terms of S.193 of the Customs Act, 1969 in order to reopen a past and closed transaction, the only recourse available was to initiate action within the framework of S.195 of the Customs Act, 1969.

Appeal against rejection of reference made to District Judge under S.18(3) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, before High . Court was dismissed being incompetent

Validity

Appeal by a Company or local authority was competent

In view of amendment made in S.18(3) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance (IV of 1992)

High Court while disposing of appeal had not dealt with the said amendment

Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to High Court for its decision in accordance with law

Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed in circumstances.