Jurisdiction of Civil Court

Brief facts were that the petitioner filed a civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief before the civil court at Quetta, relating to matters of the Balochistan Squash Association (BSA), of which he had previously held office

During the proceedings, it emerged that the Pakistan Squash Federation (PSF) held its 43rd Annual General Meeting and that subsequent elections and organizational steps concerning BSA were conducted there

Notices were issued, written statements were filed, and issues were framed by the Trial Court

The Trial Court ultimately returned the plaint under O.VII R.10, C.P.C. on the ground that the impugned meeting and related actions occurred at Islamabad, outside its territorial jurisdiction

Appellate court upheld Trial Court's order

The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition challenging the orders of the courts below

Held: Trial Court after considering that controversy, was required to decide the suit by recording of evidence, the provisions of O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. could not be pressed into service to non-suit the petitioner

When an action of the public authority was stated to be without jurisdiction and void, the plaintiff was within his rights to maintain suit before civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C.

Where a statute provided an alternate remedy or forum, then, if the act of public functionary was statedly mala fide, void or without jurisdiction, then the general jurisdiction of a civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C. was not barred

Courts below failed to appreciate the facts of the case in light of relevant law provisions

Orders passed by courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for affording opportunity of leading evidence to the parties for decision on merits

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Briefly, the petitioner, through the present constitutional petition, assailed the Provincial Ombudsman (Mohtasib) order directing handing over of possession of plot in question to respondent No.2, along with the consequential final demolition notice issued by the competent authority, and further challenged the Governor's order passed in the statutory representation, seeking that all such actions be declared without lawful authority

Held: Since there was a dispute/controversy related to declaration of rights, title and status of a person or property the Civil Court had the exclusive jurisdiction under S.9, C.P.C. to decide the same after recording of evidence

Scheme of Provincial Ombudsman Ordinance, 2001 did not bestow the powers upon the Ombudsman to examine cases of civil nature

Moreover, as per the spirit of S.11 of the Ordinance, 2001 the Provincial Ombudsman was the recommendatory body

Findings of the Ombudsman were of recommendatory nature and not a judgment/decision, and such performance of quasi-judicial functions by itself did not convert an Authority into a Court

Office of Ombudsman was neither a Court nor a Judicial Tribunal within the scope of Art.175 of the Constitution

Assumption of jurisdiction by Ombudsman in the present case was erroneous and could not be sustained and impugned order was set aside

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Brief facts were that the petitioners instituted a civil suit seeking permanent injunction and possession in respect of immovable property after a notice for removal of alleged encroachment was issued by the Cantonment Executive Officer under S.108 of the Cantonments Act, 1924; during the pendency of the suit, the Trial Court, instead of deciding the application for temporary injunction, returned the plaint under O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. for presentation before the proper forum, which order was upheld by the District Court in revision, whereupon the petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court through the present writ petition

Held: Notice issued under S.108 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 being administrative in nature and having the effect of affecting the civil rights of the petitioners raised issues that were of a civil nature

These include questions relating to title, possession, lawful occupation, and alleged encroachment, which fell well within the scope of civil adjudication

Moreover, there was no express bar under the Cantonments Act, 1924, that ousted the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters where executive actions were challenged on the grounds of illegality, arbitrariness, malice, or want of jurisdiction

Courts below erred in law by returning the suit filed by the petitioners which was maintainable

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Powers of Registrar can in no case exceed the powers of Civil Courts under Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Culmination of partition proceedings in favour of petitioners being owners in joint khata and issuance of warrants of actual possession

Respondent/vendee claimed to be owner in possession of land in dispute on the basis of mutations attested in her favour on the basis of decrees of Court

Validity

Purchaserin column of cultivation is not competent to file a suit for partition as it is in respect of the partition of the property amongst the co-owners i.e., the set of owners from a particular Khata, and vendee of column of cultivation step into the shoes of his vendor

Respondent had already approached the civil court for determination of her right

Total entitlement of respondent on the strength of mutations attested in her favour through judgment and decree, and the property, which was devolved upon her from her father, being subject to the ownership of their vendors were questions requiring resolution

A person cannot transfer a better title than he owns as envisaged in the Latin maxim 'Nemo dat quod non-habet' (no one can give what they do not have)

Total entitlement of the vendor shall be the shares alienated through mutations

Mutationsin favour of respondent in isolation with the rest of the factors might not be made basis for rectification of the entries in revenue papers unless the status of the vendor/vendors was determined

There was no evidence regarding the total ownership of the vendor of respondent and her predecessor-in-interest for resolution of her entitlement, thus, High Court was left with no other option but to have resort to the provisions of O.XLI R. 25 of C.P.C. for proper determination from Trial Court

Since intricate question of law and facts was involved in the matter, it could not be resolved by the revenue office, therefore, the submission of the petitioners for the dismissal of suit was held to be misconceived

Although the entire proceedings of partition which culminated in partition mutation were affected by the suit of the respondent, yet right of respondent could not be overlooked as both i.e., the beneficiary of partition mutations and the vendee of column of cultivation, shall be seen in juxtaposition

Entire confusion and perplexity were, in fact, based upon the attestation of mutations in column of cultivation but even then, the rights of the parties required determination once for all based on Latin maxim "Ubi jus ibi remedium" which encapsulated the principle that when a legal right is violated, the law provides a corresponding remedy or relief to the aggrieved party

Civil revision was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court was set aside and suit of the plaintiff/respondent was deemed to be pending before the Trial Court where all the vendees of column of cultivation and that of column of ownership were ordered to be arrayed and the matter was ordered to be resolved.

Core issue before the civil court was with regards to its lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate such suits as specific provisions for seeking change in date of birth and change in name were provided under the calendar of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Rawalpindi Volume-I which dealt with Act and Regulations whereas Volume II of the calendar prescribed the Rules

Chapter-III of Volume I provided the general regulations and Regulation 5 dealt with the matter relating to correction in date of birth of a candidate

Chapter-17 of Volume II of the calendar, on the other hand, provided the mode and manner of change in the name or surnames

Held: The amended version of S. 9, C.P.C. was in field but it was not taken into consideration at all

It was an admitted fact that all suits were instituted by the students after the amendment in S. 9, C.P.C.

From bare perusal of S. 9, C.P.C., it was clear that by virtue of amendment introduced through Act No. XIV of 2018 dated 20th March, 2018 to the extent of Province of Punjab, a radical and notable change was introduced by the legislature in the existing S. 9, C.P.C. and ouster clause was extended to the case for which a general or a special law was in force

This material change was undoubtedly not under consideration before the courts at the time of rendering the judgments

High Court allowed the civil revision and remanded the matters to civil court for deciding the question of jurisdiction afresh after keeping in consideration the amendment in S.9 C.P.C. introduced through Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018.

Consolidation authorities in appeal and revision, categorically advised the plaintiff to approach Civil Court for correction of entries in the revenue record

Every new entry in revenue record creates fresh cause of action and in this case recurring cause of action was available to the plaintiff

Plaintiff was in possession of the suit land as such the suit was well within time and the Civil Court had rightly adjudicated upon the matter

Pleas taken by the petitioners were repelled, accordingly.

Pendency of proceedings before another forum without a specific restraining order does not bar the civil court from exercising its jurisdiction vested under the law

Jurisdiction of civil courts under S. 9 of C.P.C. is plenary in nature and extends to all suits of civil nature except those expressly or impliedly barred

Unless there is a clear statutory exclusion, civil courts cannot relinquish their jurisdiction

When an administrative order affects civil rights and is alleged to be passed without jurisdiction the remedy of filing civil suit cannot be denied.

In the present case the business entity was being operated through a registered partnership firm between the two partners i.e. the petitioner (defendant) and respondent No. 1 (plaintiff)

Said business was neither a corporate entity nor was it incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, or the Companies Act, 2017 therefore, the assertion of the petitioner that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 was misconceived and fallacious

As a matter of fact, Section 5 had no applicability or nexus in the matter

Therefore, it had nothing to do with the pending suit between the parties

Substratum of the plaint did not highlight any dispute with regards to the business of the partnership firm, nor did anybody approached the Court for dissolution of the partnership firm or rendition of accounts; but for all practical purposes, the respondent No.1 only entered into an agreement for buying out 50% share of the petitioner in the partnership firm against a valuable consideration, and due to the alleged breach and non-fulfillment of terms and conditions of the agreement, respondent No.1 filed the suit for specific performance of contract with some other ancillary reliefs

All the prayers mentioned by the respondent No.1 were not considered (by the Trial and Appellate Court) which had independent status and were not dependent upon the alleged right of execution of sale deed or transfer of 50% share of the partnership firm in favour of respondent No.1 against a valuable consideration

According to respondent No.1, the partnership business was a going concern and he wanted to buy out 50% share of another partner

The effect of the agreement in question was also to be decided by the Trial Court on whether the arrangement in question could be construed as an agreement for relinquishment of share or retirement from the firm

On the alleged consensus ad idem, the contract was signed, and on the alleged breach, respondent No.1 filed the suit

Court cannot force someone to file a suit for dissolution of partnership or rendition of accounts, but it has to see whether specific performance of contract is possible or not, and in this case, unless the parties were provided equal opportunity to lead the evidence, it was not possible to decide the matter summarily on the basis of an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

At present stage, the Trial Court could not presume or anticipate the outcome that if the case was made out on merits and the Court granted a decree of specific performance, what the plaintiff would do with the partnership business, and whether he would induct any other partner, continue as proprietor, or convert it into a corporate entity of business

That was not the issue before the Court right now

At present, the lis only related to the alleged sale agreement of 50% share of another partner against some valuable consideration

This was the core issue and dispute between the parties which needed to be adjudicated by the Trial Court

High Court had rightly set-aside the orders of Trial Court and First Appellate Court, whereby the plaint was rejected, and remanded the matter to Trial Court with directions to decide the suit on merits

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Plaintiff sought a declaration in the suit that he was owner of suit property which had been taken over by the respondents

Suit was dismissed on the ground that Civil Court had no jurisdiction and the matters fell within the jurisdiction of Revenue court

Validity

S.172(2)(i) of the Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1969, (Act) empowers the Revenue Officer to resolve the issues in exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, pertaining to the limits of a land, claim of a partition or any other question connected with or arising out of the proceedings of the partition, but S.172(xviii)(2) of the Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, where question of title is involved

Parties were contravening and repelling the stances of one and the other, which obviously could not be decided without appraisal of the evidence, thus, the Revenue Court was not competent to resolve such factual controversy and the r ight forum for determination of the factual controversy was only the Court of civil jurisdiction

Civil revisions were allowed, in circumstances.

Plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit for declaration, possession and permanent injunction against the defendants alleging therein that their predecessor was tenant of the petitioners in suit land and was in possession thereof, who used to pay the share of crops to the petitioners; after his demise, the respondents, being his successors, came in possession of the suit land and were giving share of crops to the petitioners; and four years prior to the institution of the suit, the petitioners dispossessed them from the suit land without due course of law

Plaint was rejected by the trial Court by accepting the petition filed under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit

Appellate Court accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Trial Court by holding that since the petitioners had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit

Validity

Admittedly, the Revenue Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try a suit instituted by a tenant under S.41 for recovery of his possession under S.64(3), Second Group, clauses (c) and (f) of the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance, 1978

Under S.9, C.P.C., a Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance was either expressly or impliedly barred

In the present case, the cognizance of a suit instituted by a tenant for restoration of his possession was expressly barred by S.64(3) of the Ordinance

Appellate Court had illegally reached at the conclusion that since the petitioners had orally denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, as such, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit

Trial Court had, however, rejected the suit under O. VII, R. 11(c) and (d), C.P.C., on the ground of jurisdiction

Trial Court should have returned the suit under O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. read with S. 64(3) proviso (i) of the Ordinance, 1978 by endorsing upon the plaint, the particulars required by O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C., and returned the plaint for presentation to the Revenue Court

Civil revision was allowed by restoring the order of Trial Court with modification that the plaint shall be returned to the respondents for its presentation to the Revenue Court having jurisdiction for decision.

Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 ('Act') did not prohibit the Civil Court from determining the title of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 to all land held jointly or from granting a declaration of joint ownership in disputed agricultural land

Plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was seeking relief for declaration regarding his share to the extent of 14-00 Acres from the suit land being the son of deceased and partition and separate possession of his share from the suit land

Applicants had denied his share in the suit land and refused to give him a share of the produce, therefore, the provisions of the Act did not support the disputation of the applicants that the suit of respondent No. 1 was barred

Apparently, Revenue Courts did not confer jurisdiction in partition proceedings where question of title was involved amongst the parties as envisaged in the provision of the Act

Suit of the respondent No. 1 was rightly decreed

Revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

Issues regarding contract interpretation including whether a party is entitled to compensation for escalation based on legislative changes or currency fluctuation

Issue reserved for arbitrator

Civil Court in an application under Ss.8 & 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act), only has to see whether a dispute exists and whether it is covered by the arbitration agreement, and it is not meant to delve into the merits of the dispute itself, and threshold of the examination has to be extremely low to see only whether the dispute raised is one which, under the terms of the dispute resolution clause, could be considered a dispute under or in relation to that contract and can by no means extend to interpretation of the contract clauses to examine whether that interpretation justifies or precludes the claim in dispute, which is the arbitrator's job

Assertion of a claim by one party and the repudiation thereof by the other party constitutes a dispute warranting the arbitration clause to become operative

While proceeding the matter to arbitration, one has to be careful with any observations on the merits of the case, but it needs to be said that there can be a distinction between a variation to the contract price occurring due to a change in legislation and variation on market-based currency fluctuation in the ordinary course

Consequences of changes in legislation on the foreign cost component and the consequences of exchange rate fluctuations due to ordinary market movements are not necessarily the same thing

Question as to whether this distinction held in the case in hand and whether the petitioner was entitled to any escalation on that basis on the proper construction of the Contract was a job reserved for the arbitrator and not for the Civil Court

Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances.

Allegations mentioned in the plaint were regarding fraud and forgery which would only be decided after recording of evidence of the parties

In such secenario, the alleged bar contained in S. 17 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution), Act, 1993, cannot take away the plenary jurisdiction enjoyed upon the civil Court under S. 9, C.P.C, in a situation where the aggrieved person finds himself remediless, particularly, when a dispute requires detailed evidence in order to resolve a factual controversy, as in the present case, because a specific plea fraud and forgery had been pleaded

Petitioners alleged fraud and forgery in their plaint, committed by respondents to transfer the land

Main grievance of the petitioner was against the other respondents and not the Cooperative body

In the matter in hand, the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit

Impugned order and decrees were set aside and case was remanded to the trial court to decide afresh after obtaining written statements, framing of issues and recording of evidence.

Petitioner / defendant was Evacuee Trust Property Board and was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court in favour of respondents / plaintiffs setting aside order passed by Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board determining suit property as Evacuee Trust Property

Validity

Determination carried out by the Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board was not challengeable before Civil Court, in terms of S. 14 of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975

Powers were exercised by the Chairman under S. 10 of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975

Remedy of respondents against order in question was available either under sections 16 or 17 of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975

Plea of bona fide purchase by respondents / plaintiffs, from alleged allottees, extended no protection when allotment of alleged allottees, to whom Permanent Transfer Deeds were issued after June 1968 and their matter had been decided in terms of orders passed by Chairman, which orders were intact and had otherwise attained finality

High Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court

Trial Court had rightly held that Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate suits filed by respondents / plaintiffs

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellate court maintained the order of the Trial Court rejecting the plaint of the suit under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. being not maintainable

Validity

Respondents filed an application for partition of the suit property in terms of S. 135 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967, and the Assistant Commissioner passed an order which was impugned by way of filing of a suit by the applicant notwithstanding the fact that such order was an appealable order in terms of S. 161(b) of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967

Civil Court is a Court of ultimate jurisdiction and can in exceptional circumstances entertain a suit in respect of revenue matters and even against orders of the Revenue Authorities

Neither the order passed by the Revenue Authority was lacking jurisdiction; nor any mala fide intent or action had been brought on record; nor present case was a case wherein the remedy provided in law could be bypassed

Civil Court was not competent to interfere where Revenue Courts/ Authorities had exclusive jurisdiction

Mere filing of a suit without any restraining orders, interim or final, does not preclude partition of a property, if otherwise lawful

Courts below had arrived at a fair, just and legal conclusion while rejecting the plaint in the suit

Revision was dismissed accordingly.

Conditions that had to be fulfilled where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the validity of an action or an order of executive authority or a special tribunal is challenged on the ground of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court stated.

Parties cannot be restrained to enforce their right in an ordinary court of law but if by mutual agreement between the parties a particular court having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction is selected for the determination of their dispute, there appears to be nothing wrong or illegal in it or opposed to public policy.

For determination of title, the same could be decided by the civil court of competent jurisdiction by way of filing civil suit for the purpose to establish the claim and recovery of share.

Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, filed a reference under sections 8 and 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, for declaring the land in question as trust property as well as sought cancellation of allotment in favour of the allottee

Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, passed impugned order declaring the land in question as trust property and also cancelled the allotment of the allottee as well as subsequent sale transactions

Revision petition under S.17 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 was also dismissed

Petitioners filed a civil suit against the order passed by Chairman, which was dismissed and appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed

After having lost the civil suit up to the appellate court petitioners filed Constitutional petition which was dismissed as withdrawn

Held, petitioners were well aware about the order of the Chairman but they filed revision petition before the Revisional Authority after a lapse of about 35 years, however, the limitation for challenging the order in revision petition was only 15 days but neither any explanation was furnished regarding such inordinate delay nor any application was filed for condonation of delay

Pursuing the matter at wrong forum due to ill advice of counsel could not be considered as a valid ground for condonation of delay

Moreover, Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board, under S.8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, alone was competent to decide every/any controversy relating to an evacuee property attached to charitable, religious or educational trust/institution or otherwise and any order/proceeding before the Civil Court was coram non judice

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Question of title was involved in the present case and Civil Court was the only forum to resolve the controversy after recording evidence

Civil Court could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim for partition of an estate or holding or any question connected with or arising out of the proceedings of partition, not being a question as to title in any of such property

When question of title was raised in a suit then provisions of S.172(2) (xviii) of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, would not come in the way of Civil Court to decide the issue

Present suit had been filed for partition on the ground of inheritance

Suit property had been left by the forefathers of the parties

Private partition had created title and interest of plaintiff in the suit property

Suit of plaintiff did fall within the domain of Civil Court, in circumstances

Plaintiff was owner of suit land

Trial Court had rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree in favour of plaintiff

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plaintiff instituted civil suit to challenge order passed by the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue ('the Member') under S.30(2) of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 ('the Act 1912' ) to resume the land-in-question

Both the Courts below dismissed suit of the plaintiff

Contention of petitioner/plaintiff was that the Member (Colonies) passed the order without jurisdiction as the matter-in-question actually related to tenancy rights/fair price assessment

Validity

No malice, mala fide or ill-will on the part of the Member (Colonies) while passing the order against the petitioner, had been pleaded or brought on record

Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, barred jurisdiction of Civil Court to make any interference in such like orders, which had been passed with jurisdiction

Revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Trial Court while hearing the application not only dismissed the same but also rejected the plaint on account of remedy provided under the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873

Appeal whereof filed by respondents was accepted while interpreting S.68 of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 to mean that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was final, as such the suit was maintainable

Validity

Section 68 of Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, clarified that appeal was provided against the order of Sub-Divisional Canal Officer before the Divisional Canal Officer and order thereof was final

Appellate Court had fell in error while holding that no right of appeal was provided against the order of Sub-Divisional Canal Officer

Trial Court had rightly arrived at the conclusion that in presence of right of appeal before the higher forum provided under the special law remedy of civil court was pre-mature

Constitutional petition was allowed.

Where controversy involved in matter does not pertain to affairs of society there compliance with the provisions of Ss.70 & 70-A of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, is not called for.

Petitioner assailed rejection of his plaint in a suit for declaration, partition, cancellation of registered deed, mandatory and permanent injunction against his father being co-sharer

Contention of respondent was that jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred in the matters of partition of agricultural land in view of Ss.135 & 172 of Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 and S.9 of C.P.C.

Validity

Civil Court had been granted general jurisdiction to try all the suits of civil nature in respect of the enforcement of civil rights unless their jurisdiction was expressly or impliedly barred

Impugned order suffered from material illegalities, irregularities and was made in excess or failure to exercise jurisdiction, as such, the same was set aside and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for decision of suit on merits.

Contention of the petitioners (Highways Division) was that plaintiffs/respondents ,instead of filing a claim for compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer, had approached civil court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim

Held, that the notice, in the present case, for inviting claims for compensation, pursuant to S.9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued 8 years after the land (including subject-property) was occupied by the Government

Said delayed notice was issued about one year after the institution of suit by the plaintiffs/respondents, however, even after disclosure of pendency of compensation proceedings (under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) in the written statement filed by the petitioners, the plaintiffs did not file a claim for compensation before the Collector pursuant to S.9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 nor they moved under S.18 of the said Act, 1894 for making a reference against the award to the Court designated for the purpose

Acquisition proceedings remained unchallenged , therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs could not be said to be one envisaged under S.52 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to question anything done in pursuance of the said Act

Decree passed by the Appellate Court was without jurisdiction

High Court set aside the judgment, the preliminary decree and final decree passed by the Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs

Revision was allowed, in circumstances.

Civil Courts could try all suits of civil nature except those of which their jurisdiction was barred expressly or by necessary implication.

If litigation has an appropriate remedy before a special court/forum then resort to institution of a civil suit is not permissible.

Partition of agricultural land falls within the exclusive domain of Revenue Officer and the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred

Decree passed by Civil Court relating to the partition of agricultural land is without jurisdiction and nullity in the eyes of law.

Question before High Court was whether any person seeking to object to an award made by Collector, could directly invoke jurisdiction of Civil Court under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 without making an application to the Collector

Held, that Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was a complete code by itself and was a special enactment dealing with a particular subject, and any relief claimed in respect of its subject-matter must be found within the four corners of said enactment as a general rule

Jurisdiction of Civil Court under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was therefore a special one and was for determination of adequacy or otherwise of the amount of compensation paid under the award made by the Collector

Certain conditions under Ss. 18, 19, 20 & 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had to be fulfilled before Collector was empowered to make reference under S.18 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the Civil Court

Such jurisdictional facts, and their compliance was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of reference under S. 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Order made by Collector referring the matter to Civil Court, provided foundation of the jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide the objections referred to it and Civil Court was bound by said reference and could not widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which were not referred to it

High Court observed that it was not within domain of Civil Court to entertain any application under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 pro intersse suo or in the nature thereof and that S.18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 did not authorize or permit or provide for a person aggrieved, to make an application directly to the Civil Court.

College of Medicine and Dentistry-plaintiff entered into license agreement with the hospital-defendant for medical facilities of said hospital for teaching purposes to its students for a period of ten years

Hospital issued notice to the College to vacate its premises after expiry of the stipulated period of agreement

College filed suit for declaration wherein application for rejection of plaint was moved but same was dismissed

Validity

Licence agreement for affiliation of College with the hospital was executed between the parties after settlement of terms and conditions

Said agreement was terminable after expiry of five years from its execution by giving five years notice in advance from terminus date

Hospital served notice during existence of licence agreement for termination as well as non-extension of said agreement

Tenure of license agreement was completed on 08-11-2016 and College was bound to vacate the demised premises

College moved application to the Commissioner Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, concerned department of the hospital, for extension of agreement of affiliation with the hospital, no extension was granted in favour of the college and hospital served another notice to the college to vacate the hospital premises and for payment of outstanding dues

Hospital also served notice for non-compliance of terms and conditions settled between the parties

College remained unresponsive to the said notices and defaulted in payment of hospital dues but kept on utilizing the premises without any legal right or permission of the hospital

License agreement was initially for a period of ten years extendable with consent of the defendant

College was bound to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- in advance as affiliation fee and Rs. 6,00,000/- per month to the hospital for payment to the employees of the hospital

Present suit was filed on the basis of misrepresentation of record

Period of license agreement had already expired and no renewal had been accorded by the competent authority

College had no right to retain the possession of hospital premises on the basis of restraining order passed by the Civil Court

Jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred to issue any restraining order

Present suit was barred under S. 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 as in absence of any agreement college had no right which could be enforced through process of law

Hospital had refused to extend the period of alleged agreement and after expiry of the same no enforceable rights were attached with the said agreement

College was occupying the premises of hospital without any permission of licensor

Any admission made against the record or against admitted document did not create any right to declare the plaintiff as tenant of defendant

College had not challenged the notice for vacation of the premises of the hospital

Present suit had been filed after two years of the expiry of lease agreement which itself had left no right enforceable under any law

Jurisdiction of civil Court was barred in the present matter

Present suit was barred by law and suffered from the lack of cause of action

Impugned orders dismissing application for rejection of plaint had no sanctity in the eyes of law which were set aside

Plaint was rejected in circumstances

Constitutional petition was allowed.

When a suit was clearly barred by law or a statute did provide an alternate remedy/forum to the plaintiff or mechanism for dealing with the plaintiff's complaint then Civil Court could reject the plaint at any stage of the proceedings

Plaintiff in the present case had alternate and efficacious remedy against the defendant/licensee

Nothing was on record preventing the plaintiff from filing a complaint against the defendant with regard to disconnection of gas meter

Second appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Suit was dismissed on the ground that Civil Court had no powers to entertain disputes with regard to correction of entries in the revenue record

Validity

Dispute with regard to correction of revenue record did fall within the exclusive competence of revenue department

Courts below had rightly held that a civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon with regard to the matter of correction of revenue record

Findings recorded by the Courts below were in accordance with law

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Trial Court while entertaining application for temporary injunction rejected the plaint on the ground that suit for correction of revenue record was not competent before civil Court and same was upheld by the Appellate Court

Validity

Plaint could be rejected at any time in terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. if same did come within the purview of clauses incorporated therein

Section 172 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1967 did exclude the jurisdiction of civil Court in the matter with regard to correction of any entry in the record of rights, periodical record and Register of mutation

Whenever any such entry did interfere with the right of a person pertaining to the land in question then he could approach to the Civil Court for declaration of his right in terms of S. 53 of Land Revenue Act, 1967

Present plaint was not restricted to correction of entries made by revenue authorities in ordinary course of business but plaintiff had questioned the entries in the revenue record on the ground that same were made illegally which had adversely affected his rights

Bar of S. 172 of Land Revenue Act, 1967 could not be pleaded as hurdle in exercise of jurisdiction of Civil Court in circumstances

Plaintiff had also sought decree for possession and perpetual injunction in the present case

Suit could not be dismissed mere on the ground that one of the prayed remedies in the plaint could not be granted while ignoring the other prayers made in the plaint

Matter of remedies had to be resolved by the Trial Court at the time of final disposal of the suit as to which of the remedies had to be granted or refused

Suit could not be dismissed while picking one remedy out of the several ones

Trial Court had rejected the plaint while entertaining the application for interim relief

No opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff to explain the competency of suit in circumstances

Provisions of O. VII, R. 11 of C.P.C. were not meant to surprise the plaintiffs by invoking the same in order to non-suit them

Trial Court earlier rejected the application filed under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. and thereafter obtained written statement

Proper course for Trial Court was to frame issues and then provide opportunity of leading evidence to the parties in support of their respective claim and thereafter decide the controversy on merit

Rejection of plaint after commencement of proceedings by the Trial Court was not justified nor lawful

Case was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh decision after providing the parties an opportunity to lead evidence

Second appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Courts generally refused to interfere in decisions of a club on disciplinary matters if given without any irregularity in procedure unless it was proved either that rules were opposed to natural justice or that the same were not followed or that there was malice or mala fides in arriving at decision

Jurisdiction of court in such matters was therefore, limited within a very narrow compass.

Jurisdiction of Civil Court was not barred where acts of revenue authorities were ultra vires, without jurisdiction, collusive or bad in law or void or in excess of their jurisdiction or passed in absence of aggrieved party or based on fraud

If any order of Executive Officer was ultra vires, it could be struck down by Civil Court irrespective of bar under section 36 of Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912

Civil Court was competent to examine whether or not act purported to have been done under Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 could be validly done

If the order passed by Colony Authorities was within four corners of their jurisdiction, same would be immune to interference by Civil Court in view of bar under S.36 of Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912.

Intentions of Legislature in their wisdom qua S. 36 of Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 were that the officers working under the Act should exercise their powers freely and should not be interrupted unnecessarily to administer colony land according to the terms and conditions issued by the competent authority from time to time but this provision did not give unfettered/unchecked power

Ambit of jurisdiction of Revenue Courts had been laid down by Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 and the officers functioning thereunder could not be allowed to act beyond their scope of jurisdiction or exceed their jurisdiction

Civil Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction had the authority/power to interfere, if the orders of revenue hierarchy were found to be without jurisdiction mala fide, excessive or in violation of law

Under S.9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Civil Court was competent to check usurpation of power by Revenue Courts, but it could not check errors of judgment of Revenue Court on the plea of mis-appreciation of evidence.

Jurisdiction of civil court to entertain suit on question relating to nomination, scrutiny, results, qualification/disqualification of candidates or with reference to voters list or dealing with electoral process is barred and jurisdiction under S. 9, C.P.C. is not vested in civil court to entertain suit in such questions.

Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction and it should continue to assume jurisdiction with regard to civil matters unless same had been expressly barred.

Contention of plaintiff was that it was option of the aggrieved person to avail remedy by filing suit under S.9, C.P.C. or under Defamation Ordinance, 2002

Validity

Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction

Neither there was any repealing clause nor ouster of jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit filed before it with regard to damages on account of defamation

If in respect of same dispute/litigation general law and special law were in field, special law would prevail subject to condition that special law contained provisions of ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts

Aggrieved person, therefore, had option either to opt for redressal against defamatory action before court of general jurisdiction i.e. civil court or under the special law

Jurisdiction of civil court covered all kinds of civil litigation on the strength and force of S. 9, C.P.C.

Plaintiff had availed the option of the civil court but his plaint was returned while misinterpretin g the law

Impugned order was not sustainable in circumstances which was set aside and matter was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Jurisdiction of civil court with regard to suit for damages on the ground of loss of reputation and defamation was barred under S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002

District Court had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters

When special tribunal or court had been established to hear and decide the dispute then jurisdiction of courts constituted under general law should be ousted from exercising power of the nature

Word "shall" used in Section 13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 had mandatory nature of provision with regard to exclusive jurisdiction to try cases of defamation.

Plaintiff filed suit for declaration to the effect that they were owners in possession of suit property and mutation on basis of partition proceedings in another suit was wrong, illegal and ineffective upon their rights

Defendants filed application for rejection of plaint

Plaint was rejected with observation that jurisdiction of court was completely excluded in terms of S. 172 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967

Appeal against was also rejected

Validity

Partition proceedings were decided on basis of compromise whereupon mutation was attested, however, grievance of plaintiff was that Tatima was carved against their rights

Serious allegations levelled in plaint were to be looked into by court which was not possible without recording evidence

No other forum was available for plaintiffs for redressal of their grievance as order passed on basis of compromise was not assailable before higher forum in revenue hierarchy

Plaintiff was to approach civil court as they had been allegedly defrauded and in case they failed to prove, the matter would meet logical end

Contents of plaint were to be looked into on face of it without any reference to defence

Whenever jurisdiction of civil court was ousted by a particular statute, only plaint could be returned but plaint could not be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

Revision was accepted in circumstances.

Earlier, suit of plaintiff for recovery of compensation of acquired land was conditionally withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit

Plaintiff instituted fresh suit with regard to same suit land or part thereof but later on suit was withdrawn unconditionally and was dismissed as withdrawn

Present suit was barred under O. XXIII, R. 1 and O. II, R. 2, C.P.C.

Land in question was acquired on 30-11-1992 and suit for recovery of compensation was filed on 14-10-2010 which was time barred; besides present suit was outside the jurisdiction of civil court as dispute was with regard to acquisition of land falling within the ambit of Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Trial Court dismissed the suit under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Impugned order was modified and plaint was rejected

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Civil court had power to adjudicate civil disputes despite ouster of its jurisdiction if no other efficacious remedy was available to the aggrieved persons or based upon fact constituting lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal/authority and tainted with malice.

Any person having right had a corresponding remedy to institute suit in a court unless the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred

Civil court had been granted general jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature

Whenever the object of proceedings was the enforcement of civil rights then civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit independently of any statute unless its cognizance was either expressly or impliedly barred

Final decision with regard to a civil right, duty or obligation should be that of the civil court.

Jurisdiction for partition of undivided immovable property which was outside the domain of Revenue hierarchy would vest in the ordinary civil court of competent jurisdiction.

Civil suit for possession had necessarily to be filed in the civil court to claim possession of the area demarcated and encroached upon

Civil court could appoint commission for demarcation but same would be conducted by the revenue officials

Constitutional petition was accepted and impugned orders were set aside.

Mechanism and hierarchy given in the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, must be exercised unless such was a futile exercise

If the forum of appeal given in the special statute was just a wastage of time and was not proper then party could ignore said forum and could adopt alternate forum

Without exhausting proper forum invoking the jurisdiction of alternate remedy was not proper

If the orders passed under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 were without jurisdiction only then plaintiff had the right to invoke the jurisdiction of civil court

If Authority had exercised jurisdiction vested in it then the provisions of the statute barring the jurisdiction of civil court would come into force.

Parties of the suit would be free to exhaust the revenue forum and then to move the civil court by impleading the government as a party to the case in the revenue proceedings as well as in the civil proceedings

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Civil courts were forum having plenary jurisdiction but the provisions of S.9, C.P.C. were to be read and given effect to in its true perspective

Special Tribunal or Authority should be given preference for a particular relief where special procedure and special forum was provided in any other law and recourse to civil courts should be avoided

Section 9, C.P.C. would bar and exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts in the matters whereof special procedure and Special Tribunal or Authorities were constituted and established for the redressal of a particular grievance.