Interpretation

"Whether, in cases of ambiguity, the rights recorded in the relevant columns should be interpreted in favour of the husband on the ground that he bears the financial liabilities?"

Held: Such an understanding is contrary to the concept and the fundamental principles relating to a Nikah i.e. a marriage contract

Law enforced in Pakistan relating to marriage contracts explicitly recognizes the rights of both the parties, the bride and the groom, to give free consent in order to enter into a contractual bond of marriage and the freedom to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions

Both the contracting parties must have informed understanding of their respective rights and the entries which are required to be recorded in the Nikahnama

Court, while deciding a dispute and interpreting the terms and conditions of the parties, has to take into consideration whether the free consent or free will of the parties was compromised on account of the attending circumstances, such as cultural and social influences.

Family court held the wife entitled to dower mentioned in Column No.16 in the form of property; Appellate Court found her entitled to dower amount mentioned in Column-13 and property in Column-16; whereas High Court held that claim of dower mentioned in Column-16 was in lieu of the amount mentioned in Column-13, thus, if the latter obligation was discharged, then the wife was not entitled to recover the dower mention in Column 16

Validity

If the interpretation of the High Court is accepted then dower agreed to be paid in cash would have the effect of virtually making dower in other forms such as immovable or movable property redundant, which would negate the basic concept of dower i.e. parties out of free will agreeing to dower in any form provided it has a marketable value

Parties may, therefore, agree to dower being paid in cash in addition to and distinct from dower in any other form, such as immovable or movable property

Headings of columns in the Nikahnama are definitely not the determinant factor nor can they prevail over the intention of the parties, which would negate the very concept of dower

High Court had virtually rendered the right to dower agreed between the parties in the form of immoveable property as redundant by subjecting its effectiveness to fulfilling the obligation recorded under Column-13

Dower is obligatory and it could be anything which has a marketable value

It can be in the form of cash or property or both

Parties may agree to dower in the form of immovable property in addition to cash

Entry in Column-13 is definitely not a rider to entries in Columns-14, 15 and 16 as was held by High Court

Appellate court had correctly appreciated that the evidence and its interpretation regarding the entries in columns-13, 14 and 16 was in accordance with what the parties had intended at the time of execution of the Nikahnama

Judgment of the High Court was, therefore, set-aside and the judgment and decree of the appellate court was restored

Civil petition for leave to appeal filed by the wife was converted into appeal and allowed, while in the one filed by the husband, leave was refused and the petition was dismissed.

Where two or more provision appear to be in conflict, they must be interpreted in such a manner as to give effect to all, thereby maintaining coherence and integrity of the legislative scheme as a whole.

Interpretation of statute, which leads to unreasonable or inconvenient results should not be adopted when a more rational construction is available

Principles which regulate the interpretation of a statute must be taken to regulate the interpretation of the rules as well.

No rule can militate or render the provisions of an Act ineffective.

Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them.

Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them.

There is no concept of enlarging scope of charging section on the basis of ambiguous and presumptive mechanism which the scheme of law imposing tax has not provided.

In any taxing statute, there are three stages; firstly, the imposition or creation of the very tax or levy known as the 'charge'; the provision which deals with the latter is called the charging section

Secondly, the quantification of the tax of levy which is called 'assessment' and thirdly, the recovery of the levy or tax is called collection

Latter two are the machinery provisions, which are contained in the machinery sections of the statute.

Such strict interpretation is to be confined to such power of attorney only where the same runs counter to the interest of the principal

Where issue involves accretion of right of the principal, the same may be interpreted to the advantage of the principal.

Power of attorney must be construed strictly as giving only such authority as is conferred expressly or by necessary implication

Power of attorney cannot empower beyond what it really conveys and its contents must be taken into consideration as a whole

Power of attorney only gives that power which is specifically mentioned therein.

Circular, which is in the form of an administrative direction cannot offend the provisions of and Act which are unambiguous.

S. 13, Sixth Schedule, Table-1, Sr. No. 151, sub-serials (a) and (b) & Sr. 152 [as inserted by Finance Act, 2019 vide Circular No.01 of 2019]

Transposition of exemption under SRO 1212(I)/2018/ following rescindment of SROs 888, 889 and 890(1)/2018

Exemption for Federally Administrated Tribal Area / Provincially Administrated Tribal Area (FATA/PATA) area

"Supplies" as given in Serial 151 and phrase "as made till 30 June 2024"

Interpretation

Argument of the Department was that supplies of electricity had been specifically exempted vide Serial No.152 and had the legislature intended to exempt supplies of gas it would have also done so specifically

Validity

Contention of the Department was misconceived as provision envisaged in Serial No.151 was to be seen and interpreted according to its language keeping in view the background and history of the legislation

Federal Government had issued different SROs to facilitate the inhabitants of FATA/PATA to bring them within the constitutional sphere phasewise and by providing exemption on supplies as it existed prior to the 25th Constitutional Amendment and Serial No.151 is a transposition of SRO 1212(I)/2018 (now rescinded) which provided exemption from whole of sales tax by whatever name it was

Further, if the legislature in its wisdom had specifically mentioned in Serial No.152 of Table-I Sixth Schedule exemption on supplies of electricity to all consumers that did not mean that rest of all supplies were excluded from exemption specially in the presence of S.No.151 which dealt with 'supplies' also

Thus, the word "supplies" given in sub-serial (a) was an independent provision and had to operate separately by connecting with phrase "as made till 30 June 2024

Appeal filed by registered person (SNGPL) was allowed, in circumstances.

Arguments of respondent / Department was that the provisions given in sub-serials (a) and (b) of Sr.No.151 were to be read conjunctively as a single preposition; and that if sub-serials (a) and (b) were read disjunctively, it would lead to a very absurd result; and that the word 'supplies' given in sub-serial (a) if read in isolation it would mean all the supplies were exempted from the charge/levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which could not be the intent of legislature; thus, it was only when "supplies" was read conjunctively with sub-serial (b) it came out that the 'supplies' and 'imports' by the industries located in the Tribal Areas were exempted from levy of sales tax

Argument of the appellant / SNGPL was that both the sub-serials operate independently and were separately connected to the phrase "as made till 30th June 2024"

Validity

The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at times, they are read vice versa to give effect to the manifest intentions of the legislature

Legislative history and the intention of the framers clearly point out that concession to the residents of FATA/PATA in respect of immunity from sales tax on supplies was continued by providing breathing space to them to enter into the tax regime gradually and so they were granted all benefits, in the shape of exemption from all taxes, which were available to them prior to the 25th Amendment to the Constitution

Plain reading of S.No.151 did not support the interpretation made by the Department

Sr.No.151 is divided into two separate and distinct prepositions enumerated separately as (a) and (b) and are divided by use of semi colon

Semi colons are used to join two related but independent clauses

Thus, the expression "and" used in between the two clauses, should be not read conjunctively

Intent of the legislature was manifestly clear that it decided to continue the concession of exemption on sales tax as on supplies till 30th June 2024 in order to provide some breathing space to the inhabitants of FATA/PATA to merge them into the constitutional state

Appeal filed by registered person (SNGPL) was allowed, in circumstances.

Courts, while interpreting the contents and terms and conditions of a Nikah Nama, also have to take into consideration the factor of free consent of the bride and her freedom to settle the terms and conditions as a person having an informed understanding of her rights

This is crucial in the context of the social and cultural norms generally prevalent in the society

If an ambiguity or doubt arises in relation to the terms and conditions of the Nikah Nama, an entry or column thereof, then the benefit ought to go in favor of the wife if there does not exist preponderance of evidence on record to establish that she had been informed of her rights, she understood each column of the Nikah Nama, and she had the freedom to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions out of free consent

In case the columns of the Nikah Nama have been filled by others without her meaningful consultation then a doubt or ambiguity cannot be interpreted against her rights or interests

It is implicit in the expression ''free consent'' that the wife, at the time of executing the Nikah Nama, had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions as an informed person competent to enter into a contract

Paternal tendencies of the society and dominance of the male members in relation to deciding the terms and conditions on behalf of the bride has generally been accepted as a cultural and social norm of the society

It places a bride in a disadvantageous position, inevitably adversely affecting her capacity to execute the contract with free consent

Weakness or creation of an ambiguity in a Nikah Nama cannot be interpreted against the interest and rights of a wife if it cannot be established that she had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions and had exercised her free will.

Petitioner (husband) had filed his written statement in response to the plaint and had expressly admitted the description of the property but he had taken the stance that the plot was meant for the construction of a house and the respondent (wife) was to live in it for as long as the marriage subsisted

However, a plain reading of the description of the property, as mentioned in column 17, does not indicate nor supports such a stance

If such an interpretation is accepted then the property would not form part of the dower separately mentioned in columns 13 to 16 of the Nikah Nama

Copy of the Nikah Nama showed that no condition has been stipulated in column 17 except describing the property

It is not the case of the petitioner (husband) that the columns were filled by the respondent (wife) or pursuant to meaningful consultation carried out with her before or at the time of execution of the Nikah Nama

No such evidence was brought on record

Onus was on the petitioner (husband) to establish that the property described in column No. 17 was not meant nor intended by the parties to be part of the dower

Ambiguity, if any, cannot be construed against the interests and rights of the respondent (wife) in the facts and circumstances of the present case

Moreover, accepting the stance of the petitioner (husband) would amount to reading in the Nikah Nama something not provided therein

Courts cannot construe the Nikah Nama and its entries as having the effect of applying a stipulation not expressly provided therein

High Court had correctly interpreted the columns of the Nikah Nama and declared the respondent (wife) entitled to the plot described in column 17 of the Nikah Nama

Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Law of limitation being a disabling provision, its various Articles are to be construed by its plain language.

Rules have to be consistent with the statute under which they are framed and with all that is deemed to be incorporated in the statute

Rule making authority cannot clothe itself with power which the statute itself does not give

Since the Rules are the wheels on which the hypothetical vehicle of the Act runs, it is tantamount that both work in harmony; otherwise, the Act would not be able to serve the purpose for which it was passed by the legislature.

Petitioner was aggrieved of dismissal of his application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. on the ground that attorney of petitioner did not have any authority to file such application

Validity

Attorney was acting on behalf of principal for his benefit in relation to subject property with clear power to safeguard interest of petitioner

General Power of Attorney had granted powers to the attorney to do all things on behalf of the principal in relation to protecting his rights

Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court could not deprive the attorney from exercising his power to file a suit, written statement or, from filing an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., on behalf of his principal

Such interpretation was in the context of facts and circumstances peculiar to the matter of petitioner

Application of rules of interpretation regarding the punctuation slash (/) had different outcomes depending on the facts and circumstances of each case

High Court set aside orders passed by two Courts below and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision on merits after recording of evidence, as the attorney was duly authorized and competent to file application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

In other words, a sales tax statute must be strictly construed in considering its coverage and no strained construction may be indulged in against the taxpayer simply because of the apparent purpose to raise needed revenue, nor will such statutes be given a retroactive operation, unless such an effect is clearly intended by the lawmakers.

Reasons as to why treaty interpretation rules differ from domestic tax rules stated.

Procedural rule prescribing the timeframe for doing a certain act in the course of the proceedings of a case should be followed as a rule and the departure therefrom can be made only as an exception in exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the party concerned.

Reasons as to why treaty interpretation rules differ from domestic tax rules stated.

Provision ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court is to be construed strictly and established rights cannot be disturbed, nor can an ouster clause deprive anyone of property

Ouster clause can also not be used to create injustice or hardship, but, this does not mean that the ouster clause is of no legal effect

Another factor to consider in determining the scope of the ouster of jurisdiction is to examine whether those who may be affected are provided with an alternative remedy.

Respondent/plaintiff filed suit for recovery under O.XXXVII, C.P.C against appellant/defendant with averment that respondent paid amount as loan in presence of witnesses and appellant/defendant handed over to respondent/plaintiff a cheque and said cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds

Appellant /defendant denied the receipt of loan from respondent with the claim that disputed cheque was handed over to respondent as zar-e-zamanat and furthermore some amount was returned by him to respondent after the initiation of criminal proceedings against appellant/defendant

Trial Court decreed the suit

Held, that there was no denial of fact that disputed cheque was issued, suit was instituted on the basis of cheque amount and respondent/plaintiff admittedly received said some amount from appellant/defendant before filing suit

While appearing as witness, respondent/plaintiff conceded about the part-payment in cross-examination but by concealing the fact intentionally failed to plead that fact in his plaint and simply filed a suit for recovery of cheque amount

Question was as to what the term "sum of amount undertaken or ordered to be paid to payee" meant in a case where the admitted liability of the drawer of the cheque got reduced, on account of part-payment made by him, after issuing the cheque

Expression "sum of amount undertaken or ordered to be paid to payee" would mean the amount of the cheque alone in case the amount payable by the drawer but, could it be said the expression "sum of amount undertaken or ordered to be paid to payee" would mean the amount of cheque, even if the actual liability of the drawer of the cheque had got reduced on account of some payment(s) made by him towards discharge of the debt or liability in consideration of which cheque in question was issued

If it was held that the expression "sum of amount undertaken or ordered to be paid to payee" would necessarily mean the amount of cheque in every case ,the drawer of the cheque would be required to make arrangements for more than the cheque amount payable by him to the payee of the cheque in case of part-payment by the drawer of cheque to the payee and obviously that could not have been the intention of the legislature to make a person liable to pay more amount than amount payable through cheque

If the drawer of the cheque was made to pay more than the amount actually payable by him, the inevitable result would be that he would have to chase the payee of the cheque to recover the excess amount paid by him

Even if the admitted liability of the drawer of the cheque had been got reduced, on account of certain payment(s) made after issuance of cheque, the payee would not be entitled to present the cheque for the whole of the amount to the banker for encashment or in such a case, if cheque was dishonoured for want of funds, a cause of action compulsorily would arise to file a suit for recovery of cheque amount under O.XXXVII, C.P.C

High Court observed, the drawer of cheque could make part-payment of the amount of the cheque, but that could easily be avoided by payee of the cheque, either by taking new cheque of the reduced amount from the drawer or by making an endorsement through a note on the cheque by the drawer acknowledging the part-payment and then presenting the cheque for encashment of only the balance amount due and payable to him

Appeal was allowed with direction to Trial Court to return the plaint to respondent for filing the same before an ordinary civil court of plenary jurisdiction.

Dialect and phraseology of power of attorney should be construed strictly and sternly.

Power of attorney must be strictly construed and proved, and must be strictly interpreted to ascertain the authority of the agent, acting on behalf of the principal.

Amnesty notification being beneficial subordinate legislation must be viewed liberally in favour of the taxpayer in order to achieve the solitary fiscal objective of quick recovery of stuck up tax revenue.

Amnesty notification being beneficial subordinate legislation must be viewed liberally in favour of the taxpayer in order to achieve the solitary fiscal objective of quick recovery of stuck up tax revenue.

If the intention of the lawmaker had been to restrict the right of filing application only to "person" who was party to the suit, then the word "party" ought to have been used.

Courts usually interpret concept of special provision by excluding general provision in same law.

Respondent expended a substantial sum to repair the vehicle and bring it into usable condition, however, when he went to have its registration with the motor vehicle authority transferred to his name he was informed that there was already another vehicle registered with the same number and that the documents produced by him were not genuine

Respondent filed suit in the civil court claiming damages in the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (of which Rs. 600,000/- was the total of the sums expended by him and the balance was by way of compensation)

Question as to whether the subject matter of the contract between the parties, was a 'motor vehicle' in howsoever badly damaged a condition it may have been, making the appellant (Insurance Company) liable to the respondent, or was it only a 'wreck' which was not a motor vehicle in any meaningful sense, and absolutely no regard had to be given to what the respondent intended to, or could, or actually did with it

Held, that in the insurance business the thing insured could be declared to be a "total loss" in two different senses

One was of it being an "actual total loss"; here, the sense was that the insured property had been destroyed or damaged to such an extent that it could be neither recovered nor repaired for further use

In this sense the insured property was reduced to just wreckage and nothing more

Other sense in which total loss was used was "constructive total loss"; this was the situation where the repair cost of the damaged insured property exceeded its market value if the repairs were undertaken, meaning it was not worthwhile to pay for the repairs or have them undertaken

In the present case the words 'total loss' had been used in the contract

Since the contract was created by the appellant, hence following the contra proferentem rule, any ambiguity in its meaning had to be resolved against the appellant

Words "total loss" used in the contract ought to be construed to have the meaning of "constructive total loss" i.e. the vehicle in question retained its character as such, and did not cease to be a thing of the kind that had been insured

Wreckage sold to the respondent was not mere wreckage, rather it was a vehicle, howsoever badly damaged it may have been and notwithstanding that the cost of the repairs may have exceeded the market value of the vehicle when repaired

Since what was sold was a vehicle, the respondent had an enforceable expectation that he would be able to use it as such in a lawful manner, i.e., to have it registered in his own name, but as he was unable to do so and clearly suffered loss, the burden of that loss must fall on the appellant

Suit of respondent had been rightly decreed by the Trial Court and the High Court

Appeal was dismissed.

Terms of the contract were to bear that meaning as they would have for, or convey to, a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.

When there was a doubt about the meaning of a contract, the words would be construed against the person who put them forward

Said rule was a principle not only of law but of justice.

Terms of the contract were to bear that meaning as they would have for, or convey to, a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.

When there was a doubt about the meaning of a contract, the words would be construed against the person who put them forward

Said rule was a principle not only of law but of justice.

For a valid Power of Attorney, it must expressly provide with particulars, not only the scope and extent of delegated power, but also the subject matter of delegation

Attorney could not assert any inherent or implied powers

Power of Attorney must clearly set out the purpose for which the same was executed

In cases, where such power was not clear and there was a 'special' and 'general' authority stipulated therein, then the 'general' powers following the 'special' power were to be construed as limited to what was necessary for the proper exercise of 'special' powers

Similarly, where the authority was given to do a particular act followed by general words, the authority was deemed to be restricted to what was necessary for the purpose of doing that particular act.

Statute in general and subsections of a section were to be read together to understand the true purpose and meaning of a particular provision.

Entries in the FLL should be given the widest of meaning and should be liberally construed as the Constitution was a living document and should be interpreted with the widest possible meaning to ensure continuity and balance amongst the organs of the state

So an Entry in the FLL should be given the widest possible meaning and include all ancillary and subsidiary matters so as to give meaning to the legislative power and the fact that there may be an overlap would not preclude the Federation from having legal competence.

Reason varied in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thought

"Reasonable time" was to be so much time as was necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract/duty required should have been done in a particular case; in other words, "reasonable time" meant, as soon as circumstances permitted.

Statute in general and subsections of a section were to be read together to understand the true purpose and meaning of a particular provision.

Whether employees having L.L.M degree or MS in Agriculture were also eligible for M.Phil allowance on the basis that said qualifications were equivalent to M.Phil as held by the (defunct) University Grants Commission (now Higher Education Commission)

Held, that the perusal of impugned notification showed that the M.Phil allowance was specifically meant for persons who held M.Phil degrees which were recognized by the Higher Education Commission, and that it was not expressly or by implication mentioned that the allowance would be payable to all who held an "M.Phil or equivalent degree"

Intent and purpose of the competent authority in granting the allowance was clear and unambiguous and there was no room to read something into the notification which was not there

Higher Education Commission did not have any power or authority to advise that all those who held LLM or MS degrees should be eligible to draw the allowance in question.

Before issuance of the appointment letter, a letter of offer of appointment as Traffic Warden (BS-14) was issued wherein it was mentioned that appointee shall receive emoluments of one additional basic pay plus 20 days fixed daily allowance and other allowances sanctioned by the Government from time to time

However, vide a subsequent notification the said emoluments were frozen to the levels existing at a prior date

Whether the additional basic pay formed part of the basic emolument of the respondent and therefore it was subject to increase

Held, that "letter of offer of appointment" was never accepted by the respondent and it was in the nature of an intimation

Had the respondent accepted the said letter, he may have had an arguable case

Appointment of the respondent was made through a "letter of appointment" as Traffic Warden (BS-14) and it was pursuant to and in acceptance of the terms and conditions of the said letter that the respondent joined the department

Said letter of appointment undertook a promise of grant of BS-14 with other emoluments at par with the Punjab Highway Patrol Police and as enhanced/ supplemented by the Government from time to time

Even otherwise correct meaning and interpretation of the "letter of offer of appointment" as well as the "letter of appointment" in essence meant the same things namely that the respondent would be entitled to draw his pay in BS-14 with other emoluments at par with the Punjab Highway Patrol Police

Furthermore the respondent never challenged the notification of the Provincial Government by virtue of which special pay and allowances were frozen at the level of an earlier date

Said freezing was applicable to all employees of the Provincial Government including the Provincial Police

Appeal was allowed and judgment of Service Tribunal was set aside.

Special pays granted in lieu of personal qualification were excluded from the general definition of "pay" and any interpretation or reasoning adopted to include it in the "pay" was incorrect.

Office order imposed major penalty of compulsory retirement on the respondent and treated his unauthorised absence from duty as extraordinary leave without pay

Interpretation

Plea on behalf of respondent that since his unauthorised absence from duty was treated as extraordinary leave without pay, therefore, the major penalty of compulsory retirement could not be sustained

Held, that perusal of the office order reflected that the competent authority in the first paragraph of office order had expressed its mind explicitly on the unauthorized absence of the respondent by imposing the major penalty of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect

So far as the second portion of the office order treating absence of respondent as extraordinary leave without pay was concerned, since the penalty imposed by the competent authority was of compulsory retirement which followed the payment of salaries and other dues till the date of imposing such penalty, therefore, it was necessary to give finding as to how such absence was to be treated

Office order categorically provided for consequences of unauthorised absence in the form of compulsory retirement

Appeal was allowed.

Tax department found that the respondent-company had not deducted and paid tax on the mark-up accrued in terms of a finance/loan agreement executed between the respondent-company and a consortium of financial institutions and commercial banks, in respect of a long term finance granted by the said consortium to the respondent-company ("the finance/loan agreement

Tax department contended that the respondent-company, in terms of the finance/loan agreement, was obliged to deduct income tax on the markup accrued in respect of the finance granted in terms of the finance/loan agreement, as mandated by S. 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 ("the Ordinance")

Held, that S. 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 provided that " Any person responsible for making any payment by way of profit or interest on bonds, certificates, debentures, securities or instruments of any kind issued by any banking company ... shall deduct advance tax, at the time of making such payment …."

Term 'instrument of any kind', could not, in the context of the S. 50(7D) of the Ordinance be construed in its wider sense, so as to include an 'agreement', or for that matter a finance/loan agreement within its fold as it would be violative of the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis, meaning, 'the same kind or class'

General words could not be read in isolation, their colour and their contents were to be derived from their context and surroundings

Addition of the phrase 'of any kind', to the word `instrument' also was of no avail to the tax department as such purported supplementation could not detach the word 'instrument' from the string of the 'specifics' preceding it

Respondent-company could not, therefore, be held liable under S. 50(7D) of the Ordinance, for not deducting income tax in relation to the finance/loan agreement

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Tax department found that the respondent-company had not deducted and paid tax on the mark-up accrued in terms of a finance/loan agreement executed between the respondent-company and a consortium of financial institutions and commercial banks, in respect of a long term finance granted by the said consortium to the respondent-company ("the finance/loan agreement

Tax department contended that the respondent-company, in terms of the finance/loan agreement, was obliged to deduct income tax on the markup accrued in respect of the finance granted in terms of the finance/loan agreement, as mandated by S. 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 ("the Ordinance")

Held, that S. 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 provided that " Any person responsible for making any payment by way of profit or interest on bonds, certificates, debentures, securities or instruments of any kind issued by any banking company ... shall deduct advance tax, at the time of making such payment …."

Term 'instrument of any kind', could not, in the context of the S. 50(7D) of the Ordinance be construed in its wider sense, so as to include an 'agreement', or for that matter a finance/loan agreement within its fold as it would be violative of the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis, meaning, 'the same kind or class'

General words could not be read in isolation, their colour and their contents were to be derived from their context and surroundings

Addition of the phrase 'of any kind', to the word `instrument' also was of no avail to the tax department as such purported supplementation could not detach the word 'instrument' from the string of the 'specifics' preceding it

Respondent-company could not, therefore, be held liable under S. 50(7D) of the Ordinance, for not deducting income tax in relation to the finance/loan agreement

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

'Mineral oil' and 'natural gas' though being sources of energy were distinct from the source that generated nuclear energy, thus, 'mineral oil' and 'natural gas' appearing in Entry No. 51 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List were to be read disjunctively from 'nuclear energy'.

Whether employees having LL.M degree or MS in Agriculture were also eligible for M.Phil allowance on the basis that said qualifications were equivalent to M.Phil as held by the (defunct) University Grants Commission (now Higher Education Commission)

Held, that the perusal of impugned notification showed that the M.Phil allowance was specifically meant for persons who held M.Phil degrees which were recognized by the Higher Education Commission, and that it was not expressly or by implication mentioned that the allowance would be payable to all who held an "M.Phil or equivalent degree"

Intent and purpose of the competent authority in granting the allowance was clear and unambiguous and there was no room to read something into the notification which was not there

Higher Education Commission did not have any power or authority to advise that all those who held LLM or MS degrees should be eligible to draw the allowance in question.

Special pays granted in lieu of personal qualification were excluded from the general definition of "pay" and any interpretation or reasoning adopted to include it in the "pay" was incorrect.