Condonation

Appellant (registered person) assailed order passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue ('the Commissioner') before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') whereby application for refund claim of the appellant /registered person was rejected

Ground for rejection was that refund application was filed later than the prescribed period

Validity

Record transpired that through previous round of litigation this forum / Tribunal after detailed discussion on the relevant facts already condoned the delay in filing the refund application later than the due date

Resultantly, the claim of refund had to be decided on the basis of facts regarding the claim and compliance with relevant provisions of the sales tax law

Since the refund claim was rejected on technical ground of late filing of refund application, hence the verification about the facts and compliance with relevant provisions of sales tax law had not been adjudicated and explored through a verification process

A decision that was fair and in accordance with the law would require verification of the claim in the light of relevant record justifying the appellant's entitlement to the refund for the period under consideration

Since the appellant claimed refund of sales tax paid in excess of the sales tax liability, the onus to prove the correctness of the refund claims, on facts and in law, laid upon the appellant /registered person

Complete record was not before the Tribunal for giving finding of fact nor the impugned order contained any such finding

Tribunal set-aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for de novo proceedings in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity to the appellant / taxpayer and after examining relevant record, evidences and details in support of the claims of refund and then pass a speaking order

Appeal, filed by registered person, was accepted accordingly.

Sole ground on which the delay was sought to be condoned was that due to some symptoms of Covid-19, the attorney had been advised by his doctor to observe quarantine, not permitting him to enter the premises of the court

Attorney, in support of his contention, had filed a medical certificate purportedly issued to him, however, neither the name of the Attorney was mentioned in said certificate nor period / dates of quarantine had been mentioned

Moreover, the application for condonation of delay and its supporting affidavit were silent as to why the appellant himself was unable to present the appeal while his Attorney was observing quarantine

Appellant had not even filed his own affidavit explaining his disability for filing the appeal within time, therefore, the burden to explain the delay of each and every day had not been discharged by the appellant and/or his Attorney

Thus, the delay of four days in filing the appeal could not be condoned, for having been filed after the prescribed period of limitation, meanwhile valuable right had been created in favour of the respondents, and no sufficient cause was found for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation

Application for condonation of delay was dismissed, resultantly the appeal was also dismissed.

Delay of each and every day has to be explained satisfactorily, otherwise the delay cannot and should not be condoned.

Deputy Collector of Customs provisionally released the goods of appellant and transmitted the goods declaration to the Directorate General of Valuation for determination of value

Deputy Collector of Customs thereafter determined the liability of appellant on the basis of value determined by Assistant Director, Directorate General of Valuation

Appellant filed representation to the Director, Directorate General of Valuation but it was not decided

Appellant thereafter assailed the order of Deputy Collector of Customs before Collector of Customs (Appeals), who dismissed the same on the ground of limitation

Validity

Deputy Collector of Customs, prior to passing of assessment order, had not supplied the impugned valuation advice to the appellant

Appellant had no option except to challenge the vires of the value determined by Assistant Director, Directorate General of Valuation and assessment order passed by Deputy Collector of Customs before the Collector of Customs (Appeals)

Conduct of appellant confirmed that he had been pursuing his case with the departments for redressal of his grievances/re-determination of value in accordance with law, therefore, the time so consumed by the appellant was excluded by the Appellate Tribunal

Appellate Tribunal condoned the delay in filing of appeal.

Delay of 72 days in filing appeal had been sought to be condoned contending that said delay was neither deliberate not intentional, but due to transfer of record and employees, the papers were inadvertently missed and did not reach the principal officer of the taxpayer for signing

Explanation offered by the taxpayer was not plausible

Law would support vigilant and not indolent

Any delay in filing appeal was to be considered negligence on the part of the party

Appellate Tribunal declined to allow condonation of delay

Appeal was dismissed being time barred, in circumstances.

Where Writ Petition had been filed by the appellant, which was withdrawn with permission to file an appeal, time spent in wrong forum might be condoned in view of S. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for the purpose.

Petitioner/taxpayer impugned order of Commissioner Inland Revenue, whereby its claim for refund was denied on ground that petitioner's/taxpayer's claim was time-barred and delay of each and every day was not explained by taxpayer/ petitioner Validity

Authorities were required to pass reasoned and "speaking orders" under S.24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and impugned order was not a "speaking order"

Impugned order was set aside and Department was directed to decide the matter through a "speaking order"

Constitutional petition was disposed of, accordingly.

Arbitration clause provided that dispute between the parties had to be referred, in the first instance, to a specified arbitrator who was supposed to give his decision on disputes and if after the decision of said arbitrator dispute persisted, the same was to be resolved under provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940

Dispute between the parties could be referred to arbitration only after decision of specified arbitrator

Right of aggrieved party to refer contractual disputes to arbitration therefore, was preconditioned with reference of the same to specified arbitrator

Application under S.20 of Arbitration Act, 1940, without fulfilling of preconditions of reference of dispute for decision of arbitrator in terms of specific clause of agreement, was liable to be dismissed as premature

Appellant's claim was turned down by respondent in year 1996 when cause of action for instituting arbitration proceedings had accrued

Trial Court was correct in not condoning delay in filing application under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940 which was barred by many years

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Petition for condonation of delay was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused by Supreme Appellate Court.

Sufficient cause was a cause beyond control of the party.

Provision of limitation for filing appeal against acquittal, under S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C., as well as S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was 30 days, whereas present appeal had been preferred beyond said period

No explanation, for inordinate delay had been given in memo of appeal

Earlier, co-accused was acquitted, against whom appellant/complainant had not filed any appeal

Present appeal had been filed after a delay of twenty days

In filing appeal against acquittal, each and every day had to be explained, which was mandatory provision for condonation of delay

Counsel for the appellant had not said anything as to how the complainant consumed the delayed time

Limitation created valuable rights in favour of the party whosoever would sleep over his right, could not claim the relief beyond the period of limitation

Appeal being not maintainable under the law, same was dismissed along with application for condonation of delay.

Limitation is not a mere technicality rather is a mandatory statutory provision and treating it as a formality or triviality would tantamount to making the entire Limitation Act, 1908 redundant and superfluous despite the fact that redundancy should not be attributed to statute

Object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent

Helping hand could not be extended to a litigant having gone into deep slumber, on having become forgetful of his rights

Law of limitation is a law which is designed to impose quietus on legal dissensions and conflicts

Person must come to the court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence

Invoking remedy by some aggrieved person beyond the period of limitation prescribed for redressal of grievance, creates a valuable right in favour of the opposite party

In such a case, delay of each day has to be explained by the defaulting party to the satisfaction of the court, which could not be condoned lightly or as of routine, as such arbitrary exercise of discretion would cause serious prejudice to the opposite party.

Both posts being permanent in nature, it could not be said that appointment and job of the employees were temporary in nature

Employees falling within the category of permanent employees, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 fully applied in their cases

Grievance applications had been filed with delay of 22 days; though sufficient cause was not mentioned in application for condonation of delay, but the employees could not be deprived of their rights on the grounds of limitation for the reason that they during their services approached the Authority and court for the regularization of their services

Embargo of limitation was not applicable to said employees

Courts always encourage the decision of the cases on merits, rather the litigant be non-suited on technical grounds including the point of limitation

Impugned withdrawal order, was set aside being without lawful authority

Tribunal directed that difference of the salaries of the employees be paid as regular employees.

Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider question as to whether delay could be condoned under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908; whether time consumed in obtaining certified copies of judgment, decree or other documents could be excluded under S.12 read with S.29 of Limitation Act, 1908 and whether High Court had no power under S.115, C.P.C. to condone such delay.

Appeal though was belated, but the question involved in it was important specially when the parents of appellant possessed computerized N.I.Cs.

Appellant stated that due to financial constraint he could not engage counsel and filed appeal in time

Delay was condoned in the interest of justice and appeal was admitted for hearing

Period of imprisonment of appellant though had already expired, but second part of punishment in shape of deportation awaited its execution

Appeal having been admitted for hearing, sentence of deportation awarded to appellant was suspended till its decision

Appellant was directed to be released on furnishing the surety.

Supreme Court condoned such delay as it proposed to decide both the appeals through a common judgment.

Doors of justice were closed after lapse of prescribed period of limitation, and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance, could be of any avail to litigant unless delay in filing appeal etc. was justified/legally accounted for and litigant was legally bound to justify reasons for each day's delay

Courts, in exceptional circumstances, were competent to condone delay in appropriate cases on compassionate grounds, if proved

Limitation when once started in no case, could be stopped.

Departmental appeal was filed by civil servant after delay of twenty-three days from date, of relieving order and' appeal before Service Tribunal was also barred by nine days Appellant was legally bound to prove that his departmental appeal as well as appeal before Service Tribunal were within time, but he had failed to prove the same. In absence of any application for condonation of such delay, appeal was liable to be dismissed on ground of limitation.

Civil servant could bring Departmental Appeal within thirty days of passing of order against him and if said appeal would remain un-disposed of un-responded for ninety days, civil servant would have thirty days period at his disposal to come to Service Tribunal where appeal would succeed on merits and delay, if any, could be condoned.

S. 5-Condonation of delay sought on ground of ill-advice of counsel-Nothing apparent from record as to how such ill-advice was given by counsel-Ground of ill-advice, not considered for condonation of delay in circumstances-[Counsel and client].

Art. 185(3)-Delay-Condonation - Contention that petitioner having been suffering from eyesore could not secure certified copy of impugned order in time hence delay in filing petition for leave to appeal be condoned-Suffering from eyesore, held, hardly a reason for delay of over a month in filing petition.-[Delay].

S. 6 and Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5-Delay-CondonationApplication for condonation of delay before Service Tribunal filed by appellant himself not containing averment that mistake in not filing appeal in time occurred on account of advice of counsel

Question of acting on mistaken advice of counsel and of delay being caused on that account being not pleaded condonation of delay declined.

Art.185(3)-Delay-Condonation-Petition for leave to appeal time barred Each day's delay not explained-Petition dismissed as barred by time.-

[Condonation of delay?.

O. II, r. 3 -Petition for leave, to appeal -Delay-Condonation-Petitions and other proceedings being received by Supreme Court during vacation on - all working days (except Saturdays) and no ambiguity existing on point, contention of petitioner being under impression of limitation not running during long vacation of Court, held, no bona fide excuse for condonation of delay.

[Condonation of delay].