Intra-Court Appeal

In suit for recovery of money and damages appellant/ plaintiff sought attachment of properties of respondents/defendants before judgment but Trial Court ordered respondents/defendants to furnish security

Validity

Before an order of attachment before judgment can be granted, the Court must be convinced, through affidavit or other means, that a defendant is intending to obstruct or delay execution of any potential future decree by disposing of its property

No person is prohibited from dealing with his property simply because a lawsuit has been filed against him

Power to attach is only justified when Court is convinced not only that the defendant is disposing of or removing his property but also that the intent is to obstruct or delay execution of a potential future decree

It is open to Court to look to conduct of parties immediately before the suit and to examine surrounding circumstances and to draw an inference as to whether defendant is about to dispose of the property and if so, with what intention

Court can take into account nature of claim and the defence put forward

Neither the plaint nor attachment application alleged that the goods were being shipped by respondents/defendants with the intent to obstruct or delay execution of a decree that might be passed in the suit

No such intent could have been ascribed to respondents/defendants when shipment had been arranged/scheduled prior to institution of the suit without notice of any impending legal action

Plaint conveyed that shipment of goods was part of respondents'/defendants' business operations and not specifically undertaken in response to the lawsuit

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Trial Court as there was no infirmity or illegality nor was pointed out by appellant/plaintiff

Trial Court while passing order in question had appreciated all facts involved in the case

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant/complainant was aggrieved of quashing of second FIR by Single Judge in Chambers of High Court registered against respondent/accused on same set of allegations

Validity

Intra Court Appeal, in terms of proviso to S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, is neither available nor competent before Bench of two or more Judges of High Court against order of Single Judge made under Art. 199(1) of the Constitution, as FIR is not included in term "proceedings"

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court quashing second FIR

Intra-Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant was aggrieved of order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court dismissing constitutional petition filed against order passed by Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Guardian Court retrieved minor from father and handed over the custody to mother

To such extent finality was attached to the order that had been passed on an application under S. 12 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and was challengeable before Lower Appellate Court as "a decision given" in terms of S. 14(1) of Family Courts Act, 1964

Such appeal was entertained by Lower Appellate Court and had reversed the order which order was challenged through Constitutional petition

In view of availability of appeal under S. 14(1) Family Courts Act, 1964, question that appeal was not provided under S. 47 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, against order passed on application under S. 12 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, had lost its efficacy

Intra Court Appeal was not maintainable against order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction as Lower Appellate Court in appellate jurisdiction has passed order against original order passed by Guardian Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Appellant assailed the dismissal of his constitutional petition whereby he had challenged the appointment of the private respondent as non-official Member and Chairperson of the Board of Governors, Child Protection and Welfare Bureau

Validity

Appointment of the Chairperson of the Board of Governors of the Bureau is regulated under S.6 of the Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004, which provides that the Government shall appoint the Chairperson of the Board from amongst the members

Chairperson holds office during the pleasure of the Government and may resign from his office

Similarly, S.7 of the Act provides that a Member holds office during the pleasure of the Government

Said provisions indicate that the positions of member of the Board and the Chairperson of the Board are purely pleasure posts and appointments to these positions are made by the Chief Minister at his discretion

There is no requirement for advertisement before making such appointments

To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, one must establish that his legal or fundamental rights have been violated and he must have a locus standi or be an aggrieved party

Appellant in this case was neither aggrieved nor had a locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the court as the appointment process was conducted in compliance with the provisions of the Act

Intra-court appeal was dismissed.

Cane Commissioner allowed the sugar mills to start crushing for fresh season but upon their undertaking and offer for sale of sugar stocks for paying the cane growers

Petitioner-banks filed Constitutional petitions before the High Court challenging the action of the Cane Commissioner whereby the refined sugar as per their contention, was pledged with the banks against the "Running Finance" facility extended to the Sugar Mills, and therefore the banks had a first charge being secured creditors upon the refined sugar

Constitutional petitions filed by the banks were dismissed, and Intra-Court Appeals filed there against were dismissed as being non-maintainable

Held, that for purchase of cane sugar cane growers and sugar factories entered into a mandatory agreement under R. 9(3) of the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1950 ('the Rules')

In accordance with Forms 7 & 8 of Appendix II to the Rules any dispute pertaining to the agreement was to be referred to arbitration

Furthermore in accordance with the R. 17(6) of the Rules any party considering himself aggrieved by an award made during the arbitration may appeal to the Provincial Government within one month of the date of communication of the award and Government shall pass such order as it deemed fit

Admittedly, the matter in issue was a dispute regarding payment of price of sugarcane provided by the cane growers to the occupier of the sugar mills

As the applicable law for such dispute provided for an appeal, therefore, in terms of S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the Intra-Court Appeals filed by the banks were not maintainable.

Appellant impugned order passed in Constitutional petition whereby criminal proceedings against respondent were quashed and respondent was allowed to be released on bail

Contention of respondent, inter alia, was that intra-court appeal against such order was not maintainable

Validity

In order to determine forum of appeal, courts must look to the nature of proceedings in which impugned order sought to be appealed, had been made

Proceedings in which impugned order, in the present case, was passed were criminal in nature, therefore intra-court appeal under S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was not maintainable

Intra-court appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

High Court in Constitutional petition restrained respondents under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. and thereafter, upon application of respondents, clarified its restraining order

Appellant impugned such order clarifying High Court's restraining order, and contended that such order whereby clarification was issued, was amenable to intra-court appeal as same was not interlocutory but final order

Validity

Where an order did not decide matter finally and proceedings remained to be tried and rights of parties were yet to be finally determined, then such order could not be termed as "final order" but would be interlocutory in nature against which appeal under S.3(3) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 would not be competent

Impugned order was one which disposed of an application for clarification of earlier order of High Court and said order itself stated that the matter was yet to be decided, which meant that such order was clearly "interlocutory"

Intra-court appeal, being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Question before High Court was whether an order passed by Single Judge of High Court upon an application under S.12(2) C.P.C., could be assailed by intra-court appeal under S.3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Held, that appeal under S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 could either lie against a decree passed or final order of Single Judge of High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction

Although an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. was a civil proceeding yet it could not be regarded as a suit as every suit was commenced by a plaint, and where there was no suit, there could be no decree

Mere fact of a matter coming directly before High Court, under law, would not suffice the same to be within ordinary meaning of original civil jurisdiction

Remedy of making application under S.12(2) C.P.C. would arise only if there was a judgment or order of a Court meaning thereby it was contemplated as a sort of reconsideration or reopening or in a way review of a decided matter on limited ground of fraud misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction

Such type of rethinking of matter relating to enforcement of civil right brought before the Constitutional jurisdiction could not possibly be claimed to be exercise of original jurisdiction

High Court held that order under S.12(2) C.P.C. made in a petition before Single Judge of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution could not be challenged by way of intra-court appeal under S.3(1) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Intra-court appeal, being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Subsection (2) of S.3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 provides that no appeal shall lie under subsection (1) or subsection (2) from an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the court.

Member of Housing Society assailed Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court against act of the Society reducing size of her plot and failure to hand over the possession

Single Judge of High Court directed the Housing Society to deliver possession of plot and in case of reduction in measurement of plot, the Society was to pay compensation according to market rate

Validity

Provisional transfer letter was issued to the member of the Society which was subject to certain conditions, one of which had allowed the Society to make adjustments in the location and size of provisionally allotted plot

Such condition specifically had stated that prospective adjustment would likely to affect price of plot and in such case necessary monetary compensation was to be made at the time of possession of the plot

Housing Society was justified to arbitrarily reducing measurement of plot of its member

No Fundamental Right of the member was violated and she could claim compensation from the Society for reduction of measurement of land in terms of provisional transfer letter

Such questions were otherwise not amenable to exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction

Only provisional transfer letter was issued to the member, which letter per se did not create any enforceable right, seeking enforcement thereof by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction as the same was not permissible

Intra Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Any direction, determination in pursuance to some proceedings like proceedings of District Assessment Committee, resulting into finalization of assessment of rent could be termed as an 'order' contemplated in S.301 of Punjab Local Government Act, 2019

Rent agreements executed inter se parties contained arbitration clause and had provided a mechanism for resolution of disputes inter se parties

Appellants did not invoke arbitration clause and instead filed Constitutional petition but they had opted to invoke the same that should be proceeded as per mandate of Arbitration Act, 1940 which had provided remedy of appeal in terms of S. 39 of Arbitration Act, 1940

Division Bench of High Court in view of provisions of S. 39 of Arbitration Act, 1940 declined to interfere in the matter as appellants, under provisions of S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 were precluded to file Intra court appeal

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Order in question was challengeable and appellant had challenged the same through representation / review petition under S. 9 of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, before competent authority which was also rejected

Intra-court appeal was filed under S. 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Provision of proviso to S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 barred remedy of intra-court appeal in cases in which relevant law provided remedy of appeal, revision or review

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the matter as proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 specifically barred remedy of intra-court appeal in those cases in which relevant law provided remedy of appeal, revision or review

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Court could only direct that a candidate should be considered for regularization but it could not order for regularization of person against post that had not been sanctioned and was not a permanent post

Impugned judgment passed by the Single Judge of High Court was set aside

Intra court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Authorities were aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Single Judge of High Court in favour of plaintiff on grounds that photocopies of measurement book were inadmissible

Validity

Measurement Book was an important document and same always remained in custody of Engineers

If it was misplaced, it created a great spot of malfeasance upon those who were custodians of same

After missing of Measurement Book, Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer had not bothered to lodge even a non-cognizance report

Such conduct itself showed that how the functionaries behaved in case of missing of a valuable record

In case of missing Measurement Book, majority of civil work done could easily be reentered in another Measurement Book by re-measuring work done in brick and mortar

As soon as Measurement Book was recorded, entries should have been verified and bills were prepared in office of Executive Engineer by recording measurement in requisite document

Measurement could again be obtained either directly from site or from other relevant record which was never done

Any objection regarding inadmissible piece of evidence was supposed to be raised at the very time of recording of such evidence and not thereafter

Inadmissible documentary evidence, if not objected, became admissible

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Single Judge of High Court as same neither had misreading or non-reading of available evidence

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Suit was filed by plaintiffs for termination of their membership by defendant which was a private club on allegations of corruption and corrupt practices in certain projects

Single Judge of High Court allowed injunction application of plaintiffs and suspended operation of termination letter

Validity

Plaintiffs whose memberships were terminated were never issued any specific show cause notices requiring them to explain their position with regard to allegations of corruption and corrupt practices in respect of projects

No proceedings for termination of membership was initiated against plaintiffs in terms of Karachi Gymkhana Rules/Bye-laws

Defendant had initiated investigation against plaintiffs by constituting an investigation committee with task to conduct a fishing and roving inquiry against plaintiffs on basis of allegations of corruption and practices in respect of two construction of lodges and driveway projects of Karachi Gymkhana

No provision of Rules and Byelaws of Karachi Gymkhana under which such inquiry or investigation could be authorized on charges of corruption was mentioned

Membership of a member of Karachi Gymkhana could only be suspended or terminated in terms of R. 30 of Rules and Byelaws of Karachi Gymkhana

Plaintiffs were never issued any show cause in terms of R. 30 of Rules and Byelaws of Karachi Gymkhana for misconduct

Proceedings against plaintiffs were in violation of principles of natural justice, Rules and Byelaws of Karachi Gymkhana and could not be considered free from doubt and conclusive in nature unless proper evidence was recorded in such regard

Suit filed by plaintiffs against their termination was still pending before Single Judge of High Court to be decided in accordance with law and after recording evidence

Plaintiffs appeared to have made out a prima facie case before Single Judge of High Court seeking injunctive relief

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Single Judge of High Court as same was passed exercising discretion vested in him

Single Judge of High Court took into consideration necessary ingredients required for grant of injunctive relief, i.e., prima facie case, balance of inconvenience and irreparable loss and injury

Order passed by Single Judge of High Court prima facie did not suffer from factual error or legal infirmity

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Where the proceedings from which the writ petition had arisen provided for either review, revision or appeal, then in terms of proviso to S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, remedy of Intra Court appeal would not be available against the judgment passed by the Single Judge in the writ petition.

Question before the High Court was whether intra-court appeal against an order passed under S.74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was maintainable

Held, in order to determine maintainability of intra-court appeal, it had to be examined whether any appeal, revision or review was available under the applicable law which was the Sales Tax Act, 1990

Perusal of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 revealed that no such right of appeal, revision or review was provided for in either S. 45-B or 46 of the Sales Tax Act ,1990 against order passed in exercise of powers under S. 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990

Intra-court appeal was therefore, in circumstances, maintainable.

No right of appeal, review or revision being available against order of Authority, Division Bench of High Court, in exercise of powers of intra court appeal is entitled to examine entire matter.

Question before High Court was whether intra-court appeal filed by Secretary of a Provincial Government Department against order passed in a Constitutional petition regarding affairs of the Provincial Government, was maintainable

Held, that impugned order passed in the present case related to matters which were concerned with affairs of Provincial Government and no officer of the said provincial government in his / her official capacity or otherwise, could be said to be an "aggrieved person" in relation to a judicial order regarding affairs of the Government

High Court observed that Provincial Government was a party to the Constitutional petition and it could have preferred intra-court appeal against the same if it so wanted, and the present appeal filed by Secretary of a Provincial Government Department was not maintainable, and was dismissed, in circumstances.

Question before the High Court was whether petitioner, after dismissal of petitioner's application for restoration of Constitutional petition, could file a second Constitutional petition on the same subject-matter

Held, after dismissal of first Constitutional petition for non-prosecution, petitioner under O. IX, R. 4, C.P.C. could either have brought a fresh Constitutional petition, or applied for an order to set the dismissal aside, and in the present case , the petitioner chose to file an application for restoration of the Constitutional petition

High Court observed that had the petitioner not availed remedy of application for restoration of earlier Constitutional petition under O. IX, R. 4, C.P.C., then second Constitutional petition would have been maintainable, and therefore in the present case, second Constitutional petition was not maintainable

Intra-court appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Order passed in constitutional petition was assailed through application under S.12(2) C.P.C. but same was dismissed being time barred

Appellant had challenged the said order through intra court appeal

Validity

Law did not provide substantive right of appeal under C.P.C. against the decision on application under S.12(2) C.P.C.

Right of appeal was not available in the present matter as constitutional petition was decided and application under S.12(2) C.P.C. had been dismissed

Order passed in constitutional petition which was subject matter of application under S.12(2) C.P.C. could not be treated as an order passed while exercising original civil jurisdiction

Right of filing intra court appeal was confined to those orders of Single Judge of High Court which were passed under Art.199 of the Constitution

Subject matter of present appeal being an order passed under S.12(2) C.P.C. was not appealable

Right of appeal was substantive right unless it was provided under the statute it could not be exercised

Subject matter of constitutional petition was not the proceedings from any suit filed before Civil Court or from civil jurisdiction

Appeal being not competent was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff was directed by Single Judge of High Court to file balance sale consideration amount with court official but he failed to deposit the same, resultantly suit was dismissed

Validity

Single Judge of High Court had directed the plaintiff to deposit remaining sale consideration before court official but plaintiff failed to deposit the same in court even though suit remained pending for about 13 years

Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and during that period suit property was sold out by way of a registered document

Such further transfer of suit property made the plaintiff disentitled for grant of discretionary relief of specific performance in his favour

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Single Judge of High Court and the suit was rightly dismissed

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Respondents raised objection that the appeal was barred by limitation as there was no requirement of appending certified copy of appeal

Plea raised by appellant was that initial filing was within time

Validity

In terms of Chapter 1, R. 4 of Volume V of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders (also applicable to Islamabad High Court), attaching of certified copy of the order or judgment was not required for filing Intra-court appeal

Where initial filing was within period of limitation and objections were raised which subsequently were removed beyond the period prescribed then appeal could not be termed as barred by time

Procedure prescribed under High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders had to be followed

Appeal was not barred by limitation and was filed within time period prescribed

Objection was overruled by High Court in circumstances.

Respondent was candidate for post of Judicial Member Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue Azad Jammu and Kashmir but Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council re-advertised the post

Respondent assailed decision of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council

Single Judge of High Court issued writ in favour of respondent to issue appointment letter

Validity

Body created by laws of Azad Jammu and Kashmir could not be issued a writ by High Court (Pakistan) in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution even if it took decisions within its territorial jurisdiction and even if such decisions could not withstand test of legality on provisions of Constitution of Pakistan

Competitive process for appointment in question was not pursuant to any laws of Pakistan but under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council vide Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Adaptation of Laws Act, 1979

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court as writ of Mandamus could not be issued with respect to a decision taken by Prime Minister of Pakistan in his capacity as Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council

Intra-court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Question before the High Court was whether demand/show-cause notices under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 fell within purview of the proceedings in which the law provided for an appeal, revision or review as envisaged in proviso to S.3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Held, that word "proceedings" would include every step taken towards further progress by which machinery of law was put into motion

Original order may be the order passed by the lowest officer or authority in the hierarchy; and test for S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was whether original order passed in such proceedings was subject to appeal under the statute, irrespective of whether such appeal was availed or not

Original order was one under which statutory proceedings were commenced

Show-cause / demand notices under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 were original orders and steps in proceedings, for which remedy under Ss. 14 & 15 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 were available, and therefore S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 would be attracted, and intra-court appeal would not be maintainable.

Intra-court appeal was not maintainable in circumstances.

Question before the High Court was whether demand/show-cause notices under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 fell within purview of the proceedings in which the law provided for an appeal, revision or review as envisaged in proviso to S.3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972

Held, that word "proceedings" would include every step taken towards further progress by which machinery of law was put into motion

Original order may be the order passed by the lowest officer or authority in the hierarchy; and test for S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was whether original order passed in such proceedings was subject to appeal under the statute, irrespective of whether such appeal was availed or not

Original order was one under which statutory proceedings were commenced

Show-cause / demand notices under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 were original orders and steps in proceedings, for which remedy under Ss. 14 & 15 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 were available, and therefore S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 would be attracted, and intra-court appeal would not be maintainable.

Where a person was aggrieved of an impugned order, he had locus standi to file appeal notwithstanding the fact that he was not party in the proceedings where impugned order was passed.

Scope.

Chit from Medical Officer produced in support of condonation of delay did not have any seal of the doctor and even the name and sign of patient

Said chit appeared to be a cooked-up document

No due diligence or reasonable explanation had been given for delay in filing of present appeal

Appellant had been avoiding specific performance of contract despite having received initial consideration and the rest having been deposited with the Nazir of the Court

Appeal was dismissed being time barred in circumstances.

Petitioner's complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman regarding non-issuance of income tax refund was decided in petitioner's favour, which was subsequently set aside by order in Representation to the President of Pakistan filed by Department

Petitioner's Constitutional petition against said order in Representation was dismissed

Validity

Federal Tax Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into matters which related to assessment of income , determination of liability of tax , interpretation of law, rules and regulations relating to assessment/determination in respect of which legal remedies of appeal, review or revision were available under the relevant legislation

Intra Court appeal was hit by proviso to S.3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as S. 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 provided remedy of representation before the President against recommendations of the Federal Tax Ombudsman

Intra Court appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondent was importer of cellular mobile phones to be imported free of customs duty on basis of Notification S.R.O. No.659(I)/2007, dated 30-06-2007 issued in pursuance of Free Trade Agreement between Pakistan and China

Respondent assailed charge of regulatory duty under Notification SRO No.568(I)/2014, dated 26-06-2014 on grounds that same was ultra vires the law

Single Judge of High Court declared notification S.R.O. No.568(I)/2014, dated 26-06-2014 as ultra vires to law and held Free Trade Agreement to be offshoot of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)

Validity

Neither violation of any mandatory rule was pleaded before the single Judge of High Court nor it was admitted at appellate stage

To hold any notification as ultra vires it was imperative that violation of rules of business was claimed, pleaded and examined by Court and upon finding of fact that mandatory rule was violated, necessary consequence would be a declaration that such notification was ultra vires

Provisions of Notification S.R.O. No.568(I)/2014, dated 26-06-2014 was not examined or adjudicated on such touchstone therefore, it could not be held as ultra vires by mere placing of reliance by respondents at appellate stage

Exemptions granted through Notification S.R.O. No.659(I)/2007, dated 30-06-2007 was of statutory/standard duty levied under S. 18(1) of Customs Act, 1969 only and not from duty levied through Notification S.R.O. No. 568(I)/2014, dated 26-06-2014 issued under S. 18(3) of Customs Act, 1969

Despite grant of exemptions through Notification S.R.O. No.659(I)/2007, dated 30-06-2007 in terms of Free Trade Agreement, Federal Government was competent to impose regulatory duty on goods falling under Free Trade Agreement

Exemption agreed to be granted under Free Trade Agreement was subject to consequential legislations as well as conditions mentioned in exempting Notification S.R.O. No. 659(I)/2007, dated 30-06-2007

Free Trade Agreement was not offshoot of GATT therefore, provisions of S. 18(5) of Customs Act, 1969 did not apply

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by the Single Judge of High Court

Intra-court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Appellant/ Commissioner Inland Revenue, sought condonation of delay of 37 days in filing of intra-court appeal, on the ground, inter alia, that the procedural constraints required permission to be sought from the Department, which caused delay

Validity

Said reason was neither cogent nor confidence inspiring and in time-barred proceedings, defaulting party must explain delay of each day caused in preferring valid proceedings in accordance with law and the same was not done in the present case

Sufficient cause must be shown by person seeking condonation of delay, which meant "circumstances beyond control of the party concerned", and nothing shall be deemed to have been done in good faith which was not done with due care and attention

High Court observed that for purposes of limitation, Government (departments) could not be treated differently

Intra-court appeal being barred by time, were dismissed, accordingly.

Appellant in intra-court appeal impugned the order passed in Constitutional petition whereby appellant's Constitutional petition against order of Commissioner, Punjab Revenue Authority was dismissed on the ground that the remedy of appeal under S. 63 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 was available to the appellant

Validity

Appellants had not challenged the order of the Commissioner, Punjab Revenue Authority in appeal before the competent forum and proviso to S. 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 barred remedy of intra-court appeal in cases where the relevant law provided the remedy of appeal, revision or review

Impugned order of the Commissioner, Punjab Revenue Authority, had clearly mentioned that the appellant had the remedy of appeal against said order in the manner prescribed in S.63 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012

Intra-court appeal being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Word "proceedings" mentioned in proviso to S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 includes also FIR, therefore, intra-court appeal against order passed by Single Judge of High Court in constitutional jurisdiction for registration of FIR was not maintainable.

Constitutional petition was allowed against which civil petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court which was dismissed as withdrawn and intra-court appeal was filed

Contention of appellant was that delay in filing intra-court appeal was not deliberate or intentional

Validity

No reason or justification had been given in the application for condonation of delay to justify delay in filing the intra-court appeal

Only ground/reason for condonation of delay was 'mis-reading and misinterpreting' which was neither cogent nor confidence inspiring to extend favour of condonation of delay

Supreme Court while disposing of civil petition for leave to appeal made no observations with regard to condonation of delay in filing of the intra-court appeal rather disposed of the petition as withdrawn

Date on which the Supreme Court dismissed the civil petition for leave to appeal as withdrawn, was to he considered as the date of filing intra-court appeal

Intra-court appeal, therefore, was barred by limitation

Appellant had failed to show any sufficient reason for condonation of delay

No reason existed to condone the delay in filing of intra-court appeal

Impugned judgment was personam for respondents

Petition for condonation of delay and intra-court appeal were dismissed being barred by time.

Limitation for filing appeal from decree or order of High Court passed in original jurisdiction was twenty days from the date of said decree or order.

Appellant's constitutional petition impugning conversion of an open space designated as a park to another use, by the authorities was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that the Constitutional petition involved disputed questions of fact

Validity

Civic amenities constituted a basic right of citizens and said right had to be upheld on the touchstone of Art.9 of the Constitution

Authorities had no power or authority under law to convert use of the open space and raise construction thereon, as the same had been in continuous use as a park, and had been maintained as such

High Court observed that it had been established that the status of the area which was the subject matter of the constitutional petition was for use as a park and said position was reinforced by various orders of the High Court in previous rounds of litigation, as well as by the stance of authorities in the said cases

Nature and existence of the park was therefore an undisputed fact, and thus it was disingenuous for the authorities to now take a contrary position

Finding recorded in the impugned order regarding disputed questions of fact, was therefore not valid, as the nature and existence of the park had been established by judicial orders and statements of the authorities

Impugned order was set aside, and authorities were directed to preserve and maintain the open space as a park, which was not to be converted to any other use under any circumstances

Intra-court appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Order passed under Art. 199(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution was not appealable and the other embargo on the appeal was that if any order passed by Single Judge of High Court arising out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided one appeal or one review to any court, Tribunal or Authority against the original order had been provided

Intra-court appeal against interlocutory order or an order which did not dispose of the entire case was not competent.

FIR being just "first information report" did not carry significance so as to be covered by the scope of word "proceedings"

Intra-court appeal against an order for quashing of FIR or refusing to quash an FIR passed in the constitutional petition was not maintainable

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner filed Constitutional petition claiming that she having secured first position in M.Sc. examination and was entitled to gold medal under University notifications, but said gold medal was denied to her on basis of subsequent decision made by Academic Council of University, whereby University had revised its policy as to award of gold medal

Petitioner contended that said decision of Academic Council was not applicable to her as she had secured first position before the said decision of Academic Council

Defendant University took plea that Convocation Committee implemented the revised policy for convocation relating to petitioner and she was therefore not entitled to University gold medal

Validity

After securing first position in University, petitioner had a vested right to be dealt with under University notifications

Academic Council could change its policy for award of gold medal but the same could not be applied retrospectively to the case of petitioner whose result had already been announced

Convocation was merely an award conferring ceremony and had no bearing on entitlement of gold medal already earned by petitioner by securing first position in University

Notifications and administrative orders, which infringed right of parties, could not be applied retrospectively

Impugned order was set aside and University was directed to award gold medal to petitioner

Intra-court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Company was wholly owned and controlled by the Government and funds which had been given by the government for acquisition of land would remain to be public funds

Prior agreement in accordance with S. 39 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was for ensuring the payment of cost of acquisition

Government had already transferred the funds to the company

No illegality was pointed out in the impugned judgment

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellant was aggrieved of order passed on application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., whereby Single Judge of High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh

Validity

If an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., was accepted or rejected, no plea was available under S. 104, C.P.C., read with O. XLIII, R. 1, C.P.C., and only revision was competent under S. 115, C.P.C.

Intra-court appeal was not competent/maintainable under proviso to S. 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as right of revision was provided under S. 115, C.P.C., on dismissal of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Inaction on the part of authorities to confirm or reject it further should not come in the way of appellant and to the detriment of his interest

When law was amended in year 2006, application of appellant was pending before relevant authorities and by operation of law, after introduction of amendment it would be deemed to have been accepted after 90 days

Single Judge of High Court had not minutely examined facts and circumstances of the case and had dealt with petition in cursory manner merely on the statement of Law Officer

Division Bench of High Court directed the authorities to implement order in favour of appellant and had set aside judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court

Intra-court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Appeal was barred by two days and under Art. 151 of Limitation Act, 1908, prescribed period was 20 days and under S. 4 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, period of limitation was to start from the date of decree or order

Appellants were bound to challenge order in question within the stipulated/prescribed time, period of limitation i.e. 20 days

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by the single Judge of High Court, as the intra court appeal was time barred and order in question had already been complied with

Intra-court appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Limitation-Appellant was aggrieved of the order passed by single Judge of High Court, whereby application to restore appeal dismissed for non-prosecution was dismissed

Validity

Period for limitation for re-admission of appeal under O.XLI, R.19(1), C.P.C. was thirty days under Art.168 of Limitation Act, 1908

Time had begun to run from the date of "dismissal" of appeal and not from the date of "knowledge"

If application was governed by any other Article of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908 (as application under O.XLI, R.19(1), C.P.C. was governed by Art.168 of Limitation Act, 1908) then provisions of Art.181 of Limitation Act. 1908, being residuary Article was not applicable

Division Bench of High Court declined to readmit appeal as application to restore was filed after expiry of prescribed period

Intra court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellant assailed ex parte judgment and decree passed against him on the plea that no limitation would run against void order, as he was not served and was unaware of judgment and decree

Validity

Mere irregular, incorrect, erroneous or illegal order did not necessarily fall within conception of the term "void" and law of limitation would apply to such orders

Single Judge of High Court was fully competent to adjudicate upon subject matter of underlying suit and to pass judgment and decree in question

No assertion to the contrary was made by appellant in such regard

Appeal filed against judgment and decree in question was barred by limitation

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

By staying the proceedings, Court retained its jurisdiction as well as has respected the agreement between parties as being permissible to choose a forum of their convenience to settle the dispute

By dismissing the suit as not maintainable, Court had ousted itself from lawful jurisdiction it had

Dealership agreements in question were signed outside Pakistan and there was always a likelihood that a part of cause of action could accrued within territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan

Division Bench of High Court modified order passed by Single Judge of High Court as suit could not be dismissed and it was more appropriate to keep it pending by staying proceedings till such time issue was resolved by parties from the forum chosen by them for settlement of dispute in agreement or otherwise

Intra-court appeal was allowed accordingly.

During pendency of execution application filed by landowners, authorities preferred objections on which Single Judge of High Court directed authorities to deposit decretal amount within 30 days and on failure to comply with direction, execution was allowed

Single Judge of High Court while deciding execution application recorded observations and authorities wanted to get said observations implemented

Validity

Even if such part of order whereby it was observed that decree-holder was entitled for compensation under S.28-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was set aside, same would have no bearing on final outcome, as judgment and decree itself provided for payment of such compensation against which appeal preferred by authorities already stood dismissed and same had not been challenged any further

Observations were recorded by Single Judge of High Court as it was specifically pleaded on behalf of authorities that since S.28-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stood omitted as if it was never on the statute book, therefore, additional compensation was paid

Authorities were to agitate merits of judgment and decree in further appeal which otherwise had attained finality and not before Executing Court through review application

Authorities tried to make an attempt to get modification of judgment and decree by raising such objections which were not permissible as Executing Court was bound by judgment and decree passed in the matter and such observations in order in question could not be challenged to seek further opportunity of having decree set aside

High Court declined to interfere in the matter as authorities did not assail appellate order any further, therefore same had attained finality and was not a case of pending proceedings

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaint sought declaratory relief wherein element of recovery of amount was present along with mandatory injunction and repossession of factory

Defendants required that pliant be struck off at preliminary stage on the basis of limitation on the ground of date of agreement which was disputed by plaintiff on the ground of adjustment of payment towards another liability as claimed

Conclusion of agreement was based upon their own assertions

Single Judge of High Court highlighted thoroughly the issue of limitation, where such issue of limitation was based upon ascertainment of facts and as such within the proverbial phrase "mixed questions of law and facts"

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by the Single Judge of High Court

Intra-court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.