Extension of time

Record reflected that the Show Cause Notice was issued on 27.04.2020 and 90 days limitation period for issuing an order-in-original expired on 26.07.2020

The order-in-original was passed on 10.08.2020 and hence was time barred

It seemed that the Collector (adjudication) granted himself an extension without recording reasons and hence under no stretch of imagination could be considered as valid extension of time

Even otherwise such extension had no application

No case for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court was made out

Leave to appeal was refused.

Petitioner/plaintiff was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court declining to extend time for deposit of balance consideration amount, resultantly suit was dismissed for not depositing complete balance consideration amount

Validity

When Trial Court invoked penal provisions of O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C. due to non-compliance of order, no reference could be made to any previous omission or commission, if any, on the part of petitioner/plaintiff

In the event of non-compliance of Court's order, Court could invoke penal provisions of O. XVII R. 3, C.P.C. but prior to resorting to such penal action Trial Court should have satisfied itself that the party concerned had failed to comply with its order despite availing reasonable time

As per S. 148, C.P.C., Court enjoys power to extend period fixed by it for performance of an act by a party to the lis upon showing sufficient cause for non-compliance of its order within the stipulated period

Trial Court failed to exercise such powers despite the fact that petitioner/plaintiff filed application for extension of time to comply with order in question prior to expiration of period fixed by Trial Court

Such act of Court amounted to failure on its part to exercise power vested in it, which called for interference by High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested under S. 115, C.P.C.

High Court set aside order in question and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Such power has been conferred by makers of the Constitution to extend an Ordinance for another term of 120 days and therefore, includes power to extend it retrospectively

Provision of an Ordinance, even if extended by giving it retrospective effect, remains enforced for a total period of 240 days from the date of its promulgation

Act of extending an Ordinance is essentially a legislative power and therefore, it can be exercised at any time after expiry of 120 days and before 240th day from the date of promulgation

This is a legislative power and can be exercised retrospectively.

In terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. court first has to determine amount as valuation of suit and if there is any issue, to determine if there was any deficiency and if so, to what extent and to give a directive to plaintiff to make it up within time so specified in order

Rejection of plaint can only be made if on determination of correct valuation as also amount of deficiency and of issuance of direction to make it up, petitioner if fails to do the needful, plaint could be rejected though court still has power to extend time under S. 149, C.P.C. if sufficient reasons are put forth.

Trial Court set aside the award on the basis of objection that it was not filed in Court beyond limitation as it was a misconduct

Validity

Arbitrator was to make award within four months after the date of entering upon reference

Arbitrator was entitled under Paragraph 3 of First Schedule to Arbitration Act, 1940, to make award within such extended time for making the award and did not impose any obligation on a party to make a formal application in such behalf

Award made beyond period of four months was neither invalid nor void merely on such account

Where after expiry of four months, if a party had been appearing before arbitrator without any protest or demur and never took the objection that time for making award had expired, such party would be deemed to have waived the implied condition as to time

Such party was estopped from challenging validity of award on the ground of same having been made beyond time

Power to extend time for making award could also be exercised by an appellate Court

Arbitrator did not commit any 'misconduct' as understood in arbitration parlance by engrossing award dated 30-5-2000 on stamp paper issued on 1-7-2000

By doing so arbitrator simply carried out a ministerial act which was not concerned with any of his adjudicatory responsibilities in regard to the reference

Time for completing arbitration proceedings was extended until date when award was rendered and defendants' objections to award were dismissed

Application under S. 14(2) of Arbitration Act, 1940 of plaintiff seeking filing of award in Court and making the same as rule of Court was allowed

High Court set aside judgment passed by Trial Court and made award rule of the Court

Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and application for restoration of the same was accepted on 06-10-2012 subject to payment of costs within one week and matter was fixed for 01-11-2012

Plaintiffs moved application for extension of time for depositing the costs

Trial Court dismissed the application with observations that it could neither review its order nor sit as appellate or revisional Court on its own order

Appellate Court and High Court concurred with the findings of Trial Court

Validity

Trial Court had heard the arguments earlier and order was subsequently announced and suit was fixed on 1-11-2012

Plaintiffs without failure appeared on the said date and filed application for extension of time for depositing the costs and sufficiently explained the reasons for the application

Said aspect had not been considered by the Trial Court

Trial Court did not become functus officio in the matter

Present matter was not of review of the order nor sitting of the Trial Court as appellate or revision Court on its own order rather it was matter of exercise of powers vested under S. 148, C.P.C. to enlarge time fixed or granted by it

Court was to adjudicate matter on merits rather on technical grounds

Impugned judgments/orders were recalled by the Supreme Court and application for depositing the costs was accepted

Plaintiffs should deposit the costs within two weeks

Appeal was accepted accordingly.

Execution application filed by decree holder was dismissed by Executing Court on the ground that decree holder deposited decretal amount after the date fixed by Executing Court

Lower Appellate Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Executing Court

Validity

Application for deposit of amount was filed on last date that too without showing any effort for payment as required under the decree and amount deposited in Court was not "payment under decree"

Payment of amount, within stipulated period was a condition precedent for execution of compromise decree

Both the Courts rightly dismissed execution petition by holding that decree holder failed to perform his part under compromise decree

Failure of decree holder to make payment under compromise decree, a valuable right had accrued in favour of judgment debtor, which could not be disturbed at appellate stage

Lower Appellate Court while hearing appeal against dismissal of execution petition could not go beyond decree to extend time stipulated in compromise decree

Revision was in circumstances.

Arbitration agreement fixing time during which reference may be made to arbitration is impliedly considered valid by S.34(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940

Court is vested with discretion to extend such time only in case if Court is of the opinion that in particular circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused to parties due to expiration of time.

Registrar, while acting under S. 123 (1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, has no power to extend the time limit to any further period from the total aggregate period of four months from the date of advertisement/re-advertisement of the trade mark in the Trade Mark Journal.

Rigidity embodied in S. 123(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 regarding adherence to the time frame carries over to S. 123(2) of the Ordinance, which, on the face of it, though appears to be against the principles of natural justice, where the Registrar is not required to hear parties before deciding the matter against them (bounded by the force that said order of Registrar is not even appealable) is very fundamental and principled reasoning

Any extension of the time limit would be at the cost and disadvantage to those persons whose rights accrue from the date of expiry of the said statutory deadline and enabling the Registrar to be in discretionary position to extend such time limit would inversely affect the long awaited rights of a set of persons.

Registrar, while acting under S. 123(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, can only extend the time for doing any act for which the time limit is not so expressly provided in the Ordinance

Section 28 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 specifically provides that an opposition can be filed within an initial period of two months or after a further extended period of additional two months in aggregate

Registrar, therefore, is handicapped under S. 123(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 from exercising any power to extend the time limit for filing an opposition beyond the time limit of four months.

Section 128 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 read with R. 4 of Trade Marks Rules, 2004 made that mandatory to file the application on Form TM-5 in the prescribed manner along with the prescribed fee

Rule 4(1) read with R. 4(5) of Trade Marks Rules, 2004, specifically provided that the fee must have been paid in respect of an application, registration or other matter

Initial two months' period to file opposition (without seeking any extension) had lapsed after the trade mark was advertised

No document had been attached to substantiate that the petitioner had timely sought two extensions to make him eligible to file the opposition up to the maximum extended time limits of four months

Petitioner had filed the appropriate opposition on Form TM-5 on a day before the expiry of the extended period of total four months; however, said application was not accompanied the prescribed fee; the petitioner rectified said error fourteen days after the four months' time limit by paying the prescribed fee

Notice of opposition on Form TM-5 would be construed as having been filed on the date on which the prescribed fee had been paid and not on the date when the opposition had been filed without prescribed fee

Opposition filed by the petitioner was, therefore, beyond the prescribed time limit of total four months, and the Registrar had rightly rejected the same on ground of limitation

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty, house-trespass, criminal intimidation, rioting, common object

Revision petition

Limitation

Extension of time

Scope

Application filed by the respondent/complainant seeking arrest of petitioner/accused was rejected by the Magistrate/Trial Court

Said rejection was assailed by the complainant through revision petition, which revision had been accepted by Appellate Court below

Petitioner had alleged that revision petition filed by the complainant being time-barred, should have been outrightly dismissed on the point of limitation

Validity

Revision petition could not be rejected on mere ground of delay or laches

What required the court to observe, was that a revision petition should be filed within a reasonable period of time, which could change from case to case; and situation to situation

Rule to file a revision petition within 30 days against an order complained of was not inflexible; and time could be extended in exceptional cases

Trial Court/Magistrate in the present case had traversed beyond its jurisdictional authority by misinterpreting the law and passing an order in favour of petitioner/ accused without caring for the law on the subject; even in the slightest term and dealt with the matter in an unlawful and ridiculous manner

Mere technicalities, could not be taken into consideration to annul a lawful judgment passed by revisional court.

Though in the proviso of O. VIII, R.1, C.P.C. the word used was "ordinarily" but before the said word the rule contained the word "if so required by the court'-'

Interpretation given to the word "ordinarily" would mean that no infinite time could be allowed on the basis of the said word rather such was for the court to see and require as to what time had to be provided after the fall of the period of 30 days

Use of the word "required" made it clear that the court in the given circumstances if felt even after expiry of 30 days that there were reasonable, justifiable and condonable circumstances which did not allow in spite of best efforts on behalf of the party to file written statement, the court might give some reasonable time

Party would not be entitled to extension of time if the delay on the part of the party was conscious

High Court declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction

Constitutional petition was dismissed by High Court in limine.

Rent Tribunal granted leave to defend the case on the application filed by tenant beyond statutory period of ten days which was not accompanied by any affidavit

Plea raised by tenant was that constitutional petition was not maintainable against interim order

Validity

Although a Constitutional petition against an interim order passed by Special Court was not maintainable yet it was not an absolute rule, and facts of each case had to be considered before proceeding to determine question of maintainability of Constitutional petition

Rent Tribunal had proceeded against mandatory provision of law, which had to be checked at early stage instead of waiting for passing of a final order

If such practice of not checking interim orders at proper stage was not discarded that would lead to the wastage of public time and would also multiply the litigation between the parties

Petition having been filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the Court should have taken the notice of such fact before granting leave to contest the ejectment petition

None of the Courts had jurisdiction to extend the time beyond ten days for filing the leave application thus the Court had proceeded wholly against the mandatory provisions of S.22(2) of Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009

Tenant did not file affidavit with his application for leave to defend and purpose for enacting such provision of law was to require a tenant to make out a ground for contesting the ejectment petition and if the Court deemed that the tenant had raised a plausible defence then the Court could allow the leave application, which would subsequently be treated as written statement

While not taking the proceedings in accordance with the spirit of S.22(3) of Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, the Rent Tribunal committed grave illegality which needed interference of High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction

High Court declared the order passed by Rent Tribunal as illegal having been passed without lawful authority and of no legal consequences and the same was set aside

High Court directed the Rent Tribunal to proceed to pass an order under S.22(6) of Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, as the leave application was not filed within the prescribed time

Petition was allowed accordingly.

Vehic'es imported were provisionally released on the basis of provisional assessment and after lapse of nine months, authorities issued valuation advice and intended to initiate proceedings against petitioner under S. 32 of Customs Act, 1969

Validity

Purpose behind requiring Collector to record exceptional circumstances which warranted extension of time was to ensure that Collector had applied his mind to relevant facts of each case and made his decision on a proper consideration of the same

Omnibus request, assented to in a mechanical manner was no compliance with the requirements of proviso to S. 81(2) of Customs Act, 1969

Stipulated period was not extended by the authorities, as required by law, with the result that the period lapsed on the expiry of nine months

Additional amount computed on the basis of "provisional assessment" in terms of first proviso to S. 81(1) of Customs Act, 1969, was not included in "provisional determination" on the basis of which goods were provisionally released

If final determination was not completed within stipulated period, then provisional determination would have become final and the same did not include "additional amount"

Stipulated period was not extended in terms of proviso to S.81(2) of Customs Act, 1969, and hence expired at the end of nine months

No final determination was available within nine months, therefore, provisional determination became final

Petitioner having discharged its liability in terms of provisional determination, no other amount was payable by it, and no "additional" amount could be recovered front petitioner

Constitutional Petition was allowed accordingly.

Trial Court passed ex parte preliminary decree against judgment-debtor and in favour of decree-holder with the condition that decree-holders would deposit outstanding amount of sale consideration within prescribed period of forty days

Decree-holders who failed to deposit said amount within prescribed period of forty days, filed application for extension of period for deposit of outstanding amount and Trial Court while exercising its powers under S.148, C.P.C. accepted said application extended the requisite period and allowed the decree-holders to deposit the amount

Decree­holders deposited said amount long after expiry of prescribed period and Trial Court passed final decree and judgment-debtors were directed to hand over the possession of suit property to decree­-holders

Validity

Conditional decree was passed in favour of decree-holders and in the event of non-deposit of the balance sale consideration within prescribed period said decree entailed dismissal of the suit of the decree-holders

As non-deposit of the remaining amount entailed the penal consequence of the dismissal of the suit, Trial Court was functus officio and was vested with no jurisdiction to pass an order with regard to extension of time for deposit of the outstanding amount

Once the original decree was without jurisdiction and was the result of illegal act of the court, the entire edifice raised thereon, would automatically dash to the ground and crumble

Obtaining the final decree also would lose its importance and was of no use to the decree-holders

Judgments of both courts below being erroneous, not warranted by law and without jurisdiction, were set aside and the suit of the decree-holders stood dismissed.

Trial Court declined to make award rule of the Court on the basis of objections which were filed by respondent beyond the period of thirty days

Validity

Notice of filing of award was duly served on respondents, who were to file objections against the award till 11-1-2008, which was not done

Objections were filed on 29-1-2008, which were barred by time and no effort was made to explain the delay

No application for condonation of delay was filed, therefore, Trial Court had no power or jurisdiction to extend time for filing of objections

Findings of Trial Court that period of limitation for filing of objections would start running from the date that award was de-sealed, had no legal basis and was erroneous

Respondents had knowledge and notice of award since 24-7-2007, which was substantiated by the fact that they filed their objections on 29-1-2008, which was much before the award was de-sealed

Objections filed by respondents against the award were filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 158 of Limitation Act, 1908

Delay could not have been condoned by Trial Court of its own motion and on equitable grounds

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order passed by Trial Court as the same was unlawful and without jurisdiction

Objections filed by respondents were rejected as the same were filed beyond the period of limitation

High Court directed the Trial Court to proceed with making award rule of the Court

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Directors of Company under winding up, as well as official liquidator made relentless efforts to facilitate sale of assets of the company but all remained fruitless

Winding up process under the provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984, was to be concluded within a period of one year but due to law and order situation, the same could not be done

Official Liquidator gave notice for extraordinary general meeting seeking consent of members of the company and to resolve that time for conclusion of winding up proceedings might be extended for a period of six months

After diligent proceedings, all members of the company unanimously agreed and passed resolution whereby time for conclusion of winding up proceedings extended for a period of six months

Application was filed by official liquidator for approval of resolution for extension of time

Validity

High Court after perusing annexure which reaffirmed contentions which were written in the application, approved special resolution passed by members and time was extended by another six months for conclusion of winding up proceedings

Application was allowed accordingly.

At the time when application was submitted by the defendant, the Trial Court had not passed a decree nor it had become functus officio

Trial Court could have extended the time under S.148, C.P. C. for furnishing the surety bond

Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Proceedings on ejectment application filed by respondent were stopped due to filing of suit for specific performance of agreement to sell by petitioner

Both the parties settled their dispute before civil court and petitioner agreed to deposit balance sale consideration within 15 days

On failure to make payment within 15 days civil court passed an order, against which petitioner filed appeal but it was dismissed by Appellate Court on the ground that no appeal was available against consent decree

Appellate Court also declined to entertain application filed by petitioner under S.148 C.P.C. for extension in time for deposit of balance amount

Rent Controller continued ejectment proceedings against petitioner

Validity

Specific performance of agreement would be no ground to avoid eviction of tenant by Rent Controller, if other requirements of law had been fulfilled

Mere agreement to sell did not confer any right of ownership or right to possess a property without fulfilling requirements like payment of rent etc. as per agreed relationship prior to agreement to sell

Agreement to sell having already been .declared as rescinded and after its confirmation by High Court no further benefit could be allowed to petitioner through such flimsy petitions

Request for extension of time refused by Trial Court was well within its discretion

If petitioner had filed application under S.148 C.P.C. before expiry of period mentioned in the order passed by Civil Court, the same could have been entertained

After expiry of period mentioned in the order passed by civil court, which was 15 days, Trial Court had become functus officio hence there was no question of any interference by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction

Confirmation of the order by Appellate Court was also unexceptionable

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Conduct of appellant in appearing before arbitrator even after time for giving award had expired, without any objection, and fact that arbitrator gave adjournments at instance of appellant

Time spent beyond four months by arbitrator, held, was justifiably extended under S. 28

Discretion exercised by trial Court in allowing time with retrospective effect was rightly affirmed in circumstances.

Last day being closed holiday-Prayer for extension of time for making deposit refused on ground that Court had become functus officio after passing decree

Order maintained

Held: Benefit of S. 9 of General Clauses Act could be claimed or extended only if petitioner had made a prayer not for extending time for deposit but for depositing amount or had deposited amount on day of opening of Court

Not being a fit case for grant of leave, petition dismissed.

Last day being closed holiday-Prayer for extension of time for making deposit refused on ground that Court had become functus officio after passing decree

Order maintained

Held: Benefit of S. 9 of General Clauses Act could be claimed or extended only if petitioner had made a prayer not for extending time for deposit but for depositing amount or had deposited amount on day of opening of Court

Not being a fit case for grant of leave, petition dismissed.

Extension of time-Contention that petitioner having no information to pay court-fee could not comply with order although he deposited pre-emption money-High Court dismissing appeal holding that trial Court could have passed a conditional order calling upon petitioner to make up deficiency in court-fee failing which plaint would stand rejected and no sufficient cause shown for enlargement of time to make up deficiency in court-fee-Contention dealt with at great length and with thoroughness by High Court and answered in negative and nothing possible to be usefully added to reasons assigned by High Court-Petition dismissed.-[Court-fee].

S. 148-Extension of time-Compromise decree entered into between parties fixing certain date for payment of pre-emption money Time fixed under compromise, held, could not be extended under S. 148

Period of payment specified in decree of trial Court-Appellate Court, held, competent to extend such period by ad interim order-Pre-emptor. In view of such order, could, after dismissal of his appeal, deposit pre-emption money within reasonable time-[Malik Khan Badshah v. Miram Khan A I R 1944 Posh. 22 dissented from].