Maintainability

Petitioner had invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court despite the fact that criminal proceedings were pending against the respondent

Petitioner could not invoke the constitutional jurisdiction on the same matter simultaneously

Constitutional petition was dismissed.

Direct appeal lies in Supreme Court when the value of the subject matter in the court of first instance and in the appeal is not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court has altered, varied or set aside the impugned judgment or decree of the court immediately below

High Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and the value of subject matter was more than fifty thousand rupees, thus, direct appeal was competent and not the CPLA

Limitation for filing direct appeal before Supreme Court was 60 days, which had expired during the pendency of the CPLA and the petitioner had not filed any application for conversion of the CPLA into appeal within limitation, thus, by operation of law and following the dictum of Supreme Court CPLA was not maintainable

CPLA was dismissed being incompetent, in circumstances.

Admittedly, two suits were filed before the Trial Court, however, while fling the Petition for Leave to Appear (PLA)/appeal the appellant had annexed the verification regarding non-filing of the list of the plaintiffs in one suit filed by the (present) Appellant and failed to annex the list of legal representatives of the defendants in the said suit

Similarly, neither the list of legal representatives of the plaintiffs as well as defendants in second/other suit was filed by the (present) respondent, nor the verification in that regard had been annexed with the memo of PLA/appeal

Under Sub-rule (1-A) of R. 3 of O. XIII of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, filing of lists of the legal heirs of the plaintiffs and the defendants filed before the Trial Court was mandatory and had to be annexed with the memo of PLA/appeal and failure to comply with it entailed dismissal of the PLA/ appeal on this sole ground

It was enjoined upon the (present) appellant to annex the lists of legal representatives of the plaintiffs and the defendants of both the suits and if the same were not filed in the Trial Court, then the certification of the Trial Court in said regard should necessarily be brought on the record, which had also not been done

Present appeal had been filed in violation of the statutory provision, hence, the same being filed incompetently, was liable to be dismissed on the sole ground

Thus, the (present) appeal had been filed incompetently, therefore, there was no need to dilate upon the merits and demerits of the case as the same would be a futile exercise

Appeal was dismissed.

A party choosing to seek partition should not have the liberty to selectively choose and acquire a share in the more valuable aspects of the joint holdings while simultaneously excluding those portions of lesser value

Each co-owner possesses ownership rights over every inch of the joint holding corresponding to their share

Therefore, it is inappropriate for any part of the joint holding to be permitted for separate partition

This principle is rooted in the need to protect all co-owners from potential discrimination and inequity

As a result, the entire property corpus is aggregated into a common pool, overseen by the Court, which ensures that each co-owner receives their allocated share fairly, based on the relative value of the properties, taking into account their area, location, and nature.

Appellant was aggrieved of provisional attachment order passed by Trial Court, against which High Court did grant any interim relief

Plea raised by authorities was that appeal against provisional attachment order was not maintainable as order of High Court was an interim order

Validity

Order of attachment under Section 8 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 was otherwise final for the taxpayer whose all immovable and moveable properties, including bank accounts were attached without providing any opportunity of being heard, in consequence whereof, the entire business had come to an halt

No other remedy was provided under Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 except to challenge the same by filing appeal under Section 23 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010

Matter fell within the exceptions to exercise discretion under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to obliviate miscarriage of justice

Supreme Court suspended operation of order of attachment of properties, passed by Trial Court, till final decision of appeal pending before High Court

Appeal was allowed.

Appeal under S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C., in a hurt case defined by the P.P.C and tried by the Courts constituted under Criminal Procedure Code shall be competent by a person who has been hurt, and if he is a minor or insane then appeal would be competent on his behalf by his father and grandfather or a paternal grandfather howhighsoever he may be; if he dies for any other reason before final decision of the hurt case then appeal would be competent by his legal heirs

In the instant case the alleged injured was neither minor nor insane

Appellant did not fall within the definition of "an aggrieved person"

Thus, appeal against acquittal was dismissed being not competent.

Briefly, the petitioner, through the present constitutional petition, assailed the Provincial Ombudsman (Mohtasib) order directing handing over of possession of plot in question to respondent No.2, along with the consequential final demolition notice issued by the competent authority, and further challenged the Governor's order passed in the statutory representation, seeking that all such actions be declared without lawful authority

Held: Since there was a dispute/controversy related to declaration of rights, title and status of a person or property the Civil Court had the exclusive jurisdiction under S.9, C.P.C. to decide the same after recording of evidence

Scheme of Provincial Ombudsman Ordinance, 2001 did not bestow the powers upon the Ombudsman to examine cases of civil nature

Moreover, as per the spirit of S.11 of the Ordinance, 2001 the Provincial Ombudsman was the recommendatory body

Findings of the Ombudsman were of recommendatory nature and not a judgment/decision, and such performance of quasi-judicial functions by itself did not convert an Authority into a Court

Office of Ombudsman was neither a Court nor a Judicial Tribunal within the scope of Art.175 of the Constitution

Assumption of jurisdiction by Ombudsman in the present case was erroneous and could not be sustained and impugned order was set aside

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Undisputedly, the appellants were initially inducted into government on work-charge basis, however, their services were regularized by the competent authority through a formal order issued pursuant to decisions rendered by the Labour Judicial Forums, which attained finality and were binding upon the department

Following such regularization, the appellants had been serving against duly sanctioned posts within the regular establishment of the Department and they were governed by the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974

Said factors collectively affirmed their integration into the statutory framework governing civil servants

Regularization of service by a competent authority, whether pursuant to judicial direction or lawful administrative discretion, alters the legal character of employment, conferring upon the employee the status of a civil servant

Once an employee is regularized, he or she ceases to be a contractual, contingent, or ad hoc worker, and becomes entitled to the full breadth of statutory protections available under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974

Appellants satisfied each of the relevant conditions

Significantly, there was no material on record indicating that the regularization of the appellants was ever annulled, withdrawn, or declared void by any competent authority

In the absence of such a determination, a presumption of legality attached to their regularized status

Moreover, the impugned departmental orders were issued by the authorities exercising powers under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, further affirming that the appellants were treated as civil servants in administrative practice

Thus, the appellants, having been lawfully regularized and absorbed against sanctioned posts, had acquired the status of civil servants within the meaning of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and the preliminary objection was accordingly overruled

Appeals were held to be maintainable.

Section 31(7) of the Drugs Act, 1976, provided that a person who had been sentenced by a Drug Court might file an appeal before a Bench of the High Court consisting of not less than two judges within thirty days of the passing of the judgment

In the present case, the conviction and sentence were passed against "SUK", Manager Regulatory Affairs, respondent No. 3, in his personal capacity

However, the instant appeal had not been preferred by the said convict, rather it had been instituted by the private company which was neither convicted in specific terms nor held guilty through a separate order

Only a person aggrieved by a conviction or sentence passed by the Drug Court, or a person legally competent to represent him under due authorization, could file an appeal under S.31 (7) of the Act

In the absence of such authorization, the appellant lacked locus standi

Therefore, the appeal, as filed by the private company against the conviction of its erstwhile employee, "SUK", was not competent in law

Consequently, the appeal filed by the private company against the conviction of respondent No.3 was misconceived and incompetent for want of locus standi

Appellant company could not challenge a conviction passed against an individual in his personal capacity unless duly authorized and empowered to represent him for that specific purpose

Appeal was dismissed being incompetent and not maintainable.

No statutory requirement exists for filing or deciding an appeal under the Rent Ordinance on the basis of a formally drawn decree sheet

Scope

Respondent No.1/landlord sought petitioner's/tenant ejectment and recovery of rent and utility dues

Although the petitioner had contested the case by filing written statement, he failed to appear for cross-examination and was proceeded against ex parte, and an ejectment order was passed against him

His appeal was later dismissed as not maintainable by the Appellate Court, leading to the filing of the present constitutional petition

The relevant issue in the matter was “whether, in the circumstances, the ex parte rent order could be challenged through appeal and whether dismissal of the appeal on the ground of non-maintainability was legally justified?”

Held: Appellate Court failed to realize that appeal before said Court had been filed under S.15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, where there was no requirement of drawing of decree sheet

Under S.17 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, every order made by a Rent Controller under Ss.10, 13 and every order passed on appeal under S.15 was to be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court

There also, requirement of drawing of decree sheet was not mentioned

Requirement of drawing decree sheet for maintaining an appeal could not have been read into the Ordinance and petitioner had wrongly been penalized

Appellate Court wrongly held the appeal as not maintainable

Matter was remanded to Appellate Court to decide the same in accordance with law

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Brief facts were that the petitioners instituted a civil suit seeking permanent injunction and possession in respect of immovable property after a notice for removal of alleged encroachment was issued by the Cantonment Executive Officer under S.108 of the Cantonments Act, 1924; during the pendency of the suit, the Trial Court, instead of deciding the application for temporary injunction, returned the plaint under O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. for presentation before the proper forum, which order was upheld by the District Court in revision, whereupon the petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court through the present writ petition

Held: Notice issued under S.108 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 being administrative in nature and having the effect of affecting the civil rights of the petitioners raised issues that were of a civil nature

These include questions relating to title, possession, lawful occupation, and alleged encroachment, which fell well within the scope of civil adjudication

Moreover, there was no express bar under the Cantonments Act, 1924, that ousted the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters where executive actions were challenged on the grounds of illegality, arbitrariness, malice, or want of jurisdiction

Courts below erred in law by returning the suit filed by the petitioners which was maintainable

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Applicants invoked S.12(2) of C.P.C. to assail the High Court judgment which had attained finality and declared the general power of attorney as fictitious and bogus, thereby invalidating subsequent mutations executed on its strength

The original defendants (respondents Nos. 8 to 13) had actively contested the suit through trial, appeal, and revision but failed

Applicants claiming to be subsequent purchasers of the suit property through those very defective mutations argued that they were not parties to the earlier proceedings and had been denied the opportunity to defend their rights

However, as their alleged title stemmed entirely from a void and fraudulent power of attorney, their claim remained tainted by the same foundational defect, leaving them without any independent or superior right

Therefore, the pivotal question arisen for determination before the High Court as to "whether the application under S.12(2) of C.P.C. was maintainable by subsequent purchasers who acquired interest in the suit property only through mutations rooted in a general power of attorney already declared fictitious and void, when importantly, such applicants neither held title nor had any subsisting legal interest at the time of the original litigation and final judgment which had attained finality?"

Held: Admittedly, respondents Nos.8 to 13 (original defendants) actively contested the suit at all three stages; trial, appellate, and revisional

However, the general power of attorney allegedly executed in favour of respondent No. 13 was conclusively held to be fictitious and bogus

Consequently, the land transfers effected through mutations, attested on 31.10.1970, on the strength of the said power of attorney, were declared defective

It was undisputed that the applicants derived their title from those very mutations

Therefore, their claim was tainted by the same foundational defect

The legal maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" i.e. one cannot transfer what one does not possess, squarely applied to the present case

Since the original defendants had no valid title to convey, the applicants, having derived title through them, acquired no better or independent right

Having stepped into the shoes of the original defendants, the applicants were bound by the same fate; both must sail or sink together

Position of the applicants was devoid of legal sanctity

The judgment of the High Court dated 27.02.2006, having attained finality, conclusively held the general power of attorney to be fictitious and the consequent mutations based thereon as defective

Any subsequent transactions flowing from such a defective title stood vitiated in the eyes of law

The applicants, having derived their title from respondents Nos. 8 to 13, who themselves held no valid title, could not claim any superior or independent right

Action taken by the revenue authorities, whereby they cancelled all subsequent mutations rooted in the defective mutations in question, including those in favour of the applicants, was not only in accordance with law but also a necessary consequence to uphold the sanctity of the final judicial determination passed by the High Court

Record unequivocally reflected that at the time when the original suit was instituted, contested, and ultimately decided, culminating in the judgment passed by the High Court, the present applicants neither held title nor had any demonstrable connection with the suit property or the litigation arising therefrom

No mutation stood attested in their favor during the pendency of the earlier proceedings, and their alleged interest in the property only materialized through subsequent mutations executed by respondents Nos. 8 to 13, post-finality of the said judgment

The applicants were complete strangers to the prior litigation and could not claim to have been prejudiced by a judgment rendered at a time when they held no legal or proprietary interest in the property

The mere fact of acquiring property at a later stage through a chain of title already declared defective did not confer upon them the right to challenge the judgment collaterally through an application under S.12(2) C.P.C.

Such an application could be maintainable only where the applicant had a direct and existing legal interest therein at the relevant time

The applicants, therefore, lacked the requisite locus standi to maintain the present proceedings, and their claim amounted to an impermissible attempt to reopen settled issues by way of indirect challenge, which the law did not recognize

Application under S.12(2) of C.P.C. was without merit and same was dismissed, in circumstances.

National Bank of Pakistan is a statutory body established under the National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1949, and its employees are employees of a statutory corporation and thus fall within the purview of Art. 199 (5) of the Constitution

National Bank of Pakistan being a statutory corporation is amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and also its employees can avail the recourse to the writ jurisdiction for the redressal of their grievances in respect of their service matters.

Suit for declaration cannot be maintained nor can a declaration of title be given on the basis of an agreement to sell.

Petitioners, being employees of Quetta Electrical Supply Company / QESCO), invoked S.31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, alleging that the respondents / QESCO had committed gross unfair labour practices by unilaterally scrapping the decades-old binding "Commercial Procedure" and imposing an entirely new feeder-wise duty system

Validity

The jurisdiction of National Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') under S.31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ('the IRA, 2012') is limited to redressing "unfair labour practices"

The expression "unfair labour practice" is a term of art and cannot be invoked merely because employees are aggrieved by a managerial decision

Assignment of duties, preparation of duty rosters, transfers, postings and internal administrative arrangements are purely managerial prerogatives and do not constitute unfair labour practice unless they are proved to be actuated by malice, victimization or made with the object of punishing workers for trade union activities

Thus, present petition was not maintainable under S.31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012

Petition, being non-maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Sales Tax Reference had been filed by the respondent/Department against the Order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), whereby recovery proceedings initiated against the sole proprietorship concern (petitioner) on the basis of show-cause notice for alleged adjustment of inadmissible input tax upheld relevant Order-in-Original and Order-in-Appeal were annulled

As such, the scope of pending Sales Tax Reference was limited to the validity of impugned orders therein regarding recovery of alleged sales tax

Therefore, the vires of impugned raid and search operation, which were conducted during pendency of appeal of the petitioner before ATIR, did not fall within the scope and ambit of pending Sales Tax Reference before the Division Bench of this/High Court

Similarly, another constitutional petition having been instituted by the petitioner with respect to relevant FIR emanated from criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent /Department and as such, it was distinct in terms of scope, cause of action and prayer made therein in comparison to the instant constitutional petition which had impugned the raid and search operation alleging the same to be in derogation to the express provisions of S. 40 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 ('the Act')

Pertinently, the constitutional challenge qua breach of statutory rights lies with the Single Bench of High Court and on account of difference in the scope of cited matters, there was no reason to club present petition with referred cases

Further, S. 45B of the Act provides remedy of appeal against specific orders passed under specified Sections of the Act, whereas, S. 46 of the Act provides for appeals to the ATIR against specified orders

The stated remedy of appeal is not available to assail statutory infringements which is examined by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution

Hence, the objections qua maintainability were baseless and the same were overruled accordingly

In the present case, record established that the raid and seizure of record by respondent was unlawful being in derogation to the express provisions of S. 40 of the Act

High Court declared the impugned search and seizure operation conducted by respondent /Officer at the business / office premises of the petitioner as unlawful having no legal effect directing the respondents to forthwith return the seized record of the petitioner and were restrained to use the same against the petitioner

Constitutional petition, filed by registered person, was allowed accordingly.

Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal) remanded the matter to the Adjudicating Officer for factual verification and to determine whether respondent was using imported produced raw material or locally produced in order to determine that which provision of law would be applicable to the respondent/ assesse

No question of law arises from the said remand order as the matter had been remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh appraisal and the Tribunal having not given any conclusive finding against the applicant / department, there was no final order holding the field which could be said to have given rise to any question of law for determination by the High Court

The matter was wide open which would be decided by the Assessing Authority including factual verification after giving applicant /department and respondent /assesse full opportunity to participate in the proceedings and thereafter the matter would be matured for expression of opinion by the High Court if needed

Reference Application is not maintainable in respect of remand order or interlocutory order as under provisions of S. 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, only those matters are referable to the High Court in respect of which a question of law arises for determination

In the present case, no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, whereby the matter had been remanded

Thus, the question raised was declined

Reference application, being not maintainable, was decided against the applicant / department.

Perusal of Ss. 45-B and 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ('the Act 1990'), which are the provisions conferring right of appeal, clearly spell out that an appeal under S.45-B read with S.46 of the Act, 1990 is only available against orders passed under S. 10, 11, 25, 36 or 66 of the Act, 1990

Section 74 under which the impugned order has been passed, is not an appealable order, therefore, the only remedy available with the petitioner, particularly in the wake of the fact that impugned order has allegedly been issued without notice or an opportunity f hearing, is by way of filing a Constitutional petition as the petitioner cannot be left remediless.

Submission was that the appeal(s), if required to be filed, would become available once proceedings on the basis of Show-Cause Notices commenced

Held: Such submission tantamounts to avoid inevitable consequences of an inchoate, arbitrary and fanciful order

The edifice of the Show-Cause Notices solely hinges upon the vires of the impugned order

Where a superstructure is built on illegal and void order(s), the same is meant to collapse if such an order is declared illegal and unlawful

Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice

High Court set-aside the Impugned Order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect

Constitutional petition, filed by Company/Registered Person, was allowed accordingly.

Briefly, the appellants, being the brother and mother of the deceased, filed an insurance appeal after their claim under a family takaful policy was not paid in full, however, prior to approaching the Insurance Tribunal, they had already pursued the same grievance before the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, who passed an order awarding partial payment, followed by dismissal of their review petition, without availing further statutory remedies

The Insurance Tribunal dismissed their petition as not maintainable, and the present insurance appeal before the High Court raised the issue as to “whether, after invoking and exhausting the jurisdiction of the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, the appellants could lawfully re-agitate the same matter before the Insurance Tribunal in view of S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and the bar of limitation?”

Held: Applicants/appellants asserted that the delay occurred due to a miscalculation during Eid vacations, which they argued constituted a sufficient cause, however, the explanation offered was vague, unsupported by any evidence, and did not qualify as "sufficient cause" under the strict interpretation of limitation law

Each day of delay had to be explained satisfactorily and casual or administrative oversights did not justify condonation

In the present case, no substantive cause had been made out to warrant relaxation of the statutory limitation

The applicants' plea of oversight due to vacations failed to meet the threshold required for condonation

Against order for dismissal by the Federal Ombudsman no representation was filed under S. 14 of the Act before the President of Pakistan as indicated by the record

In view of S.18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, the appellants' petition was not maintainable before the Insurance Tribunal

As per S. 18 of the Act, once the Federal Ombudsman had initiated proceedings or decided a matter, no court or tribunal could take cognizance of that matter

Moreover, through exercise of judicial review, High Court examined S. 18 in detail and found it to be legally valid, enforceable, and constitutionally compliant

Being a quasi-judicial forum, the Ombudsman could not assume the role of a litigant or act as a party to assert or defend its own orders in appellate or judicial proceeding

Appellant did not avail the remedies provided under S.14 of the Act 2013 as well as S. 130(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000

In the present case, the appellants themselves elected to file their claim before the Federal Ombudsman, accepted the adjudicated compensation, and also pursued a statutory review, which was dismissed

Having fully availed and exhausted the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, the appellants could not subsequently seek to re-agitate the same grievance before the Insurance Tribunal

The principle of finality squarely applied in said circumstances

Present appeal was barred under S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and was hit by the doctrine of election as well as law of limitation

Application for condonation of delay was dismissed and the present appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was also dismissed.

This would require a petition by members having not less than 10% of the voting power in the company and may be declared invalid by reason of a material defect or omission in the notice or irregularity in the proceedings of the meeting

Therefore, the law itself provides an alternate remedy to the members having not less than 10% of the voting power

Petition shall be made within thirty days of the impugned meeting

If a minority shareholder does not file the petition within time he cannot allege oppression of the minority shareholders.

Unless plaintiff satisfies Court that the terms on which he received permission had been satisfied, there is no proper plaint before the Court, with the result that no proceedings on the plaint can be taken

Order of dismissal of suit can be passed only after it is found that plaintiff, on an objection taken, is not willing to comply with the terms on which he was permitted to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit.

If Trial Court considered that any disobedience to its order was committed pursuant to sections mentioned therein then the offender could be imposed a fine of Rs.200/- only after following the procedure under S.481, Cr.P.C. but if the Court had considered that more severe sentence was to be imposed then the Court should have sent the complaint to Magistrate for the purpose of trial under S.482, Cr.P.C.

Procedure prescribed in S.482, Cr.P.C. had not been followed, rather the Trial Court had directly passed conviction and sentence of imprisonment for 15 days, though the Court was not authorized under S.480, Cr.P.C. nor Trial Court had sent the complaint to Magistrate

High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as the same was nullity in the eyes of law

High Court repelled the plea of authorities that in petty offences no appeal laid as per mandate of S.413, P.P.C. because when an offender was punished under S.180, P.P.C. pursuant to S.480, Cr.P.C. then appeal against such order was provided under S.486, Cr.P.C.

High Court acquitted the accused as appeal was competent against conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Counsel for the petitioner, upon realization of that fact, did not press that petition and sought permission to withdraw the same

Petition was disposed of, accordingly.

Challenge was laid to the office objection regarding maintainability of an application seeking re-hearing of a civil revision which had already been dismissed on merits by the High Court; petitioner thereafter filed an application under S.151 C.P.C. for re-hearing, which was objected to by the office and an earlier similar application had already been rejected; through the present successive application, he again sought re-hearing of the same civil revision

The issue for determination was "whether a second application for re-hearing of a civil revision already decided on merits was maintainable in law?"

Held: While hearing the revision, not only the merits of the case were discussed but on the basis of same, the case was decided and there was no reason for re-hearing of the matter solely for the reason that applicant was dissatisfied with the decision especially when the stance of the applicant that his counsel had not been granted proper hearing was not emanating from the record of the case

Moreover, the second application again praying for re-hearing of the objection as well as the main civil revision was also not maintainable as subject to certain exceptions which were not available in the present case, filing of successive applications on the same subject matter even though on different grounds was not permissible under the law and the applicant was required to take all the grounds available to him at the time of filing first application and subsequent application after decision of earlier application was barred

Besides by up-holding the office objection, the matter had come to an end and the applicant had the remedy to challenge the order, whereby civil revision was dismissed, before the higher forum, therefore, there was no justification in the present case for re-hearing of the matter

Office objection viz. maintainability raised against the present application for re-hearing, which even otherwise was a subsequent application on the same subject, was sustained, in circumstances.

Re-hearing of a case cannot be ordered merely because the applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the case as every dissatisfied litigant may file an application for re-hearing and there would be no end to litigation rather the same can only be ordered where the applicant substantiates before the Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause beyond control to appear before the Court when the case was called for hearing.

It is for the Court to decide regarding maintainability of such a Constitutional petition, seized of the matter, to appreciate whether the (interlocutory) order is hitting root of the case and if the defect is not rectified, trial may become defective, and upon its conclusion Appellate Court has to remand the case to cure the defect

This would be sheer wastage of public time and may cause delay in outcome of final decision.

The petitioner was appointed as a financial analyst by respondent No.1 in 2007, and his services were terminated in 2016; after issuance of a grievance notice, the petitioner filed a grievance petition

During the proceedings, respondents Nos.1 to 3 filed an application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., contending that the petitioner was not a workman and, therefore, the grievance petition was not maintainable; application was allowed and the grievance petition was dismissed, prompting the petitioner to file an appeal, which was also dismissed resulting in the filing of the present constitutional petition

Moot question before the High Court was as to "whether the petitioner was a workman or not?"

Held: For maintaining a grievance petition by an employee before the forums provided under the labour laws for settlement of an industrial dispute or a case of unfair labour practice, the basic requirement was that the person approaching the said court should be a worker or a workman as contemplated in S.2(xxxiii) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and the initial burden to prove this fact lay upon the employee who has brought the lis before the court, so as to prove that his nature of work is ministerial or clerical and not managerial or administrative and this fact has to be proved by him through his oral as well as documentary evidence

The appointment letter of the petitioner transpired that not a single word had been mentioned therein about the nature of the duties assigned to the petitioner so as to determine that he was a workman or not

Since there was nothing or the record wherefrom this could be culled out that what duties had been assigned to the petitioner as a financial analyst wherefrom his status could be determined and for proving the said fact it was mandatory that the parties should be directed to produce their respective evidence whereupon a decision could be made regarding the status of the petitioner as a workman or otherwise as at the preliminary stage no determination could be made, therefore, impugned orders were not sustainable in law

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

This would require a petition by members having not less than 10% of the voting power in the company and may be declared invalid by reason of a material defect or omission in the notice or irregularity in the proceedings of the meeting

Therefore, the law itself provides an alternate remedy to the members having not less than 10% of the voting power

Petition shall be made within thirty days of the impugned meeting

If a minority shareholder does not file the petition within time he cannot allege oppression of the minority shareholders.

Interlocutory orders which are not final or conclusive in nature cannot be challenged by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction

Adequate remedy in such circumstances

Proper course is to await Trial Court's decision

Rationale

All interim orders remain open to scrutiny in appeal

Facts of the present matter were that the petitioner bought a top-floor flat with a rooftop where he installed a water tank and solar panels

The dispute arose when the building owner planned further construction over the rooftop, which the petitioner claimed would infringe his easement rights and bar his access to his utilities installed at the rooftop

In the civil suit filed by the petitioner, request for grant of ad-interim injunction was declined by trial court as well as the appellate court

High Court was called upon to challenge the refusals of grant of ad-interim injunction by courts below, where at the outset the petitioner was confronted as to the question of maintainability of the Constitutional petition being against the interlocutory order

Therefore, pivotal question for determination before the High Court was as to "whether a Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution was maintainable against interlocutory orders refusing an ad-interim injunction?"

Held: Relief sought for through application for interim injunction had no nexus with easement rights rather it amounted to trespassing the property of the adversary

When easement rights were kept in juxtaposition with ownership rights, indubitably ownership rights prevailed and could not be defeated in the garb of so-called easement rights

An ad interim order granted by a court held the field till the next date of hearing and a litigant was supposed to get decided his application for grant of temporary injunction filed under O.XXXIX Rr. 1 and 2 of C.P.C.

The grant of ad-interim injunction by the High Court would have amounted to stepping into the shoes of Trial Court which was not mandated by law

Invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court by challenging grant or refusal of ad-interim injunction by courts below was not an adequate remedy as application for grant of temporary injunction was yet to be decided

If litigants were allowed to question grant or refusal of ad-interim injunction through constitutional petitions, it would open floodgates

Constitutional jurisdiction being an extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked to challenge interlocutory orders that were not final or conclusive in nature

The impugned orders were unexceptionable and did not call for any interference by the High Court

Constitutional petition was not maintainable and same was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

The alleged violations, if any, quo the terms and conditions of service, if not backed by statutory rules, cannot be redressed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

Rules of an organization if not approved by government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization are non-statutory.

Petitions filed by those employees who were part of the T&T Department would be maintainable for the reason that such employees had statutory rules relating to terms and conditions of their service which were protected by S. 35 read with S. 36 of the Act, 1996

It is not axiomatic that all employees of T&T Department would have ipso facto right to challenge any/all actions, if so initiated against them, by invoking judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court.

Briefly, matter comprised of multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), grouped into two categories: Category "A", consisting of petitioners who were not employees of the erstwhile Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department and joined PTCL after the enactment of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996; and Category "B", consisting of petitioners who were originally employees of the T&T Department and were subsequently transferred first to the Corporation and then to PTCL

The petitions arose out of disciplinary proceedings initiated by PTCL, including the issuance of show-cause notices and charge sheets against the petitioners

All petitions challenged the initiation of disciplinary actions by PTCL and involved questions relating to the nature of employment of the petitioners, the applicable service framework, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions

Held: Petitioners of category (A) petitions were neither civil servants nor were they employed as employees of T&T department and were rather appointed by the corporation, therefore, the petitions mentioned in category (A) were not maintainable since the services of these petitioners were never regulated under any statutory rules as they started their employments being employees of corporation and were then transferred to PTCL as transferred employees

After PTCL's privatization under the Act, 1996 and subsequent amendments thereto, the petitioners' status in both categories (A & B) seized to be that of civil servants and they were governed by the PTCL's internal rules and regulations or standing orders

Consequently, the E&D Rules, 1973 were no longer applicable

It was settled by Supreme Court in the case reported as 2021 SCMR 1998 that an employee, who, at no point, had served in T&T department, could not claim that his terms and conditions of service were baptized by any statutory protections

Such employees could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution for agitating the grievance pertaining to their service matters

It was the case of the petitioners in category (B) petitions that since the proceedings sought to be initiated against the them were in violations of the E&D Rules 1973, as such proceedings had either not been initiated by mentioning the E&D Rules, 1973 or where even so mentioned, the proceedings were not initiated by the 'competent authority', therefore, the proceedings were without jurisdiction

This ground failed for two reasons; firstly, the E&D Rules, 1973 had been repealed by virtue of R. 21 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 (E&D Rules, 2020) and the concept or term 'authorized officer', as couched in sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 had been done away with by the substituted/replaced Rules i.e. E&D Rules, 2020, thus the entire premise of the case sought to be built by the petitioners was without any foundation

Without prejudice to the foregoing, even sub-rule (3) of the R. 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 provided that if no officer was so authorized, the authority could proceed to perform such functions

This was beside the point that the petitioners of category 'B' could not insist that they could only and exclusively be proceeded under the E&D Rules, 1973 and the prescribed rules and regulations of Corporation/PTCL, could not be invoked

Mere maintainability of a constitutional petition, owing to statutory protections in terms of Ss. 35 & 36 of the Act, 1996, did not mean that the petitioners could stifle the very essence and purpose of the incorporation of the PTCL and the Act, 1996

It was concluded that the proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL had lawfully been commenced, therefore, filing of present petitions by way of laying challenges to the mere issuance of the show cause notices and charge sheets were not tenable

All petitions, falling under categories "A" and "B", were dismissed

Category "A" petitions being held not-maintainable for want of jurisdiction, while category "B" petitions were dismissed on merits.

Mere adoption of statutory rules does not render the rules statutory for the purpose of organization which adopts such rules.

While bestowing jurisdiction upon the High Court, Art. 199 of the Constitution places certain restrictions about which the High Court should/must always be conscious before entering into realm of exercise of such jurisdiction one of which is the availability of alternate and efficacious remedy

If the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy available to him then he is precluded to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and in such eventuality the Constitutional petition would not be maintainable.

'Mutwalli'was not only empowered to engage counsel for the conduct of cases for the Waqf property but he was also competent to lease the property of the Waqf

High Court emphasized that under S. 15 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act 2009 (the "Act 2009"), the "landlord" may seek eviction of the tenant on various grounds mentioned therein

The term "landlord" was defined under S. 2(d) of the Act 2009 which meant owner of premises and included a person entitled or authorized to receive rent in respect of the premises

In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that property was vested in the Trust, the Mutwalli being authorized to lease out the property and also receiving rent fell within the definition of landlord and could file ejectment petition

Ejectment petition was maintainable and lawfully allowed against the petitioner

Constitutional petition being meritless was dismissed, in circumstances.

Present suit essentially seeks to assail selection for audit notices, under S. 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, ostensibly predicated upon such specified reasons which has already been disapproved

Once a taxpayer is selected for audit and till such audit is completed the taxpayer is provided ample and multiple opportunities at every step to defend his position, support his returns and offer explanations for the information provided and entries made in the tax returns

Even if a discrepancy is discovered taxpayer should be provided yet another opportunity to explain his position before his assessment would be revised

Such selection is not per se illegal

A mere notice seeking information is not necessarily adversarial and would not ipso facto give rise to an actionable cause

Audit proceedings provides a forum and opportunity for consideration of any reservation of the plaintiffs

If any adverse order is passed in pursuance thereof the same would be appealable

Default by the plaintiff in submitting to the statutory hierarchy can not be demonstrated to denude the statutory forum of its jurisdiction; or confer the same upon the High Court on original jurisdiction

Plaintiff (taxpayer having been selected for audit failed to demonstrate an actionable cause of action

Plaint was rejected, in circumstances.

A cardinal principle in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction is the doctrine of judicial restraint, particularly with regard to constitutional adjudication

Said principle dictates that courts refrain from deciding constitutional questions if a case can be resolved on other narrow grounds

The rationale behind this is to avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings, which could have far-reaching and unintended consequences

Courts are urged to adopt a minimalist approach, addressing only the specific issues necessary for the determination of the case at hand

By doing so, courts ensure that broader constitutional principles are not unnecessarily invoked or interpreted, thus maintaining judicial prudence and restraint

Furthermore, it underscores the importance of resolving disputes through the most direct and least expansive means, respecting the separation of powers and avoiding encroachments on legislative and executive functions

In summary, this principle safeguards the judiciary's role within its constitutional mandate by ensuring that only the requisite and narrowly focused questions are addressed in judicial decisions

In the present case, a Show-Cause Notice (SCN) based on a seizure-cum-contravention report was issued to the petitioner

In response, the petitioner filed a constitutional petition directly challenging said Show-Cause Notice

High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution to issue writs in cases where an individual's rights are infringed, or there is a lack of jurisdiction, illegality, or procedural impropriety

Constitutional petition may be maintainable if the petitioner can establish that the Show-Cause Notice was issued without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice

One of the primary considerations in determining the maintainability of a constitutional petition is whether the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy available

Courts generally emphasize the exhaustion of all statutory remedies before invoking constitutional jurisdiction

In the context of customs disputes, the petitioner typically has the opportunity to respond to the Show-Cause Notice, participate in adjudication proceedings, and, if aggrieved by the decision, file an appeal under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969

It would be appropriate, for the issues asserted by the petitioner to be raised before Respondent /Collector of Customs, who must first determine whether they have the jurisdiction to proceed with the matter before taking any further action, ensuring adherence to procedural propriety and statutory mandates

Constitutional petition was disposed of.

Reasons assigned for extension of time could not extend limitation as provided under S.11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, whereas, the other argument that matter was under consideration in audit also did not entitle respondents to seek extension in the limitation either on the excuse of audit or delay in any other manner

Show-cause notice was time barred, whereas, the law as to limitation was settled

Cardinal principle of law was that all were equal before law, whether a citizen or State, and if a law prescribed time period for recovery of money, after its lapse, recovery was not enforceable through Courts

Since it was not in dispute that show-cause notice was hopelessly time barred, hence without jurisdiction, therefore, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction notice of same was taken by the High Court, and by doing so, the impugned show-cause notice was set-aside/quashed

Constitution petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Petitioner/Company, claiming itself as creditor of respondents/Company, filed petition for winding-up of respondents / Company while a civil suit filed by the petitioner (plaintiff) for recovery against the respondents remained pending adjudication

Validity

Petitioner failed to cite exact provision or circumstance of the Companies Act, 2017 ('the Act, 2017') which had been ignored or violated, due to which the instant petition was instituted

Petitioner also remained unable to provide any cogent document / reason to establish that the petitioner was indeed a creditor of the Company, and/or that they definitively owed monies by the respondent / Company, which the said Company was unable to pay

Company jurisdiction is founded under S. 5 of the Act, 2017, and S. 301 of the Act, 2017 deals with matters pertaining to winding-up of companies

Per S. 301 of the Act, 2017, there are several requirements provided under which a company may be wound up

In the present matter, none of such/those obligations had been legitimately argued or established by the petitioner

Ergo, since none of those circumstances had been established, the requirements to invoke jurisdiction of this Court remained unfulfilled, and hence, present petition was non-maintainable as at the best it was a commercial dispute between the petitioner and respondents, which was already in the process of adjudication before the civil court

Whilst there is no bar on winding-up proceedings commencing when there is a civil suit pending, but the jurisdiction under S. 5 of the Act, 2017 must still be first formed, showing that some violation or incurrence, creating a causation under the Companies Act, 2017, has occurred

The requirements for winding-up a company are entirely separate from a commercial dispute / claim

A claim for commercial recovery cannot be equated with a demand for winding-up, both of which follow separate conditions and constraints

Petition for winding-up, being entertain able, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Banking Court granted damages of Rs.5,000,000/- on account of mental stress, agony etc. suffered by respondent / customer

Validity

Such damage did not occur out of any contractual or financial obligation between the parties

Respondent / customer might have a right to institute a claim against appellant / bank for seeking such damages, and those could only be awarded by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, and not by Banking Court in its special jurisdiction

Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment and decree to such extent as Banking Court had travelled beyond the scope of its jurisdiction

Respondent / customer remained at liberty to file any civil suit for damages etc. against appellant / bank in a court of competent jurisdiction for seeking his claims of damages, in accordance with law

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Brief facts were that the applicant company along with another entered into a contract with the respondent company for a project of Balancing, Modernization and Rehabilitation at the applicants' factory

Disputes arose between the parties and were referred to two arbitrators who gave conflicting awards, leading to the appointment of an umpire, who issued his award and same was made rule of the court

Subsequent civil appeals and applications by the applicants were dismissed at various stages, with the final appellate judgment and decree dated 13.05.2009 upholding the umpire's award

The applicants then filed the present civil revision under S. 115, C.P.C., challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below

Legal issue requiring determination was as to "Whether a revision application under S.115, C.P.C. lay against an appellate judgment rendered under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and whether the High Court could interfere with the concurrent findings and the umpire's award within the limited supervisory jurisdiction"?

Held: a second appeal was not available against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside the award, however, the aggrieved party was entitled to file a revision application

The scope of revision application was limited and the court could only interfere if the subordinate court had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity

Therefore, at the outset, it was observed that the present revision application was maintainable as under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act no second appeal lay under the scheme of the Act

The primary dispute between the parties was whether certain works undertaken by the respondent were beyond the scope of the contract

It was contended by the applicant, as articulated in the impugned judgement and not during the course of arguments before the High Court, that the extra work undertaken by the respondent was beyond the scope of the contract and the agreement ought to be void for "uncertainty"

Whereas, the award as well as the impugned judgment, placing reliance on clause 51.1 of the general conditions of contract had rendered a finding that the agreement between the parties stipulated additional work

There was no error, factual or legal, floating on the face of the record and the High Court was not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment

Further, the appellate court had correctly curtailed its jurisdiction by holding that the said court was not a court of appeal and the jurisdiction, even if liberally interpreted at the appellate stage, was of a supervisory nature

The scope of interference, in the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115, C.P.C., against concurrent findings of the court below, was further circumscribed

Applicants failed to bring the present case within the constricted scope and therefore the present revision application was dismissed.

Applicant /defendant was aggrieved of grant of interim injunction by Trial Court in favour of respondent / plaintiff, which was assailed before High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction

Validity

Order in question basically stated that as the Survey Superintendent contradicted himself and admitted that there might exist an overlap of location of properties in question, prima facie case for injunctive relief was made out

Such order could not be considered as special circumstances where Trial Court had either assumed a jurisdiction not vested init or had failed to exercise or declined to assume a jurisdiction vested in it by law or had taken a procedural step or had omitted to take a procedural step which was contrary to a mandatory provision of law or had taken procedural step pursuant to law which was directory in nature and applicant / defendant was prejudiced

High Court declined to exercise revisional jurisdiction as the application was not maintainable for there existed no special circumstances

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

The petitioners, residents of a private residential scheme filed a constitutional petition claiming to be office bearers of the Colony's welfare association and purchasers of residential plots within the scheme

They alleged that essential civic amenities such as electricity, gas, drainage, sewerage, roads, and street lighting had not been provided

Through the present constitutional petition petitioners had sought directions for provision of basic municipal facilities and to restrain further construction on the disputed land

Held: Present constitutional petition was not maintainable in its present form

The primary grievance of the petitioners had arisen out of alleged inaction by private individuals or entities, who did not fall within the definition of "person, amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution"

Writ could not ordinarily be issued against private parties unless it was demonstrated that they were discharging public functions under a statutory frame work which was not the situation in the present case

Moreover, the relief sought against government official was also misconceived

It was responsibility of private developers to obtain approval of the housing scheme and to provide infrastructure and amenities prior to transfer of such scheme to the local government

Unless and until the scheme was duly approved and handed over to the relevant municipal corporation, government was under no statutory obligation to provide basic facilities within such private developments

Additionally, the petitioners raised dispute which invoked factual controversies concerning the obligation of private parties, which required evidence and enquiry

Constitutional petition being misconceived was not maintainable in law and same was dismissed in limine.

If property is situated within territorial limits of Cantonment area the provisions of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 would become applicable

The petitioner/landlord filed a rent case before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of respondent No.1/tenant from a tenement on the ground of default in rent payment

The Rent Controller, however, refused to assume jurisdiction holding that the matter fell under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 rather than the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979

The petitioner's appeal was dismissed affirming the Rent Controller's decision

The petitioner/landlord then filed the present Constitutional petition before the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of both lower courts regarding jurisdiction and seeking eviction of the respondent/ tenant from the tenement

Question for determination before the High Court was as to "Whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to entertain the eviction proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 in respect of a property situated within the territorial limits of a cantonment area, or whether such jurisdiction exclusively lay under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963"?

Held: Section 1 and Preamble of the Act 1963 indicated that the same was applicable to certain classes of buildings and tenements "within the limits of the cantonment areas"

Moreover, S.5 of the Act 1963 specifically ousted the jurisdiction of any other court, other than the one established under the Act 1963

The tenement lay within the territorial limits of the cantonment and therefore the provisions of the Act 1963 were applicable thereto

Courts below had correctly refused to assume jurisdiction in the matter

Concurrent findings of courts below required no interference

Present Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner was awarded a two-year vending contract through an open auction conducted by Pakistan Railways pursuant to a public notice

Petitioner deposited 30% of the bid amount, i.e., Rs.1,683,000, with the respondents

Allotment pertained to vending services, and subsequent to commencement of the contract, the petitioner's vending operations were regulated in terms of items permitted for sale and the number of salespersons authorized under the allotment order and applicable railway policy, during which period the petitioner's vending activity ultimately ceased

Held: Matter at hand emanated solely from a contractual dispute between the parties

The document annexed by the petitioner himself demonstrated that the petitioner was authorized to vend only twelve items and to operate through no more than four salespersons, in accordance with the terms explicitly set forth in the contractual letter, hence, the very basis of his claim stood contradicted by his own annexures

Furthermore, the petitioner had concealed a material fact viz. institution of a civil suit, wherein, plaint was rejected

Such concealment, coupled with the petitioner's contradictory pleadings, rendered it evident that the petitioner had not approached the High Court with clean hands, and, therefore, was not entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court

Contractual disputes, laden with factual controversies, did not fall within the purview of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution

In the absence of any demonstrable violation of fundamental rights or statutory obligations, High Court could not be called upon to adjudicate such dispute

Present petition was misconceived and same was devoid of any merit, as such, same was dismissed.

In the present case the core challenge stemmed from the vendor's/petitioner's attempt to reclaim possession of the property without first seeking cancellation of the subsisting agreement to sell

The agreement to sell was contingent upon issuance of NOC from GHQ, which was never granted, but despite this the vendee had already paid almost the entire sale consideration and continued in possession

The vendor, instead of pursuing cancellation of the agreement to sell, directly filed a suit for possession, which was legally questionable as to how possession could be reclaimed unless the underlying sale agreement was first lawfully set aside

Held: Possession being sought by the appellant/plaintiff was without any ground or justification as the said possession could not be granted in the absence of a prayer for cancellation of the agreement to sell

Valuable rights in favour of the respondent/vendee had already accrued for the reasons that significant percentage (95%) of the sale consideration had already been paid to the appellant/vendor

Suit of the appellant/vendor was rightly dismissed by the courts below

Moreover, under equitable principles the respondent/vendee was entitled to retain her possession

In the given circumstances her possession was a complete defense to the suit filed by the appellant which was rightly dismissed by courts below

No substantial error in the impugned judgment was pointed out, as such, no case for interference was made out

Second appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

A foreign accused who was in custody of Pakistani authorities on the charges of espionage and terrorism, for his release of whom, International Court of Justice was approached, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199, against death sentence handed down against him by the Field General Court martial, appeal against which was rejected by the appellate court.

The alleged complaint about the embezzlement in service medicines was relating to PAF Hospital [at Karachi]; the Board of Inquiry was initiated by the correspondence

Base Routine Orders issued from [Karachi]

Since the crucial set of facts had previously occurred [at Karachi], therefore, the High Court [at Karachi] had territorial jurisdiction to scrutinize the controversy.