Discretion of Court

Whether penalty could be sustained in absence of mens rea and in circumstances where duty was voluntarily disclosed and paid?

Held: Record revealed that the Appellant, upon issuance of notice under S.26 of the Customs Act, 1969, produced the actual invoice issued by the foreign supplier and requested the department to accept payment of the amount in question

This fact was also reflected in the Order-in-Original

Penalty in the present case had been imposed under clauses (9), (10A) and (14) of S. 156(1), which use the expression “shall be liable to penalty”, thereby conferring discretion and not mandating imposition of penalty in every case

Imposition of penalty requires presence of a guilty mind, i.e. mens rea, which was absent in the present case

Mere payment of amount after issuance of show-cause notice or passing of order does not ipso facto establish intentional evasion or existence of mens rea unless supported by corroborative material

The mistake had been admitted prior to passing of the order and request for payment was made to the department

Penalty disproportionate to the gravity of alleged offence is unsustainable in law

The authority, while imposing penalty, must consider gravity of charge in the attending circumstances

The Appellant being a majority-owned Government Corporation, the burden of penalty would ultimately fall upon the Government itself and no useful purpose would be served in sustaining the same

The Tribunal had already reduced the penalty and the department itself was not aggrieved thereof

Thus, imposition of penalty was not justified

High Court set aside the impugned order

Appeal filed by the Government Corporation was allowed.

If the court comes to the conclusion that in grant of a decree equity leans in favour of the plaintiff then decree can be granted, otherwise, it is the discretion of the court

Even if the plaintiff has proved the agreement to sell even then it is the discretion of the court to grant a decree or refuse the same.

Petitioners moved an application under S.540, Cr.P.C for summoning the defence witnesses, which was allowed, resultantly, they appeared as DWs 3 to 4

However, during recording of examination in chief of said witnesses, defence counsel requested the Trial Court to declare them as hostile, but his request was turned down

In a situation, where at the time of recording evidence, the integrity of a witness was shaken up to such an extent that he was causing damage to the case of the party, who produced him, then, in such eventuality, the provisions of S.150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat O.1984, would come into play, according to which, the Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who called a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party

It was true that the provisions of the Article conferred powers on Court to permit a party who called a witness to put any question, which may be put in cross-examination, but it was equally true that such discretion must be exercised with due care, keeping in view the interests of both the parties so that no one would be prejudiced from the order of the Court

Statements of the DWs were perused and according to their statements, though, they had signed/thumb impressed the affidavits, however, they did not read its contents

Nothing was observed in their statement that either they had made any deviation from their earlier statements or attempted to conceal material facts as the record told that during investigation of the case one of the petitioners submitted an application to the District Police Officer concerned, which was marked to Police Officer/witness

Said witness during cross-examination stated that during inquiry, the accused party produced three witnesses in defence and they submitted their affidavits, which he placed on record

Said witness further admitted that the statements of the said deponents were not recorded by him under S.161, Cr.P.C as they (deponents) were not ready to record their statements, and when their statements were not recorded previously, then how they could be declared hostile on the ground that they were telling a lie or concealing material facts

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the discretion exercised by the Trial Court was in accordance with law which needed no inteference by the High Court

Petition being without merit was dismissed, in circumstances.

Application for filing the rejoinder to the written statement was dismissed, however, the appellate court allowed the said application in a civil revision

Validity

Respondent/plaintiff could file a rejoinder only with the leave of the court, which had discretion in granting or refusing permission to file a rejoinder, and typically, it would allow it if necessary for a just determination of the lis

If the written statement of the defendant raised new defences or arguments, the plaintiff could be allowed to file rejoinder to clarify, explain or deny those defences

Rejoinder is an optional pleading and can only be filed under the circumstances where it is needed to respond to new defences or issues raised by the petitioners/defendants that have not been adequately addressed as pleaded by the respondents/plaintiffs in their written application seeking permission of the Court to allow them to file rejoinder

Court's discretion envisages that unnecessary or frivolous replies are avoided, promoting efficiency in the judicial process

Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Allegation against the applicant was that he, along with another accused , forcibly took away the complainant's son (victim) on the force of pistol and the victim later disclosed to the prosecution witnesses about the act of sodomy committed with him by both accused

Severity of an offence alone is not sufficient ground to denya bail plea

The fundamental concept underlying bail is that the liberty of an innocent person should not be restricted until proven otherwise

Section 497(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, establishes that for bail to be granted, the court must be convinced, based on the evidence presented, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment; this section also emphasizes that the court should consider whether there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into the accused's guilt

Such further inquiry should indicate to the case's outcome and demonstrate or tend to show the accused's innocence

Bail, being a discretionary relief, requires the court to exercise its discretion fairly and judiciously

In the context of the court, the term "discretion" implies sound judgment guided by the law, aiming to alleviate the hardship faced by individuals

Bail should not be denied as a form of punishment

Bail was granted to accused, in circumstances.

Where parties to a contract have agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration, ordinarily Court must hold the parties to their bargain

This is not an absolute rule

Power conferred upon Court to grant a stay under S. 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 is entirely a matter of discretion of Court

Expression "such authority may make an order staying the proceedings" indicates that Court has discretion to stay suit or not.

Section 149, C.P.C. is an exception to the command delineated under Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 ("Court Fees Act")

Exercise of discretion by the Court at any stage is, as a general rule, expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant on presenting plausible reasons which may include bona fide mistake in the calculation of the court fee; unavailability of the court fee stamps; or any other good cause or circumstances beyond control, for allowing time to make up the deficiency of court fee stamps on a case to case basis, and the said discretion can only be exercised where the Court is satisfied that sufficient grounds are made out for non-payment of the court fee in the first instance.

For determining the grounds of alleged fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, if any, raised in the application moved under section 12(2), C.P.C., the Court is not obligated in each and every case to frame issues mandatorily in order to record the evidence of parties and exactly stick to the procedure prescribed for decision in the suit but it always rests upon the satisfaction of the Court to structure its proceedings and obviously, after analyzing the nature of allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, the Court may decide whether the case is fit for framing of issues and recording of evidence, without which the allegations leveled in the application filed under Section 12(2), C.P.C. cannot be decided.

Grant of decree in suit for specific performance is within the exclusive discretionary power of the Court which can refuse to grant the relief on the principle of equity even if the suitor has proved the case.

Any individual or small group of persons, in the garb of public interest litigation, cannot be allowed to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution, on mere allegation of mala fide in respect of any decision of the executive authority, whereas, Courts are required to exercise restraint, and should ensure that unless there is a matter of public interest or enforcement of fundamental rights, only then its discretion under Art. 199 of the Constitution should be invoked and exercised by the Courts

In such type of cases, extra caution and care has to be exercised, and unless good faith on the part of petitioner is established and the matter is found to be of a public interest, and the respondent is not in a position to distinguish that the impugned transaction does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect or patent illegality, the Courts may not encourage frivolous litigation between the parties and cause miscarriage of justice.

Parameters of discretion available with Court in condoning delay stated.

Revision is a matter between the higher and subordinate courts, and the right to move an application in that respect is merely a privilege

Provisions of S.115 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 have been divided into two parts: the first part enumerates the conditions under which the Court can interfere; and second part specifies the type of orders which are susceptible to Revision

Jurisdiction under S.115 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is discretionary.

Discretion of court to grant or refuse bail plea is not dependent upon police opinion or no objection/objection of state counsel but an independent view of the court itself that accused has made out a case for grant of bail within the meaning of criteria, so set out for post or pre-arrest bail.

Making of a winding up order was discretionary because S. 305 uses the word "may" in relation to all the grounds given therein, and not "shall"

Discretionary powers conferred on the Court ought generally to be exercised consistently with, and was certainly to be informed by, equitable principles

Hallmark of equity jurisdiction was the flexibility inherent in the discretionary nature thereof

Flexibility and discretion, that is, to decide the case after taking into consideration all relevant matters that tend towards the justice or injustice of granting the remedy that was sought.

Court had ample discretion to deny the relief to a purchaser of an immovable property keeping in view the circumstances of each case as he could not claim specific performance of a contract as a matter of right even where it was lawful to do so.

Specific performance of a contract was essentially an equitable and discretionary relief and the court seized of the matter was in a better position to decide and resolve not simply according to the spirit of the law but also in accordance with the principles of substantial justice by keeping in mind peculiar facts and circumstance of each case

Specific performance could not be claimed as a matter of right

Discretion to be exercised by the court required that it should not be arbitrary but should be sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal

Such an exercise of grant or refusal of relief would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and also the conduct of the parties.

Object of requiring surety was to secure the interest of any such person who may have a share, interest or claim in the movable or immovable assets left by the deceased, such as, a legal heir whose name had not been disclosed to the Court or who was not before the Court, a minor legal heir or a legal heir of unsound mind whose share was retained by the Court, or a legal heir whose share was not distributed to him in accordance with law after the grant of Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate, or a creditor of the deceased

If the Court was satisfied that none of the said situations existed in the case before it, it may dispense with the (requirement of) furnishing of surety while granting Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate

Such power of the Court was discretionary and the person applying for Letters of Administration or Succession Certificate could not seek such discretion in his favour as a matter of right

Exercise of discretion shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, however such discretion should be exercised liberally keeping in view the hardship that may be faced by the legal heirs of the deceased in furnishing surety, who may not have any other or additional property of their own to offer as surety

In some cases, the legal heirs may not be in a position to offer even the inherited property as security.

Any person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make a declaration that he is so entitled, and the claimant need not in such suit ask for any further relief

Court shall not make any such declaration where the claimant being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so.

Ample discretion laid with the Court to deny the relief to a purchaser of an immovable property keeping in view the circumstances of each case

Purchaser could not claim specific performance of a contract as a matter of right even where it was lawful to do so.

Relief of specific performance was discretionary in nature and despite proof of an agreement to sell, exercise of discretion could be withheld if the Court considered that grant of such relief would be unfair or inequitable.

Where one party has made an offer to the other for performance of an act within a particular period of time and such act is not performed, the court without consent of party making an offer cannot enlarge time while exercising its powers under S.148 or S.151, C.P.C.

Time could be further granted only with consent of party.

No enmity, ill-will or grudge had been alleged against the prosecution witnesses, rather sufficient material had been brought by the prosecution on record including positive report of Chemical Examiner of narcotic substance

Section 25 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 excluded the application of S.103, Cr.P.C.

Activities in which the petitioner was involved gave the country bad name in the international community of nations

Record showed that the evidence of the complainant/ Investigating Officer had been adduced and trial would be concluded in near future

Larger interest of the public and State demanded that in case of huge recovery of narcotics, the discretion under S.497, Cr.P.C. was not to be exercised liberally

Generalizations in matters which rested in discretion and an attempt to discover formula of universal application when facts were bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion

No two cases were alike in facts , therefore, Court was to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of discretion was to be meaningful

Such discretion, however, must be permitted to remain in the domain of discretion, to be exercised objectively and open to correction by the Higher Courts

Offence, in the present case, was heinous in nature

Court had to observe tentative assessment and deeper appreciation of evidence was not required at bail stage

Bail was refused to the petitioner, in circumstances.

Law does not recognize absolute and unfettered discretion and discretionary powers ought to be exercised in accordance with well-established principles

In exercise of discretionary powers a court is not empowered to act arbitrarily or in a mechanical manner, rather it is circumscribed by law, recognized norms of justice, fair play, equity, logic, rationality and reasonableness.

Plaintiff in a suit being dominus litis might choose the persons against whom he wished to litigate and could not be compelled to sue a person against his wishes

Discretion under O. I, R. 10(2), C.P.C. could be exercised either suo motu or on the application of plaintiff or defendant or application of a person who was not a party to the suit

Court could add any one as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it found that he was necessary or proper party

Trial Court without having any supporting document had passed the impugned order at premature stage

Impugned order was not sustainable in circumstances

Applicant after filing relevant documents might file fresh application for impleadment as a party

Impugned order was set aside and application for impleadment of party was dismissed

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Once the legislature had conferred discretion on the court to exercise jurisdiction in particular category of offences without placing any prohibition on such discretion then, the court shall not import to such provision of law, reasons or factors alien thereto and not specifically mentioned in the statute.

Held, that case of accused fell under S. 397, Cr.P.C. which provided discretion to the court to exercise powers moderately and judiciously

Convict, in the present case, was about 80-years of age and had undergone 13-years of rigorous imprisonment

Sentences in both FIRs were ordered to run concurrently by High Court

Petition was allowed accordingly.

Application for leave to contest was dismissed and eviction petition was accepted and tenant was directed to hand over the demised premises to the landlord within thirty days

Appellate Court dismissed the appeal while granting six months time for vacation of demised premises

Validity

Second ejectment petition was maintainable on new cause of action

Rent agreement had expired and nothing was on record with regard to renewal or extension of the same

Landlord issued notice to the tenant for vacation of demised premises which was received by him

Mere filing of eviction petition in itself was a sufficient notice to the tenant for termination of rent deed

Tenant was cognizant about the rigors of legal proceedings, he should have made arrangement bona fidely for vacation of demised premises but no such effort was made

Tenant could not take stance with regard to non-service of notice regarding termination of rent agreement as well as vacation of demised premises, he was occupying the tenements despite the termination of tenancy and his status was not better than an illegal occupant

Law did not favour the illegal occupant

Grant of time for vacation of rented premises was discretionary jurisdiction of Court

Such discretion was interlinked with the previous as well as present conduct of tenant during judicial proceedings

Tenant was debarred to challenge the impugned order as principle of estoppel was applicable against him to resile from the earlier statement made in the judicial proceedings

Contumacious conduct tainted with malice had disentitled tenant for any discretionary relief

Four months time was reasonable for vacation of demised premises

Period of six months' awarded by the Appellate Court was not reasonable having no backing of Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 as well as any other law and same was not sustainable

Said period was reduced to four months' time commencing from the judgment of Appellate Court subject to payment of monthly rent as well as other bills of amenities installed at the rented premises

No illegality or material irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned orders/ judgments passed by the Courts below

Constitutional petition was partially allowed in circumstances.

Where in appropriate cases some extenuating circumstances were available, the court had the discretion to award lesser punishment of imprisonment of life provided under S. 302(b) of Penal Code

Sentence of imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court to the accused along with compensation was justified.

Power to allow additional evidence was discretionary in nature circumscribed by the limitation specified in R.27(b) of O.XLI, C.P.C.

Conditions.

Prosecution having successfully established its case against accused persons beyond any shadow of doubt, Trial Court convicted and sentenced accused persons to suffer life imprisonment with fine

Trial Court, while deciding the question of quantum of sentence, drew a misconception of relevant law and by adopting the misconstrued interpretation thereof observed that since the requirement of S.304, P.P.C., were available, qisas could not be enforced

Under S.302(b), P.P.C., though punishment of Tazir was provided as death or imprisonment for life for qatl-i-amd, but it would not follow that the court had absolute discretion to award, either of the two sentences

Normal sentence for qatl-i-amd as Tazir was death, but the court had the discretion to award the lesser sentence of life imprisonment in a case there were mitigating circumstances

Such discretion was neither uncontrolled, nor it was to be exercised arbitrarily, but judiciously

Court, after reaching the conclusion that accused was guilty of qatl-i-amd, could award lesser sentence of life imprisonment, provided the court would record reasons for awarding such lesser sentence i.e. mitigating circumstances or basis whereof case was boiled down for not awarding sentence of death

Once the Trial Court drew the conclusion that accused persons had committed qatl-i-amd, within the meaning of S.302(b), P.P.C., it was bounden duty of the Trial Court to have recorded the reasons for awarding the sentence of life imprisonment, instead of penalty of death; which course would ultimately meet the ends of justice subject to the provisions of S.367(5), Cr.P.C.

Trial Court had to judiciously exercise the discretion, but, in the present case, said exercise was not carried out in letter and spirit

Conditions enumerated in S.304, P.P.C., would be required only in a case where the penalty of death as qisas was awarded as envisaged under S.302(a), P.P.C., but in case, if penalty of death or imprisonment for life as Tazir was going to be awarded, said condition would not be required

Conclusion drawn by the Trial Court being not sustainable, High Court observed that it would be appropriate that the case be remanded to the Trial Court for re-writing of judgment in accordance with the relevant provisions of law

Impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court was set aside accordingly.

Contention of appellant was that due to his poor financial position he could not affix court-fee with the appeal at relevant time

Validity

Office raised objection on the memorandum of appeal and returned the same for removal of such objection within a period of three days

Appellant filed present appeal after eight months after removal of such objection which was received by the office without any objection

Section 149, C.P.C. empowered the court at any stage to allow the supply of deficiency in court-fee and upon such payment the memorandum of appeal should have the same force and effect if such court-fee had been paid in the first instance

Discretion of court was not to be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously but judiciously and with care

Such discretion might be exercised in favour of litigant except in case of contumacy or mala fide or negligence

Contention of appellant with regard to his poor financial position and getting loan for payment of court-fee was supported by an affidavit and same was not rebutted by counter-affidavit

No material was on record to suppose that the appellant was guilty of contumacy or he had deliberately avoided to pay court-fee

Delay in complying with office objection was condoned and court-fee deposited by the appellant was accepted in circumstances.

Where rule of exclusion apply and the documents could not be filed without leave of the Court leave was not to be ordinarily refused, it would be erroneous to assume that there was no discretion left with the court

Court has the discretion which must be allowed to be exercised in each case in the light of the peculiar facts of the case before the court.

Concession of bail was the discretion which a court exercised by transferring the custody of an accused from jail to the court, which discretion was normally withheld if the accused abused the concession by repeating the offence after the grant of bail

Prior criminal cases registered against an accused, prima facie, attracted withdrawal of such concession.

Held that, according to the calculation chart, the total period of imprisonment came to 214 years and the total amount of fine imposed was Rs.17,20000/- or in default thereof to undergo imprisonment for a further period of 11-1/2 years

After getting benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. and various remissions, granted by the Federal and Provincial Governments and the jail authorities, the appellant had undergone sentence of 42 years, 7 months and 21 days

Court of law could not fold up its hands to deny the benefit of Ss. 35 & 397, Cr.P.C. to the appellant as denial would amount to ruthless treatment and he would certainly die while undergoing such long period of imprisonment

If concurrent running of sentences was denied to the appellant, it would bring at naught the benefit conferred upon him by the amnesty given by the Government and ultimately the object of the same would be squarely defeated as appellant would meet natural death during imprisonment

Construing the beneficial provisions in favour of the appellant would clearly meet the ends of justice

Supreme Court directed that all the sentences awarded to the appellant shall run and shall be deemed to have run concurrently; that the appellant shall also have the benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.0 and all the remissions whether granted by the Federal and Provincial Governments or the jail authorities, shall be extended to him

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Concurrent running of sentences-Provisions of Ss. 35 & 397 Cr.P.C. widened the scope of discretion the court to direct that sentences of imprisonment or that of life imprisonment awarded at the same trial or at two different trials but successively, shall run con currently

Once the legislation had conferred the said discretion in the court, then in hardship cases, courts were required to seriously take into consideration the same to the benefit of the accused so as to minimize and liquidate hardship treatment

Court of law could not fold up its hands to deny the benefit of Ss.35 & 397, Cr.P.C. to an accused person as denial would amount to ruthless treatment.

Even in cases where the agreement to sell was validly proved by the plaintiff, the courts may refuse to allow the relief of specific enforcement

Court was neither obliged to grant the relief of specific performance nor could the plaintiff claim it as a matter of right.

When a person came to the court to prove an oral assertion made in the plaint, he was required to specifically plead the same with full details

No document was in existence, in the present case

Grant of decree for specific performance was discretionary relief which would be granted if courts were satisfied that there was an agreement and plaintiff had to prove the same without shadow of doubt

No receipt of payment was in existence and no name of witness had been mentioned in the plaint

Where no date, place and time of agreement was pleaded in the case of oral agreement and no name of the witness had been mentioned in the plaint, decree in such like cases was exceptional

Statements of the plaintiff and her witnesses were contradictory with regard to payment of consideration and agreement arrived at between the parties

Payment in a suit for specific performance was most important ingredient of the contract and upon such point the evidence was sketchy and contradictory

Courts below fell in error while ignoring contradictory evidence available on record and findings recorded by them were not sustainable under the law

Both the courts below while recording concurrent findings had ignored the law

Revision was accepted and impugned judgments and decrees were set aside and suit was dismissed with costs throughout.

Involvement of ladies and juvenile, in the said business had become order of the day, as they could easily earn benefit of their gender and tender age

Mandatory remedies and concessions accorded by the law could not be withheld

While exercising discretionary power, regard must be had to the consequences, ensuing therefrom

Courts were required to strike the balance, as future of the whole generation could not be sacrified at the altar of unwarranted concession to a drug trafficker

Impugned judgment of the Trial Court, whereby accused was convicted and sentenced, could not be interfered with, in circumstances.

Trial Court was obliged and duty bound to require the pre-emptor to deposit with the Court 1/3rd of the sale price of the property pre-empted

Period within which such amount could be ordered to be deposited was left to the discretion of the court, which discretion was not unbridled, rather was circumscribed by a span of 30 days from the date of institution/filing of the suit

Court should provide adequate time to the pre-emptor to make the deposit, but under no circumstances it had the discretion to allow the pre-emptor to make the deposit beyond the period of 30 days from the filing of the suit

Even where the court on account of omission or some lapse failed to specify the time in such behalf, it shall be deemed that full 30 days period had been allowed by the court to the pre-emptor to make the deposit, and not withstanding such omission/lapse, it would be the duty of the pre-emptor to make the deposit within a period of 30 days from the institution of the suit.

Reading of S.11 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 provided that the Juvenile Court, after it had decided, that the accused juvenile had committed the offence, might, if it thought appropriate, pass order for releasing the juvenile on probation

Juvenile Court had discretion to decide the issue of release of juvenile on probation but by not exercising such discretion or in-action in exercising such discretion, the Juvenile Court would offend the dictates of law.

Accused, who was a juvenile at the time of commission of alleged offence, was forced by the police to stop at a checkpoint and after being apprehended he himself disclosed presence of 13.2 kilograms of charas in petrol tank of his vehicle

Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused under S.9(c) of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997

Validity

All witnesses consistently deposed that accused was apprehended on the spot along with his vehicle, which was under his control as he was driving the same at the relevant time

No discrepancy in statement of any witness despite being subjected to searching cross-examination

Accused had conscious knowledge of narcotics concealed in the petrol tank of his vehicle because when he was signalled to stop he tried to escape and was subsequently forced to stop by blocking the road

After arrest, accused himself disclosed presence of narcotics in the vehicle

Accused was in exclusive control of the vehicle in which narcotics were kept in secret cavity, therefore, he would be deemed to be in the exclusive possession of the charas recovered from the vehicle

Nothing on record suggested that narcotic was planted on accused or that he was falsely charged

Samples taken from the recovered substance were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, which found them to contain charas

At time of framing of charge against accused he was aged about 17/18 years

Section 11 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 provided discretion to court to decide the issue of release of juvenile on probation

Not exercising such discretion or in-action in exercising such discretion would offend the dictates of law

Trial Court, in the present case, had not exercised the discretion vested in it under S.11 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, which surely prejudiced the accused

Appeal was partially allowed, conviction and sentence awarded to accused was maintained, however, case was remanded back to Trial Court to decide the same after providing opportunity of hearing to accused and rendering reason, regarding exercise of discretion, as provided under S.11 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 to release the accused on probation and the terms thereof.

Court in order to grant such relief would have to exercise its discretion in accordance with settled and fixed principles of law

Party seeking equity must have to do equity himself, even if contract was unobjectionable in nature.

Discretion left in the court under S. 497(5), Cr.P.C was pari materia with the principles, which applied to the setting aside of orders of acquittal.

Law has conferred discretion upon the court to withhold the penalty of death and to award the punishment of imprisonment for life, if the outlook of a particular case requires that course.

There may be an accused who has no antecedents of any criminal case or who is not an incorrigible, desperate or hardened criminal

Punishment, in such a case, lesser to death can serve the purpose of dispensation of criminal justice

Extreme penalty of death can be avoided to be given to the accused in such cases, to grant him a chance to mend his ways in his future life.

One of the key requirements of jurisdictional rules is that the rules must be certain and this must be so, whether they are statutory in nature or judicially evolved

Such is so because such rules affect, regulate and control exercise of judicial power at the most fundamental level

Leaving matters to discretion of the court introduces, an unacceptable uncertainty in the law; all rules must of course be interpreted but that is an entirely different matter.

Word "shall" used in section 426(1-A), Cr.P.0 had been inserted to make it mandatory for the court to release an accused on bail by suspending his sentence during pendency of appeal if his case felt within the categories enumerated in sub-clauses (a), and (c) of section 426 (1-A), Cr. P. C and his case did not fall within the exceptions provided in proviso to section 426 (I -A)(c), Cr.P.C.

Discretion left in the court under S.497(5), Cr.P.C. was pari materia with the principles, which applied to the setting aside of order of acquittal.

One of the key requirements of jurisdictional rules is that the rules must be certain and this must be so, whether they are statutory in nature or judicially evolved

Such is so because such rules affect, regulate and control exercise of judicial power at the most fundamental level

Leaving matters to discretion of the court introduces, an unacceptable uncertainty in the law all rules must of course be interpreted but that is an entirely different matter.