Authority
Authority legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Customs Appellate Tribunal ('Tribunal'), while resting upon the provisions contained in S.142 of the Customs Act, 1969 ('the Act 1969'), as well as letter No.1(19)/2012-Imp-II(Vol-1), dated 14.05.2018, allowed re-export of the banned items on the premise that the customs authorities had the power to allow re-export of banned / restricted items (i.e. foreign origin new/used mobile phones of Samsung, I-Phone, One Plus of assorted models, 10 foreign origin drones, 1 set of play station)
Held, that the exercise of jurisdiction and authority in terms of S. 142 of the Act, 1969 is dependent upon a mandatory pre-condition of a true declaration by the passengers/respondents, if so made, in terms of S. 139 of the Customs Act, 1969
Said provision requires the owner of a baggage to declare the contents of the baggage to the proper Officer of the Customs Department; it is only when a truthful declaration is made under S. 139 of the Act, 1969 that one can claim a right to be considered for invoking benefits under S. 142 of the Act, 1969, the Baggage Rules, 2006 and the letter dated 14.05.2018
Even in a case of truthful declaration in terms of S. 139 of the Customs Act, 1969, the option to re-export the goods abroad cannot be claimed as a matter of right
The plain reading of S. 139 makes it abundantly clear that in the matter of declarations, no onus is cast upon the Department to accost individual passengers for taking declarations, particularly after introduction of the channel system, which system is to the effect that a passenger passing through green channel leads to an ineluctable declaration on the part of the passenger concerned that he has no dutiable goods accompanying him to be declared
Similarly, the object of S. 142 of the Act, 1969, which is a relatively new provision and was introduced by the legislature to give a facility to the passenger(s) for temporarily leaving the baggage with the Customs Department for the purpose of being returned to him on his leaving Pakistan
Another object of S.142 may be to exclude any articles from the purview of Ss. 156 & 168, if a declaration is made under S. 139 of the Act, 1969
It is inconceivable that there would be any refund, or the right to re-export will be forthcoming, if indeed, there is a misdeclaration or no declaration at all on the part of a passenger, with a view to evade payment of duty
Clause(s) of S. 2 of the Customs Act, 1969, refer to goods specified therein and other goods notified by the Federal Government as smuggled goods
It is admitted position that SRO 1512(I)/2022 dated 26.07.2022 (SRO, 1512), prohibiting mobile phones, was in place on the fateful day, therefore, the goods squarely fell in the category of items, which items, if brought in the country, would amount to smuggling and will thus trigger the case of invocation of offences, penalties and confiscation
Since the goods apparently fall under the definition of smuggled goods in terms of S. 2(s) read with S. 16 of the Act, 1969 and SRO 1512, therefore, before the Tribunal could have embarked upon to invoke S. 142 of the Customs Act, 1969, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to render a factual determination to the effect of implication of invocation of clause(s) of S. 2 read with S.156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969
Declaration, as envisaged under S.139, is a sine qua non for invocation of S. 142, as S. 139 creates an obligation upon every passenger to make declaration of the contents of his baggage and to answer questions with respect to baggage and articles carried by him
The failure to do so or the failure to produce baggage or any such article(s) for examination is liable to penalties and confiscation as provided by item (70) of S. 156(1)
Tribunal was also required to determine whether the mandatory declaration in terms of S.139 of the Act, 1969 was made by the respondents
The question that as to whether a declaration under S139 of the Act, 1969 was made by the respondents or an opportunity to such a declaration was provided by the customs officials at the time of apprehending the respondents, are purely factual questions, which have not been determined by the Tribunal
Highest authority for factual determination in tax/customs duty matters is the Tribunal, and as evident, the factual question of true declaration under S.139 of the Act, 1969 has not at all been adverted to by the Tribunal, which led to erroneous interpretation of S.142 of the Customs Act, 1969
Thus, the findings of the Tribunal while relying upon S.142 of the Act, 1969 are not sustainable in the eye of law
Thus, the Tribunal erred in law while passing the impugned judgment which fails to render any findings qua the factual determination
Resultantly, the question mentioned were answered in affirmative; consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh
Special Customs Reference Application was allowed accordingly.
Appellant/defendant assailed judgment and decree passed by Banking Court on the ground that suit was not instituted by a competent person having authority
Validity
Plaint was not accompanying any power of attorney and the same was not instituted by manager
Banking Court specifically framed an issue as to the authority for institution of plaint and its verification
Respondent/plaintiff/Bank produced one witness and brought on record as many as sixteen (16) documents including a letter in favour of witness to give evidence but failed to produce any document showing that the person who instituted the suit and verified the plaint, had any such authority or power as required under S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001
High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Banking Court as institution of suit or verification of the plaint was not in accordance with S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001
Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
Plaintiff company was aggrieved of withdrawal of suit on basis of compromise which was result of misrepresentation and fraud
Single Judge of High Court in exercise of powers under S. 12(2), C.P.C. set aside compromise
Validity
To obtain withdrawal of suit it was presented to court by representatives of parties as they had entered into compromise out of court
To dispute alleged compromise, plaintiff had filed application with affidavits of three persons who were among five attorneys appointed by plaintiff company for purposes of suit
All three persons were associated with a law firm who stated that plaintiff company had always given its instructions directly to the advocate and not to any of attorneys
Managing Director of plaintiff company also filed affidavit stating that there was no compromise with defendant Shipping Company and no instructions had ever been given to representative to withdraw suit nor representative had any authority to do so
High Court declined to interfere in order passed by the Single Judge of High Court as there was no out of court compromise and a case of misrepresentation was established
High Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Repeal of an existing law may be amended through express intendment or it may be implied from statute enacted later in time and which contain provisions that are contrary to the provisions of an earlier Act of Parliament.
Plaintiff was a shipping company and claimed that despite delivery of consignments, defendant failed to pay freight amount
Plea raised by defendant was that suit was not maintainable as there was no resolution passed by Board of Directors of plaintiff company in favour of plaintiff witness
Validity
If plaintiff had Board resolution in favour of plaintiff witness, then same should have been produced even at a subsequent stage in evidence by reexamining plaintiff witness but that was not done
Plaintiff could have cured such irregularity by producing Articles of Association containing power and authority to institute legal proceedings conferred upon a particular person or Director in which case Board resolution was not required and the same was also not done by plaintiff
Plaintiff was adversely affected by principle relating to best evidence, according to which, if a best piece of evidence was not produced by a party or was withheld then an adverse inference would be drawn against such party that it had deliberately not produced the evidence, coupled with some motive
Suit was not maintainable as person who filed proceedings was not authorized by Board of Directors of plaintiff company or by way of some other written instrument including Articles of Association or Power of Attorney
Suit was dismissed in circumstances.
Petitioners were appointed as Chairmen District Zakat and Ushr Committees for a period of three years but after change of government, Provincial Government removed the petitioners and appointed respondents as the Chairmen
Plea raised by authorities was that petitioners had alternate remedy of filing review to Provincial Zakat Council against its decision
Validity
Only Provincial Zakat Council could arrive at the opinion that petitioners had been guilty of alleged misconduct etc. and it was after the resolution of Provincial Zakat Council, the petitioners could be removed from the office as Chairmen of District Zakat and Ushr Committees
Notification in question was issued by Provincial Government with the approval of Chairman, Provincial Zakat Council, unauthorisedly exercising powers of Provincial Zakat Council, which on the face of it was illegal, without jurisdiction and coram non judice, hence the same was of no legal effect
No decision of Provincial Zakat Council was on record and decision of its Chairman alone could not be termed to be a decision of Provincial Zakat Council, therefore, no review could be filed before Provincial Zakat Council in absence of its decision
Orders/notifications of recalling/withdrawing nomination of petitioners and nominating respondents as Chairman District Zakat and Ushr Committees were declared to be illegal and of no legal effect
Petition was allowed in circumstances.
Authority to conduct said test was vested in the High Court and if Administration Committee of the High Court for reasons that "National Testing Services" being a Specialized Agency would be more attuned for conducting tests for general knowledge, verbal ability and similar other characteristics, no fault could be found with such a decision by Administration Committee.
Provision of S.7(1), Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordnance, 1970 empowers the Authority to prescribe by general order, the practice which shall be deemed to be unreasonably restrictive trade practice
Before making any general order, the Authority has to comply with the provisions of S.7(2)(3) of the Ordinance
Before recording a finding that there has been or is likely to be contravention of the provisions of S.3 of the Ordinance, the Authority must establish that there .exists-c' or will exist an unreasonably restrictive trade practice
To establish the existence of an unreasonably restrictive trade practice, either the Authority has to establish all the ingredients of an unreasonably restrictive trade practice mentioned in S.2(n) or has to resort to the deeming clause of Ss.6 & 7 of the Ordinance
Where admittedly there was no general order prescribing the practice, which shall be deemed to be unreasonably restrictive trade practice, either the Authority was to establish all the ingredients of unreasonably restrictive trade practice, or to prove an agreement mentioned in S.6 of the Ordinance justifying to presume that unreasonably restrictive trade practice has been resorted to or is continuing.
In the light of provision of subsections (13) and (65) of S.2 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 the Additional Commissioner was legally competent "authority" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to perform the functions of Taxation Officer as delegated to him by the Commissioner.
Senior Special Magistrate whether Authority under the provisions of Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996
Magistrate was neither an employee nor, an officer of the "Authority" employed under S.10 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996, nor was he the "Authority" under S.3(2) or the Chairman of the "Authority" under S.3(3) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996
Magistrate by his designation was a civil servant employed by Provincial Government under Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 to recover public dues in accordance with West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, but such assignment did not make him an officer of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority.
An Authority is enjoined to perform particular functions within the framework of law and not to its derogation.
An Authority is enjoined to perform particular functions within the framework of law and not to its derogation.
"Authority", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/15786
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Authority"
2019 Y L R 851
Qazi BADR-UL-WAHAB and 20 others — Appellants Versus LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR, PROVINCIAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PESHAWAR and 3 others — Respondents
Court: Peshawar2022 P L C (C
ZAHID ALI Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistani and Human Resource Development and others
Court: Islamabad High CourtP L D 2015 Lahore 661
NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY AUTHORITY — Appellant Versus FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED — Respondent
Court: High CourtP L D 1980 Lahore 613
RIAZ MAHMOOD KHAN MAZARI — Petitioner Versus SALAHUDDIN ZAFAR AND 4 OTHERS-
Court: Meld, cannot challenge validity of orders passed by Election Authority as well as District Judge as Appellate Authority.-Words and phrases.2010 P T D 2552
DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY through Secretary Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX and 3 others
Court: Lahore High Court2009 P T D (Trib
N/A
Court: Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Pakistan2011 P L C (C
ZAFAR IQBAL Versus PAKISTAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY through Director Administration and another
Court: Sindh High CourtP L D 1976 Lahore 258
CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE‑Applicant Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE‑Respondent
Court: ‑‑ S. 4(3) (iii)‑"Local authority"‑Definition‑General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 3(28).‑Words and phrases.P L D 1987 Supreme Court 421
NASIR SAID‑‑Appellant Versus WAPDA through its
Court:1984 C L C 2181
Ch. ABDUL HAMEED‑ — Petitioner Versus ELECTION AUTHORITY AND OTHERS‑ — Respondents
Court: Lahore