Complaint

Potential misappropriation involving advance payment against purchase of land and failure in paying outstanding amount of provident fund, allegations of

Initiation of proceedings under inapplicable provision of law

Legality of proceedings

Briefly, the petitioner company challenged before the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction a show cause notice issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and a subsequent order appointing inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company on allegations relating to advance payment for purchase of land and non-payment of provident fund

The issue requiring determination before the High Court was "whether the SECP could lawfully invoke S. 265 to initiate an investigation on the basis of a single shareholder's complaint, without fulfilling the statutory requirements and threshold prescribed under S. 263 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?"

Held: Impugned show cause notice was issued under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984 and a holistic reading of the same made it abundantly clear that the proceedings were not initiated by the SECP on its own and under its suo motu powers conferred by S. 265 by forming an in dependent and bipartisan opinion

Instead, the entire process was initiated on a complaint from an individual claiming to be a shareholder of the petitioner company

Thus, the SECP's issuance of the impugned notice under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984, based on a shareholder complaint, was fundamentally flawed because it failed to meet the legally required threshold, specifically, the complaint must have been filed by 10% of the total voting power of the shareholders

Proceedings commenced by the SECP under S. 265, an inapplicable provision, on the basis of a complaint by a shareholder of the petitioner company were in clear contravention of statutory requirements and thus vitiated the legality of the proceedings

Impugned notice issued on the basis of misappropriation of payment against purchase of the land was not in essence of the third round of proceedings since it was regarding the same issue, transactions and allegations

Since it was an admitted fact that the documents submitted by the petitioner company in respect of the land were already available with the SECP, who had not yet given any findings in respect of the same due to pendency of these proceedings, the department retained the liberty to initiate separate and independent proceedings, if required according to the law

Impugned show cause notice and order were set aside

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim relief passed in a complaint under S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Possession orders passed as interim relief, invalidity of

Specificity and proper procedural consideration, lack of

Scope and effect

Interim relief, grant of

Stage

"During trial", meaning of

Petitioner ( accused ) challenged an order handed down by the Trial Court whereby, in pursuance of inquiry report of SHO, he (petitioner) had been directed to hand over the possession of one room in the subject property to the respondent /complainant

Plea of the petitioner / accused was that impugned order was not sustainable in law as under the provisions of S.7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (' the Act 2005'), the possession cannot be restored to the complainant as an interim relief before trial

Whether power of interim relief (to put the owner / occupier) in possession was enshrined in S.7 of the Act 2005

Held: Grant of interim relief within meaning of S.7(1) of the Act 2005 was subject to condition "during the trial"

The said stage is the condition precedent

The use of word by legislature "during the trial" in S.7(1) of the Act 2005 is of significance

The expression "during the trial" is not as common sense assumes

In the present case, records revealed that before delivery of copies to the accused and framing of charge, the Trial Court passed the impugned order

The procedural stage, as envisaged under the Act 2005 being a special law, was altogether disregarded prior to the issuance of the impugned order

When the law prescribes a specific manner for performing a particular act, it must be carried out in that prescribed manner alone and not otherwise

Execution or implementation constitutes the process through which a judicial order is enforced, thereby enabling the successful party to derive the intended benefit from such order

While it is not in dispute that the complainant was the uncle of the accused, the familial relationship stood overshadowed by the severity of the disputes, which were of such a grave nature that they could not be resolved within the family or the local community, ultimately necessitating judicial intervention

Significantly, the complainant/respondent had explicitly alleged in the complaint that the accused/petitioner had extended threats of murder

However, perusal of the complaint did not reveal how many rooms existed in the house in question, nor whether any room had an independent or direct access to the street

The police report was also silent on these critical particulars

Likewise, the cursory evidence adduced by respondent /complainant did not specify either the number of rooms or the existence of any room with a direct approach to the passage

In said context, the direction to hand over possession of "one room" in the subject property appeared inconsistent with both the legal framework and the factual assertions made in the private complaint as well as the cursory evidence on record

Furthermore, the impugned order stated that, in the event of non-compliance by the petitioner/accused, the concerned Station House Officer (SHO) shall effect possession in favour of the complainant, however, in the absence of a precise identification of the room-in-question, such a direction effectively delegated to the law enforcement agency the judicial function of specifying which room was to be handed over-an action which was legally impermissible

Accordingly, the directive to implement the handing over of possession became incapable of execution due to lack of specificity and judicial certainty

Said portion of the impugned order, being devoid of essential judicial safeguards and precision, was liable to be set aside even on this singular ground

High Court set-aside the impugned order for suffering from material illegality and procedural irregularity, rendering it unsustainable in the eye of law

Criminal revision, filed by accused, was allowed accordingly.

Petitioner alleged that shares of company under winding-up were put to public offer which had earlier been purchased by respondent company with majority shares

Validity

Grounds for winding-up a company are set-out in S.301 of Companies Act, 2017

Company may be wound up by the Court under S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 if the company is - conducting its business in a manner oppressive to the minority members or persons concerned with the formation or promotion of the company

Oppression of minority members by the companyis a recognized ground for winding-up of that company

Where oppression of minority is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017, it is implicit that there should be cause to wind-up the company

Once threshold of oppression is crossed, the threshold of winding-up is automatically crossed

Where it is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017 that affairs of the company are being conducted, or are likely to be conducted, in an unlawful or fraudulent manner, or in a manner not provided for in its memorandum, a case for winding-up can be triggered under S.301 (g)(i), (ii), (iv) & (v) of Companies Act, 2017

Such acts committed by the Board of company under winding-up in collusion with respondent company with majority shares, oppressed minority shareholders such as the petitioner who were in the category of 'substantial shareholder' as defined in S.2(7)(d) of Companies Act, 2017 i.e. holding an interest of 10% or more in the company

Once oppression of minority shareholders was established, a case for winding-up was made out in view of S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 and Court could then consider corrective orders under S.286 (2) of Companies Act, 2017

Violation of S.86(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to divert funds/assets of the company for no apparent gain to the company and deliberate violation 158(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to delay election of directors at the behest of the largest shareholder was also mismanagement by the Board of company under winding-up, conducting the affairs in unlawful and fraudulent manner within the meaning of S.286 of Companies Act, 2017

High Court in exercise of powers under Ss. 286 & 287 of Companies Act, 2017 declared that shares held by respondent company with majority shares were to be the property of company under winding-up as the same were deemed to have been purchased by the company from its shareholders under S.88 of Companies Act, 2017 as treasury shares subject to the conditions set-out in S.88 (3) of Companies Act, 2017

High Court directed Central Depository Company to amend central depository register accordingly

High Court directed the company to amend register of its members accordingly and make other consequential alterations to its record

High Court declared that public offer made by respondent company with majority shares stood abated as it was to acquire controlling shares of the company

High Court directed the Manger to the Offer to return the shares tendered by shareholders of the company to the respective shareholders

High Court directed Board of directors of the company to forthwith issue notice for calling an extra-ordinary general meeting of the company for electing directors

High Court further directed that Board of Directors of the company, constituted after election would then decide whether to retain treasury shares, to cancel them or to sell them as per Regln. 13 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019 provided that, where the treasury shares would exceed the limit fixed by Regln. 9 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019, the shares exceeding such limit were to be cancelled or sold

Petition was allowed accordingly.

Plea of the respondent was that in view of S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (2013-Act) and Art. 29 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 (Order-1983), the jurisdiction of all courts and other authorities from interfering in orders passed by the Ombudsmen had been ousted and alternate remedies provided under Ss.13 & 14 of the Act-2013 had not been availed

Validity

After the establishment of the Office of the Provincial Ombudsman pursuant to the provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act (V of 2018) since no provision was inserted in the Act-2010 empowering the Ombudsman to transfer complaints or proceedings to the Provincial Ombudsman, thus, the order of transfer of complaint was without jurisdiction and without lawful authority

If respondent wanted the Provincial Ombudsman to conduct proceedings on her complaint, she could have applied to the Federal Ombudsman for the return of her complaint so that she could file the same before the Provincial Ombudsman

Unlike Art. 10(3) of the Order-1983, which provides for a limitation period of three months for filing the complaint, there is no limitation period provided either in the Act-2010 or the Act-2018 for filing the complaint

Sub-constitution legislation could not oust the jurisdiction of High Court conferred by Art. 199 of the Constitution, especially where the order of the Ombudsman, which was sought to be quashed by the issuance of a writ of certiorari, was without lawful authority

Constitutional petition was allowed, in the circumstances and the matter was remanded to the Federal Ombudsman who may consider returning the complaint to the respondent enabling her to file the same before the Provincial Ombudsman.

Petitioner / Broadcasting company was aggrieved of Letters issued by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) approving recommendations made by Council of Complaints (COC)

Validity

Mere narration in letters in question that recommendations of COC were approved by competent authority did not suffice for purpose of compliance with R.10 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Council of Complaints) Rules, 2010

Minutes of various meetings of PEMRA where recommendations of COC underpinning each of the letters in question had been considered were also placed on record under cover of a statement to reinforce contention regarding compliance with codal requirements

Such statements did not serve to advance the case of PEMRA as those did not reflect any value judgment or application of mind

Leave refusing order relied upon by authorities was of no avail, since it addressed only a question of delegation and the subject of R.10 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Council of Complaints) Rules, 2010 was not a point under discussion

High Court set aside letters in question issued against petitioner / broadcasting company

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Record showed that the trial Court while entertaining the complaint made by the Investigation Officer did not consider the application of law, especially, the penal concept under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010

Investigation Officer who issued notice under S.9 (1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, started investigation from date of order of attachment made under S.8(1) on the basis of report in his possession while seeking prior permission of the Court

provisional attachment of properties of the petitioners and the entire mechanism provided in special law i.e. the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, required prospective operation of SRO No.425(I) /2016 dated 14.05.2016 which provided the powers to deal with the predicate offence referred in Schedule (I) of S.2 (xxvi) for the first time on that particular date i.e. 14.05.2016, therefore, entire proceedings initiated by the Investigation Officer as well as the cognizance taken by the Special Court were defective if seen in context of basic crime which was pointed out in the enquiry under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, where reference of assessment years were given for the tax year 2012 to 2016 creating the tax demand and even the notice highlighted the tax details for those years of 2014, 2015 and 2016 which were not to be considered in terms of the Anti-Money Laundering Act,2010, within the scope of S.192/192-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Hence, serious mistake had been committed by the Investigation Office as well as by the Court by treating the offence of Ss.192/192-A for the period when the same was not prescribed in the Schedule of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010

Therefore, the act referred in the case and made basis of entire proceedings was not an offence prior to the cut-off date i.e. 14.05.2016 when Ss.192/192-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was not mentioned in the Schedule of predicate offence

Similarly, the jurisdiction exercised by the Investigation Officer as well as by the Special Court was also to be treated outside the purview of law

However, powers of Trial Court under Ss.249-A & 265-K, Cr.P.C, were co-extensive with similar powers of the High Court under S.561-A, Cr.P.C, and proper course was to approach the Trial Court in the first stance, though there was no bar upon the High Court from entertaining any petition in such cases, therefore, at this stage the Court was of the view that the entire action of Investigation Officer as well as cognizance of the Court in terms of S.21 (2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, including the notice in terms or S.9(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, were illegal and beyond the legal authority, hence, criminal appeal was allowed by setting aside the impugned orders

Accused/appellants were acquitted accordingly.

Prima-facie case only means that there is ground for proceedings and it is not the same thing as proof which comes later when the Trial Court has to find whether accused is guilty or not guilty.

Petitioner /accused assailed order of initiating proceedings against him and others on a complaint filed by the respondent

Record revealed that demolishing of two steps of stairs by one of the accused persons, was oozing from preliminary inquiry report submitted by the concerned SHO

Thus, prima facie case itself was floating from surface of record constituting sufficient ground to issue process in furtherance of the complaint

Discarding complaint in presence of sufficient grounds was not warranted by law and was against the doctrine of dispensation of criminal justice

Application qua registration of FIR moved by the petitioner already stood rejected by the Justice of Peace and though said order was impugned before the High Court, however, dislodging the complaint amounted to non-suiting and making the complainant armless, that too when domestic probe ex-facie strengthened the stance of the complainant / respondent

Criminal revision filed by the accused was dismissed, in circumstances.

Admitting a complaint and issuance of process under S.204 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, is subject to having sufficient grounds for proceeding , meaning thereby that presence of facts or evidence prima- facie constitute an offence to enable the Court to issue process.

Process within contemplation of S.204 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, can be issued upon existence of sufficient grounds to be contemplated on basis of cursory evidence

Formation of opinion by Court does not require full dress rehearsal nor anticipated failure of case of complainant would stand as an impediment .

Where Trial Court admits the complaint and issues bailable warrants against accused persons, they (accused persons) have ample opportunity to move an application under S.265-K of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, in case they feel that there is no possibility of conviction in the matter, even if the evidence purposed to be produced in Court is so produced.

Any woman can file a complaint under Enforcement of Women's Property Rights Act, 2020 who owns any property in Islamabad Capital Territory by way of registered sale deed, mutation, allotment letter, provisional allotment letter or through any other legal instrument, through which a property rights are conveyed to her with specific details and description, which has been taken over by force or by way of fraud or through any other mode and mean against the legal rights of a woman.

No roving inquiry is to be conducted by the Trial Court, in the absence of material particulars, exact date and time of the alleged dispossession, to ascertain whether or not the complainant was dispossessed in terms of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, is to be read together with the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, having been included within the definition of relevant legislation

Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, is an ouster clause that prohibits courts from assuming jurisdiction in relation to a matter that (i) falls within the jurisdiction of an Ombudsman, or is (ii) pending with or decided by an Ombudsman

Jurisprudence in relation to ouster clauses is well-established: orders and proceedings are amenable to judicial review to the extent they suffer from lack of jurisdiction, corum non judice or mala fides and that ouster clauses cannot oust jurisdiction of constitutional courts in relation to acts and/or proceedings that suffer from such infirmity

High Court can only exercise jurisdiction in relation to a proceeding pending before the Ombudsman or an order passed by the Ombudsman if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) the subject-matter of the complaint pending before the Ombudsman or that forms the subject-matter of an order passed by the Ombudsman is such that falls beyond the authority and jurisdiction of the Ombudsman as defined in the Act and thus suffers from jurisdictional defect and the Ombudsman is coram non judice; (ii) the order passed by the Ombudsman is such that the Ombudsman has no authority to pass and it, thus, suffers from lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction and consequently mala fide in law; (iii) the proceedings being conducted and/or order passed suffers from mala fide in fact; (iv) the proceedings continuing before the Ombudsman or the order passed by the Ombudsman undermine the fundamental rights of a citizen, especially the right guaranteed under Art.10-A of the Constitution.

Section 82B of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 only barred Banking Mohtasib from entertaining such complaints which had already been disposed of by the State Bank of Pakistan or any other court of Pakistan and pendency of criminal proceedings on the subject matter would not oust jurisdiction of Banking Mohtasib where proceedings were civil in nature

Period prior to intimation by complainant to a Bank of his/her intention to file a complaint did not figure into S. 82D(2) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 while determining the period of limitation for making complaint to Banking Mohtasib

Banking Mohtasib under S. 82(D) of Banking Companies Ordinance having discretion to condone delay in filing of a complaint before it, it would be deemed by implication, where a complaint had been decided before it, that any delay therein was condoned as such complaint was decided upon by Banking Mohtasib.

Applicants/alleged unauthorized occupants had raised legal objection to the maintainability of the complaint on the ground that criminal complaint could not be filed through Attorney

Applicants also moved an application that proceedings could be stayed till the said legal objection regarding locus standi of the Attorney to file complaint was finally decided

Validity

Complaint need not necessarily be made by the person injured, but could be made by the person aware of the offence

Complaint could be filed by the attorney acting on behalf of original owner of disputed property

Objection raised by applicants to the maintainability of the complaint by the attorney, carried no weight.

Applicants had alleged that illegal occupants, during pendency of complaint allegedly had sold the shop in question to another person

Complainant had contended that application was not maintainable, as they being not in possession of shop in question, had lost their locus standi

Validity

Complainant had prayed for dismissal of the application

Contention of complainant was without any substance

If such proposition was accepted it would open a room for unauthorized occupant to defeat, least frustrate an order for restoration, which normally would be in respect of person complained as illegal occupant

Neither mere change of hands nor manoeuvre by unauthorized occupant would be a sufficient ground to defeat a lawful order for possession or title even, which was obtained by an aggrieved person from a competent court of law

Mere delivery of possession by unauthorized occupants to any body under any plea would not be an excuse to legal consequences of an order passed under Ss.7 & 8 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

Appellants were manufacturing tea whiteners who were imposed different penalties by Competition Commission on complaint filed by an individual

Plea raised by appellants was that complaint was neither lodged by an undertaking nor by a registered association of consumers and same could not be entertained

Validity

Complainant was neither an undertaking nor a registered association of consumer, therefore, he was not competent to lodge complaint against appellants

Except e-mail, there was no other evidence in support of complaint

Competition Commission violated mandatory provisions of law by initiating proceedings against appellants on basis of complaint which was incompetent, wrong, illegal and based on no evidence

Relevant evidence to be collected during inquiry was that of consumers and other undertakings and competitors but inquiry report was silent regarding collection of evidence in such connection

Instead of conducting job of collecting evidence in support of complaint, inquiry committee had just made academic discussion to provide a foundation of issuance of show-cause notice and writing judgment by Competition Commission

Competition Appellate Tribunal declared that not only complaint was incompetent but report of inquiry committee was defective, one-sided and based on no evidence

Competition Appellate Tribunal further declared that no evidence was collected during inquiry proceedings nor recorded before Competition Commission to prove allegations of deceptive marketing practices against appellants

Competition Appellate Tribunal set aside judgment passed by Competition Commission

Appeal was allowed accordingly. [Majority view]

Appellants were manufacturing tea whiteners who were imposed different penalties by Competition Commission on complaint filed by an individual

Plea raised by appellants was that complaint was neither lodged by an undertaking nor by a registered association of consumers and same could not be entertained

Validity

Inquiry committee complied with formalities prescribed under Competition Commission Inquiry (Conduct of Investigating Officer) Rules, 2007

Inquiry committee relied on documentary evidence made available to it by appellants

Appellants during proceedings before Competition Commission modified their respective publicity campaigns in an attempt to address concerns of Competition Commission

Such conduct of appellants indicated that they had impliedly admitted to the fact that publicity campaigns on which Competition Commission issued them show cause notice was in violation of S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010

Competition Commission had rightly concluded that appellants contravened S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010

Illegalities committed by appellants were proved and judgment/order in question passed by Competition Commission did not require any intervention

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. [Minority view]

Complainant alleged that a certain air carrier's practices regarding transportation of obese persons were discriminatory and filed a complaint before the Transportation Agency ("the Agency")

Agency dismissed the complaint on basis that complainant failed to meet the tests for private interest standing and public interest standing as developed by and for courts of civil jurisdiction; that complainant lacked private interest standing because he was not himself obese, and so could not claim to be aggrieved or affected or to have some other sufficient interest; that complainant lacked public interest standing because his complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of legislation or the illegal exercise of an administrative authority

Appellate Court allowed complainant's appeal and held that a strict application of the law of standing as applied in courts was inconsistent with the Agency's enabling legislation, and directed that the matter be returned to the Agency to determine, otherwise than on the basis of standing, whether it would inquire into, hear and decide the complaint

Validity

[Per McLachlin C.J. (Majority view): Relevant statute (Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996) bestowed broad discretion on the Agency to hear and determine complaints

In the present case, the Agency did not reasonably exercise its discretion to dismiss the complaint

Decision was reasonable if it was justifiable, transparent and intelligible, and fell within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes

Agency's decision that the complainant lacked standing did not satisfy the requirements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility for two reasons; first, the Agency presumed public interest standing was available and then applied a test that could never be met

Any valid complaint against an air carrier would impugn the terms and conditions established by a private company

Such a complaint could never, by its very nature, be a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation or the illegality of administrative action

Imposition of a test that could never be met could not be what Parliament intended when it conferred a broad discretion on an administrative body such as the Agency to decide whether to hear complaints

Agency's application of the test was also inconsistent with the rationale underlying public interest standing, which was for the court to use its discretion, where appropriate, to allow more plaintiffs through the door

Agency did not maintain a flexible approach to said question and in so doing unreasonably fettered its discretion

Secondly, the total denial of public interest standing was inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Agency's legislative scheme

Applying the tests for private and public interest standing in the way the Agency did in the present case would preclude any public interest group or representative group from ever having standing before the Agency, regardless of the content of its complaint

In effect, only a person who was himself/herself targeted by the impugned policy could bring a complaint, which would be contrary to the scheme of the relevant statute [(Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996)

Parliament had seen fit to grant the Agency broad remedial authority and to allow the Agency to act to correct discriminatory terms and conditions before passengers actually experienced harm

To refuse a complaint based solely on the identity of the group bringing it prevented the Agency from hearing potentially highly relevant complaints, and hindered its ability to fulfil the statutory scheme's objective

Appellate Court should not have held that standing rules could not be considered by the Agency in its reconsideration of the matter

Better approach would be to send the matter back to the Agency for reconsideration in its entirety

Deference required that the Agency determined for itself how to use its discretion, provided it did so reasonably

Supreme Court (Canada) remitted the matter to the Agency to reconsider the matter in whole, whether on the basis of standing or otherwise]

[Per Abella, J, dissenting (Minority view): Nothing in the Agency's mandate circumscribed its ability to determine how it would decide what cases to hear

Parliament had given the Agency wide discretion to choose, according to its own institutional constraints and demands, how it would promote its overall mandate to regulate and adjudicate national transportation issues

Agency's power to process and resolve complaints was framed in discretionary language, giving the Agency the authority to make its own rules about how it carried on its work, as well as the manner of, and procedures for, dealing with matters before the Agency

In the present case, the Agency developed its standing rules in full accordance with its legislative mandate, and there is no basis for interfering with them

Agency was entitled to apply a gate keeping or screening mechanism which enabled it to balance, in a transparent and effective manner, the Agency's various competing interests and demands, such as access and resources

Complainant brought a complaint with no underlying facts, no representative claimants and no argument; his complaint was purely theoretical, his interest in the issues was academic, and the proposed suit did not constitute an effective and reasonable means of bringing the issue before the Agency

Agency's decision to deny the complaint on the basis that the complainant lacked standing was reasonable in the circumstances, thus, it was unnecessary to remit the matter to the Agency]

Appeal was partly allowed.

Standing rules existed to enable a court or tribunal to economize and prioritize its resources, and ensure that it benefited from contending points of view that were advanced by those best placed to advance them

Requiring a tribunal to adjudicate even marginal or inadequately substantiated complaints would grind the operation of a tribunal to a halt and could be "devastating" to private litigants

Tribunals were not required to follow the same procedures courts used, but when a tribunal choose to apply and exercise its broad legislative mandate by borrowing an approach to standing long sanctioned by the courts as an effective and principled way to determine which cases it would hear, reviewing courts should not interfere merely because the court might have applied the mandate differently

Where the adopted standing procedures flowed from the same concerns and rationales as those relied on by courts, there was no reason for a tribunal to be immunized from access to a procedure courts had endorsed

Access to justice demanded that both courts and tribunals be encouraged to develop screening methods to ensure that access to justice would be available to those who needed it most in a timely way

Fact that a Tribunal's governing legislation had a public interest dimension did not preclude it from adopting similar rules of standing to those used by the courts.

Section 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could only be attracted when any person dispossesses, grabs, controls or occupies the property without having any lawful authority to do so with the intention to dispossess, grab, control or occupy the property from owners or occupier of such property

In the present case, complainant/applicant was neither lawful owner nor lawful occupier of the subject premises, therefore, S.3 of the Act was not attracted

Applicant had failed to point out that he was put in possession of the subject premises by respondent and was subsequently dispossessed

No sanctity, therefore, could be attached to the assertion of applicant

Circumstance established that no illegality or irregularity had been committed by Trial Court in passing the impugned order, revision petition was dismissed accordingly.

Plea raised by appellant was that complaint before Trial Court was not maintainable and remedy had been provided under Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962

Validity

Where consumer under Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 availed medical services after paying consideration, as such the same fell within definition of 'consumer' as defined in S.2(c) of Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995

Such 'services' provided by appellant fell within definition of S. 2(e) of Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995

Only difference in both special laws i.e., Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995 and Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962 as well as Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulation, 2008 was of compensation which could only be given under consumer law whereas Pakistan Medical and Dental Council laws were silent to that extent

Trial Court could entertain complaint of any consumer, if it had come to prima facie view that a case of medical negligence of any doctor came on record, then matter could be sent to Medical and Dental Council authorities for their opinion with time limitation

Pakistan Medical and Dental Council after adopting their own procedure could submit their report to Trial Court whereafter complaint under Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995 could be processed for purpose of compensation

Complaint was maintainable in circumstances.

Complaint against accused had been filed with the allegations of commission of offence under S.11 of Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997

Complaint had been filed by the Director General Environmental Protection Authority, but it did not bear the signatures of the Director General, rather same had been signed by Deputy Director

Said practice was not approved

Criminal complaint had to be signed and proved by the complainant himself and not any body else

Director General could only delegate the functions under provisions mentioned in Ss. 6 & 7 of Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997

If the Environmental Protection Order was issued under the conferred powers, the Director must have mentioned the same in the order itself

Environmental Protection Order was an appealable and quasi judicial order, which must be signed by the Director General

Environmental Protection Authority, in the present case, did not procure any analysis report to attract the provisions of S.11 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997

In absence of analysis report, Environmental Tribunal could not presume that the discharge of waste water of accused unit exceeded the limit

No specification of the proposed treatment plant had been given in the Environmental Protection Order

Construction of settling tanks, could also be considered to be the arrangement made for preliminary treatment of the waste water

No offence under S.11 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 was made out

No likelihood of conviction of accused under S.11 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 existed and to proceed further with the complaint would be a futile exercise

Application under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., was allowed and accused stood acquitted, in circumstances.

Petition, had been directed against the interim order of the Trial Court whereby application filed by respondent under S.7 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was accepted and petitioner/accused was restrained from cultivating land leased out to him by the respondent/complainant

Allegation against petitioner, was that, he, after expiry of agreement of lease in respect of land of the respondent/claimant, was not surrendering land in dispute and was grabbing the same

Claim of petitioner was that, initially land in dispute was leased out to him in 'Ijara', but subsequently same was sold out to him by the complainant and that he had filed civil suit for specific performance against complainant/respondent

Dispute between the parties, did not fall within the purview of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, rather the case of respondent, would come within the purview of Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance, 1978, which had provided a complete procedure for ejectment of tenant

Proceedings initiated in the case under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was coram non judice, because respondent himself had pleaded that petitioner was his tenant/lessee

Petitioner being a lawful occupant of land in dispute as tenant, his case was covered in terms of S.2(c) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Impugned order passed by the Trial Court was set aside and the proceedings initiated on complaint filed by the respondent before the Trial Court under Ss.3, 4 & 8 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, were quashed, in circumstances.

District Officer (Environment) issued Environment Protection Order which was allegedly violated therefore complaint was filed

Validity

Neither District Officer (Environment) was competent to issue Environment Protection Order nor such power could be delegated to him by Director-General Environment Protection Authority

Environmental Tribunal could not take cognizance of any complaint which was not filed by provincial agency, government agency or local council

Legislature, wherever necessary, empowered authorized officer to deal with a specific matter

Provisions of S.17(6) of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, provided that Director-General of provincial agency or an officer generally or specially authorized by him in such behalf could, on the application of accused, compound an offence under Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, with the permission of Environment Tribunal or Environmental Magistrate

If powers of S. 16 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, to issue environmental protection order or to file complaint were intended to be conferred on any other officer the same could have been mentioned in Ss. 16 & 21 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997

Complaint was not maintainable as the same was filed without jurisdiction

Tribunal declared notification issued by Director-General to be illegal and without jurisdiction to the extent of delegating powers under Ss. 16 & 21 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997

Complaint was dismissed accordingly.

Court while taking cognizance of complaint had only to consider the existence of a prima facie case either on the basis of averments made n the complaint and the statements of complainant on oath.

Court while taking cognizance of complaint had only to consider the existence of a prima facie case either on the basis of averments made in the complaint and the statements of complainant on oath

Complainant herself was not having the clear title with regard to the disputed property

Complainant had failed to establish her stand so taken with regard to forcible dispossession

All ingredients or elements must be made out before it was established that the offence had been committed by the accused person

If even one of the ingredients or elements was missing, then no offence would be made out

Trial Court had dismissed the complaint on sound footings

Complainant had remedy before the civil court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Complainant in order to constitute an offence had to allege and show that he was actual owner (or occupier i.e. in lawful possession) of immovable property in question; that accused had entered into (or upon) the said property; that entry of accused into (or upon) the said property was without any lawful authority and accused had done so with the intention to dispossess (to grab or to control or to occupy) the complainant.

Applicant had impugned order of the Trial Court, whereby he was ordered to deliver the possession of subject property to complainant/respondent

Complainant had claimed ownership over subject property on the strength of sub-power-of-attorney executed by the attorney of original allottee of the property

Applicant/alleged dispossessor, was in possession of the subject property, who had let out the same to the tenants for many years

Complainant was never in possession of the property, after execution of alleged power-of-attorney in his favour and had not disclosed the specific date and time of his alleged dispossession by the applicant from the subject property

Complainant had failed to produce the title documents of the property in his name, but had tried to build the premise of his case on the mere strength of alleged power-of-attorney

Charge against the applicant had not been framed which was a mandatory condition to pass any interim order under S.7(1) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Trial Court, had neither considered the question of title of the complainant over the property in dispute, nor afforded an opportunity to the applicant to clarify the allegations levelled by the complainant by producing oral as well as documentary evidence in his defence

Impugned order was not in consonance with the provisions of S.7(1) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

For appropriate conclusion of the controversy, recording of evidence of both the parties, was essential, but same had not been done in the case

Impugned order passed by the Trial Court before framing the charge against applicant and recording evidence of the parties, was purely at the premature stage, which was not sustainable under the law

Authorities had not delivered the possession of subject property to original allottee, the attorney, the sub-attorney and special attorney

Complainant, in circumstances, had failed to prove his claim in respect of property in question on the basis of alleged power of attorney

Impugned order passed by the Trial Court being contrary to the facts as well as law, was recalled

Revision application was allowed, with direction to the Trial Court to decide the subject complaint on merits after framing the charge, and recording the evidence of the parties.

Trial Court dismissed complaint filed by the attorney on the ground that attorney was not competent to file direct complaint under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Validity

Complainant and accused jointly purchased the subject land on equal shares

Status of both the parties was that of 'joint owners'

Co-owner could seek restoration of possession from other co-owner subject to establishing his/her possession

Nothing was on record that land jointly purchased was partitioned

Complainant had not indicated as to from which area of joint holding the accused was in 'unlawful possession' or from which portion of such holding he had been dispossessed

Nothing was on record with regard to involvement of accused in illegal activities or their belonging to the gang of 'land grabbers or land mafia'

Mere words of one to be 'land grabbers or land mafia' would not be sufficient to dress him up with such status

Accused had filed a civil suit which was dismissed but appeal of the same was pending for adjudication

Civil courts were courts of ultimate jurisdiction for deciding civil right of the party and status of a document

Present dispute did not fall within the scope of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Complaint under the Act would be equated with that of an FIR

Attorney did not fall within the definition of "witness/complainant"

Attorney could not file the FIR or a criminal complaint

Anybody could bring the law into motion but not as an attorney

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Complainant, was aggrieved of not only that he was dispossessed from his property, but the standing crops were also damaged and destroyed

Respondents raised construction on the land in question

Report of investigation submitted by Tehsildar, described existence of the property in the names of several persons, including the name of the complainant

Physical possession at the site as described by the report, was with the respondents, who not only occupied the subject land, but had also constructed houses on the land

Such fact, only described the physical possession with the respondents, but not enough to consider an offence under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

To establish criminal liability on the part of the respondents, the complainant, must be specific enough to describe the act as illegal and the extent of involvement of the respondents in the commission thereof

Contents of the complaint, failed to disclose the measurement and area of the property, from which petitioners were dispossessed

Even the measurement of the area, where the alleged construction was raised, nowhere disclosed, nor specified the period when such construction was raised

Mode of dispossession was also not stated

No allegation was levelled to the effect that the respondents were land-grabbers, and with show of force, illegally occupied the land in question

Trial Court properly assessed the available material, and arrived to a decision on the basis of the contents of the complaint, in addition to the investigation report

No case for illegal dispossession, could be made out on the basis of the available material

No illegality or irregularity on the part of the Trial Court had been pointed out, which needed interference by High Court

Petition being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Claim of petitioner for seeking directions of High Court under S.290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, was not maintainable as he lacked locus standi to seek the same.

For taking cognizance of complaint under S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, Trial Court is under legal obligation to see that (i) whether complainant was in possession of disputed property under proper legal cover; (ii) whether he has been dispossessed by use of force; (iii) whether accused has got no title in disputed property; (iv) whether accused party belongs to group of land grabbers and (v) whether complaint discloses unlawful act and criminal intent

Complainant, at initial stage, has to satisfy court about existence of every ingredient of alleged offence

If complainant succeeds to persuade and convince court and make out a triable case, court should proceed with the matter by taking cognizance of offence under S.3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Without the same, Trial Court is not obliged to summon accused and record evidence like ordinary criminal trial.

Obtaining inadmissible refund of huge amount of Rs.102.04 million by concealment of duty free/sales tax free import of input materials by complainant company was under post refund audit with Directorate General of Inland Revenue Audit under instructions of Federal Board of Revenue

No justification existed for allowing withdrawal of complaint at such stage

Federal Ombudsman recommended the Directorate General of Inland Revenue Audit to expedite post-refund audit of complainant company to complete it within a reasonable period of time

Ombudsman also recommended to recover inadmissible amount of refund obtained through concealment of duty free/tax free import of input materials and to proceed under law against those found responsible for fraudulent claim of refund

Withdrawal of complaint was rejected in circumstances.

Complainant had sought indulgence of the Ombudsman against a letter, issued by Deputy Collector (Exports); whereby the Private Manufacturing Bond Warehouse Licence, had been amended by deleting shredded tyre scrap (cut into pieces) from manufacturing bond licence

Contention was that shredded tyres were used as fuel; and it was not an input material for manufacturing of cement to be used as input material

Complainant being aggrieved by said letter filed complaint to the ombudsman, along with application for grant of interim relief by suspending the operation of impugned letter, whereby facility of manufacturing bond, was withdrawn

Documents available on record, prima facie, supported the plea of the complainant

Circumstances, explained by the complainant, reflected that, if the clearance of shredded tyres was withheld, the complainant would face irreparable loss

Interim injunction was granted in favour of the complaint by suspending the operation of impugned letter in circumstances.

'Complaint', was a statement of accusation or allegation of fact or information put forth to a Magistrate informing commission of offence to be taken cognizance of

Complaint was just a statement of allegation to set the law in motion, and failure to furnish details of the occurrence, could not by itself mean that what was stated at the trial subsequently was false or baseless

No specific form was prescribed in law so as to put in motion the criminal law through a complaint

Essential requirement of S.200, Cr.P.C., was that the substance of the complaint would be reduced to writing and would be signed by the complainant

Section 200, Cr.P.C., had made it clear that the examination of the complainant could only succeed and not precede the taking of cognizance, for, it was the act to be done after the taking of cognizance, whatever might be the meaning of the word "cognizance" or whatever might amount to taking cognizance

Law did not require that the court on receipt of a direct complaint must hold preliminary inquiry

If a prima facie case was made out, court could take cognizance of the same after examination of the complainant on oath; and if no such case was made out, court was competent to dismiss the same

Private complaint could be dismissed at preliminary stage under Ss.203 & 204(3), Cr.P.C.

Accused could also be acquitted and private complaint could be dismissed by the Sessions Court at any stage of the trial under Ss.265-K & 265-H(1), Cr.P.C.

Provision of S.200, Cr.P.C., in no manner bound the court to record the evidence of complainant, despite the fact that the accusations made in the complaint, did not constitute the offence, or that act complained of was not an offence at the time of occurrence.

Both the parties were claiming their possession over the disputed house on the basis of documents executed in their favour

Proper forum to decide the controversy with regard to genuineness of documents and ownership of the disputed house would be the civil court, where suits were already pending.

Grievance of importer was that authorities committed maladministration by encashing its security treating provisional assessment of goods declaration as final

Complaint filed by importer was dismissed by Federal Tax Ombudsman

Validity

Encashment of security on expiry of period under S. 81(2) of Customs Act, 1969, by treating provisional assessment final in terms of S. 81(4) of Customs Act, 1969, was not in violation of law, rules and procedure and did not tantamount to maladministration as defined under S. 2(3) of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000

Goods declaration was finalized on 11-9-2008, leviable duty and taxes were recovered by encashment of securities in May, 2012 but complaint was filed on 18-6-2013, i.e. after more than one year of finalization of the matter

Complaint, on the face of it, under the provisions of S. 10(4) of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, was hit by limitation

Review was rejected in circumstances.

Issue essentially involved in the case was, whether the loss of vision of the insured persons (appellant) had been caused by the fall he had while discending the stairs as claimed, or it was the eventual result of some ailment, the appellant had contracted and suffered much before entering into insurance contract with the insurance company

Approach to discern fact from the fiction via medical tests had already been tried and exhausted without leading to conclusion; it was assumed, in circumstances, that it would be better, if both parties try to reach on amicable settlement on their own

Appellant side offered that, if the Insurance Company would undertake the treatment of the blinding disease of the appellant, then there would be no more dues on the company

Other offer of appellant side was that Insurance Company refund the entire premium already paid, and the main Life Policy be continued

Other options discussed were the waiver of the premium in the respective future term period, and the Policy to continue as such and that compensation be paid to the appellant under the policy in a fairway with main Policy of life remain intact

Counsel for Insurance Company had submitted that company was willing to refund the whole premium with no deduction at all to the appellant plus Rs.50,000

Appellant accepted the final settlement offer, with Proviso that no deduction be made from the premium refund

Insurance Company, on that point had already expressed their approval

Parties having arrived at the settlement on their own quite agreeably, it was ordered that Insurance Company would refund the premium already paid, to the appellant with no deduction under any head plus the payment of Rs.50,000 on compassionate ground

Policy along with all auxiliary benefits thereafter would stand terminated.

Not mandatory for the court that before taking cognizance statement under 5.200, Cr.P.C. should be recorded.

Complainant filed 23 customs duty drawbacks claims for the years 2004 and 2005 and during scrutiny of documents, department observed that claims were filed after expiry of limitation period

Deputy Collector Customs rejected the claims of the complainant and appeal against rejection order having been rejected, the complainant had filed appeal before Appellate Tribunal

Pending said appeal, Federal Board of Revenue appointed Alternate Dispute Resolution Committee, which examined the case and observed that late filing of claims was of no advantage to the exporter and it could not be deliberate

Said Committee unanimously recommended for condonation of delay under S.224 of Customs Act, 1969, but Federal Board of Revenue rejected the recommendations of the Committee

Complainant filed complaint alleging maladministration for passing an arbitrary and unreasonable order almost three years after submission of recommendations of the Committee, whereas the Board was required to take decision on the recommendation of the Committee within 45 days of receipt of recommendations

Counsel for the complainant had submitted that Deputy Collector Customs in identical cases had condoned delay and decided the duty drawbacks claim

Government had no right to withdraw citizen's money on ground of limitation or technical reasons

Federal Board of Revenue also had been allowing condonation of delay in submission of documents in many cases

Federal Board of Revenue's rejection of unanimous recommendation of the committee, was both arbitrary and unreasonable

Ombudsman recommended that Federal Board of Revenue should direct the concerned officials to condone delay in filing of duty drawback claims and decide the pending cases in accordance with law within 21 days.

Courts are duty bound to scrutinize complaints and, if necessary, examine complainants to protect hapless victims of false complaints or complaints which do not show existence of all necessary elements of alleged offence

Bald assertion in complaint alleging mens rea may not (depending on facts of a case) justify 'assumption of jurisdiction, if the attendant circumstances set out in complaint or ascertainable from material filed in support thereof, do not bear out such allegation

In the event, if Court does not find sufficient material in complaint to justify cognizance, it may dismiss the same without proceeding to order an inquiry or investigation and without summoning the accused.

Enabling power of court under S.5 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, can only be exercised on the basis of and after considering contents of complaint

Power to direct investigation under S.5 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, has to be exercised judicially and not as an unconsidered or mechanical action undertaken on every complaint filed under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, regardless of the merits of the same

Purpose of investigation under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, is to ascertain prima facie, the authenticity of what has been stated in complaint

Complaint itself has to show that an offence cognizable by Court has been committed by accused named therein

Aim of directing investigation to police is not to add to allegations or grounds raised in complaint

Purpose of such investigation, if resorted to by Trial Court, is to inquire into correctness of allegations made in complaint itself-Court need not order investigation under S.5 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, if it concludes from complaint and material furnished by complainant in support thereof, that all essential elements of offence under S.3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, are or not sufficiently disclosed and established

Court is not to become a party in gathering information or evidence in support of complaint to justify existence of mens rea, when none can be made out from complaint itself.

Generation of highly hazardous air polluting waste known as "asbestos" from production of PVC pipes spreading within radius of 15 miles of factory and causing various types of cancers amongst residents of area including death of complainant's brother

Report of Environmental Protection Authority not found to be comprehensive by Environmental Tribunal

Order of Tribunal finding such matter to be of technical nature directed for constitution of commission to carry out environmental audit and directed petitioner to prepare Environmental Management Plan through reputable environmental consultants to address environmental issues

Validity

Complainant had not alleged in the complaint that the petitioner was using any hazardous substance with or without a valid licence

Complainant had lodged complaint against hazardous waste and sought direction in public interest against petitioner to clean asbestos front the area and take preventive measures and pay damages for death of his brother

Such matter was exclusively triable by the Tribunal

Tribunal constituted under special law was legally obliged to examine environmental issue before' passing any final order

Impugned order, whereby Tribunal had decided to conduct an inquiry into allegations made in complaint, was not a final order and appealable under Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997

Impugned order was not prejudicial to interest of petitioner

Tribunal while passing impugned order had not committed any illegality or jurisdictional error

Setting aside of such interim order in constitutional jurisdiction would tantamount to negating provisions of relevant statute not providing for an appeal thereagainst

Setting aside of impugned order at such premature stage would amount to strangulate and stifling spirit and scope of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 promulgated in larger public interest

High Court dismissed constitutional petition in limine.

Generation of highly hazardous air polluting waste known as "asbestos" from production of PVC pipes spreading within radius of 15 miles of factory and causing various types of cancers amongst residents of area including death of complainant's brother

Report of Environmental Protection Authority not found to be comprehensive by Environmental Tribunal

Order of Tribunal finding such matter to be of technical nature directed for constitution of commission to carry out environmental audit and directed petitioner to prepare Environmental Management Plan through reputable environmental consultants to address on environmental issues

Validity

Complainant had not alleged in the complaint that the petitioner was using any hazardous substance with or without a valid licence

Complainant had lodged complaint against hazardous waste and sought direction in public interest against petitioner to clean asbestos from the area and take preventive measures and pay damages for death of his brother

Such matter was exclusively triable by the Tribunal

Tribunal constituted under special law was legally obliged to examine environmental issue before passing any final order

Impugned order, whereby Tribunal had decided to conduct an inquiry into allegations made in complaint, was not a final order and appealable under Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997

Impugned order was not prejudicial to interest of petitioner

Tribunal while passing impugned order had not committed any illegality or jurisdictional error

Setting aside of such interim order in constitutional jurisdiction would tantamount to negating provisions of relevant statute not providing for an appeal thereagainst

Setting aside of impugned order at such premature stage would amount to strangulate and stifling spirit and scope of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 promulgated in larger public interest

High Court dismissed constitutional petition in limine.

Complaint filed against respondent for causing pollution was accepted and a fine of Rs.50,000 was imposed upon the respondent

Court was obliged to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XXII-A, Cr.P.C. and prior to passing any conviction, charge had to be framed under S.265-D, Cr.P.C.

If accused would plead guilty, it would be compulsory for the court to record the plea and thereafter pass the order of conviction.

Tenant of respondent had stated that the soakage pit as well as burial pit were already provided by the owner of the Poultry Farm when he took over the same

Representative of complainant department who was directed to get the site inspected for verifying the statements of the tenant filed report

Said report revealed that compliance of the directions issued by the department had already been made by the respondent

Site Inspection Report filed by the department revealed that respondent poultry farm was situated near the river and it was apprehended that poultry farm would pollute the river, which was a natural reservoir

Guideline adopted by Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency was that poultry farm should be situated 500 meters away from the human settlement and on the leeward side

Farm being near the river, it was to be shifted 500 meters' away from the river

Order accordingly.

No limitation is prescribed in criminal prosecutions, but the longer a complaint is delayed the lesser becomes the chance of believing in its truth, particularly when it is based entirely upon oral evidence.

Parties to the proceedings were real brothers inter se and a dispute over the property cropped up between the parties after death of their predecessor

Inheritance mutation of landed properties had also been attested in favour of the parties

Civil litigation between the parties with regard to their ancestral properties was also pending adjudication in the competent court of law

Petitioner had impugned two different sets of orders, one with regard to dismissal of their application for dismissal of complaint/proceedings under S.145, Cr.P.C.; and the other was against the attachment order of the properties passed by the Judicial Magistrate

Petitioner had applied for dismissal of complaint on the plea that dispute between the parties was of civil nature and there was no imminent danger of breach of peace, but their request was turned down by two courts below

Nothing was on record to suggest that parties were at the risk of breach of peace

Proceedings under S.145, Cr.P.C. would not be appropriate, rather it would amount to abuse of process of court

When one of the parties was in possession of joint property, then the recourse for the other party would not be under S.145, Cr.P.C. as it appeared from the main complaint under S.145, Cr.P.C. that one party in the complaint had admitted the possession of other party

Exercise of jurisdiction by the Judicial Magistrate, in the circumstances would amount to an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction and continuation of such proceedings would certainly amount to abuse of the process of court

Concurrent judgments of two courts below, were set aside and complaint under S.145, Cr.P.C. was dismissed.