Appeal to Supreme Court
Appeal to Supreme Court legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Delay of each and every day has to be explained by the appellant for lodging the appeal after the prescribed period of limitation.
Direct appeal lies in the Supreme Court when the value of the subject matter in the Court of first instance and in the appeal is not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court has altered or varied or set aside the impugned judgment or decree of the Court immediately below.
Appeal of appellant before Service Tribunal was admitted for regular hearing and appellant was directed to deposit the requisite security and process fee within a week but she failed to deposit the same and filed an application for extension of time on the ground that due to earthquake, the needful could not be done
Validity
Service Tribunal, in the given circumstances, should have extended the time for depositing the requisite security and process fee
Harsh order which deprived the party from right of access to justice could not be passed until and unless the circumstances so compelled the court and left it with no other alternative due to conduct of the party
Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order of Service Tribunal and remanded the case for deciding the same on merits after hearing the parties.
Subsection (11) of S. 42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, provided that in criminal cases a direct appeal against the judgment of the High Court was competent when High Court had reversed the order of acquittal and sentenced the accused to death or to imprisonment for life or on revision, had enhanced a sentence to a sentence as aforesaid
Conviction order by the Trial Court was upheld by the High Court, therefore, impugned judgment of the High Court did fall within the category of Subsection (11) of S.42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, for filing direct appeal
Orders, which did not fall within the domain of Subsection (11) of S. 42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, could only be challenged by filing a petition for leave to appeal
Direct appeal filed by the appellant was not maintainable
Appeal was dismissed.
Plaintiffs had failed to point out any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Further, important questions of law had been raised in the three appeals and in order to avoid legal complications and anomalous situations arising out of the judgment of the Tribunal being left intact in appeals which were barred by time and possibly setting aside the same in the appeal which was filed within time, a case had been made out for condonation of delay
Accordingly, applications for condonation of delay were allowed and the delay caused in filing the two appeals was condoned.
Further, important questions of law had been raised in the three appeals and in order to avoid legal complications and anomalous situations arising out of the judgment of the Tribunal being left intact in appeals which were barred by time and possibly setting aside the same in the appeal which was filed within time, a case had been made out for condonation of delay
Accordingly, applications for condonation of delay were allowed and the delay caused in filing the two appeals was condoned.
Appellants impugned order of High Court whereby their appeals against order of Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal were dismissed
Question before the Supreme Court was whether the present appeals were maintainable
Held, that under S. 42(11) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974; pre-condition for filing direct appeal before Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was that the matter before the High Court should have been one which had arisen from a "court" and not a "tribunal" such as the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal
In the present case, appellants had, before the High Court, challenged judgment/order of a "tribunal" which did not fall within definition of "court" hence present appeals were not maintainable
Appeals were dismissed, in circumstances.
If the Shariat Court was found to have committed an error of law or had disregarded the well-known principles relating to the appraisal of evidence resulting into the miscarriage of justice then Supreme Court had no reluctance to reappraise the evidence for doing complete justice.
To constitute "public importance," the matter must go substantially beyond the facts of the case; it was not sufficient that a question of law arose in the case, but whether the question of law transcended the facts of the individual case and was substantial enough to have a significant bearing on the public interest
In the context of service laws a substantial question of law of public importance was a question that may arise out of a case but then surpassed the parties, to the case, and had an overarching effect on the public or a community or a class of civil servants
To determine what might constitute a substantial question of law of public importance under Art.212(3) of the Constitution, a good test was to determine whether any decision by the Supreme Court in the matter would have a bearing on the public or on the rights of a community or segment of civil servants and would not be restricted to the parties to the case
Any question of law that involved interpretation of the law, rules, instructions, notifications or governmental policy; that had not been finally settled by the Supreme Court or was not free from difficulty or ambiguity or called for discussion of alternative views; that highlighted a state of uncertainty in the law, arising from a contradictory precedent, or, that pointed out blatant abuse of due process, may pass for a substantial question of law of public importance.
Where a finding had been based on misreading, non-reading of evidence, no evidence or even erroneous assumptions of law and facts, mere concurrence of the fora below would not vest it with any sanctity.
Appeal would lie to the Supreme Court from a judgment or order passed by the Service Tribunal if the case involved a substantial question of law of public importance and leave had been granted.
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Value of subject matter in the court of first instance and in the High Court was more than Rs.50,000/- and High Court had altered the judgment of court of first instance
When the value of subject matter in the court of first instance and High Court was not less than Rs.50,000/- and High Court had altered, varied or set aside the judgment and decree of the court immediately below, then direct appeal would lie in the Supreme Court
Appellant was bound to file application for treating the appeal as petition for leave to appeal soon after the announcement of impugned judgment or within a period of 60 days
No explanation had been furnished for filing application after four months of the announcement of impugned judgment
Appellant was negligent and he was not entitled for condonation of delay
Application for conversion of appeal into petition for leave to appeal and vice versa could only be entertained if same was filed within the prescribed period of limitation
No case for condonation of delay was made out by the appellant
Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed as filed incompetently.
Petitioner-company applied to the Home Department for issuance of licence to run radio channel but he was advised to approach Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority for the same
Contention of respondent-department was that any order passed by the Officer of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority was appealable before the Authority
Writ petition was dismissed by the High Court
Validity
Any person aggrieved from the order passed by the Officer of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority might file an appeal within thirty days of issuance of such order
Impugned order was communicated to the petitioner within time but he failed to file any appeal against the said order
Remedy by way of R. 23 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2002 was an efficacious remedy
Writ petition was not maintainable in presence of alternate and efficacious remedy
Every alternate remedy was no bar to the filing of writ petition but when alternate remedy was equally efficacious then writ petition was not maintainable
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority had not made any decision yet
Application for issuance of licence for radio channel was placed before the General Manager (Licensing) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority who advised the petitioner-company to apply under the law
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Plaintiff filed an application for permission to furnish surety bond instead of cash deposit which was dismissed concurrently
Contention of plaintiff was that Trial Court had jurisdiction to change order from depositing of cash amount to furnishing the security and from security to cash deposit
Validity
Trial Court was bound to order for deposit of security to the plaintiff whether equal to one-fifth of the probable value of the land or required him to give the security to the satisfaction of court not exceeding the probable value of the property
Such power had to be exercised before the settlement of issues
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to order for cash deposit or other security after framing of issues
If plaintiff had sought equity for himself then he must do equity in favour of other party
Vendee had purchased suit land against the price of Rs. 8.5 million and due to filing of pre-emption suit his huge amount would remain stuck till the disposal of the case
Plaintiff had to prove his bona fide by acting in an equitable manner
Amount deposited should be available for the discharge of costs and if plaintiff had failed to deposit or furnish the amount of security within time specified by the court then plaint should be rejected or appeal should be dismissed
Courts below had passed the impugned orders in a legal manner
No illegality was pointed out in the judgment passed by the High Court
Plaintiff was allowed 8 day's time for depositing amount equal to one-fifth of ostensible price from the date of announcement of judgment
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Trial Court accepted application for custody of minor filed by the mother but Shariat Court remanded the case for decision afresh on the ground that mother of minor had contracted second marriage during pendency of appeal before the said court
Validity
Welfare of minor was of paramount importance
Age of minor was 11 years and father had also contracted third marriage
Both mother and father of minor had contracted other marriage
Question of custody of minor had to be decided keeping in view the interest and welfare of the minor
Father never paid expenses to the minor
Second marriage of mother did not disentitle her from the custody of minor
Father was not interested in the custody of minor who was in the custody of mother for the last about 8 years
Father had disentitled himself from the custody of minor due to his conduct
Welfare of minor was in the custody of mother
Opinion of minor had also to be considered if he was intelligent enough to form an independent opinion
Application for custody of minor could be decided on the basis of statement of minor
Judgment of Family Court was perfectly legal
Remand order passed by the Shariat Court was set aside
Mother should provide an appropriate opportunity at a place mutually agreed to the father if he wanted to meet the minor or he might apply to the Family Court for such purpose.
Shariat Court ordered to deposit necessary expenses for issuance of proclamation but no one appeared on the date fixed and appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution as well as for non-compliance of order of the court
Application for restoration of appeal/review for setting aside order of Shariat Court was filed which was also dismissed
Validity
Shariat Court for the purpose of performance of its functions had powers which were vested in the High Court while exercising revision, appellate and original civil and criminal jurisdiction
Shariat Court had powers to conduct its proceedings and regulate its procedure in all respects as it deemed fit
Said court had also power to review any decision made or order passed by it
Shariat Court had held on the one hand that the order impugned sought for review was appealable and on the other hand had observed that jurisdiction vested for review of judgment was very limited and quite different to that of appeal
Appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution as well as for non-compliance of order of Shariat Court which was not justified
Shariat Court was required to dismiss the appeal only for non-prosecution if appellant was not present
When two penal provisions were applicable then less stringent provision should be applied
Shariat Court was competent to treat review petition as an application for restoration of the case dismissed for non-prosecution
Case was remanded to the Shariat Court for decision afresh and for passing a speaking order
Appeal was accepted in circumstances.
Applicant had participated in the proceedings of the suit and got knowledge of compromise by the alleged attorney on 21-2-2006
Applicant had not approached the court within prescribed limitation
No illegality had been committed by the courts below
Application for setting aside compromise decree had been rightly dismissed being time barred
Valuable rights had been accrued to the other party due to carelessness and negligence of applicant by efflux of time and same could not be set at naught
Applicant did not deserve for condonation of delay who slept over his right being negligent
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Second suit for enhancement of maintenance allowance fixed in the previous suit was filed and Family Court enhanced the maintenance allowance from Rs.5,000 to Rs.11,000 per month but Shariat Court dismissed the suit being not maintainable
Contention of husband was that he had already deposited the maintenance allowance up to year 2015
Validity
Once a decree by the Family Court in a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance was granted second suit could not be filed and if any dispute with regard to rate of allowance had arisen then it was not necessary to file a fresh suit rather same could be agitated through a miscellaneous application
Filing of fresh suit for enhancement of maintenance allowance was not necessary and suit filed by the plaintiffs should be treated as an application
Family Court had powers to entertain the matrimonial matters and other issues connected therewith
Father was bound to maintain his children till they had attained the age of majority in case of son and the daughter till she was married
Law did not debar minor children to claim the maintenance allowance even after attaining the age of majority
If children after becoming major had their independent sources then father was not bound to maintain them
Decree in the present case was passed in the year 2005 and father was directed to make payment of Rs.5,000 per month as maintenance allowance
Considerable time had elapsed i.e. more than 8 years and during said period cost of living had much been increased
Ground taken by the father that his financial position did not permit him to enhance the maintenance allowance was not convincing
Maintenance allowance could be awarded while keeping in mind the financial position of father
Father was running business and his earning was handsome
Father was in a position to enhance the maintenance allowance
Maintenance allowance was enhanced by the Supreme Court from Rs.5,000 to Rs.10,000 per month keeping in view financial and economic position of father
Impugned judgment passed by the Shariat Court was set aside and that of Family Court was modified
Appeal was accepted in circumstances.
Custodian of Evacuee Property dismissed review petition on the ground that limitation for filing the same was 30 days but writ petition was accepted by the High Court
Validity
If an application for review was filed before the Custodian of Evacuee Property then same had to be made within a prescribed period
If Custodian of Evacuee Property felt necessary to review his own order or the order of his predecessor at his own then he was at liberty to review the order at any time after giving notice to the concerned party and Rehabilitation Authority as the justice of the case might require
Limitation for filing review petition was 30 days
Review was not filed within limitation before the Custodian of Evacuee Property which was time barred and was correctly dismissed
Impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and that of Custodian of Evacuee Property was restored
Appeal was accepted in circumstances.
Contention of plaintiffs was that one of the plaintiff in whose favour a decree had also been passed was not impleaded as party in the line of respondents before any appellate court
Validity
No effective order could be passed without impleading a person in the line of respondents who was necessary party
Application for amendment in the memo of appeal filed at belated stage could not be considered without provision of sufficient cause
Non-impleading the necessary party in the present case was not a bona fide mistake and same could not be ignored lightly
Application for amendment in the memo of appeal was not beneficial to the defendant as appeals before the appellate courts were not competently filed
Valuable right had accrued to the other party
No convincing explanation for not impleading one of the plaintiff as party in the line of respondents before the appellate courts who was necessary party had been advanced which was fatal for maintenance of present appeal
Gross negligence was on record on the part of defendant which could not be ignored lightly
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Application for placing on record a copy of 'misl-i-haqiat' was filed during pendency of suit which was accepted by the Trial Court but same was dismissed by the High Court
Validity
Document/order issued by the courts of occupied Kashmir could not be given the status of the document/order issued by the foreign country as same did not fall under the purview of foreign State
Status of occupied Kashmir was yet to be determined according to the resolutions of United Nations Organization
Government of occupied Kashmir was not recognized by the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or the Government
Document which the plaintiffs wanted to produce was only an attested copy of agency under the control of Government of occupied Kashmir and same had not been certified under the seal of consul or diplomat
If such document was certified under the seal of consul or diplomat even then the same could not be brought in the purview of Art.89 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 as Indian occupied Kashmir did not hold the status of a foreign country
No mode was available to verify such document that the original was in the possession of the same person who issued it
Such document could not be given any authenticity without any codal backing and same was not admissible in evidence
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Both the Family Court and Shariat Court had concurrently decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula
Contention of husband was that suit for dissolution of marriage was filed on the ground that he was impotent and not on the basis of khula
Validity
No law could compel wife to live with husband when she had stated that at every cost she wanted separation and was not willing to live with her husband
Spouses should be separated if it was impossible for them to live together within the limits ordained by Almighty Allah
Although main ground for seeking the decree for dissolution of marriage was that husband was impotent, however, at the same time from the statement of wife it could be conceived that she did not seem to live with the husband as a wife, in such circumstances, it would be immaterial to discuss that whether husband was potent or impotent
Marriage could be dissolved on the basis that court was satisfied that spouses could not live as husband and wife within the limits ordained by Allah and it was not necessary that same could only be dissolved on the basis of khula
Both the courts below had attended the controversy in a legal manner and passed the impugned judgments while assigning the solid reasons
No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned judgments
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
No right of title in Shamilat deh land could be conferred unless same was legally partitioned according to the entitlement of proportionate shares of owners of village
Vendee who had stepped into the shoes of vendor could not claim rights more than that of vendor
If any transaction of Shamilat deh land was made out then same would only transfer the possessory rights and not the title of such land
Sale deed in favour of plaintiff would only confer upon him the possessory rights vested in the vendor and not the title of sold property
Both the parties were co-owners of the village and they were entitled to proportionate share in the Shamilat deh land
Owner in the village who was in possession of a portion of Shamilat deh land was entitled to retain the same unless property was legally partitioned
Courts below fell in error of law, mis-read and non-read the evidence
Assertion of defendant was an admitted fact which had been proved from the evidence of the parties
Both the parties were in possession of the pieces of suit land but exact measurement of land in their possession was not ascertainable
Factual proposition on the basis of available evidence on record could not be resolved
First Appellate Court had rightly accepted the application for appointment of commission to ascertain the on-spot position of the parties
Impugned judgment was set aside and case was remanded to the Trial Court with the direction that a commission should be appointed to ascertain the on-spot position of the parties and thereafter decree for mandatory injunction should be granted to the extent of land proved in the possession of the parties in terms that their possession should not be interfered with illegally till the legal partition of Shamilat deh land by the competent authority
Appeal was disposed of in circumstances.
Out of Rs. 2,00,000 only Rs.31,000 had been paid to the wife at the time of Nikah whereas Rs.1,69,000 were still payable and defendant could not escape from the liability according to commitment made by him at the time of Nikah
Both the courts below had appreciated the record in a legal manner and had rightly come to the conclusion that wife had succeeded to prove that dower amount was fixed as Rs. 2,00,000 which was partly paid to her at the time of Nikah and remaining Rs. 1,69,000 were still payable
Shariat Court had rightly examined the statements of the witnesses produced by the defendant
No misreading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Writ petition without arraying functionary who had passed an order against a party in the line of respondent was not competent
Basic order in the present case had been passed by the Rent Controller who was a necessary party and without arraying him as party in the line of respondents writ petition was not maintainable
Appellate Court had not passed the original order which was passed by the Rent Controller
Rent Controller was necessary party in the present case
No illegality was found in the impugned order passed by the High Court
Tenant was directed to hand over the vacant possession of demised premises to the landlord within specified period and he was also directed to pay rent till eviction of demised premises
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
When justified.
Contention of petitioner was that he was a refugee from Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan but respondent had been recommended against the quota of refugee settled in Pakistan and such recommendation was illegal, arbitrary and without lawful authority
Validity
Impugned notification which came in the knowledge of petitioner during the pendency of writ petition had not been challenged before the High Court
Proper course for the petitioner was to challenge the said notification while filing application for amendment of writ petition or challenge the same independently but no such course was adopted
Petitioner had prayed to declare the recommendations made in favour of respondent and his appointment order having been issued without lawful authority
Petitioner had not challenged the appointment order of respondent in writ petition, therefore, he could not challenge the same directly before the Supreme Court
If a point had not been taken in the lower forum then same could not be taken for the first time in Supreme Court
Petitioner had to amend writ petition or challenge the impugned notification through a separate writ petition when the fact of appointment of respondent came into his knowledge
No relief could be claimed which was not prayed
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
On acquittal, an accused person earned twofold innocence particularly, in the case when there were concurrent findings to such effect by the Trial Court and the Court of First Appeal (High Court)
Unless such concurrent findings of the two courts below were found perverse, fanciful, arbitrary and were based on misreading and non-reading of material evidence causing miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court would not lightly disturb the same on basis that on reappraisal another view might be possible
Sanctity was attached under the law to such concurrent findings in ordinary course.
Supreme Court could not go behind concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below unless it could be shown that the findings were on the face of it against the evidence or so patently improbable, or perverse that to accept same could amount to perpetuating a grave miscarriage of justice, or if there had been any misapplication of principles relating to appreciation of evidence, or finally, if the findings could be demonstrated to be physically impossible.
Supreme Court normally did not interfere in the discretion exercised by the courts in bail matters, unless same was capricious and against the settled rules governing the bail matters.
Where question of limitation was not raised in the High Court, same could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in Supreme Court at the time of arguments.
High Court and Supreme Court cannot entertain any question on a finding of fact given by the Income Tax (Appellate) Tribunal.
Such questions could not be raised before the High Court or Supreme Court.
High Court and Supreme Court cannot entertain any question on a finding of fact given by the Income Tax (Appellate) Tribunal.
Such questions could not be raised before the High Court or Supreme Court.
Reappraisal of evidence, though was not the function of the Supreme Court, but it would examine the evidence only to satisfy that there had been proper appreciation of evidence, and no gross misreading or non-reading of evidence had been committed by the Trial Court or the first Appellate Court.
Period of limitation for filing petition for leave to appeal under O.XIII of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978 was 60 days from the date of impugned judgment of High Court
Judgment and decree, in the present case, was passed by the High Court on 7-4-2010
Plea of petitioners/appellants was that they came to know about the decision of the High Court on 30-6-2010
Petition for leave to appeal was ready on 3-7-2010 and it was signed on 4-7-2010, but was filed after a delay of one day for which no sufficient cause had been brought on the record
Delay of each and every day had to be explained
If the plea of counsel for the appellants is taken into consideration that they came to know about the decision of High Court dated 7-4-2010 on 30-6-2010, even then petition for leave to appeal was filed after a delay of one day for which no sufficient cause had been brought on record
Argument of the counsel that appellants were illiterate persons, therefore, they did not know the question of limitation, had no force as the ignorance of law was no excuse
Appeal was dismissed being barred by time, in circumstances.
Respondent/employee had contended that affidavit in support of the contents of the memorandum of appeal sworn by Advocate, was in his personal capacity
Contention was repelled as under O.XVII, R.4, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, it was provided that affidavit in support of the contents of memorandum of appeal would be filed by the Advocate-on-record who was filing appeal
Other objection of the respondent was that affidavit was not sworn in before any of the authorities mentioned in R.8 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978
Objection was not helpful to respondent because affidavit had been duly attested by the Notary Public as provided by the Rules.
Respondent had raised objection that no counter affidavit had been filed by the appellants, in the High Court as well as in Supreme Court
Validity
In the absence of a counter-affidavit, the uncontested affidavit could not be believed
Uncontroverted affidavit had to be believed, if there was no material to the contrary on the record
Written statement and the original file summoned from the Services and General Administration Department was available before the High Court
Objection raised by the respondent that the affidavit was uncontroverted, had no force, in circumstances.
When certain posts including the posts of constables were advertised, appellant and many others applied for the same, but the authorities without conducting test and interview appointed the private respondents
Appellant challenged said orders through writ petition, but High Court dismissed the petition in limine
Validity
Appellant in his writ petition had specifically alleged that the authorities had violated the statutory rules as no merit list was prepared and that only on the basis of favouritism, some persons had been appointed who did not even fulfil the required qualification for the post
Statement of facts averred in the writ petition had been supported by an un-rebutted affidavit of the appellant
Authorities in their pre-admission comments, neither had submitted copy of merit list nor any other document supposed to be in their possession to rebut the factual statement of the appellant
Authorities, even had not filed counter affidavit to rebut or deny the contents of the affidavit of the appellant
Assertion made by the appellant, prima facie, seemed to be true
Such state of affairs demanded admission of writ petition for the ends of justice.
When the order was passed by the lower forum, subject to objections by other party, normally, the party would resort to the lower forum; and file objections; and Supreme Court would refrain from interfering in such order, but if order passed by the lower forum was against the legal provisions, then the party could file petition for leave to appeal against the said order in the Supreme Court
In the present case, the impugned order offended the provisions of R.34 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 and O.XLIX, Rr.1, 2, C.P.C.
Said order also appeared against the provisions of S.47 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974
Appeal to Supreme Court was competently filed, in circumstances.
Point which was not raised in the Trial Court and in the Appellate Court below, could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court
If a point was not taken in the lower court or the High Court; and it involved inquiry into the facts, said point could not be raised for the first time in Supreme Court.
Respondents had raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of appeal, on the ground that copy of impugned order had not been appended with the memo of appeal
Contention of the respondents was that under Supreme Court Rules, 1978, it being mandatory for the appellants to file copy of the order passed by the Lower Tribunal, appeal merited dismissal on that point
Validity
Order XIII, R.3(i)(ii) of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978 provided that filing of the copy of order of Lower Tribunal, which was challenged in the High Court was not mandatory with the appeal to Supreme Court
Objection, stood repelled, in circumstances.
Question which had not been raised in the lower court, same could not be raised in appeal for the first time before the Supreme Court.
Point not raised in the High Court could not be raised in appeal before the Supreme Court.
Where the amount of value of the subject matter of the suit in the court of first instance and also in appeal, unless varied by an Act of the Parliament, fifty thousand rupees and the Appellate Court i.e. the High Court had varied, altered or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the court immediately below, a direct appeal, would be competent before the Supreme Court
Intention of the Legislature referring to any amount "fixed by an Act of the Parliament", clearly would mean that it referred to an increase or decrees in the amount of fifty thousand rupees
Such was why the Legislature in the Civil Procedure Code; 1908 expressed its intention by ,using the word `unless varied' by an Act of the Parliament, and the same had been put in brackets
Under clauses (d) & (e) of sub-section (11) of S.42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, a direct appeal would lie to the Supreme Court, if the amount or value of the subject matter in the first court, as well as in appeal before the Supreme Court was not less than fifty thousand rupees or any increased sum specified by the Act, and the judgment decree or final order placed before the court was varied or set aside by High Court
Intention of the legislature was clear on the point that if the High Court did not vary, alter or set aside the judgment of the court below, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court was not competent, although the amount or value of the subject-matter, was more than fifty thousand rupees
Constitution fixed the minimum value of the claim, unless same was not altered by an Act of the Parliament
Constitution did not contemplate the appeal from a decree of affirmance.
Employee who was removed from service, filed appeal before the Service Tribunal, which through the impugned judgment set aside punishment of removal from service and reinstated him into service, but period spent in between his removal and reinstatement was treated as leave without pay
Department filed appeal before the Supreme Court against judgment of Service Tribunal whereby he was ordered to be reinstated in service
Validity
Appeal was barred by 4 days and deducting one day which had been spent in obtaining certified copy of impugned order, appeal was time-barred
For condonation of delay, the party had to explain the delay of each day and every day to satisfy the court, whereas in the present case neither any explanation had been tendered nor any request for condonation of delay in filing appeal had been made
Appeal being time-barred was not maintainable, in circumstances.
Appellant who was a Civil Judge, having been found guilty of misconduct, was compulsorily retired from service after issuing him show-cause notice and holding inquiry against him
Appellant had not denied the factual happening of alleged acts of misconduct as incorporated in the statement of allegations
At three different stages, the concerned authorities (Inquiry Officer, Authority and Service Tribunal) had concurred that explanations and reasoning extended by the appellant, were not acceptable
Explanation extended to by the appellant, appeared to be a lame excuse, which did not match with law knowing person and specially the Judicial Officer of status of a Senior Civil Judge
Judgment in question was a speaking one and the inquiry report was well reasoned, while the Authority had passed orders after due application of mind providing the appellant the opportunity of hearing
Appellant had failed to bring on record anything to prove alleged discriminatory treatment
In absence of any proof the question of discriminatory treatment would not arise
Conduct of the appellant was not only contradictory, but also not like a Judicial Officer
Ignorance of law was no excuse
While a lay man could not claim the excuse of ignorance of law how such excuse could be available to a Judicial Officer like the appellant
Appellant had failed to point out any illegality in the impugned judgment of Service Tribunal
Appeal was dismissed.
"Appeal to Supreme Court", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/2251
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Appeal to Supreme Court"
2001 P T D 3243
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX Versus PALGHAT SHADI MAHAL TRUST
Court: 240 I T R 9241983 S C M R 22
AJAIB KHAN-Petitioner Versus THE STATE — Respondent
Court: ----Art. 212-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court-Federal Shariat Court-- Not an Administrative Court or Tribunal-Appeals to Supreme Court under Art. 212 (3) of Constitution, held, can only be filed in respect of orders passed in connection with matters specified in Art. 212 and in no other matters.-Jurisdiction.1983 S C M R 159
ADMINISTRATOR, THAI DEVELOPMENT-Petitioner Versus MEHBOOB ALI KHAN-Respondent
Court: --3 as amended by Law Reforms (Amendment) Act (VIII of 1972 Inter-Court Appeal-Competency-Leave to appeal to Supreme Court Granted to consider contention that view of High Court as to intra Court appeal being not competent was a misreading, misinterpretation and misconstruction of S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3).1982 S C M R 1009
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ANOTHER-Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD SALEEM AND OTHERS-Respondents
Court: ----Art. 185(3)-Leave to appeal-Both parties agreeing as to petition for leave to appeal having been filed by mistake of fact and petitioners having been entitled as of right to file a direct appeal before Supreme Court-Petition for leave to appeal hence treated as an appeal Counsel of parties also agreeing as to respondents being entitled to enhanced rate of compensation on their share in land as assessed by High Court-Appeal being time-barred dismissed in circumstances. Appeal to Supreme Court.1981 S C M R 837
Ch. MUHAMMAD AKBAR-Petitioner Versus CHAIRMAN, MUNICIPAL. COMMITTEE, JALALPUR
Court: -- Art. 185(3)-Appeal to Supreme Court-Ad interim order passed by High Court yet to be confirmed after hearing petitioner-Not appealable to Supreme Court--Best course for petitioner in circumstances to apply to High Court for setting aside such order.-Appeal to Supreme Court.1977 S C M R 166
Messrs F. & I. INDUSTRIES LTD. AND 2 OTHERS Appellants Versus MESSRS FORBES FORBES CAMPBELL & Co. LTD Respondent
Court: ----‑ Art. 185(3)‑Leave to appeal to Supreme Court‑‑Divergence in judicial opinion on legal question involved in case‑Question also appearing to be of first impression in so far as Supreme Court con cerned‑Leave to appeal granted.‑Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court.P L D 1965 Supreme Court 466
Syed MASUMUL HASSAN AND ANOTHER Petitioners Versus Sheikh MUHAMMAD OMER‑Respondent
Court: (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 58‑Leave to appeal to Supreme Court‑Granted where questions involved were whether a letter written by counsel of judgment‑debtor was to be construed (i) as having been written on behalf of judgment‑debtor, and (ii) as containing acknowledgment of liability, sufficient to extend limitation‑Both questions complex‑High Court's judgment one of reversal of that of Court below‑Execution of decree for Rs.20,000.1977 S C M R 314
Mst. REHMAN BEGUM‑Appellant Versus Mst. MAHMOODI BEGUM AND OTHERS‑Respondents
Court: Art. 185‑Appeal to Supreme Court‑Leave to appeal not granted to consider validity of remand order but confined only to con sideration of error apparent on face of record, validity of remand order, held, cannot be questioned‑Even otherwise, appellant not standing to gain unless case goes back to settlement authorities for fresh determination of entitlement and relative merits of respective claims of parties.‑Appeal to Supreme Court.1987 S C M R 2104
ABDUL QADIR and others‑‑Appellants Versus CHAIRMAN, ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE and others‑‑Respondents
Court: ‑‑Arts. 185(3) & 199‑‑Appeal to Supreme Court‑‑Allotment of land‑ Cancellation of‑‑Locus standi to challenge on basis of judgment to which appellants were not party‑‑Order of Rehabilitation authorities upheld by High Court‑‑Question arising whether appellants, who had not appealed to Supreme Court although a party in constitutional petition before High Court, were not entitled to the benefit of order of Supreme Court‑‑Since no appeal was filed by appellants to challenge decision of High Court, allotment in favour of respondents became final and appellants had no locus standi to challenge allotment which they had allowed to become final, on basis of judgment of Supreme Court to which they were not parties.‑‑Locus standi.1978 S C M R 261
MUHAMMAD SIRAJ-Petitioner Versus PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
Court: ----Art. 185(3)-Appeal to Supreme Court-Jurisdiction- impugned judgment delivered by Dacca High Court on 5-5-1971, and petitioner submitting petition for leave to appeal against said judgment on 16-11-1973, much before recognition of Bengla Desh by Pakistan as a separate sovereign country-Petition, held, competent on such account and also for reason of writ of Court, if issued, running against Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Health and not against any authority in Bengla Desh.-Appeal to Supreme Court-Jurisdiction).