Compromise

Accused-respondent filed miscellaneous criminal application for suspension of execution of his death sentence before the Trial Court on the basis of compromise, but was dismissed

Revision was filed against order for dismissal of petition before this Court, wherein matter was remanded to decide the same afresh

Record showed that Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused-respondent on the basis of compromise in both the offences as he had been convicted and sentenced under S.302(b) P.P.C read with S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Whereas under the provisions of S.367(2) and (3) of the Cr.P.C it was mandatory for the Trial Court that after finding the accused guilty of one or more offences, upon recording conviction, separate sentence must be clearly awarded to the accused, so convicted, otherwise it would be illegal being in violation of the mandatory provisions of S.367 Cr.P.C, therefore, at this stage it could not be agitated that the necessary modification shall be made in the conviction and sentences of the accused-respondent and he be further convicted and sentenced under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as well because, the matter was now past and closed transaction and could not be re-opened

Thus, Trial Court while acquitting the accused-respondent on the basis of compromise had committed no illegality or irregularity, calling for interference of this Court

Resultantly, this appeal, being without any substance, was dismissed.

Cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for the purpose of cheating, use of a forged document as genuine, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, common intention

Appreciation of evidence

Compromise

Accused were charged they had obtained forged heir-ship certificate by way of fraud and got transferred the property of complainant in their names

Joint application for settlement supported by the affidavits of all concerned were duly sworn in by them

After filing of compromise application, all concerned also conceded to disposal of the appeal on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties and acquittal of the appellant even in respect of non-compoundable offences

In the best interest of justice, equity and fair play the compromise arrived at between the parties in the instant case in respect of compoundable offences viz. Ss.420 & 427, P.P.C, as well as non-compoundable offences was accepted/allowed to take effect

Appellant alleged that S.498-A P.P.C had been wrongly inserted in the charge which led to his subsequent conviction under S.498-A, P.P.C., by the Trial Court

As per record, in FIR No.93 of 2020, there was no mention of S.498-A, P.P.C.; therefore, insertion of said Section in the charge and conviction of the appellant under said Section by the Trial Court was not in consonance with law

At the time of transaction/mutation dated 17.11.2008, S.498-A, P.P.C. was not in the field/existence as it was promulgated by the Legislature through Criminal Law (Third Amendment) Act, 2011, vide Act No.XXVI of 2011 on 28th December, 2011; therefore said Section was wrongly inserted in the charge by the Trial Court

Prosecution alleged that at the time when the compromise application was not yet filed by the parties, the trial Court had rightly inserted and subsequently convicted the accused/appellant under S.498-A, P.P.C

However, after filing of compromise application, they also conceded to disposal of the appeal on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties and acquittal of the appellant even for the offence under S.498-A, P.P.C, too

In view of said legal position, it could safely be held that insertion of S.498-A, P.P.C, in the charge framed by the Trial Court and subsequent conviction of the accused/ appellant for the offence under said Section was not warranted under the law

Compromise application was allowed, in circumstances

Consequently, Criminal Appeal stood allowed accordingly.

Complainant filed applications under Ss. 345(2) & 345(6), Cr.P.C with the submission that possession of the disputed property had been restored to him, therefore, he with the core of his heart had forgiven the accused "AA" and he had no objection if the said accused was acquitted of the charge

Since, the complainant had entered into compromise with main co-accused "AA" and the possession of disputed property had also been restored to him; hence, the case of co-appellant was at par and conviction could not be maintained more particularly when on identical charge, co-accused had been acquitted by way of compromise; besides, possession of the disputed property had been restored to the complainant

Admittedly, complainant as well as appellant "AA" had amicably settled all their differences and agreed to pass rest of their lives in peace, tranquility and harmony

Non-compound- ability of a particular offence under any section of the enactment should not be read in isolation but it should be read in the background of each criminal case and beneficial interpretation should be given to it

In present case, though the possession of the disputed property had been handed over/restored to the complainant yet he had entered into compromise with only appellant "AA" however, had not compromised with co-appellant

As far as, case of co-appellant was concerned, no different charge was framed against him nor any specific allegation regarding dispossessing the complainant from the particular property had been leveled against him

In such state of affairs, case of co-appellant could not be bifurcated or separated

Appeal against conviction of co-appellant was allowed accordingly.

During the pendency of the instant appeal, both parties had compromised the matter outside court, and in that regard, they had filed joint applications under Ss. 345(5) & 345(6), Cr.P.C, along with supporting affidavit of complainant

Complainant submitted that possession of the property in dispute had been handed over to him; therefore, he, with the core of his heart, had forgiven the appellant; hence, they had filed compromise applications jointly and he did not want to prosecute the appellant anymore and he had no objection if the applications were allowed and the appellant was acquitted of the charge

Validity

Appellant-accused was convicted under subsection (2) of S.3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, did not specify whether the alleged offence was compoundable or non-compoundable

Section 9 of the Act mandated that, except where otherwise specified, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, shall govern all proceedings conducted under the Act

Therefore, a compromise effectuated under the Act must be regarded as a compromise under S.345 of the Criminal Procedure Code

Moreover, it is recognized that parties to a dispute may reach an amicable resolution, signifying their commitment to co-exist in peace, tranquility, and harmony

Such principle reflected the legal philosophy that encouraged the settlement of disputes through mutual agreement, thereby promoting social stability and reducing the burden on the judicial system

In relation to the non-compoundability of specific offences, it was critical to interpret such provisions within the context of individual cases

Legal precedents suggested that a beneficial interpretation of statutory provisions should be favoured, allowing Courts to consider in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case rather than applying a rigid interpretation

Such approach aligned with the broader legal philosophy of justice and equity, emphasizing that the spirit of the law should guide judicial outcome to foster reconciliation and uphold community harmony

In light of the compromise reached between the parties outside the Court, the complainant's decision not to pursue the case and his lack of objection to the appellant's acquittal, it was not appropriate to uphold the conviction

Therefore, in order to maintain cordial relations between the parties in future, the application under S.345(5), Cr.P.C., was granted; resultantly, the application under S.345(6), Cr.P.C. was accepted

Appellant was acquitted of the charge by way of compromise.

No doubt the legislature has not provided a specific section/provision under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, for compounding the offense

However, S.9 of the Act ibid provided that unless provided in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the provisions contained under the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, shall apply to all the proceedings under the Act ibid

Therefore, the compromise effected between the parties under the Act ibid should be treated as the compromise within the meaning of S.345, Cr.P.C.

Non-compoundability of the particular Section of the law should not be read in isolation but it should be read in the background of each criminal case and beneficial interpretation should be given to it

When the parties had earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquility by forgetting and giving up all their past transactions then for the sake of their welfare in general and betterment of socio-economic conditions of the society as a whole in particular, it would be prime need of time to acquit the accused from the charge upon the basis of compromise despite the non-compoundability of the S.3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

Joint application for compromise between parties had been filed duly supported with affidavits of accused persons as well as complainant

Counsel for the complainant had also made a statement duly signed by the complainant to the effect that possession of the disputed property had been handed over to complainant, therefore he had no objection to acquittal of the accused persons

Legal question was that said offence was not compoundable nor the legislature had defined it in its Preamble whether it should be treated as compoundable or non-compoundable

However, if the parties, particularly the aggrieved person/victim and both the parties i.e. the complainant and appellant/convict, had compromised against themselves then it should be treated as compromised, though under the statute it had not been defined whether it was compoundable or non-compoundable

In the present case, keeping in view the compromise that had taken place between the parties outside the Court, it was not proper to hold the conviction, especially when the complainant did not want to pursue his case anymore and had raised his no objection for acquittal of the appellants

In the circumstances and in view of the compromise effected between the parties, the appeal was disposed of

Appellants were acquitted of all the charges.

Complainant, who was father of victim boy, was present before the Court on 28.08.2019 and stated that due to intervention of elders of their community, he had forgiven the accused and raised no objection for his acquittal by way of compromise as he did not want to pursue the case anymore or to prosecute the accused

With regard to prosecution's contention that the offence with which accused stood charged was not compoundable, the complainant, who was father of victim boy had stated before the Court regarding the compromise, thus had extended his no objection for allowing present revision application

Moreover, no offence was committed except alleged attempt

Sperm was found available upon the clothes of the victim, which were not sent to laboratory for DNA testing nor such report was made available with regard to matching of the same with DNA of accused

In absence of DNA report, remaining prosecution evidence, which was imaginary and had not been corroborated with any substantive material except allegation of attempt and in view of settlement of the parties outside the Court, prosecution evidence could not be used for maintaining conviction against the accused

Criminal Revision Application was allowed by setting aside impugned judgments passed by Trial Court and Appellate Court.

Partial compromise cannot be taken into consideration for acquittal.

Earlier suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was withdrawn unilaterally thereafter they filed instant suit for implementing a promise made by appellant/defendant in earlier proceedings

Trial Court rejected the plaint but Lower Appellate Court set aside the order and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh

Validity

Statement was given in absence of opponent party and even without any notice on application to withdraw earlier suit

Compromise could become effective only when the two or more parties agreed to settle a real or supposed claim in which each party had surrendered something in concession to each other

Unilateral statement given by respondents/plaintiffs and that too in absence of other side could not be taken as mutual concession or mutual promise, having any binding effect, especially when statement regarding so-called out of court compromise was not backed by any document

Such statement did not fulfill requirements of O. XXIII, R. 3, C.P.C., which necessitated satisfaction of the Court

If such an easy way of escaping restriction contained in O. XXIII, R. 1(3), C.P.C. by simply giving unilateral statement as to compromise was permitted, the very purpose of the provision of O. XXIII, C.P.C., would be negated

High Court set aside the order passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

If both the parties had earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquillity by ignoring and settling all their past differences, then for the sake of their welfare in particular and betterment of socio-economic conditions of the society as a whole, it would be prime need of the time to accept the compromise and consequently acquit the accused from the charge.

Petitioners moved an application before the trial court for issuing direction to the State to pay the Diyat amount on their behalf, which was dismissed

Validity

Petitioners had not challenged the payment of Diyat amount but had only prayed that since they could not pay the Diyat amount for lack of reasonable resources, the State be directed to pay the said amount

Scope

Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007 (Rules 2007), issued vide S.R.O. No.1110(I)/2007, dated 13th November, 2007, described that only vulnerable prisoners could be compensated, if they were languished in jail only for payment of Diyat amount

Said concession was earlier only available to the prisoners of 60 years of age, but subsequently Rules were amended and the minimum age limit was fixed at 40 years

Petitioners could not be compensated under the said rules as they were neither behind the bars or languished in jail nor they meet the criteria of minimum age limit of 40 years

In the present case, in the list of legal heirs some were of minor age, being below the age of 18 years, therefore, the right of Diyat could not be pardoned or waived of by their respective wali under the injunctions of Islam, however, the Trial Court could grant the permission for payment of Diyat amount in lieu of shares of minor legal heirs of the deceased in sixty instalments and further the petitioners were also admitted to bail subject to furnishing surety equivalent to the Diyat amount

High Court observed that petitioners' case though did not fall within the purview of Rules 2007, but it was admitted feature of the case that the Government was wali for the deceased on behalf of his/her legal heirs, without imposing any embargo of upper or lower age limit

Impediment of payment of Diyat on behalf of offenders to the legal heirs of the deceased subject to minimum age limit of 40 years, did not stand of any explicit reason, rather it seemed discriminative to the petitioners on the basis of their age as well as for the reason that they were not languishing in jail merely for payment of Diyat amount

Petitioner's case was distinguishable one, since they had been admitted to bail by the trial court by invoking provisions of S. 331 of P.P.C. and the reference to Rules 2007 could not be considered as sacrosanct piece of legislation

In view of equality of citizens guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Constitution, rather the Rules 2007 were an attempt to create a special class, and said class or category of the prisoners would only be entitled to get benefit of payment of Diyat after attaining the age of 40 years

In the present case both the petitioners were below the age of 40 years and in case of non-payment of Diyat amount through instalments, they would ultimately be incarcerated due to default in payment of Diyat amount, in that case both of them would be kept in jail till attaining the age of 40 years and then they would be entitled for the payment of Diyat through Bait-ul-Mal or any other medium allocated by the concerned government in that behalf

If the stated situation was accepted, then the petitioners would not be in position to get benefit of funds allocated by the Government for payment of Diyat, therefore, present case was a fit case to be referred to the Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs, who shall further proceed and place the case before the appropriate committee of the Ministry of Human Rights for considering the case on sympathetic basis in view of observations by the High Court

High Court further observed that no inquiry had so far been conducted to ascertain that whether the petitioners had any other means in shape of moveable or immovable property to make the payment good, or otherwise

High Court remanded the case to the Trial Court to conduct inquiry with regard to financial situation of the petitioners through concerned Tehsildar

If the report suggested and finally concluded that the petitioners did not have enough means to make payment of Diyat good, the trial court shall forward the case to the Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs along with copy of the judgment with the direction for compliance

Home Secretary shall ensure that amount of Diyat in the present case was deposited in the Trial Court by the State for payment to the legal heirs, either from the 'Bait-ul-Maal' or from the fund allocated by the Federation to the Ministry of Human Rights, within three months of the receipt of that order, failing which the Trial Court shall take necessary steps for the recovery of the amount of Diyat by attachment/sale of movable or immovable property of the State in accordance with law

Revision petition was accepted accordingly.

Plaintiffs filed suit with the contention that their father in his life time had gifted entire property in their favour and impugned inheritance mutations were based on fraud

Defendants filed written statement that alleged gift being forged, fictitious and fabricated had been prepared to disinherit the sisters from the legacy of deceased father

Plaintiffs did not produce alleged gift deed during proceedings before the Trial Court

Contention of plaintiffs was that one of the defendants had admitted the transaction of gift before Trial Court whereas another defendant had recorded compromising statement before Appellate Court

Defendants had contended that alleged statements on behalf of defendants were result of coercion and influence and same could not be treated as lawful compromise

Suit was dismissed concurrently

Validity

Plaintiffs had failed to produce original gift deed before the Trial Court

One of the defendants while appearing in the witness box in favour of plaintiffs had admitted the transaction of gift but she had not stated that compromise had been effected

Statement of said witness of plaintiffs was contrary to her written statement

Trial Court was justified to disbelieve the deposition of said witness in circumstances

One of the defendants had submitted compromise deed before the Appellate Court and had even recorded her statement that compromise had been effected

Said defendant thereafter had filed an application that plaintiffs while practicing fraud had procured her statement and no compromise had been effected

Intention to settle the things/disputes through compromise must exist

Defendants had claimed that alleged gift deed was forged and fictitious

Courts below had no other option but to dismiss the suit

Defendants being brothers were dominants of the family and they had procured compromise deed to settle the dispute

Even compromise deeds had been signed only on behalf of defendants and plaintiffs were not its signatories in any capacity

Nothing was on record as to why compromise had been effected and whether defendants had accommodated the sisters against said compromise

Governing words in R.3, O.XXIII, C.P.C. appeared to be not 'compromise' but an 'adjustment' and in absence of an intention and adjustment to other party it could not be termed as lawful

Claim of plaintiffs was based on forged and fictitious document and there was no occasion for its adjustment

Suit property was joint therefore until and unless it was bifurcated a lawful compromise could not be made by some of its co-shares which might have prejudiced the rights/interests of the others

Statements recorded on behalf of defendants had not been acted upon and they had withdrawn the same

Court had discretion to accord compromise as per its satisfaction

Courts below, in the present case, were not satisfied that either there as possibility of lawful compromise or it could be effected

High Court observed that no compromise had been effected rather it was merely a relinquishment which was not favourable to the plaintiffs to establish their right as such relinquishment by a female being against public policy was unlawful

Plaintiffs had failed to point out any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiffs filed suit with the contention that their father in his life time had gifted entire property in their favour and impugned inheritance mutations were based on fraud

Defendants filed written statement that alleged gift being forged, fictitious and fabricated had been prepared to disinherit the sisters from the legacy of deceased father

Plaintiffs did not produce alleged gift deed during proceedings before the Trial Court

Contention of plaintiffs was that one of the defendants had admitted the transaction of gift before Trial Court whereas another defendant had recorded compromising statement before Appellate Court

Defendants had contended that alleged statements on behalf of defendants were result of coercion and influence and same could not be treated as lawful compromise

Suit was dismissed concurrently

Validity

Plaintiffs had failed to produce original gift deed before the Trial Court

One of the defendants while appearing in the witness box in favour of plaintiffs had admitted the transaction of gift but she had not stated that compromise had been effected

Statement of said witness of plaintiffs was contrary to her written statement

Trial Court was justified to disbelieve the deposition of said witness in circumstances

One of the defendants had submitted compromise deed before the Appellate Court and had even recorded her statement that compromise had been effected

Said defendant thereafter had filed an application that plaintiffs while practicing fraud had procured her statement and no compromise had been effected

Intention to settle the things/disputes through compromise must exist

Defendants had claimed that alleged gift deed was forged and fictitious

Courts below had no other option but to dismiss the suit

Defendants being brothers were dominants of the family and they had procured compromise deed to settle the dispute

Even compromise deeds had been signed only on behalf of defendants and plaintiffs were not its signatories in any capacity

Nothing was on record as to why compromise had been effected and whether defendants had accommodated the sisters against said compromise

Governing words in R.3, O.XXIII, C.P.C. appeared to be not 'compromise' but an 'adjustment' and in absence of an intention and adjustment to other party it could not be termed as lawful

Claim of plaintiffs was based on forged and fictitious document and there was no occasion for its adjustment

Suit property was joint therefore until and unless it was bifurcated a lawful compromise could not be made by some of its co-shares which might have prejudiced the rights/interests of the others

Statements recorded on behalf of defendants had not been acted upon and they had withdrawn the same

Court had discretion to accord compromise as per its satisfaction

Courts below, in the present case, were not satisfied that either there as possibility of lawful compromise or it could be effected

High Court observed that no compromise had been effected rather it was merely a relinquishment which was not favourable to the plaintiffs to establish their right as such relinquishment by a female being against public policy was unlawful

Plaintiffs had failed to point out any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Conditions.

Conditions.

Defendants had filed compromise application with the request to decree the suit against them on their admission of claim of the plaintiff

Validity

Compromise application with the clause of two months' time to be given to defendants to vacate suit property from the date of order on the said application had been filed

Two months' time to vacate suit property by the defendants had already expired prior to filing of present application

Terms and conditions of compromise should have already been complied with by the parties during the period of pendency of proceedings

Condition of order of the Court on such compromise was absurd

Decree for disposal of suit/appeal on compromise would not serve the purpose

Appeal on such compromise had become infructuous, in circumstances

Alleged compromise was one sided and contrary to the record and conduct of appellant

Compromise application was dismissed, in circumstances and counsel for the appellant was directed to address the court on merit of the case on the fixed date.

Qatl-i-amd, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace, hurt, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly

Bail, grant of

Compromise

Matter had been patched up between the parties and the names of the accused had already been placed in column No.02 of the challan

Affidavits on behalf of the complainant and one of legal heirs of deceased had been filed, which indicated about the fact of compromise between the parties

Accused persons were admitted to bail, in circumstances.

Joint application for compromise between the appellant and complainant/respondent had been filed duly supported by affidavits which was taken on record

Respondent/complainant had also made a statement to the effect that possession of disputed property had been handed over to him and, therefore, he had no objection to the acquittal of the appellant-accused from all the charges including payment of fine

Statement was also taken on record

Admittedly, both the parties had amicably settled all their differences and had agreed to pass rest of their time in peace, tranquillity and harmony

Non-compoundability of a particular offence under any provision of law was not to be read in isolation but it read in the background of each case and beneficial interpretation to be adapted

When both the parties had earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquility, by ignoring and settling all their past differences, then for the sake of their welfare in general and betterment of socio-economic conditions of the society as a whole, it would be a prime need of the time to accept the compromise and consequently acquit the accused-appellant from the charge

Appellant-accused was convicted under subsection (2) of S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

High Court observed that although, Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was silent as to whether it was compoundable or not, however, the dispute being related to property was presumed to be of civil nature

Room for negotiation, in civil rights, ever remained open, therefore, the legislature in its wisdom had left it open for the courts to decide such issue

Keeping in view the compromise, which had taken place between the parties outside the court, it was not proper to uphold the conviction specially when the complainant himself did not want to pursue his case anymore and had raised no objection to the acquittal of the accused-appellant

Compromise application arrived at between the parties merited consideration, therefore the same was accepted

Consequently, appeal was disposed of.

Legislature had not provided any specific provision of law in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 for compounding the offence

Section 9 of the Act, provided that unless otherwise provided in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the provisions contained under the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 shall be applicable to all the proceedings under the Act

Compromise arrived at between the parties under the Act would be treated as the compromise within the meaning of S. 345, Cr.P.C.

Legal heirs of both the deceased had forgiven the accused in the name of Allah Almighty and had no objection if the accused was released on bail or acquitted of the charge under S.302, P.P.C.

Accused was about 16 years old at the time of commission of offence, as such he was juvenile and on this ground too he was also entitled for concession of bail

Parties having themselves voluntarily forgiven the crime and had entered into a settlement/ compromise outside the court which could be considered good ground for grant of bail to the accused in the interest of justice

Accused was admitted to post arrest bail, in circumstances.

Alleged abductee had appeared before the Chief Court and stated that she had entered into compromise and had forgiven the accused persons in the name of Allah Almighty and that she had no objection if ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to accused persons was confirmed

Although, offence under S. 365-B, P.P.C., was not compoundable, however, compromise was a ground for grant of pre-arrest bail, as complainant party was no longer willing to prosecute the matter against the accused persons

Pre-arrest bail was confirmed, in circumstances.

Execution scheduled was stayed by Division Bench of the High Court with direction to Trial Court to verify the factum of composition

Accused sought acceptance of said compromise

Trial Court confirmed the genuineness of compromise, however, declined to bless it with approval on the ground that conviction of accused along side S. 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 stood an impediment to acquittal of accused; as said charge being non-compoundable

Accused was convicted for homicide alone, as was evident from Trial Court's judgment, upheld by High Court as well as the Supreme Court

Accused, in circumstances, incurred no penal consequences under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Conviction of accused could not be impliedly construed to be under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, merely on the basis of forum of trial or joinder of charges under said Act

Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court could not decline acceptance of compromise, merely on that ground; i f otherwise, Judge was satisfied about the genuineness thereof

Constitutional petition was allowed and impugned order was set aside

Plea of accused for acceptance of compromise would be deemed as pending before the Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, for decision in accordance with law after due verification.

During pendency of suit filed by the plaintiff-company against the defendant-companies, attorney of the plaintiff filed an application under O.XXIII, R.3 C.P.C. claiming that the matter between the plaintiff and defendants had been settled

Trial Court allowed said application and dismissed the suit as not pressed

Plaintiff contended that order by Trial Court had been obtained through misrepresentation and fraud as its attorney had no instructions and or lawful authority to withdraw the suit, and neither any compromise had been reached outside the Court, nor any such compromise was on record

Held, that perusal of the power of attorney reflected that the plaintiff-company had appointed the agents severally as the company's attorneys in question to do the acts deeds and things in connection with and arising out of the subject consignment and for its delivery and transportation from Egypt to Ethiopia

Said purpose had been so stated and it clearly spelt out that the principal/plaintiff-company wanted these attorneys to act in furtherance of the said act

Though a specific power for compromise was not available in the power of attorney but even if the word "comprise" used therein was understood as "compromise" (treating it as an inadvertent error or a typographical mistake) by no stretch of imagination it could be held that this also provided power for withdrawing the proceedings

Word 'withdrawal' had been purposely left out from the Power of Attorney

Admittedly, no separate withdrawal power was available in the Power of Attorney

Order passed by Trial Court was obtained by way of misrepresentation and fraud in that the Attorney had no lawful authority on behalf of the plaintiff/principal to withdraw the suit

Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C. was allowed in circumstances and High Court gave directions for the suit to proceed on merits.

Applicant/plaintiff-company booked a consignment of steel coils from a foreign country, which was shipped on a vessel owned by the first defendant-company

Cargo was supposed to be transported from Egypt to Ethiopia, however during transit the same was allegedly stolen and by preparation of forged and fabricated documents, it had been brought to Karachi, Pakistan in the name of second defendant-company, who was under the process of clearance of the same from Customs when suit was filed by the plaintiff-company and certain restraining orders were obtained

During pendency of suit an application under O.XXIII, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, was filed by the attorney of the plaintiff-company supported by one of the Directors of the company claiming that the matter between the plaintiff-company and defendant-companies had been settled

Trial court allowed said application and dismissed the suit as not pressed

Plaintiff-company contended that order by Trial court had been obtained through misrepresentation and fraud as its attorney had no instructions and or lawful authority to withdraw the suit, and neither any compromise had been reached outside the Court, nor any such compromise was on record

Held, that on an application under O. XXIII, R. 3 C.P.C., the Court was required to pass a decree on the terms so settled through an agreement between the parties

Such agreement ordinarily must be signed and supported by the parties who had entered into such agreement

In the present case, there was no compromise agreement on record whereby, any inference could be drawn that interest of the plaintiff-company was safeguarded while filing the application under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C.

Even otherwise, for a compromise to be termed or called as being valid there ought to have been some material on record in favour of the plaintiff-company, which could have compelled the plaintiff-company/principal to instruct the Attorney to withdraw the suit

Trial Court had been misled or at least an attempt had been made to mislead the Court by filing an application under O. XXIII, R. 3 C.P.C. with supporting affidavits of plaintiff-company and first defendant, whereas, what has been stated in the order of the Trial court was entirely contrary to the contents of the application and finally on such application suit of plaintiff-company had been dismissed as not pressed

Order passed by Trial Court was obtained by way of misrepresentation and fraud and was resultantly set-aside

Application under S.12(2) C.P.C. was allowed in circumstances and High Court gave directions for the suit to proceed on merits in that the Attorney had no lawful authority on behalf of the plaintiff/principal to withdraw the suit.

Four accused were let off by the police during investigation whereas only the accused-appellant was held responsible for the charge and subsequently he was sent up to face trial

Joint applications filed by the parties in terms of S. 345(2)(4)(6), Cr.P.C. were entertained and subsequently allowed and accused-appellant was directed to pay diyat amount to the legal heirs of deceased

Accused had contended that when let off accused were nominated in the FIR and, subsequently, the prosecution witnesses and complainant had deposed against them before the trial court, therefore, the accused-appellant alone could not be held responsible to pay the full diyat amount

Validity

Record showed that the Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant only and not the let off accused

Let off accused, in circumstances, would not suffer any consequences whether there was a compromise between the parties or not, as they had not been charged with commission of any offence

Letting off of the co-accused by the Investigating Officer of the case was the result of statements of the complainant as well as the widow of the deceased and some witnesses, wherein they exonerated the said co-accused

Such fact was stated by the Investigating Officer of the case during his deposition

Once the co-accused were let off/released by the Investigating Officer on the basis of statements of the complainant, the widow of the deceased and witnesses, for all practical purposes they were not charged with commission of any offence

Co-accused were present before the court and in such view of the matter no adverse order could be passed against them

Compromise had been entered upon between the accused-appellant and the complainant/legal heirs of the deceased and the let off accused were not party thereto

Accused-appellant, being the only tried accused and convict, was not entitled to any benefit and would be required to pay the diyat as ordered by the court

Application was dismissed accordingly, in circumstances. [Paras. 8, 9 & 12 of the judgment]

Appellants had challenged their conviction through appeal, whereas complainant filed revision petition for enhancement of sentence awarded to the appellant

Pending appeal, appellants had entered into compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased, who had pardoned the appellants

Compromise documents were sent to the Trial Court for verification and recording the statements of the legal heirs of deceased to confirm as to whether the compromise effected between the parties was genuine or otherwise

Record showed that deceased had eight legal heirs comprising one widow and seven children

Out of seven children only one son and one daughter were major, while rest were minors being below the age of 15-years

Trial Court had recorded the statements of complainant, real brother of deceased, widow, a major son and a major daughter of deceased

Record showed that legal heirs of deceased entered into compromise with the accused-appellants voluntarily and without any coercion

Legal heirs of deceased had verified the contents of compromise deed as they pardoned the accused-appellant in the name of Almighty Allah and did not intend to proceed further against the accused-appellants

Right of Diyat had been waived by the legal heirs of deceased

Trial Court confirmed that the compromise arrived at between the parties was genuine

Compromise deed was supported by the affidavits of the legal heirs of the deceased

Since the offence under S. 302(b), Penal Code, 1860 was compoundable and parties had entered into compromise, as such application under S. 345(2), Cr.P.C. was accepted subject to payment of Diyat amount as per S. 323, Penal Code, 1860 to the extent of minors

Accused-appellants were acquitted in circumstances by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

Prosecution case was that accused party assaulted on complainant party as a result of which two persons of complainant party died on the spot and three sustained injuries

Matter was compromised between the parties during trial

Legal heirs of the deceased and injured appeared before the Trial Court and verified the factum of compromise arrived at between the parties

Accused was acquitted of the charge under Ss.302, 324 & 34, P.P.C., in pursuance of the compromise, however, convicted under S.311, P.P.C. for the reasons that offence was fasad fil Arz

Accused filed appeal for setting aside the conviction and sentence under S.311, P.P.C.

Complainant also moved appeal and contended that compromise was the outcome of duress, coercion and pressure as such, the same could not be termed as "compromise" falling within the purview of S.345(2), Cr.P.C.

Validity

Record showed that accused was hardened, dangerous criminal and member of a gang, who had committed heinous crimes and made hostage the entire area

In the present case, legal heirs of the deceased had come forward with the claim that the compromise deed filed in the Trial Court was the result of pressure, coercion and continuous threats

Accused was a habitual offender, no one dared to come forward against him and his family and the compromise in question was the result of pressure, coercion and continuous life threats to the complainant and his family including children and women folk

High Court observed that present case in such a situation, could not be taken lightly and had to be resolved as per law

Every effort was to be made to discover that compromise was genuine when possibilities of coercion or pressure by powerful persons to agree to compromise existed

Such important aspect of the matter had escaped notice of the Trial Court

Trial Court was to observe the conduct and demeanor of the accused, particularly in the case of compromise

Circumstances established that trial court failed to observe and notice the authenticity of the compromise, which caused mis-carriage of justice

Appeal filed by the accused was dismissed and that of the complainant was accepted by setting aside the impugned judgment case was remanded with the direction to Trial Court to decide the same afresh on merits after affording fair opportunity of leading evidence to the parties.

Party to compromise could not be allowed to resile from the compromise already acted upon.

Petitioners were aggrieved of the order passed by the Trial Court whereby the application of the petitioners filed under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. was dismissed, while other accused were acquitted on the basis of compromise

Validity

FIR showed that all the accused had been assigned the same role in the case, which could be termed as an effective role for the murder of the deceased

Genuine compromise at the bail stage had been effected between the parties for an end to the enmity once for all, as both the parties were closely related to each other

As a result of said compromise, petitioners were released on bail and none of the legal representatives of the deceased had pointed his finger on the said compromise at the bail stage

Said compromise showed that all the legal representatives of the deceased had waived off their right of Qisas and Diyat against the petitioners

Legal representatives had got "no objection" on their enlargement on bail and acquittal at the trial stage in the case

Compromise arrived between the parties was not confined to the matter of bail only but the same pertained to the entire case

Complainants and legal representatives of deceased and one injured had undertaken to get the petitioners acquitted from the Trial Court when the stage arrived

Trial Court on account of resiling of legal representatives of the deceased from the compromise at trial stage was not justified to decline the acquittal of petitioners

Circumstances established that compromise effected between the parties at the bail stage ensured to the benefit of accused persons

Complainant, legal representatives of the deceased and injured person could not be allowed to resile from the said compromise

Offences allegedly committed by the petitioners were compoundable, thus petition was allowed and petitioners were acquitted on the basis of compromise.

Two applications were moved, one under S.345(5), Cr.P.C. seeking permission to compound the offence and other under S. 345(6), Cr.P.C. praying for accepting the compromise and acquitting the accused

Compromise application was allowed and the amount of share of minors had been deposited

Statements of mother of minors was recorded, which showed that she had forgiven the accused persons on her behalf as well as on behalf of her minor children, for whom she was appointed as guardian/wali by the Trial Court

Interest of minors in such cases, was safeguarded on the basis of their share in the diyat amount, which was prescribed

Interest of minors having been safeguarded, therefore, there would be no impediment to allow the compromise with the accused-petitioner

Facts and circumstances of the case showed that compromise was made without duress, pressure coercion and the same was volunteer in nature

Application under S. 345(5), Cr.P.C. was allowed and parties were permitted to compound the offence

Application under S. 345(6), Cr.P.C. was allowed and accused-petitioner was acquitted of the offence

Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Application under S.345(2), Cr.P.C. by accused was allowed with direction to applicant/accused to pay diyat amount of Rs. 500,000/- out of which Rs. 100,000/- be paid to each minor heir of the deceased

Record showed that applicant sought compromise on the basis of compounding of offence by the legal heirs of the deceased under Ss.345(2) & 345(6), Cr.P.C. without payment of diyat amount to the minor legal heirs of deceased

Validity

Diyat was one of the forms of punishment and it was to be fixed by the court and court could direct the accused to pay diyat amount to minor legal heirs of the deceased after determination as provided under S.338-E(2), P.P.C. if the accused was earning acquittal under Ss. 345(2) & 345(6), Cr.P.C.

In the present case, Trial Court had directed the applicant to pay diyat amount to the minors in order to protect their interest

Right of diyat amount could not be waived on behalf of the minors

Circumstances established that impugned order did not suffer from material illegality and irregularity, therefore, revision application was dismissed.

Three applications were moved, under S. 345, Cr.P.C. for permission to enter into compromise; for acceptance of compromise and acquittal of accused and for appointment of wali of minor legal heirs

Said applications were sent to the Trial Court for holding enquiry, in order to ascertain the genuineness of compromise and report

Trial Court submitted its report that major legal heirs of deceased and minors through their wali (mother), in their statement on oath, had stated that they had patched up and forgiven the accused and recorded "no objection" to the acquittal of accused

Validity

Record showed that all the legal heirs i.e. mother and father of the deceased themselves and mother of deceased on behalf of minor legal heirs of deceased had entered into compromise with the accused without waiving or accepting "Badle Sulh"

Applications were allowed and permission to compound the offence was accorded to the parties and the compromise between the parties was accepted

Accused was acquitted by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court accordingly.

Accused was booked for offence under S.377, P.P.C., but during investigation Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were also added and after completion of investigation, challan was sent to the Court of Anti-Terrorism

Trial Court recorded statements of father, mother, one uncle of the victim and some Jirga members to the effect that a compromise had been effected between the parties

Trial Court on the same date, acquitted accused from the charges

Validity

Trial Judge, had accepted the compromise, illegally and passed acquittal judgment in excess of his jurisdiction; because the offence was not one of 'Terrorism' and Trial Judge wrongly and illegally took cognizance of the case under S.12 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Trial Court should have sent back the case to ordinary court of jurisdiction, even if no application under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was filed by the either party

Trial Court instead of laying off its hands, jumped into the case and assumed jurisdiction and despite resistence from State Counsel that case of sodomy was not compoundable, accepted compromise and acquitted accused from the charges on the same day

Such urgency, was because of some extraneous considerations and not to advance the cause of justice

Appeal filed by the State was accepted by the Chief Court and impugned judgment passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, was set aside

Provisions of Ss. 6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being not attracted to the case, same were deleted from the challan and case was transferred from the Anti-Terrorism Court to the Sessions Judge for assuming adjudication and to start trial of accused.

Court being custodian of the Fundamental Rights of all the legal heirs of deceased could not shut its eyes from the illegalities, irregularities and suppression of material facts by the petitioner and the legal heirs.

Once a compromise always a compromise, unless it was brought on record that the same was effected through any influence, coercion or force.

Allegation against accused, a doctor, was that while lying the victim/child on the bed for the purpose of ultrasound caught hold of him, kissed his lips and tried to enter his finger in the anus of child

Grandfather of the victim submitted affidavit to the effect that he had no objection if accused was released on bail as compromise between the parties had been effected

Validity

Compromise could not be taken as an option for release of accused on bail as the offence for which the accused stood nominated was non-compoundable, besides heinous in nature

Bail was refused.

Petitioner/Pre-emptor contended that principle of waiver could only apply to any act or omission of the plaintiff which was prior to the institution of suit

Pre-emptor/plaintiff denied execution of written compromise produced by the respondents in the evidence

Respondents contended that they had duly proved written compromise and plaintiff was estopped legally to press his claim of pre-emption

Validity

Question of Talbs had already been adjudged by the courts below in favour of petitioner/plaintiff and as there was no appeal, revision or cross objection by the opposing side, so that findings of the court had become final

Question before High Court was that as to whether the compromise produced by respondents and relied by the courts below could be considered as a genuine compromise and whether principle of waiver was attracted in the present case

Held, under O.XXIII, R. 3, C.P.C. if it was proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit had been compromised, then it would order such compromise to be recorded

Such was not a mere formality but it was a mandatory provision of law which had been made appealable

As far as written compromise was concerned, the compromise would only be acted upon if it was admitted by the parties and after that it had been reduced into writing

Section 15 of Khyber Pakhtunkwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 clearly indicated that any act or omission or acquiescence of the plaintiff at the time of sale would debar the pre-emptor from assailing the sale transaction through pre-emption

Record was silent as to whether compromise agreement was signed or ever consented to by the plaintiff

Even otherwise, once the execution of a document relied upon by a party was denied by the other, onus to prove such document lay on the party which relied on such document

Findings of both the courts below were not only against the law and evidence on the file but also against the dictum of the superior courts, thus, were not tenable in the eyes of law

Impugned judgments and decrees of both courts below were set aside and the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner was decreed

Revision was accepted accordingly.

Legal representative of the deceased having compounded the offence, and waived their right of qisas and diyat, S.311, P.P.C., had wrongly been inserted by the Police in the FIR

Case being compoundable, compromise was accepted, and accused was directed to be released on bail, in circumstances.

If the property which was not the suit property was included, in the compromise, in that case the court could only record compromise but could not pass a decree, or if the court record the compromise, that part of the compromise could not be executed through the court

Defendants had stated that suit to the extent of matter settled between the parties be decreed in favour of plaintiffs but the suit was dismissed

Impugned judgments and decrees were against the law and were not sustainable which were set aside

Suit of plaintiffs in accordance with the compromise was decreed in their favour

Revision was allowed.

Compromise was arrived at between accused and legal heirs of the deceased, on the basis of which accused could be acquitted

Trial Court submitted report regarding alleged compromise and the report revealed that deceased was survived by her mother, husband, four sons, including one minor, and two daughters

Major legal heirs got recorded their respective statements, whereby they confirmed their compromise with the accused, without any compensation and there was no objection on acquittal of accused

Share of diyat of the minor was determined, and was paid accordingly

Report of the Trial Court further showed that the compromise was genuine and complete

Compromise, could only be effected regarding the offences mentioned in S.345, Cr.P.C.

Conviction and sentence of accused in offence under S.302(b), P.P.C. was set aside on the basis of compromise and he was acquitted under the offence

Offence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being not compoundable, compromise in that respect, could not be permitted and accepted

Accused having committed offence inside the court room, provisions of S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were fully attracted and accused was rightly convicted under the section

Where the accused had been acquitted from the charge under S.302(b), P.P.C. as a consequence of compromise, he deserved concession in quantum of sentence for offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Which was an extenuating circumstance for lesser penalty

Conviction of the accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was maintained, but his sentence was altered from death to imprisonment for life with benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.; payment of amount of fine, was maintained.

While deciding a suit on the basis of compromise, passing of decree was mandatory requirement and Trial Court did not follow the same

High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Lower Appellate Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Said agreement to sell was not enforceable at law even if contesting parties were ready and willing to abide by its terms

Sub-attorney who claimed to have entered into an agreement of sell with the attorney had not invited objections on entering into agreement of sale of suit property

Even (present) plaintiff after entering into agreement of sale with the sub-attorney had not issued any public notice in newspapers for inviting any objection from public-at-large for transfer of title of suit property

Had such effort been made, legal heirs of the deceased executant of power-of-attorney could have warned the plaintiff before making any further payment of suit property

Search certificate of suit property was not obtained from the office of Sub-Registrar of the properties concerned

Defendant had already breached promise with the plaintiff

Broken promise by the compromising parties could not be endorsed by the court

Application for compromise of suit was liable to be dismissed

No cause of action existed for filing of suit against the defendant

Cause of action shown in the plaint was a false and collusive statement of plaintiff and defendant

Plaintiff had attempted to obtain a compromise decree from the court

Defendant had never refused to perform her part of contract

When cause of action had ceased to exist, provisions of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. would attract and plaint was liable to be rejected

Suit for specific performance was liable to be rejected once defendant had conceded that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract

Nazir of the court could not be allowed to perform part of contract under circumstances

Suit had become infructuous and plaint was liable to be rejected

Both the suit and compromise application were dismissed with cost of Rs. 100,000/- to be jointly and severally borne by the plaintiff and defendant

Said cost should be paid within specified period and if the same was not paid, Nazir of the court should take step for recovery of cost including attachment of movable and immovable properties of plaintiff and defendant

Member Inspection Team of High Court was directed to examine the record and if any criminal case was made out, he should initiate or cause to initiate criminal proceedings against plaintiff and defendant in accordance with law.

Two applications were moved one under S.345(2), Cr.P.C. seeking permission to compound the offence and other under S.345(5), Cr.P.C. praying for accepting the compromise and acquitting the accused

Statements of legal heirs of deceased were recorded, which showed that they had forgiven the accused and waived their right of Qisas and Diyat

Legal heirs of the deceased recorded statements that they had no objection to the acquittal of accused

All legal heirs appeared in court and repeated their said averment before the court

Applications were allowed and conviction and sentence awarded to accused were set aside

Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Accused killed his real sister and her alleged paramour by firing with pistol and sought bail on the plea of compromise with legal heirs of deceased

Validity

Provision of S. 302, P.P.C. was compoundable but according to S. 345, Cr.P.C. in case of 'Karo Kari' (Honour killing), S. 302, P.P.C. was not declared as compoundable

Offence with which accused was charged fell under prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.

Trial against accused had commenced and most of prosecution witnesses had been examined and it would conclude in near future

Bail was refused in circumstances.

Plaint was rejected on the ground that plaintiff was not in possession of suit property and he had not prayed for recovery of possession as consequential relief; therefore, the suit was not maintainable

Validity

Parties had reached a compromise during pendency of suit

Defendants had conceded that compromise had been voluntarily made by the parties and they had no objection if suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff

Suit could be adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise to the satisfaction of court

Where defendant had satisfied the plaintiff with regard to whole or any part of the subject matter of suit, court should order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction (to be recorded) and should pass decree in accordance therewith

Making a prayer for possession in a suit for specific performance was not necessary

Relief by way of delivery of possession in a suit for specific performance would spring out of contract for sale and would be incidental to main relief of specific performance granted in the suit

Both the courts below had committed illegality in exercise of jurisdiction and wrongly rejected the plaint

Impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below were set aside and suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed in terms of compromise

Revision was accepted, in circumstances.

Principles.

All legal heirs of the deceased, except father of the deceased, who was residing abroad, got recorded their statements qua compounding the offence and effecting a compromise with the accused

Advocate/real brother of father of the deceased, having a general power-of-attorney, appeared on behalf of the father of the deceased before the court, and stated that a valid compromise had been effected between the parties

Trial Court had shown its satisfaction with regard to genuineness of the compromise

Compromise had been arrived at between the parties without any duress and coercion, which was in the interest of the parties, so that they could forget the existing estrangement and could live in harmony and peace

Permission to compound the offence was granted

Convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court against accused persons were set aside, they were acquitted, in circumstances.

Compromise was arrived between accused and legal heirs of the deceased, according to which, legal heirs of the deceased had forgiven accused and had waived their right of qisas in the name of Almighty Allah

Heirs of the deceased deposed that they had no objection to acquittal of accused for the murder of their son

Trial Court had verified that said compromise had been entered into voluntarily and without fear

High Court was satisfied that legal heirs of the deceased had effected compromise with regard to murder of the deceased, and had resorted to amicable relations, to promote harmony and good-will between the parties, and to ensure peace and tranquility in the vicinity

Compromise was accepted for murder of deceased

Offence under S.377, P.P.C. was not compoundable, but as legal heirs of the deceased had pardoned accused for murder of their son, which was a major offence, courts of law had always taken lenient view with regard to akin offences falling under the category of non-compoundable offences

Compromise having been effected in the regular proceedings, High Court could consider the compromise as a mitigating circumstance in the matter of quantum of sentence awarded in the non-compoundable offence i.e. under S.377, P.P.C.

Accused had admitted that he had committed a shameful act; that his conscience pinched him that he deserved punishment; and that he felt repentant

Such was an extraordinary extenuating circumstance for taking a lenient view in the matter of sentence under S.377, P.P.C.

Accused had undergone two years, three months and 27 days incarceration

Sentence already undergone by accused under S.377, P.P.C., would be more than sufficient

Impugned judgment to the extent of conviction and sentence under S.302(b), P.PC., was set aside and accused was acquitted of the charge of murder

Conviction of accused under S.377, P.P.C., was maintained, but taking lenient view in awarding punishment under said section, sentence already undergone by accused, would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice.

In case of compoundable offence, no extra argument is required to extend the fullest benefit of rapprochement to a convict but in a case that is not compoundable, its benefit may still be extended to him in viable terms, so as to translate parties' reconciliatory mood into an objective reality

Compromise always hints at noble spirit parties which ought to be respected and given an assent to by the Court of law.

Parties entered into compromise but Trial Court convicted accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year for each offence

Conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court were maintained by Lower Appellate Court

Validity

Compromise was fully applicable to mischief of S.420, P.P.C. and as the parties had resolved their differences amicably and voluntarily, accused was acquitted of the charge of cheating

Conviction under Ss. 468 & 471, P.P.C. was based on cogent and confidence inspiring evidence, led by prosecution against him during the course of trial

Testimonies of prosecution witnesses emitted sense of believability regarding allegation, the accused was tried for

No inconsistencies or major discrepancies were found in prosecution evidence, which bore the stamp of impartiality and credibility

High Court upheld the conviction awarded to accused under Ss.468 & 471, P.P.C. but reduced imprisonment from one year each to period already undergone by him

Appeal was allowed accordingly.